Thomas J. Sargent
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Thomas J. Sargent has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Lars Peter Hansen
Dept. of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, U.S.A. and NBER; l
2 shared publications - Timothy Cogley
Timothy Cogley is from University of California, Davis
2 shared publications Martin Ellison
University of Oxford, U.K., and Bank of Finland, Finland; New York University and Hoover Institution, U.S.A.
1 shared publicationRiccardo Colacito
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Kenan‐Flagler Business School
1 shared publication- Riccardo Colacito
Riccardo Colacito is from The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Kenan‐Flagler Business School
1 shared publication Rodolfo Manuelli
Washington University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 11 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Methodology
- Vol. 29 (1) , 17-29
Learning from Lucas
This paper recollects meetings with Robert E. Lucas, Jr. over many years. It describes how, through personal interactions and studying his work, Lucas taught me to think about economics.
- 11 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Methodology
- Vol. 29 (1) , 17-29
Learning from Lucas
This paper recollects meetings with Robert E. Lucas, Jr. over many years. It describes how, through personal interactions and studying his work, Lucas taught me to think about economics.
- 9 October 2012
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 53 (4) , 1047-1065
A DEFENSE OF THE FOMC*
We defend the forecasting performance of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) against the criticism of Christina and David Romer (2008, American Economic Review 98, 230–235) by assuming that the FOMC’s forecasts depict a worst‐case scenario that it uses to design decisions that are robust to misspecification of the staff’s model. We use a simple macro model and a plausible loss function to illustrate how such an interpretation of the FOMC’s forecasts can explain the findings of Romer and Romer, including the pattern of differences between FOMC forecasts and forecasts published by the staff of the Federal Reserve System in the Greenbook.
- 9 October 2012
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 53 (4) , 1047-1065
A DEFENSE OF THE FOMC*
We defend the forecasting performance of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) against the criticism of Christina and David Romer (2008, American Economic Review 98, 230–235) by assuming that the FOMC’s forecasts depict a worst‐case scenario that it uses to design decisions that are robust to misspecification of the staff’s model. We use a simple macro model and a plausible loss function to illustrate how such an interpretation of the FOMC’s forecasts can explain the findings of Romer and Romer, including the pattern of differences between FOMC forecasts and forecasts published by the staff of the Federal Reserve System in the Greenbook.
- 1 May 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Macroeconomic Dynamics
- Vol. 14 (5) , 727-762
ALTERNATIVE MONETARY POLICIES IN A TURNPIKE ECONOMY
This paper modifies a Townsend turnpike model by letting agents stay at a location long enough to trade some consumption loans, but not long enough to support a Pareto-optimal allocation. Monetary equilibria exist that are nonoptimal in the absence of a scheme to pay interest on currency at a particular rate. Paying interest on currency at the optimal rate delivers a Pareto-optimal allocation, but a different one than the allocation for an associated nonmonetary centralized economy. The price level remains determinate under an optimal policy. We study the response of the model to “helicopter drops” of currency, steady increases in the money supply, and restrictions on private intermediation.
- 1 May 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Macroeconomic Dynamics
- Vol. 14 (5) , 727-762
ALTERNATIVE MONETARY POLICIES IN A TURNPIKE ECONOMY
This paper modifies a Townsend turnpike model by letting agents stay at a location long enough to trade some consumption loans, but not long enough to support a Pareto-optimal allocation. Monetary equilibria exist that are nonoptimal in the absence of a scheme to pay interest on currency at a particular rate. Paying interest on currency at the optimal rate delivers a Pareto-optimal allocation, but a different one than the allocation for an associated nonmonetary centralized economy. The price level remains determinate under an optimal policy. We study the response of the model to “helicopter drops” of currency, steady increases in the money supply, and restrictions on private intermediation.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2010
- Published by The Econometric Society in Quantitative Economics
- Vol. 1 (1) , 129-162
Fragile beliefs and the price of uncertainty
A representative consumer uses Bayes' law to learn about parameters and to construct probabilities with which to perform ongoing model averaging. The arrival of signals induces the consumer to alter his posterior distribution over parameters and models. The consumer copes with specification doubts by slanting probabilities pessimistically. One of his models puts long-run risks in consumption growth. The pessimistic probabilities slant toward this model and contribute a counter-cyclical and signal-history-dependent component to prices of risk.
- 1 January 2010
- Published by The Econometric Society in Quantitative Economics
- Vol. 1 (1) , 129-162
Open AccessFragile beliefs and the price of uncertainty
A representative consumer uses Bayes' law to learn about parameters and to construct probabilities with which to perform ongoing model averaging. The arrival of signals induces the consumer to alter his posterior distribution over parameters and models. The consumer copes with specification doubts by slanting probabilities pessimistically. One of his models puts long-run risks in consumption growth. The pessimistic probabilities slant toward this model and contribute a counter-cyclical and signal-history-dependent component to prices of risk.
- 24 November 2008
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 40 (8) , 1599-1623
Robustness and U.S. Monetary Policy Experimentation
We study how a concern for robustness modifies a policymaker's incentive to experiment. A policymaker has a prior over two submodels of inflation‐unemployment dynamics. One submodel implies an exploitable trade‐off, the other does not. Bayes' law gives the policymaker an incentive to experiment. The policymaker fears that both submodels and his prior probability distribution over them are misspecified. We compute decision rules that are robust to misspecifications of each submodel and of the prior distribution over submodels. We compare robust rules to ones that Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent (2007) computed assuming that the models and the prior distribution are correctly specified. We explain how the policymaker's desires to protect against misspecifications of the submodels, on the one hand, and misspecifications of the prior over them, on the other, have different effects on the decision rule.
- 24 November 2008
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 40 (8) , 1599-1623
Robustness and U.S. Monetary Policy Experimentation
We study how a concern for robustness modifies a policymaker's incentive to experiment. A policymaker has a prior over two submodels of inflation‐unemployment dynamics. One submodel implies an exploitable trade‐off, the other does not. Bayes' law gives the policymaker an incentive to experiment. The policymaker fears that both submodels and his prior probability distribution over them are misspecified. We compute decision rules that are robust to misspecifications of each submodel and of the prior distribution over submodels. We compare robust rules to ones that Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent (2007) computed assuming that the models and the prior distribution are correctly specified. We explain how the policymaker's desires to protect against misspecifications of the submodels, on the one hand, and misspecifications of the prior over them, on the other, have different effects on the decision rule.
- 18 January 2007
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 39 (s1) , 67-99
Benefits from U.S. Monetary Policy Experimentation in the Days of Samuelson and Solow and Lucas
A policy maker knows two models. One implies an exploitable inflation‐unemployment trade‐off, the other does not. The policy maker's prior probability over the two models is part of his state vector. Bayes' law converts the prior probability into a posterior probability and gives the policy maker an incentive to experiment. For models calibrated to U.S. data through the early 1960s, we compare the outcomes from two Bellman equations. The first tells the policy maker to “experiment and learn.” The second tells him to “learn but don't experiment.” In this way, we isolate a component of government policy that is due to experimentation and estimate the benefits from intentional experimentation. We interpret the Bellman equation that learns but does not intentionally experiment as an “anticipated utility” model and study how well its outcomes approximate those from the “experiment and learn” Bellman equation. The approximation is good. For our calibrations, the benefits from purposeful experimentation are small because random shocks are big enough to provide ample unintentional experimentation.
- 18 January 2007
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 39 (s1) , 67-99
Benefits from U.S. Monetary Policy Experimentation in the Days of Samuelson and Solow and Lucas
A policy maker knows two models. One implies an exploitable inflation‐unemployment trade‐off, the other does not. The policy maker's prior probability over the two models is part of his state vector. Bayes' law converts the prior probability into a posterior probability and gives the policy maker an incentive to experiment. For models calibrated to U.S. data through the early 1960s, we compare the outcomes from two Bellman equations. The first tells the policy maker to “experiment and learn.” The second tells him to “learn but don't experiment.” In this way, we isolate a component of government policy that is due to experimentation and estimate the benefits from intentional experimentation. We interpret the Bellman equation that learns but does not intentionally experiment as an “anticipated utility” model and study how well its outcomes approximate those from the “experiment and learn” Bellman equation. The approximation is good. For our calibrations, the benefits from purposeful experimentation are small because random shocks are big enough to provide ample unintentional experimentation.