Saad Gulzar
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Saad Gulzar has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Benjamin Pasquale
Independent Researcher, United States
5 shared publications - Nicholas Haas
Aarhus University
4 shared publications - Apoorva Lal
OpenAI, San Francisco, CA, USA
2 shared publications - Luke Sonnet
Independent Researcher, Palo Alto, CA, USA
2 shared publications - Miriam A. Golden
European University Institute, Fiesole (FI), Italy
2 shared publications Muhammad Yasir Khan
University of Pittsburgh
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 29 September 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
Political Responsiveness, Information Provision, and Capacity Gaps
To investigate whether lack of information is one reason politicians may be unresponsive to voter preferences, we conduct a randomized control trial with senior politicians in Pakistan that collects citizen preferences using Interactive Voice Response (IVR). IVR allows politicians to script questions for citizens and allows the latter to respond on their cell phones. There is strong politician interest in soliciting opinions via IVR; additionally, response rates by citizens are relatively high. Nonetheless, politicians fail to use the new information to modify on-the-ground engagement with voters or service delivery. Nor do we observe improvements in citizen evaluations of politicians or in their electoral support for them. A forecasting exercise shows that experts find these null outcomes unexpected. Our findings reveal that even eager and informed politicians may be unable to respond to citizen preferences due to institutional capacity constraints, highlighting limits of information-centric theories of accountability.
- 29 September 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
Political Responsiveness, Information Provision, and Capacity Gaps
To investigate whether lack of information is one reason politicians may be unresponsive to voter preferences, we conduct a randomized control trial with senior politicians in Pakistan that collects citizen preferences using Interactive Voice Response (IVR). IVR allows politicians to script questions for citizens and allows the latter to respond on their cell phones. There is strong politician interest in soliciting opinions via IVR; additionally, response rates by citizens are relatively high. Nonetheless, politicians fail to use the new information to modify on-the-ground engagement with voters or service delivery. Nor do we observe improvements in citizen evaluations of politicians or in their electoral support for them. A forecasting exercise shows that experts find these null outcomes unexpected. Our findings reveal that even eager and informed politicians may be unable to respond to citizen preferences due to institutional capacity constraints, highlighting limits of information-centric theories of accountability.
- Open Access
- 23 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature
- Vol. 634 (8036) , 1125-1131
Bureaucrat incentives reduce crop burning and child mortality in South Asia
Air pollution in South Asia is a health emergency, responsible for 2 million deaths every year1. Crop residue burning accounts for 40–60% of peak pollution during the winter harvest months2,3. Despite being illegal, this practice remains widespread4,5. Any solution to curb the problem necessitates government action at scale. Here we study whether leveraging the incentives of bureaucrats tasked with controlling burning can mitigate this phenomenon. Using a decade of wind, fire and health data from satellites and surveys from the Demographic and Health Surveys Program, we show that crop burning responds to bureaucrat incentives: fires increase by 15% when wind is most likely to direct pollution to neighbouring jurisdictions, and decrease by 14.5% when it pollutes their own. These effects intensify with stronger bureaucratic incentives and capacity. We also find that bureaucrat action against burning deters future polluters, further reducing fires by 13%. Finally, using an atmospheric model, we estimate that one log increase in in utero exposure to pollution from burning raises child mortality by 30–36 deaths per 1,000 births, underscoring the importance of bureaucrat action. Contrary to the growing beliefs that the problem of crop burning is intractable6,7, these findings highlight specific ways in which existing bureaucrats, when properly incentivized, can improve environmental management and public health outcomes.
- 23 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature
- Vol. 634 (8036) , 1125-1131
Open AccessBureaucrat incentives reduce crop burning and child mortality in South Asia
Air pollution in South Asia is a health emergency, responsible for 2 million deaths every year1. Crop residue burning accounts for 40–60% of peak pollution during the winter harvest months2,3. Despite being illegal, this practice remains widespread4,5. Any solution to curb the problem necessitates government action at scale. Here we study whether leveraging the incentives of bureaucrats tasked with controlling burning can mitigate this phenomenon. Using a decade of wind, fire and health data from satellites and surveys from the Demographic and Health Surveys Program, we show that crop burning responds to bureaucrat incentives: fires increase by 15% when wind is most likely to direct pollution to neighbouring jurisdictions, and decrease by 14.5% when it pollutes their own. These effects intensify with stronger bureaucratic incentives and capacity. We also find that bureaucrat action against burning deters future polluters, further reducing fires by 13%. Finally, using an atmospheric model, we estimate that one log increase in in utero exposure to pollution from burning raises child mortality by 30–36 deaths per 1,000 births, underscoring the importance of bureaucrat action. Contrary to the growing beliefs that the problem of crop burning is intractable6,7, these findings highlight specific ways in which existing bureaucrats, when properly incentivized, can improve environmental management and public health outcomes.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 119 (2) , 812-831
Can Party Elites Shape the Rank and File? Evidence from a Recruitment Campaign in India
Recruiting a large number of ground workers is crucial for running effective modern election campaigns. It is unclear if party leaders can influence the quality and quantity of the unpaid rank-and-file workforce as they can with prized nominations for candidates. We analyze a field experiment conducted by an Indian party that randomized recruitment messages reaching 1% of a 13-million-person electorate to join its rank and file. Contrary to concerns that parties can only attract a few poor-quality volunteers, we show that elite efforts can shape the rank and file. In fact, specific strategies can increase the size, enhance the gender and ethnic diversity, and broaden the education and political skills of recruits. Strategies that signal gender inclusiveness have a lasting impact on some dimensions up to 3 years later. Taken together, this article provides the first causal evidence that rank-and-file recruitment is an opportunity for elites to influence long-term party development.
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 119 (2) , 812-831
Open AccessCan Party Elites Shape the Rank and File? Evidence from a Recruitment Campaign in India
Recruiting a large number of ground workers is crucial for running effective modern election campaigns. It is unclear if party leaders can influence the quality and quantity of the unpaid rank-and-file workforce as they can with prized nominations for candidates. We analyze a field experiment conducted by an Indian party that randomized recruitment messages reaching 1% of a 13-million-person electorate to join its rank and file. Contrary to concerns that parties can only attract a few poor-quality volunteers, we show that elite efforts can shape the rank and file. In fact, specific strategies can increase the size, enhance the gender and ethnic diversity, and broaden the education and political skills of recruits. Strategies that signal gender inclusiveness have a lasting impact on some dimensions up to 3 years later. Taken together, this article provides the first causal evidence that rank-and-file recruitment is an opportunity for elites to influence long-term party development.
- Open Access
- 12 March 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 92 (1) , 339-364
Good Politicians: Experimental Evidence on Motivations for Political Candidacy and Government Performance
How can we motivate good politicians—those that will carry out policy that is responsive to citizens’ preferences—to enter politics? In a field experiment in Pakistan, we vary how political office is portrayed to ordinary citizens. Emphasizing prosocial motives for holding political office instead of personal returns—such as the ability to help others versus enhancing one’s own respect and status—raises the likelihood that individuals run for office and that voters elect them. A year later, the treatment improves the alignment of policy with citizens’ preferences. These effects emerge only when treatments are randomly delivered in a public setting. Taken together, the results demonstrate that how politics is perceived shapes who decides to run for office, who is elected, as well the policies that democracies deliver.
- 12 March 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Economic Studies
- Vol. 92 (1) , 339-364
Open AccessGood Politicians: Experimental Evidence on Motivations for Political Candidacy and Government Performance
How can we motivate good politicians—those that will carry out policy that is responsive to citizens’ preferences—to enter politics? In a field experiment in Pakistan, we vary how political office is portrayed to ordinary citizens. Emphasizing prosocial motives for holding political office instead of personal returns—such as the ability to help others versus enhancing one’s own respect and status—raises the likelihood that individuals run for office and that voters elect them. A year later, the treatment improves the alignment of policy with citizens’ preferences. These effects emerge only when treatments are randomly delivered in a public setting. Taken together, the results demonstrate that how politics is perceived shapes who decides to run for office, who is elected, as well the policies that democracies deliver.
- Open Access
- 22 November 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Experimental Political Science
- Vol. 11 (3) , 343-359
Inaccurate forecasting of a randomized controlled trial
We report the results of a forecasting experiment about a randomized controlled trial that was conducted in the field. The experiment asks Ph.D. students, faculty, and policy practitioners to forecast (1) compliance rates for the RCT and (2) treatment effects of the intervention. The forecasting experiment randomizes the order of questions about compliance and treatment effects and the provision of information that a pilot experiment had been conducted which produced null results. Forecasters were excessively optimistic about treatment effects and unresponsive to item order as well as to information about a pilot. Those who declare themselves expert in the area relevant to the intervention are particularly resistant to new information that the treatment is ineffective. We interpret our results as suggesting that we should exercise caution when undertaking expert forecasting, since experts may have unrealistic expectations and may be inflexible in altering these even when provided new information.
- 22 November 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Experimental Political Science
- Vol. 11 (3) , 343-359
Open AccessInaccurate forecasting of a randomized controlled trial
We report the results of a forecasting experiment about a randomized controlled trial that was conducted in the field. The experiment asks Ph.D. students, faculty, and policy practitioners to forecast (1) compliance rates for the RCT and (2) treatment effects of the intervention. The forecasting experiment randomizes the order of questions about compliance and treatment effects and the provision of information that a pilot experiment had been conducted which produced null results. Forecasters were excessively optimistic about treatment effects and unresponsive to item order as well as to information about a pilot. Those who declare themselves expert in the area relevant to the intervention are particularly resistant to new information that the treatment is ineffective. We interpret our results as suggesting that we should exercise caution when undertaking expert forecasting, since experts may have unrealistic expectations and may be inflexible in altering these even when provided new information.
- Open Access
- 6 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 118 (2) , 764-783
Representation and Forest Conservation: Evidence from India’s Scheduled Areas
How does political representation affect conservation? We argue that the mixed evidence in the literature may be driven by institutional arrangements that provide authority to marginalized communities, but do not make adequate arrangements to truly boost their voice in resource management. We study a 1996 law that created local government councils with mandated representation for India’s Scheduled Tribes (ST), a community of one hundred million. Using difference-in-differences designs, we find that the dramatic increase in ST representation led to a substantial increase in tree cover and a reduction in deforestation. We present suggestive evidence that representation enabled marginalized communities to better pursue their interests, which, unlike commercial operations such as mining, are compatible with forest conservation. While conservation policy tends to stress environmentally focused institutions, we suggest more attention be given to umbrella institutions, such as political representation, which can address conservation and development for marginalized communities in tandem.
- 6 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 118 (2) , 764-783
Open AccessRepresentation and Forest Conservation: Evidence from India’s Scheduled Areas
How does political representation affect conservation? We argue that the mixed evidence in the literature may be driven by institutional arrangements that provide authority to marginalized communities, but do not make adequate arrangements to truly boost their voice in resource management. We study a 1996 law that created local government councils with mandated representation for India’s Scheduled Tribes (ST), a community of one hundred million. Using difference-in-differences designs, we find that the dramatic increase in ST representation led to a substantial increase in tree cover and a reduction in deforestation. We present suggestive evidence that representation enabled marginalized communities to better pursue their interests, which, unlike commercial operations such as mining, are compatible with forest conservation. While conservation policy tends to stress environmentally focused institutions, we suggest more attention be given to umbrella institutions, such as political representation, which can address conservation and development for marginalized communities in tandem.
- 18 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 729-759
Does Political Affirmative Action Work, and for Whom? Theory and Evidence on India’s Scheduled Areas
- 18 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 729-759
Does Political Affirmative Action Work, and for Whom? Theory and Evidence on India’s Scheduled Areas
- 28 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-31
Does Political Affirmative Action Work, and for Whom? Theory and Evidence on India’s Scheduled Areas
- 28 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-31
Does Political Affirmative Action Work, and for Whom? Theory and Evidence on India’s Scheduled Areas
- 25 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-31
Does Political Affirmative Action Work, and for Whom? Theory and Evidence on India’s Scheduled Areas
- 25 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-31
Does Political Affirmative Action Work, and for Whom? Theory and Evidence on India’s Scheduled Areas
- Open Access
- 15 April 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Good Politicians: Experimental Evidence on Motivations for Political Candidacy and Government Performance
How can we motivate good politicians – those that will carry out policy that is responsive to citizens’ preferences – to enter politics? In a field experiment in Pakistan, we vary how political office is portrayed to ordinary citizens. Emphasizing prosocial motives for holding political office instead of personal returns – such as the ability to help others versus enhancing one’s own respect and status – raises the likelihood that individuals run for office and that voters elect them. A year later, the treatment improves the alignment of policy with citizens’ preferences. These effects emerge only when treatments are randomly delivered in a public setting. Taken together, the results demonstrate that how politics is perceived shapes who decides to run for office, who is elected, as well the policies that democracies deliver.
- 15 April 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessGood Politicians: Experimental Evidence on Motivations for Political Candidacy and Government Performance
How can we motivate good politicians – those that will carry out policy that is responsive to citizens’ preferences – to enter politics? In a field experiment in Pakistan, we vary how political office is portrayed to ordinary citizens. Emphasizing prosocial motives for holding political office instead of personal returns – such as the ability to help others versus enhancing one’s own respect and status – raises the likelihood that individuals run for office and that voters elect them. A year later, the treatment improves the alignment of policy with citizens’ preferences. These effects emerge only when treatments are randomly delivered in a public setting. Taken together, the results demonstrate that how politics is perceived shapes who decides to run for office, who is elected, as well the policies that democracies deliver.