RSRyan Shandler

Ryan Shandler

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Ryan Shandler has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    In the Metaverse, Politicians Can Hear You Scream: Corporate Scandals, Big Tech Regulation, and the Microfoundations of Focusing Events

    by Pepper D. Culpepper, Taeku Lee, Ryan Shandler

    Around the world, the growing power of giant technology firms has outpaced regulatory oversight, raising urgent questions about how public opinion can be mobilized in support of meaningful reform. When do broad coalitions emerge in support of stronger regulation? This study investigates corporate scandals as windows of opportunity—focusing events—that can galvanize public support for new regulations and amplify issue salience. To assess this possibility, we conducted a two-wave survey experiment that we fielded simultaneously in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. After collecting pre-treatment data in a separate, dedicated survey wave, our subjects were later assigned to read media coverage describing the 2018 Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal. The results confirm our preregistered hypothesis: in all four countries, exposure to scandal coverage significantly increases support for technology regulation and elevates the issue’s salience. Anger mediates this shift, and increased issue salience correlates with a greater willingness to engage in political action around technology policy. At a moment of heightened concern about the concentration of economic and political power in a handful of mammoth technology firms, these findings illuminate the microfoundations of how focusing events can break political inertia and catalyze regulatory reform.


  • Open Access

    Hacking Voters’ Trust in Democracy: Panel Evidence on Safeguarding Confidence in Election Integrity

    by Ryan Shandler, Iris Ong, Olivia Leu, Anthony DeMattee

    We are experiencing a crisis of trust in democracy. As elections become increasingly digitized, voters have grown uneasy with the digital infrastructure that underpins the electoral process. This study investigates how cyber threat narratives erode trust in the integrity of elections, and tests targeted interventions to counteract this effect. Using a pre-registered, two-wave survey experiment fielded during the 2024 election, we find that media coverage of cyberattacks significantly undermines perceptions of electoral integrity, an effect that spans party lines. Even cyberattacks unrelated to elections reduced trust in voting systems, suggesting that voters generalize digital insecurity. However, offering some hope, we also identify an intervention that counteracts the negative effect. By inoculating participants four weeks earlier with a short video describing election safeguards, participants maintained stable trust levels despite their later exposure to threatening content. These findings offer a new perspective on democratic trust in an age of digital elections.

  • Open Access

    Enhancing Soldiers for Future Warfare: Good Science; Bad Ethics?

    by Nicholas G. Evans, Michael L Gross, Ryan Shandler

    Ethical concerns dog emerging technologies designed to enhance warfighter performance. Brain-computer interfaces, exoskeletons, and mind- or body-altering drugs raise fears about risky, invasive, and experimental medical procedures that offer armies physically and cognitively superior soldiers that will dictate and disrupt the course of future war. What counts as enhancement, however, has been subject to longstanding and passionate debate. This study aims to put an end to this dispute by employing a conjoint experimental design to survey a group of military and professional experts from across the world to explore how definitional perceptions of enhancement influence ethical acceptability. Two main findings emerge. First, we find that there already exists a broad agreement about what constitutes enhancement, and this consensus spans countries, discipline, political orientation, and age. Future policy may now be able to accommodate a definition of enhancement that is widely shared among members of the international community. Second, across the board, ethical acceptability diminishes as medical technologies aim for transhuman warfighting capabilities. Enhancement research and development for military purposes must navigate the conflicting ethical demands of medical experimentation and lawful war. Human enhancement is not morally unacceptable but ethically precarious, requiring regulation, oversight, and transparency.


  • Cyberwarfare research methods

    by Miguel Alberto Gomez, Grace B. Mueller, Ryan Shandler, Brandon Valeriano, Christopher Whyte

    Cyber conflict and cyberwarfare have emerged as central components of International Relations and security studies research, with states exercising power in and through cyberspace to augment existing instruments of statecraft such as warfare. In this chapter, we advance a call to arms and articulate a vision of building a diverse array of theoretically sound and empirically driven research on issues of statecraft as it applies to cyberspace. We begin by analysing several less-than-ideal conditions that characterize cyber conflict scholarship before mapping the various content areas and methods of inquiry that can revitalize this emerging field and restore a semblance of scientific rigour. We conclude by offering a vision of policy-relevant cyberwarfare scholarship that meets the early promise of the field.

  • Cyberattacks and public opinion – The effect of uncertainty in guiding preferences

    by Eric Jardine, Nathaniel Porter, Ryan Shandler

    When it comes to cybersecurity incidents – public opinion matters. But how do voters form opinions in the aftermath of cyberattacks that are shrouded in ambiguity? How do people account for the uncertainty inherent in cyberspace to forge preferences following attacks? This article seeks to answer these questions by introducing an uncertainty threshold mechanism predicting the level of attributional certainty required for the public to support economic, diplomatic or military responses following cyberattacks. Using a discrete-choice experimental design with 2025 US respondents, we find lower attributional certainty is associated with less support for retaliation, yet this mechanism is contingent on the suspected identity of the attacker and partisan identity. Diplomatic allies possess a reservoir of good will that amplifies the effect of uncertainty, while rivals are less often given the benefit of the doubt. We demonstrate that uncertainty encourages the use of cognitive schemas to overcome ambiguity, and that people fall back upon pre-existing and politically guided views about the suspected country behind an attack. If the ambiguity surrounding cyberattacks has typically been discussed as an operational and strategic concern, this article shifts the focus of attention to the human level and positions the mass public as a forgotten yet important party during cyber conflict.


  • Introduction: Cyber-conflict – Moving from speculation to investigation

    by Ryan Shandler, Daphna Canetti

    Investigating cyber conflict is enormously difficult. The domain is complex, quality data are sparse, international affairs are shrouded in secrecy, and despite its seeming ubiquity, cyber power has only recently entered the battlefield. In the face of these challenges, we must rise to meet the challenges of cybersecurity research by deploying creative methods that collect verifiable and probatory data, and which allow for predictive models of cyber behavior. Against this backdrop, our special issue offers a vision of cybersecurity research that embraces a culture of rigorous inquiry based on theoretically robust, and policy relevant investigation. We highlight two key features. First, research at the intersection of cybersecurity and political science must incorporate the human dimension of cyber conflict. A human security approach to cybersecurity places people as the primary objects of security and recognizes that individual-level analyses can shed light on macro-level trends. Second, cyber research must adopt rigorous, empirical methods. We embrace a broad tent of empirical data collection techniques – spanning qualitative and quantitative, experimental, and observational research. What is integral is that all scholarship abides by the highest standards of replicability and falsifiability. The articles contained in this special issue collectively form a proof of concept that expands the horizons of cybersecurity research from a substantive viewpoint (adding a human dimension to the prevalent military/strategic analyses), and from a methodological perspective (propounding the importance of empirical scrutiny). Together, these 10 pieces of scholarship collectively affirm that there is now a critical mass of substantively diverse and empirically rigorous research in the field of cybersecurity, and that we as a community are capable of making bold, theoretically grounded, and empirically tested claims that verify how cyber power is or is not altering the nature of peace, conflict and international relations.


  • Open Access

    The limits of cyberattacks in eroding political trust: A tripartite survey experiment

    by Sharon Matzkin, Ryan Shandler, Daphna Canetti

    To what extent do security threats – such as cyberattacks – undermine trust in government? Fears have emerged that cyberattacks undercut public trust in government and sow doubt in democratic institutions heavily dependent on digitised systems. Nevertheless, the logic of this threat remains untested. This article presents survey experiments conducted in the United States (n = 607), the United Kingdom (n = 594), and Israel (n = 627) that examine whether cyberattacks on critical infrastructure truly undermine public trust in government and, if so, by what psychological mechanism. We exposed participants to simulations of cyberattacks against critical infrastructure before measuring the psychological and political outcomes. Our results reveal that cyberattacks do not undermine voters’ trust in the government’s ability to protect them. Furthermore, in the United States, exposure to cyberattacks heightens public trust by amplifying anger. Our findings inject a missing comparative component to the theoretical discussion of when, why, and how cyberattacks affect public trust in government.