Piotr Zagórski

Generation Z is the most educated and yet pessimistic about the future. At the same time, populist parties have much support among young voters. Do they find an answer to their discouraging socio-economic situation in populist appeals? In this article, we analyse how pessimistic economic expectations shape the preference for populist parties among the young in Spain. By using conjoint experiments, we explore which specific features of populist parties (‘thin’ or ‘thick’ characteristics) are decisive in attracting young and pessimistic voters. Unlike older generations, for whom immigration is the most relevant factor, Generation Z, especially the pessimistic, focuses more on the thin ideological elements of populism. This finding contradicts previous experimental studies, which argue that thin populist characteristics are irrelevant in explaining the general population’s voting behaviour. Ideology plays a significant mediating role, as young pessimists on the left tend to be attracted by anti-elitism, while those on the centre-right by people-centrism.

Are citizens less likely to support populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in countries with more inclusive migrant integration policies? Studies show that integration policies foster positive attitudes toward migrants, which, in turn, are associated with a lower likelihood of supporting PRRPs. However, the impact of integration policies on PRRP voting has not been assessed yet on a cross-country level—neither direct nor dependent on (anti)immigration attitudes. Using data from the European Social Survey 2016 and the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) from 2011 and 2015 for 15 EU member states, we show that more inclusive integration policies are associated with a lower likelihood to support PRRPs. We also find a moderating effect of these policies on the impact of attitudes toward migrants on PRRP voting. However, the effect of migration policy change seems to be more context dependent.

Some defenders of democratic rights and the rule of law are becoming increasingly frustrated by the European Union's inadequate response to democratic backsliding in countries like Poland and Hungary. This study focuses on Poland and introduces the concept of ‘Eurodisappointment’ to describe this new group, which is conceptually and empirically distinct from Euroscepticism. Rather than being Eurosceptic, the Eurodisappointed self-limit their Euroenthusiasm without opposing integration. Drawing on original survey data, we demonstrate that Eurodisappointment is particularly prevalent among women, opposition party voters, and those dissatisfied with the state of democracy in Poland. It is yet to be seen whether and how the concept of Eurodisappointment can be applied to studies of attitudes towards the European Union in other member states.

Labor market competition theory has traditionally analyzed the threat perceived by lower and middle class’ natives on competition over jobs with immigrants. However, in this article we focus on the fiscal burden and competition for social benefits generated by unemployed immigrants and its impact on the vote for Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs). Combining individual-level data and aggregate unemployment indicators for over 60 regions from 10 EU countries, we show that, on the one hand, upper class natives seem to support PRRPs when migrant unemployment rates are higher, irrespective of migrants’ origin, which is consistent with the fiscal burden model. On the other hand, lower and middle class natives are more likely to support PRRPs only in contexts of higher unemployment rates among non-EU migrants (but not among migrants from other EU member states), pointing towards an interaction between cultural and economic explanations. These findings underscore the need to account for migrant populations’ characteristics and to consider not only labor competition, but also the fiscal burden to better understand how unemployment may impact PRRP voting.

Following the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the ‘democratic backslider’ parties in Hungary (Fidesz) and Poland (Law and Justice) took differing stances on Russia, bringing their positions on the Rule of Law (RoL) conflict and within the broader alliance of Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties into question. Building on and advancing the theoretical framework of democratic backsliding and PRR party cooperation, this article assesses the impact of exogenous shocks triggered by external authoritarian actors on these types of collaborations. A detailed examination of the voting patterns of Fidesz, Law and Justice and other PRR parties in the European Parliament (EP) is undertaken, and their stances towards Russia and the RoL conflict before and after the invasion are weighed. The findings show that the invasion did not influence the dynamics of democratic backsliding. Despite the rhetoric, it actually brought Fidesz and Law and Justice closer together. While the attack led to a convergence of assertiveness towards Russia among the PRR parties, the Putin regime remains a divisive issue within the PRR family. The different positions towards Russia did not affect the support of PRRs for the backsliders.

Celem artykułu jest sproblematyzowanie relacji między wiekiem a uczestnictwem wyborczym w Polsce, ich syntetyczne omówienie, a także analiza empiryczna. Mają one znaczenie dla wielu aspektów i obszarów życia społecznego, politycznego, gospodarczego, a szczególnej wagi nabierają współcześnie, w dobie fundamentalnych zmian demograficznych zachodzących w Polsce. Przeprowadzone przez nas analizy potwierdzają, odwołując się do najlepszych publicznie dostępnych danych empirycznych (PGSW), istnienie wyraźnych związków między wiekiem a uczestnictwem wyborczym. Te związki mają znaczenie dla procesu demokratycznego i politycznej reprezentacji. Rosnące dysproporcje między poszczególnymi grupami wiekowymi skutkują zmianą poziomu ich reprezentacji. Analiza wpływu wieku na wyborcze uczestnictwo (cyklu życiowego, okresu/momentu historycznego, kohorty) wskazuje na większe znaczenie cyklu życia i (względnie) mniejsze znaczenie doświadczeń pokoleniowych, generacyjnych, kohortowych. Odnotowywane w Polsce systematyczne różnice we frekwencji wyborczej między poszczególnymi grupami wiekowymi nie są świadectwem pokoleniowych różnic w (skłonności do) partycypacji. Większe znaczenie ma cykl życia i jego fazy.

Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) often mobilize referring to the past. This aspect is not commonly included amongst the characteristic elements of these parties and, more importantly, we do not know much about the electoral returns of this strategy. In this article, we focus on three PRRPs – AfD in Germany, PiS in Poland and VOX in Spain – to argue that the conflicts of the past play a prominent role in their recent mobilizing strategies. By analysing comparative survey data gathered in early 2020 as part of the H2020 REPAST Project we show that opinions about the past that are in consonance with the parties’ discourses have a positive influence on the support they get in elections. These effects are independent of other factors associated with populist voting, but they are contingent on the internal/external nature of the conflicts of the past that each of the parties appeals to. Our findings lead us to think that the use of the past is a key component of the electoral success of more parties of this kind.

This article assesses the impact of individual-level experiences of political socialisation under communist rule on the propensity to vote in elections after 1989 in eight Central and Eastern European countries. Using CSES and CEU data, it sheds light on the heterogeneity of the effects of communist socialisation on electoral turnout, showing how these effects are jointly dependent on the coerciveness of the previous regime and individual religious observance. While exposure to authoritarian communist socialisation reduces the likelihood of electoral participation independently of religiosity, socialisation in totalitarian times only has a negative effect on the voting propensity of frequent churchgoers.