Thorsteinn Sigurdur Sveinsson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Thorsteinn Sigurdur Sveinsson has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Svend E. Hougaard Jensen
Copenhagen Business School
3 shared publications - Filipe Bonito Vieira
KPMG Acor Tax
1 shared publication - Gylfi Zoega
Department of Economics, University of Iceland, Reykjavik, Iceland
1 shared publication - Miguel Sousa Duarte
Copenhagen Business School
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 32 (4) , 1076-1105
Working less for longer: unintended effects of longevity adjustment of retirement age
Using a standard macro model with overlapping generations in the manner of Blanchard–Yaari, we show that by broadening the labour supply on the extensive margin through longevity adjustment of the statutory retirement age, labour supply is likely to decrease on the intensive margin. However, this backlash effect depends on the specific design of the pension system. It is significantly higher under a pay-as-you-go scheme with fixed benefits compared to a pay-as-you-go scheme with fixed contributions and a fully funded scheme based on voluntary savings. The findings have implications for responses to the fiscal and macroeconomic challenges raised by an ageing population.
- 26 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 32 (4) , 1076-1105
Open AccessWorking less for longer: unintended effects of longevity adjustment of retirement age
Using a standard macro model with overlapping generations in the manner of Blanchard–Yaari, we show that by broadening the labour supply on the extensive margin through longevity adjustment of the statutory retirement age, labour supply is likely to decrease on the intensive margin. However, this backlash effect depends on the specific design of the pension system. It is significantly higher under a pay-as-you-go scheme with fixed benefits compared to a pay-as-you-go scheme with fixed contributions and a fully funded scheme based on voluntary savings. The findings have implications for responses to the fiscal and macroeconomic challenges raised by an ageing population.
- 24 January 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in CESifo Economic Studies
- Vol. 70 (1) , 1-16
Addressing Longevity Inequality: How Retirement Age Differentiation Can Be Implemented
Differences in life expectancy across socioeconomic groups create a serious problem of inequality within the public part of the pension system. This article considers two actuarially sound ways of addressing longevity inequality. The first is to allow low life-expectancy workers to retire earlier and delay the retirement of the high life-expectancy workers so that the two groups receive the same amount, equal to the expected discounted value of future pension benefits received by the average worker under the current system. The second, and more radical, is to delegate to occupational pension funds the task of paying out the public pension benefits to each retiree, based on a lump-sum transfer from the government to the pension funds of an amount for each retiree equivalent to the payout in the first scenario. (JEL codes: E21 and E24)
- 24 January 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in CESifo Economic Studies
- Vol. 70 (1) , 1-16
Addressing Longevity Inequality: How Retirement Age Differentiation Can Be Implemented
Differences in life expectancy across socioeconomic groups create a serious problem of inequality within the public part of the pension system. This article considers two actuarially sound ways of addressing longevity inequality. The first is to allow low life-expectancy workers to retire earlier and delay the retirement of the high life-expectancy workers so that the two groups receive the same amount, equal to the expected discounted value of future pension benefits received by the average worker under the current system. The second, and more radical, is to delegate to occupational pension funds the task of paying out the public pension benefits to each retiree, based on a lump-sum transfer from the government to the pension funds of an amount for each retiree equivalent to the payout in the first scenario. (JEL codes: E21 and E24)
- Open Access
- 2 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Working Less for Longer: Unintended Effects of Longevity Adjustment of Retirement Age
This paper utilises a model with overlapping generations ad modum Blanchard-Yaari and shows that by broadening the labour supply on the extensive margin through longevity adjustment of the statutory retirement age, labour supply is likely to decrease on the intensive margin. This backlash effect depends strongly on the specific design of the pension system: It is significantly higher under a pay-as-you-go scheme with fixed benefits compared to a pay-as-you-go scheme with fixed contributions and a fully funded scheme based on voluntary savings. The findings have implications for how to address the fiscal and macroeconomic challenges raised by an ageing population. JEL codes: E21, J21, J26, H55
- 2 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Open AccessWorking Less for Longer: Unintended Effects of Longevity Adjustment of Retirement Age
This paper utilises a model with overlapping generations ad modum Blanchard-Yaari and shows that by broadening the labour supply on the extensive margin through longevity adjustment of the statutory retirement age, labour supply is likely to decrease on the intensive margin. This backlash effect depends strongly on the specific design of the pension system: It is significantly higher under a pay-as-you-go scheme with fixed benefits compared to a pay-as-you-go scheme with fixed contributions and a fully funded scheme based on voluntary savings. The findings have implications for how to address the fiscal and macroeconomic challenges raised by an ageing population. JEL codes: E21, J21, J26, H55