Ronen Palan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ronen Palan has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Anastasia Nesvetailova
1 shared publication- Duncan Wigan
Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark
1 shared publication - Hannah Petersen
City, University of London, Northampton Square, Clerkenwell, London, EC1V 0HB, UK
1 shared publication - Richard Phillips
University of Sheffield
1 shared publication - Richard Phillips
City, University of London, Northampton Square, Clerkenwell, London, EC1V 0HB, UK
1 shared publication - Richard Phillips
City, University of London
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 29 August 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Journal of International Relations
- Vol. 30 (4) , 894-917
Voice, exit . . . arbitrage: the politics of the modern multinational firm
Multinational corporations (MNCs) are often seen as singular organizations, with a parent company controlling branches in other countries. But this is an abridged version of decentred corporate groups structured as clusters of separate legal entities in several jurisdictions held together by equity ties. The article argues that while the abridged version of the MNC matches those aspects of those organizations that are of interest to economists, it fails to capture the principal mechanism of interaction between business and the institutional and political environment. I argue that the abridged version is a barrier preventing political scientists from asking salient questions about the power of MNCs and their shareholders. Specifically, while political scientists and international political economists discuss the way these companies use their considerable financial resources to voice their views on unwanted regulatory changes, to threaten exit or if all else fails, to carry through with the threat, they ignore a third approach favoured by corporate groups, setting up subsidiaries in third countries to arbitrage rules.
- 29 August 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Journal of International Relations
- Vol. 30 (4) , 894-917
Voice, exit . . . arbitrage: the politics of the modern multinational firm
Multinational corporations (MNCs) are often seen as singular organizations, with a parent company controlling branches in other countries. But this is an abridged version of decentred corporate groups structured as clusters of separate legal entities in several jurisdictions held together by equity ties. The article argues that while the abridged version of the MNC matches those aspects of those organizations that are of interest to economists, it fails to capture the principal mechanism of interaction between business and the institutional and political environment. I argue that the abridged version is a barrier preventing political scientists from asking salient questions about the power of MNCs and their shareholders. Specifically, while political scientists and international political economists discuss the way these companies use their considerable financial resources to voice their views on unwanted regulatory changes, to threaten exit or if all else fails, to carry through with the threat, they ignore a third approach favoured by corporate groups, setting up subsidiaries in third countries to arbitrage rules.
- 25 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of International Relations and Development
- Vol. 26 (2) , 373-403
Global corporate structure of Chinese state-owned financial institutions through Hong Kong
- 25 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of International Relations and Development
- Vol. 26 (2) , 373-403
Global corporate structure of Chinese state-owned financial institutions through Hong Kong
- Open Access
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Finance and Society
- Vol. 8 (1) , 22-41
Arbitrage power and the disappearing financialized firm
Modern corporations have increasingly been adopting a decentred, layered, and multi-jurisdictional form as a strategy of boundary manipulation known amongst tax lawyers and accountants as ‘regulatory arbitrage’. The argument we put forward in this article is that the scholarly work that treats these strategies as mere tax avoidance practices has contributed to an underestimation and misrecognition of the way contemporary multinationals operate in markets. These strategies, which we explain in terms of arbitrage power, exploit the difference between exchanges in an imaginary ‘smooth’ market of the economic textbook and a global market that is divided among legal authorities, each imposing their own rules, regulations, and taxations. Arbitrage power exploits differences between the location of market exchange and the location of the registration of property title transfers, combining this with a manipulation of formal systems for recognizing business enterprises in order to escape some or all of the rules and regulations of society. The result is a marked difference between the ‘brochure multinational’, the way multinationals are seen and presented in their glossy brochures, and the way multinationals are legally and practically organized nowadays.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Finance and Society
- Vol. 8 (1) , 22-41
Open AccessArbitrage power and the disappearing financialized firm
Modern corporations have increasingly been adopting a decentred, layered, and multi-jurisdictional form as a strategy of boundary manipulation known amongst tax lawyers and accountants as ‘regulatory arbitrage’. The argument we put forward in this article is that the scholarly work that treats these strategies as mere tax avoidance practices has contributed to an underestimation and misrecognition of the way contemporary multinationals operate in markets. These strategies, which we explain in terms of arbitrage power, exploit the difference between exchanges in an imaginary ‘smooth’ market of the economic textbook and a global market that is divided among legal authorities, each imposing their own rules, regulations, and taxations. Arbitrage power exploits differences between the location of market exchange and the location of the registration of property title transfers, combining this with a manipulation of formal systems for recognizing business enterprises in order to escape some or all of the rules and regulations of society. The result is a marked difference between the ‘brochure multinational’, the way multinationals are seen and presented in their glossy brochures, and the way multinationals are legally and practically organized nowadays.
- Open Access
- 2 February 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 35-60
Sophisticated Financial Engineering and Tax Arbitrage
This chapter delves into the inner sanctum of corporate organization in order to find evidence of rise or decline in the use of techniques of tax arbitrage by the corporate sector within the EU region. We follow then with an analysis of the use of sophisticated financial instruments in tax mitigation techniques in the EU to assess the impact of finance-oriented tax mitigation techniques. Our conclusion is not positive. It appears to us that in comparison with the US (and possibly China), the European fiscal regime failed to address a core political issue. These political conditions encourage the use of those diverging rules and regulations one against the other and affect jurisdictional arbitrage with the overall aim of tax mitigation. Europe is emerging as the playground for international corporations’ tax arbitrage and financial techniques of tax mitigation.
- 2 February 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 35-60
Open AccessSophisticated Financial Engineering and Tax Arbitrage
This chapter delves into the inner sanctum of corporate organization in order to find evidence of rise or decline in the use of techniques of tax arbitrage by the corporate sector within the EU region. We follow then with an analysis of the use of sophisticated financial instruments in tax mitigation techniques in the EU to assess the impact of finance-oriented tax mitigation techniques. Our conclusion is not positive. It appears to us that in comparison with the US (and possibly China), the European fiscal regime failed to address a core political issue. These political conditions encourage the use of those diverging rules and regulations one against the other and affect jurisdictional arbitrage with the overall aim of tax mitigation. Europe is emerging as the playground for international corporations’ tax arbitrage and financial techniques of tax mitigation.
- Open Access
- 6 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of International Business Policy
- Vol. 4 (2) , 286-307
Group subsidiaries, tax minimization and offshore financial centres: Mapping organizational structures to establish the ‘in-betweener’ advantage
International business and public policy research have examined the techniques that multinational enterprises (MNEs) use to shift revenues to subsidiaries in offshore financial centres (OFCs) in order to minimize tax liability and arbitrage for their advantage. While study of such tax arbitrage strategies has looked to geographical locations and legal dimensions to better understand these strategies, it has ignored the structural and organizational relationship between MNEs and their subsidiaries. We define two distinct types of OFC-based corporate entities based on their location among and apparent control over other MNE affiliates: ‘stand-alone’ OFCs at the end of a chain of MNE subsidiaries; and ‘in-betweener’ OFCs with equity control over further entities and hence apparent flexibility to redirect profits to other MNE subsidiaries further down the chain. We hypothesize that when MNEs have in-betweener OFCs controlling a substantial share of overall MNE profits, this indicates greater MNE interest in aggressive tax planning (ATP). We then evaluate empirical support for our claims based on an ‘equity mapping’ approach identifying stand-alone and in-betweener OFCs in 100 of the largest MNEs operating globally. This study demonstrates that a key factor determining tax arbitrage is not the amount of value registered on OFC subsidiaries’ balance sheets, but rather the portion of the group’s operating revenues and net income controlled by OFC subsidiaries. National taxing authorities could benefit from tracking in-betweener OFC locations and behaviour to counter ATP strategies, decrease sovereign arbitrage, and increase MNE tax revenue.
- 6 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of International Business Policy
- Vol. 4 (2) , 286-307
Open AccessGroup subsidiaries, tax minimization and offshore financial centres: Mapping organizational structures to establish the ‘in-betweener’ advantage
International business and public policy research have examined the techniques that multinational enterprises (MNEs) use to shift revenues to subsidiaries in offshore financial centres (OFCs) in order to minimize tax liability and arbitrage for their advantage. While study of such tax arbitrage strategies has looked to geographical locations and legal dimensions to better understand these strategies, it has ignored the structural and organizational relationship between MNEs and their subsidiaries. We define two distinct types of OFC-based corporate entities based on their location among and apparent control over other MNE affiliates: ‘stand-alone’ OFCs at the end of a chain of MNE subsidiaries; and ‘in-betweener’ OFCs with equity control over further entities and hence apparent flexibility to redirect profits to other MNE subsidiaries further down the chain. We hypothesize that when MNEs have in-betweener OFCs controlling a substantial share of overall MNE profits, this indicates greater MNE interest in aggressive tax planning (ATP). We then evaluate empirical support for our claims based on an ‘equity mapping’ approach identifying stand-alone and in-betweener OFCs in 100 of the largest MNEs operating globally. This study demonstrates that a key factor determining tax arbitrage is not the amount of value registered on OFC subsidiaries’ balance sheets, but rather the portion of the group’s operating revenues and net income controlled by OFC subsidiaries. National taxing authorities could benefit from tracking in-betweener OFC locations and behaviour to counter ATP strategies, decrease sovereign arbitrage, and increase MNE tax revenue.
- Open Access
- 26 June 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Evolutionary Political Economy
- Vol. 1 (2) , 161-182
An evolutionary approach to international political economy: the case of corporate tax avoidance
Corporate tax avoidance is both widespread and diverse in its practical mechanics. The scope of the phenomenon often leads economists to conclude that in the jungle of economic competition, tax planning (or optimisation) is among the necessary tools to ensure the survival of the fittest. This theory is increasingly associated with a Darwinian theory of economic evolution. In this paper, I develop a contrasting framework of the evolutionary political economy of corporate tax avoidance. Analysing core concepts of Old Institutionalist Economics (OIE), I examine the core drivers of corporate tax avoidance in a globalised system of states. The major contrast, I find, is between that of the corporate and legal personality and the institutional environment in which it operates. Historically, each corporate entity has been considered a separate legal person, yet a series of ‘mutations’ of incorporations laws created a widening gap between theory and reality, and these, in turn, give rise to tax arbitrage. Narrowing this gap, however, impinges on another venerable historical institution, the institution of sovereignty and sovereign inequality.
- 26 June 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Evolutionary Political Economy
- Vol. 1 (2) , 161-182
Open AccessAn evolutionary approach to international political economy: the case of corporate tax avoidance
Corporate tax avoidance is both widespread and diverse in its practical mechanics. The scope of the phenomenon often leads economists to conclude that in the jungle of economic competition, tax planning (or optimisation) is among the necessary tools to ensure the survival of the fittest. This theory is increasingly associated with a Darwinian theory of economic evolution. In this paper, I develop a contrasting framework of the evolutionary political economy of corporate tax avoidance. Analysing core concepts of Old Institutionalist Economics (OIE), I examine the core drivers of corporate tax avoidance in a globalised system of states. The major contrast, I find, is between that of the corporate and legal personality and the institutional environment in which it operates. Historically, each corporate entity has been considered a separate legal person, yet a series of ‘mutations’ of incorporations laws created a widening gap between theory and reality, and these, in turn, give rise to tax arbitrage. Narrowing this gap, however, impinges on another venerable historical institution, the institution of sovereignty and sovereign inequality.
- 22 September 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Political Economy
- Vol. 20 (3) , 367-385
Futurity, Pro-cyclicality and Financial Crises
Nearly a century ago, one of the leading forefathers of the school of evolutionary economics, John R. Commons, coined the term ‘futurity’ to describe an epochal change in the late nineteenth-century advanced economies. Futurity refers to the reorientation of economies towards the future, and specifically to the fledgling practice of treating businesses as ‘going concerns’ and measuring its value in terms of their anticipated future profits. Curiously, the implication of such epochal changes on the performance of the financial system had rarely been discussed, let alone addressed. This article presents a theoretical argument that suggests that futurity encourages pro-cyclical dynamics that are pulling the financial systems in ever more violent and disastrous swings.
- 22 September 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Political Economy
- Vol. 20 (3) , 367-385
Futurity, Pro-cyclicality and Financial Crises
Nearly a century ago, one of the leading forefathers of the school of evolutionary economics, John R. Commons, coined the term ‘futurity’ to describe an epochal change in the late nineteenth-century advanced economies. Futurity refers to the reorientation of economies towards the future, and specifically to the fledgling practice of treating businesses as ‘going concerns’ and measuring its value in terms of their anticipated future profits. Curiously, the implication of such epochal changes on the performance of the financial system had rarely been discussed, let alone addressed. This article presents a theoretical argument that suggests that futurity encourages pro-cyclical dynamics that are pulling the financial systems in ever more violent and disastrous swings.
- 12 May 2014
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
- Vol. 5 (3) , 334-343
Herding Cats and Taming Tax Havens: The US Strategy of ‘Not In My Backyard’
Recent G8 and G20 statements, combined with a number of OECD campaigns have given an impression that the world has entered a phase of re‐invigorated multilateral efforts to combat tax abuse. We argue that this impression is not entirely mistaken, but the centre of gravity in the battle against tax abuse generally, and tax havens specifically, is shifting decidedly towards unilateral approaches. The US is, in particular, in flexing its muscles attempting to ensure that the various mechanisms used to evade taxation and perpetrated through tax havens have little impact on its ‘back yard’. We call this the ‘Not In My Back Yard’ (NIMBY) principle of regulation, which underpins the new Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). The NIMBY principle, we argue, is likely to be adopted by other large political entities.
- 12 May 2014
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
- Vol. 5 (3) , 334-343
Herding Cats and Taming Tax Havens: The US Strategy of ‘Not In My Backyard’
Recent G8 and G20 statements, combined with a number of OECD campaigns have given an impression that the world has entered a phase of re‐invigorated multilateral efforts to combat tax abuse. We argue that this impression is not entirely mistaken, but the centre of gravity in the battle against tax abuse generally, and tax havens specifically, is shifting decidedly towards unilateral approaches. The US is, in particular, in flexing its muscles attempting to ensure that the various mechanisms used to evade taxation and perpetrated through tax havens have little impact on its ‘back yard’. We call this the ‘Not In My Back Yard’ (NIMBY) principle of regulation, which underpins the new Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). The NIMBY principle, we argue, is likely to be adopted by other large political entities.
- 12 February 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Capital & Class
- Vol. 37 (1) , 65-77
The financial crisis and intangible value
The concept of ‘finance’ or the ‘financial system’ can be confusing. The assumption is that the financial system consists of related markets trading in a variety of financial instruments that are ultimately of a similar nature. In the late-19th century, however, financial assets have bifurcated into broadly two classes of property titles: incorporeal assets and intangible assets. This article argues that interrelations between the two classes of assets have generated pro-cyclical trends that are not dealt with by current regulation. It argues that these pro-cyclical trends can be even more confusing in the age of globalisation.
- 12 February 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Capital & Class
- Vol. 37 (1) , 65-77
The financial crisis and intangible value
The concept of ‘finance’ or the ‘financial system’ can be confusing. The assumption is that the financial system consists of related markets trading in a variety of financial instruments that are ultimately of a similar nature. In the late-19th century, however, financial assets have bifurcated into broadly two classes of property titles: incorporeal assets and intangible assets. This article argues that interrelations between the two classes of assets have generated pro-cyclical trends that are not dealt with by current regulation. It argues that these pro-cyclical trends can be even more confusing in the age of globalisation.
- 14 January 2010
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Theoretical Inquiries in Law
- Vol. 11 (1) , 149-176
International Financial Centers: The British-Empire, City-States and Commercially Oriented Politics
Nearly forty percent of the world’s financial assets are located in loosely defined British Empire city-state jurisdictions. This article seeks to provide an explanation for this odd development. My explanation of the rise of such a British Empire-centered economy links the development of the Euromarket, or the offshore financial market, to three sets of theories. The first is the hinterland theory that explains why small city-state types of jurisdictions are in an advantageous position when it comes to trading in Euromarket financial assets in comparison to other states. Second is the dependent jurisdictions theory, which suggests that dependent jurisdictions are perceived as safer locations for investment than independent islands, in addition to which they are able to offer better treatment of nonresident capital because they are subsidized by the motherland. As the British Empire was the largest Empire the world has ever seen, it is perhaps not surprising that the British state has inherited the greatest number of such dependent jurisdictions, and that they, in turn, have taken advantage of their "Britishness" to develop their financial centers. Third, I advance a related argument that suggests that the hegemonic position of the British Empire in the world economy prior to the rise of the United States was an important factor as well. Here, I draw on the idea that city-states and, more generally, trading centers tend to be dominated by commercially outward-oriented elites.
- 14 January 2010
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Theoretical Inquiries in Law
- Vol. 11 (1) , 149-176
International Financial Centers: The British-Empire, City-States and Commercially Oriented Politics
Nearly forty percent of the world’s financial assets are located in loosely defined British Empire city-state jurisdictions. This article seeks to provide an explanation for this odd development. My explanation of the rise of such a British Empire-centered economy links the development of the Euromarket, or the offshore financial market, to three sets of theories. The first is the hinterland theory that explains why small city-state types of jurisdictions are in an advantageous position when it comes to trading in Euromarket financial assets in comparison to other states. Second is the dependent jurisdictions theory, which suggests that dependent jurisdictions are perceived as safer locations for investment than independent islands, in addition to which they are able to offer better treatment of nonresident capital because they are subsidized by the motherland. As the British Empire was the largest Empire the world has ever seen, it is perhaps not surprising that the British state has inherited the greatest number of such dependent jurisdictions, and that they, in turn, have taken advantage of their "Britishness" to develop their financial centers. Third, I advance a related argument that suggests that the hegemonic position of the British Empire in the world economy prior to the rise of the United States was an important factor as well. Here, I draw on the idea that city-states and, more generally, trading centers tend to be dominated by commercially outward-oriented elites.