Ian McGregor
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ian McGregor has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Kyle Nash
York University Canada
3 shared publicationsDenise C. Marigold
2 shared publicationsKyle A. Nash
York University , Toronto, Canada
2 shared publicationsMike Prentice
University of Missouri
2 shared publicationsPaul R. Nail
University of Central Arkansas, Conway, USA
2 shared publicationsChristian H. Jordan
Wilfrid Laurier University , Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 9 September 2013
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Social Issues
- Vol. 69 (3) , 537-563
Anxious Uncertainty and Reactive Approach Motivation (RAM) for Religious, Idealistic, and Lifestyle Extremes
Reactive Approach Motivation (RAM) theory proposes that the personal uncertainty arising from motivational conflict causes anxiety, and that anxiety draws people to extremes because extremes activate approach‐motivated states that automatically downregulate anxiety. Five new studies consolidate existing evidence for the RAM view of uncertainty‐related threats and reactive extremism. In Studies 1–3, religious, idealistic, and RAM reactions after agentic, communal, and mortality threats were most extreme when threat‐relevant goals had been implicitly primed to create motivational conflict. In Study 4 uncertainty predicted extreme reactions only if goal conflict had been experimentally manipulated. In Study 5 personal uncertainty uniquely predicted lifestyle extremes among undergraduates whose educational goals were conflicted by a labor disruption at their university. Results converge on the conclusion that uncertainty‐related threats cause defensively extreme RAM reactions only if they arouse personal uncertainty about active goals. Results suggest that policies and programs to support the prosocial and/or nonextreme goals, ideals, and identifications of at‐risk people would reduce their motivation for antisocial extremism.
- 9 September 2013
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Social Issues
- Vol. 69 (3) , 537-563
Anxious Uncertainty and Reactive Approach Motivation (RAM) for Religious, Idealistic, and Lifestyle Extremes
Reactive Approach Motivation (RAM) theory proposes that the personal uncertainty arising from motivational conflict causes anxiety, and that anxiety draws people to extremes because extremes activate approach‐motivated states that automatically downregulate anxiety. Five new studies consolidate existing evidence for the RAM view of uncertainty‐related threats and reactive extremism. In Studies 1–3, religious, idealistic, and RAM reactions after agentic, communal, and mortality threats were most extreme when threat‐relevant goals had been implicitly primed to create motivational conflict. In Study 4 uncertainty predicted extreme reactions only if goal conflict had been experimentally manipulated. In Study 5 personal uncertainty uniquely predicted lifestyle extremes among undergraduates whose educational goals were conflicted by a labor disruption at their university. Results converge on the conclusion that uncertainty‐related threats cause defensively extreme RAM reactions only if they arouse personal uncertainty about active goals. Results suggest that policies and programs to support the prosocial and/or nonextreme goals, ideals, and identifications of at‐risk people would reduce their motivation for antisocial extremism.
- 1 January 2010
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 99 (1) , 148-161
Reactive approach motivation (RAM) for religion.
In 3 experiments, participants reacted with religious zeal to anxious uncertainty threats that have caused reactive approach motivation (RAM) in past research (see McGregor, Nash, Mann, & Phills, 2010, for implicit, explicit, and neural evidence of RAM). In Study 1, results were specific to religious ideals and did not extend to merely superstitious beliefs. Effects were most pronounced among the most anxious and uncertainty-averse participants in Study 1 and among the most approach-motivated participants in Study 2 (i.e., with high Promotion Focus, Behavioral Activation, Action Orientation, and Self-Esteem Scale scores). In Studies 2 and 3, anxious uncertainty threats amplified even the most jingoistic and extreme aspects of religious zeal. In Study 3, reactive religious zeal occurred only among participants who reported feeling disempowered in their everyday goals in life. Results support a RAM view of empowered religious idealism for anxiety management (cf. Armstrong, 2000; Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsch, & Nash, 2009).
- 1 January 2010
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 99 (1) , 148-161
Reactive approach motivation (RAM) for religion.
In 3 experiments, participants reacted with religious zeal to anxious uncertainty threats that have caused reactive approach motivation (RAM) in past research (see McGregor, Nash, Mann, & Phills, 2010, for implicit, explicit, and neural evidence of RAM). In Study 1, results were specific to religious ideals and did not extend to merely superstitious beliefs. Effects were most pronounced among the most anxious and uncertainty-averse participants in Study 1 and among the most approach-motivated participants in Study 2 (i.e., with high Promotion Focus, Behavioral Activation, Action Orientation, and Self-Esteem Scale scores). In Studies 2 and 3, anxious uncertainty threats amplified even the most jingoistic and extreme aspects of religious zeal. In Study 3, reactive religious zeal occurred only among participants who reported feeling disempowered in their everyday goals in life. Results support a RAM view of empowered religious idealism for anxiety management (cf. Armstrong, 2000; Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsch, & Nash, 2009).
- 1 January 2010
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 99 (1) , 133-147
Anxious uncertainty and reactive approach motivation (RAM).
In 4 experiments anxious uncertainty threats caused reactive approach motivation (RAM). In Studies 1 and 2, academic anxious uncertainty threats caused RAM as assessed by behavioral neuroscience and implicit measures of approach motivation. In Study 3 the effect of a relational anxious uncertainty threat on approach-motivated personal projects in participants' everyday lives was mediated by the idealism of those projects. In Study 4 the effect of a different relational anxious uncertainty threat on implicit approach motivation was heightened by manipulated salience of personal ideals. Results suggest a RAM account for idealistic and ideological reactions in the threat and defense literature. Speculative implications are suggested for understanding diverse social and clinical phenomena ranging from worldview defense, prejudice, and meaning making to narcissism, hypomania, and aggression.
- 1 January 2010
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 99 (1) , 133-147
Anxious uncertainty and reactive approach motivation (RAM).
In 4 experiments anxious uncertainty threats caused reactive approach motivation (RAM). In Studies 1 and 2, academic anxious uncertainty threats caused RAM as assessed by behavioral neuroscience and implicit measures of approach motivation. In Study 3 the effect of a relational anxious uncertainty threat on approach-motivated personal projects in participants' everyday lives was mediated by the idealism of those projects. In Study 4 the effect of a different relational anxious uncertainty threat on implicit approach motivation was heightened by manipulated salience of personal ideals. Results suggest a RAM account for idealistic and ideological reactions in the threat and defense literature. Speculative implications are suggested for understanding diverse social and clinical phenomena ranging from worldview defense, prejudice, and meaning making to narcissism, hypomania, and aggression.
- 2 June 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Justice Research
- Vol. 22 (2-3) , 231-240
Conservative Shift among Liberals and Conservatives Following 9/11/01
- 2 June 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Justice Research
- Vol. 22 (2-3) , 231-240
Conservative Shift among Liberals and Conservatives Following 9/11/01
- 9 July 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Basic and Applied Social Psychology
- Vol. 30 (2) , 183-188
Religious Zeal and the Uncertain Self
In two studies, personal uncertainty threats caused compensatory religious zeal. In Study 1 an academic uncertainty manipulation heightened conviction for religious beliefs and support for religious warfare. In Study 2 a relationship uncertainty manipulation caused non-Muslim's to derogate Islam. Together, these findings demonstrate that two aspects of religious zeal—conviction for one's own beliefs and derogation of others'—are caused by personal uncertainty.
- 9 July 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Basic and Applied Social Psychology
- Vol. 30 (2) , 183-188
Religious Zeal and the Uncertain Self
In two studies, personal uncertainty threats caused compensatory religious zeal. In Study 1 an academic uncertainty manipulation heightened conviction for religious beliefs and support for religious warfare. In Study 2 a relationship uncertainty manipulation caused non-Muslim's to derogate Islam. Together, these findings demonstrate that two aspects of religious zeal—conviction for one's own beliefs and derogation of others'—are caused by personal uncertainty.
- 1 November 2007
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Vol. 33 (11) , 1587-1599
Ideological and Personal Zeal Reactions to Threat Among People With High Self-Esteem: Motivated Promotion Focus
After a mortality salience manipulation, participants completed measures of either ideological zeal (Study 1) or personal project zeal (Study 3). Mortality salience increased both kinds of zeal but only among participants with high self-esteem. High self-esteem was positively correlated with dispositional tendencies toward promotion focus, action orientation, and behavioral activation; it was negatively correlated with behavioral inhibition and rumination (Study 2). These findings clarify the role of dispositional self-esteem in mortality salience research and confirm that, as has been found with various other threats, zealous reactions to mortality salience are most pronounced among participants with high self-esteem. Results support a regulatory focus perspective on zealous reactions to threat. Ideological and personal zeal reflect motivated promotion focus reactions that are rewarding because they decrease the motivational relevance, regulatory fit, and subjective salience of threats.
- 1 November 2007
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Vol. 33 (11) , 1587-1599
Ideological and Personal Zeal Reactions to Threat Among People With High Self-Esteem: Motivated Promotion Focus
After a mortality salience manipulation, participants completed measures of either ideological zeal (Study 1) or personal project zeal (Study 3). Mortality salience increased both kinds of zeal but only among participants with high self-esteem. High self-esteem was positively correlated with dispositional tendencies toward promotion focus, action orientation, and behavioral activation; it was negatively correlated with behavioral inhibition and rumination (Study 2). These findings clarify the role of dispositional self-esteem in mortality salience research and confirm that, as has been found with various other threats, zealous reactions to mortality salience are most pronounced among participants with high self-esteem. Results support a regulatory focus perspective on zealous reactions to threat. Ideological and personal zeal reflect motivated promotion focus reactions that are rewarding because they decrease the motivational relevance, regulatory fit, and subjective salience of threats.
- 1 April 2007
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Self and Identity
- Vol. 6 (2-3) , 223-237
The mask of zeal: Low implicit self-esteem, threat, and defensive extremism
Theorists have long proposed that vulnerable people turn to zeal in the face of perceived self-threats because doing so somehow masks the threats. The present study supports this idea, and suggests that low implicit self-esteem may be a key vulnerability that predisposes individuals toward defensive zeal. Undergraduate participants with low implicit self-esteem, as assessed by an Internet version of the Implicit Association Test, reacted to an experimentally manipulated academic threat with zeal about their opinions toward capital punishment, the US invasion of Iraq, and suicide bombing. Significant effects were found for two aspects of zeal—extremism and exaggerated estimates of social consensus for personal opinions. Results for each issue were independent of whether participants were in favor of, or against the issue.
- 1 April 2007
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Self and Identity
- Vol. 6 (2-3) , 223-237
The mask of zeal: Low implicit self-esteem, threat, and defensive extremism
Theorists have long proposed that vulnerable people turn to zeal in the face of perceived self-threats because doing so somehow masks the threats. The present study supports this idea, and suggests that low implicit self-esteem may be a key vulnerability that predisposes individuals toward defensive zeal. Undergraduate participants with low implicit self-esteem, as assessed by an Internet version of the Implicit Association Test, reacted to an experimentally manipulated academic threat with zeal about their opinions toward capital punishment, the US invasion of Iraq, and suicide bombing. Significant effects were found for two aspects of zeal—extremism and exaggerated estimates of social consensus for personal opinions. Results for each issue were independent of whether participants were in favor of, or against the issue.
- 1 January 2005
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 89 (6) , 978-996
Defensive pride and consensus: strength in imaginary numbers.
Failure (Study 1) and attachment separation thoughts (Study 2) caused exaggerated consensus estimates for personal beliefs about unrelated social issues. This compensatory consensus effect was most pronounced among defensively proud individuals, that is, among those with the combination of high explicit and low implicit self-esteem (Study 1) and the combination of high attachment avoidance and low attachment anxiety (Study 2). In Study 3, another form of defensive pride, narcissism, was associated with exaggerated consensual worldview defense after a system-injustice threat. In Study 4, imagined consensus reduced subjective salience of proud individuals' troubling thoughts. Compensatory consensus is seen as a kind of defensive self-affirmation that defensively proud people turn to for insulation from distressing thoughts.
- 1 January 2005
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 89 (6) , 978-996
Defensive pride and consensus: strength in imaginary numbers.
Failure (Study 1) and attachment separation thoughts (Study 2) caused exaggerated consensus estimates for personal beliefs about unrelated social issues. This compensatory consensus effect was most pronounced among defensively proud individuals, that is, among those with the combination of high explicit and low implicit self-esteem (Study 1) and the combination of high attachment avoidance and low attachment anxiety (Study 2). In Study 3, another form of defensive pride, narcissism, was associated with exaggerated consensual worldview defense after a system-injustice threat. In Study 4, imagined consensus reduced subjective salience of proud individuals' troubling thoughts. Compensatory consensus is seen as a kind of defensive self-affirmation that defensively proud people turn to for insulation from distressing thoughts.
- 1 January 2003
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 85 (5) , 838-852
Defensive Zeal and the Uncertain Self: What Makes You So Sure?
In Studies 1-3, undergraduates with high self-esteem (HSEs) reacted to personal uncertainty-threats with compensatory conviction about unrelated issues and aspects of the self. In Study 1 HSEs reacted to salience of personal dilemmas with increased implicit conviction about self-definition. In Study 2 they reacted to the same uncertainty-threat with increased explicit conviction about social issues. In Study 3, HSEs (particularly defensive HSEs, i.e., with low implicit self-esteem; C. H. Jordan, S. J. Spencer, & M. P. Zanna, 2003) reacted to uncertainty about a personal relationship with compensatory conviction about social issues. For HSEs in Study 4, expressing convictions about social issues decreased subjective salience of dilemma-related uncertainties that were not related to the social issues. Compensatory conviction is viewed as a mode of repression, akin to reaction formation, that helps keep unwanted thoughts out of awareness.
- 1 January 2003
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 85 (5) , 838-852
Defensive Zeal and the Uncertain Self: What Makes You So Sure?
In Studies 1-3, undergraduates with high self-esteem (HSEs) reacted to personal uncertainty-threats with compensatory conviction about unrelated issues and aspects of the self. In Study 1 HSEs reacted to salience of personal dilemmas with increased implicit conviction about self-definition. In Study 2 they reacted to the same uncertainty-threat with increased explicit conviction about social issues. In Study 3, HSEs (particularly defensive HSEs, i.e., with low implicit self-esteem; C. H. Jordan, S. J. Spencer, & M. P. Zanna, 2003) reacted to uncertainty about a personal relationship with compensatory conviction about social issues. For HSEs in Study 4, expressing convictions about social issues decreased subjective salience of dilemma-related uncertainties that were not related to the social issues. Compensatory conviction is viewed as a mode of repression, akin to reaction formation, that helps keep unwanted thoughts out of awareness.
- 1 January 2001
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 80 (3) , 472-488
Compensatory conviction in the face of personal uncertainty: Going to extremes and being oneself.
Study 1 participants' self-integrity (C. M. Steele. 1988) was threatened by deliberative mind-set (S. E. Taylor & P. M. Gollwitzer, 1995) induced uncertainty. They masked the uncertainty with more extreme conviction about social issues. An integrity-repair exercise after the threat, however, eliminated uncertainty and the conviction response. In Study 2, the same threat caused clarified values and more self-consistent personal goals. Two other uncertainty-related threats, mortality salience and temporal discontinuity, caused similar responses: more extreme intergroup bias in Study 3, and more self-consistent personal goals and identifications in Study 4. Going to extremes and being oneself are seen as 2 modes of compensatory conviction used to defend against personal uncertainty. Relevance to cognitive dissonance and authoritarianism theories is discussed, and a new perspective on terror managenment theory (J. Greenberg, S. Solomom, & T. Pyszczynski, 1997) is proposed.
- 1 January 2001
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 80 (3) , 472-488
Compensatory conviction in the face of personal uncertainty: Going to extremes and being oneself.
Study 1 participants' self-integrity (C. M. Steele. 1988) was threatened by deliberative mind-set (S. E. Taylor & P. M. Gollwitzer, 1995) induced uncertainty. They masked the uncertainty with more extreme conviction about social issues. An integrity-repair exercise after the threat, however, eliminated uncertainty and the conviction response. In Study 2, the same threat caused clarified values and more self-consistent personal goals. Two other uncertainty-related threats, mortality salience and temporal discontinuity, caused similar responses: more extreme intergroup bias in Study 3, and more self-consistent personal goals and identifications in Study 4. Going to extremes and being oneself are seen as 2 modes of compensatory conviction used to defend against personal uncertainty. Relevance to cognitive dissonance and authoritarianism theories is discussed, and a new perspective on terror managenment theory (J. Greenberg, S. Solomom, & T. Pyszczynski, 1997) is proposed.