JWJonathan Woodruff

Jonathan Woodruff

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Jonathan Woodruff has a total of 37 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    PoisonCap: Efficient Hierarchical Temporal Safety for CHERI

    by Yuecheng Wang, Jonathan Woodruff, Alfredo Mazzinghi, Peter Rugg, Alexandre Joannou, Samuel W. Stark, Robert N. M. Watson, Simon W. Moore

  • Open Access

    CHERI: Hardware-Enabled C/C++ Memory Protection at Scale

    by Robert N. M. Watson, David Chisnall, Jessica Clarke, Brooks Davis, Nathaniel Wesley Filardo, Ben Laurie, Simon W. Moore, Peter G. Neumann, Alexander Richardson, Peter Sewell, et al.

    The memory-safe Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI) C and C++ languages build on architectural capabilities in the CHERI protection model. With the development of two industrial CHERI-enabled processors, Arm’s Morello and Microsoft’s CHERIoT, CHERI may offer the fastest path to widely deployed memory safety.


  • Open Access

    Cornucopia Reloaded: Load Barriers for CHERI Heap Temporal Safety

    by Nathaniel Wesley Filardo, Brett F. Gutstein, Jonathan Woodruff, Jessica Clarke, Peter Rugg, Brooks Davis, Mark Johnston, Robert Norton, David Chisnall, Simon W. Moore, et al.

    Violations of temporal memory safety ("use after free", "UAF") continue to pose a significant threat to software security. The CHERI capability architecture has shown promise as a technology for C and C++ language reference integrity and spatial memory safety. Building atop CHERI, prior works - CHERIvoke and Cornucopia - have explored adding heap temporal safety. The most pressing limitation of Cornucopia was its impractical "stop-the-world" pause times. We present Cornucopia Reloaded, a re-designed drop-in replacement implementation of CHERI temporal safety, using a novel architectural feature - a per-page capability load barrier, added in Arm's Morello prototype CPU and CHERI-RISC-V - to nearly eliminate application pauses. We analyze the performance of Reloaded as well as Cornucopia and CHERIvoke on Morello, using the CHERI-compatible SPEC CPU2006 INT workloads to assess its impact on batch workloads and using pgbench and gRPC QPS as surrogate interactive workloads. Under Reloaded, applications no longer experience significant revocation-induced stop-the-world periods, without additional wall- or CPU-time cost over Cornucopia and with median 87% of Cornucopia's DRAM traffic overheads across SPEC CPU2006 and < 50% for pgbench.


  • Open Access

    The Arm Morello Evaluation Platform—Validating CHERI-Based Security in a High-Performance System

    by Richard Grisenthwaite, Graeme Barnes, Robert N. M. Watson, Simon W. Moore, Peter Sewell, Jonathan Woodruff

    Memory safety issues are a persistent source of security vulnerabilities, with conventional architectures and the C/C++ codebase chronically prone to exploitable errors. The Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI) research project has explored a novel architectural approach to ameliorate such issues using unforgeable hardware capabilities to implement pointers. Morello is an Arm experimental platform for evaluation of CHERI in the Arm architecture context to explore its potential for mass-market adoption. This article describes the Morello Evaluation Platform, covering the motivation and functionality of the Morello architectural hardware extensions; their potential for fine-grained memory safety and software compartmentalization; formally proven security properties; impact on the microarchitecture of the high-performance, out-of-order multiprocessor Arm Morello processor; and the software-enablement program by Arm, the University of Cambridge, and Linaro. Together, this allows a wide range of researchers in both industry and academia to explore and assess the Morello platform.


  • Randomized Testing of RISC-V CPUs Using Direct Instruction Injection

    by Alexandre Joannou, Peter Rugg, Jonathan Woodruff, Franz A. Fuchs, Marno van der Maas, Matthew Naylor, Michael Roe, Robert N. M. Watson, Peter G. Neumann, Simon W. Moore

    TestRIG (Testing with Random Instruction Generation) is a testing framework for RISC-V implementations. The RISC-V community has standardized a formal model of the architecture in the Sail language 1 , giving a human-readable specification that can also be used for simulation and verification. The Sail language is designed for this purpose by allowing instruction semantics to be described conveniently (for example, by supporting variable bit-widths). Ideally, a RISC-V implementor could formally prove equivalence between their implementation and the Sail model, but proof tools are not yet sufficiently automated to be routinely used on the whole-processor level. They instead focus on equivalence between combinational logic functions, with verification of a full out-of-order microarchitecture remaining an open problem. As a pragmatic compromise, we use TestRIG to check equivalence between the model and an implementation by generating random instruction sequences, executing the same sequences on the model and the implementation under test, and comparing execution traces (tandem execution). This approach does not prove equivalence but can demonstrate divergence, and is usable in all stages of development.


  • Open Access

    CHERI Concentrate: Practical Compressed Capabilities

    by Jonathan Woodruff, Alexandre Joannou, Hongyan Xia, Anthony Fox, Robert M. Norton, David Chisnall, Brooks Davis, Khilan Gudka, Nathaniel W. Filardo, A. Theodore Markettos, et al.

    We present CHERI Concentrate, a new fat-pointer compression scheme applied to CHERI, the most developed capability-pointer system at present. Capability fat pointers are a primary candidate to enforce fine-grained and non-bypassable security properties in future computer systems, although increased pointer size can severely affect performance. Thus, several proposals for capability compression have been suggested elsewhere that do not support legacy instruction sets, ignore features critical to the existing software base, and also introduce design inefficiencies to RISC-style processor pipelines. CHERI Concentrate improves on the state-of-the-art region-encoding efficiency, solves important pipeline problems, and eases semantic restrictions of compressed encoding, allowing it to protect a full legacy software stack. We present the first quantitative analysis of compiled capability code, which we use to guide the design of the encoding format. We analyze and extend logic from the open-source CHERI prototype processor design on FPGA to demonstrate encoding efficiency, minimize delay of pointer arithmetic, and eliminate additional load-to-use delay. To verify correctness of our proposed high-performance logic, we present a HOL4 machine-checked proof of the decode and pointer-modify operations. Finally, we measure a 50 to 75 percent reduction in L2 misses for many compiled C-language benchmarks running under a commodity operating system using compressed 128-bit and 64-bit formats, demonstrating both compatibility with and increased performance over the uncompressed, 256-bit format.