TSThomas J. Sargent

Thomas J. Sargent

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Thomas J. Sargent has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Learning from Lucas

    by Thomas J. Sargent

    This paper recollects meetings with Robert E. Lucas, Jr. over many years. It describes how, through personal interactions and studying his work, Lucas taught me to think about economics.


  • A DEFENSE OF THE FOMC*

    by Martin Ellison, Thomas J. Sargent

    We defend the forecasting performance of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) against the criticism of Christina and David Romer (2008, American Economic Review 98, 230–235) by assuming that the FOMC’s forecasts depict a worst‐case scenario that it uses to design decisions that are robust to misspecification of the staff’s model. We use a simple macro model and a plausible loss function to illustrate how such an interpretation of the FOMC’s forecasts can explain the findings of Romer and Romer, including the pattern of differences between FOMC forecasts and forecasts published by the staff of the Federal Reserve System in the Greenbook.


  • ALTERNATIVE MONETARY POLICIES IN A TURNPIKE ECONOMY

    by Rodolfo Manuelli, Thomas J. Sargent

    This paper modifies a Townsend turnpike model by letting agents stay at a location long enough to trade some consumption loans, but not long enough to support a Pareto-optimal allocation. Monetary equilibria exist that are nonoptimal in the absence of a scheme to pay interest on currency at a particular rate. Paying interest on currency at the optimal rate delivers a Pareto-optimal allocation, but a different one than the allocation for an associated nonmonetary centralized economy. The price level remains determinate under an optimal policy. We study the response of the model to “helicopter drops” of currency, steady increases in the money supply, and restrictions on private intermediation.


  • Open Access

    Fragile beliefs and the price of uncertainty

    by Lars Peter Hansen, Thomas J. Sargent

    A representative consumer uses Bayes' law to learn about parameters and to construct probabilities with which to perform ongoing model averaging. The arrival of signals induces the consumer to alter his posterior distribution over parameters and models. The consumer copes with specification doubts by slanting probabilities pessimistically. One of his models puts long-run risks in consumption growth. The pessimistic probabilities slant toward this model and contribute a counter-cyclical and signal-history-dependent component to prices of risk.


  • Robustness and U.S. Monetary Policy Experimentation

    by Timothy Cogley, Riccardo Colacito, Lars Peter Hansen, Thomas J. Sargent

    We study how a concern for robustness modifies a policymaker's incentive to experiment. A policymaker has a prior over two submodels of inflation‐unemployment dynamics. One submodel implies an exploitable trade‐off, the other does not. Bayes' law gives the policymaker an incentive to experiment. The policymaker fears that both submodels and his prior probability distribution over them are misspecified. We compute decision rules that are robust to misspecifications of each submodel and of the prior distribution over submodels. We compare robust rules to ones that Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent (2007) computed assuming that the models and the prior distribution are correctly specified. We explain how the policymaker's desires to protect against misspecifications of the submodels, on the one hand, and misspecifications of the prior over them, on the other, have different effects on the decision rule.


  • Benefits from U.S. Monetary Policy Experimentation in the Days of Samuelson and Solow and Lucas

    by Timothy Cogley, Riccardo Colacito, Thomas J. Sargent

    A policy maker knows two models. One implies an exploitable inflation‐unemployment trade‐off, the other does not. The policy maker's prior probability over the two models is part of his state vector. Bayes' law converts the prior probability into a posterior probability and gives the policy maker an incentive to experiment. For models calibrated to U.S. data through the early 1960s, we compare the outcomes from two Bellman equations. The first tells the policy maker to “experiment and learn.” The second tells him to “learn but don't experiment.” In this way, we isolate a component of government policy that is due to experimentation and estimate the benefits from intentional experimentation. We interpret the Bellman equation that learns but does not intentionally experiment as an “anticipated utility” model and study how well its outcomes approximate those from the “experiment and learn” Bellman equation. The approximation is good. For our calibrations, the benefits from purposeful experimentation are small because random shocks are big enough to provide ample unintentional experimentation.