Daniel P. Miller
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Daniel P. Miller has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dirk Krueger
University of Minnesota and NBER, U.S.A.; Wheaton College, U.S.A.; University of Pennsylvania and NBER, U.S.A.; Clemson University, U.S.A.
1 shared publication- Jungwon Yeo
Department of Economics, Pusan National University, Busan, South Korea
1 shared publication Patrick Bajari
University of Minnesota and NBER, U.S.A.; Wheaton College, U.S.A.; University of Pennsylvania and NBER, U.S.A.; Clemson University, U.S.A.
1 shared publicationPhoebe Chan
University of Minnesota and NBER, U.S.A.; Wheaton College, U.S.A.; University of Pennsylvania and NBER, U.S.A.; Clemson University, U.S.A.
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 April 2019
- Published by University of Chicago Press in American Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 5 (2) , 191-226
The Consequences of a Public Health Insurance Option: Evidence from Medicare Part D
This paper structurally estimates a demand and supply model of Medicare Part D and evaluates counterfactual scenarios that introduce a public option competing alongside private insurers. The results show that a public option with cost advantage expands coverage, crowds out private insurer enrollment, but has little effect on market premiums. Additional subsidy payments covering the expanded base of enrollees offset welfare gains regardless of the public option's cost position. In scenarios where private insurers cream skim the public option, risk adjustment payments create a pricing wedge that acts as a de facto subsidy for private insurers and tax on the public option, limiting the public option's penetration but improving welfare through lower private insurer premiums. Risk corridors can be used as a lever to regulate the pricing wedge and redistribute surplus.
- 1 April 2019
- Published by University of Chicago Press in American Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 5 (2) , 191-226
The Consequences of a Public Health Insurance Option: Evidence from Medicare Part D
This paper structurally estimates a demand and supply model of Medicare Part D and evaluates counterfactual scenarios that introduce a public option competing alongside private insurers. The results show that a public option with cost advantage expands coverage, crowds out private insurer enrollment, but has little effect on market premiums. Additional subsidy payments covering the expanded base of enrollees offset welfare gains regardless of the public option's cost position. In scenarios where private insurers cream skim the public option, risk adjustment payments create a pricing wedge that acts as a de facto subsidy for private insurers and tax on the public option, limiting the public option's penetration but improving welfare through lower private insurer premiums. Risk corridors can be used as a lever to regulate the pricing wedge and redistribute surplus.
- 29 October 2014
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 45 (4) , 705-746
Subcontracting and competitive bidding on incomplete procurement contracts
This article examines the impact of incomplete contracts on subcontracting and the design of procurement auctions. I estimate the effect of ex post contract revisions on unit costs for both subcontracted and in‐house performed work items on bridge projects procured by the California Department of Transportation. I model a scoring auction showing how ex post revisions skew bidding decisions and estimate unit costs from bid data using the method of sieve estimation. The results highlight the cost implications of incomplete contracting frictions, subcontracting decisions, and bidding distortions. In conclusion, I propose alternative auction mechanisms that could improve outcomes.
- 29 October 2014
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 45 (4) , 705-746
Subcontracting and competitive bidding on incomplete procurement contracts
This article examines the impact of incomplete contracts on subcontracting and the design of procurement auctions. I estimate the effect of ex post contract revisions on unit costs for both subcontracted and in‐house performed work items on bridge projects procured by the California Department of Transportation. I model a scoring auction showing how ex post revisions skew bidding decisions and estimate unit costs from bid data using the method of sieve estimation. The results highlight the cost implications of incomplete contracting frictions, subcontracting decisions, and bidding distortions. In conclusion, I propose alternative auction mechanisms that could improve outcomes.
- 17 April 2013
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 54 (2) , 409-442
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF HOUSING DEMAND: ESTIMATION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS*
Using data from the PSID, we estimate a dynamic model of housing demand with nonconvex adjustment costs, credit constraints, and uncertainty about income and home prices. We simulate how consumer behavior responds to house price and income declines as well as tightening credit. In response to a negative home price shock, households early in the life cycle climb the housing ladder more quickly and invest more in housing assets due to the lower price. With a concurrent negative income shock, however, housing demand falls among young and middle aged households who stay in smaller homes rather than to trade up.
- 17 April 2013
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 54 (2) , 409-442
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF HOUSING DEMAND: ESTIMATION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS*
Using data from the PSID, we estimate a dynamic model of housing demand with nonconvex adjustment costs, credit constraints, and uncertainty about income and home prices. We simulate how consumer behavior responds to house price and income declines as well as tightening credit. In response to a negative home price shock, households early in the life cycle climb the housing ladder more quickly and invest more in housing assets due to the lower price. With a concurrent negative income shock, however, housing demand falls among young and middle aged households who stay in smaller homes rather than to trade up.