Juan Lu

The unequal status between manufacturers and live-streamers often undermines supply chain profitability and social welfare. However, the “volume guarantee” commission mode, designed to mitigate this issue, has proven ineffective in practice. This paper adopts a Nash bargaining fairness framework to analyze this paradox, incorporating two defining features of live-streaming commerce: the social network effect and the streamer’s cost of purchasing public domain traffic. We develop a dynamic game model involving the platform, manufacturer, streamer, and consumers to examine commission mode selection and supply chain decision-making. Our analysis yields four key findings: (1) Under Nash bargaining fairness, the “volume guarantee” mode is invariably redundant, regardless of who sets the sales threshold. Bargaining power only influences profit distribution via commission rates without distorting optimal product pricing or traffic acquisition decisions. (2) The social network effect boosts product prices, traffic purchases, total profit, and social welfare, with its impact amplified by the streamer’s fanbase size. Thus, collaborating with top-streamers is advantageous for manufacturers. (3) While higher platform traffic costs do not affect the optimal product price, they reduce traffic purchase volume, thereby decreasing supply chain profits and social welfare. (4) To enhance social welfare, platforms can implement differentiated traffic pricing, offering discounts to top-streamers. This study provides critical managerial insights for designing fair contracts and fostering equitable cooperation in live-streaming ecosystems.

Purpose: This study aims to clarify the impact of agriculture–tourism integration (ATI) on in situ urbanization (ISURB) of rural residents, to highlight the role of industrial integration in the process of China's ISURB and to provide industrial integration suggestions for promoting urbanization quality in Chinese counties.Design/methodology/approach: By sorting out the panel data of China's 1868 counties, the evaluation index system of ISURB was constructed. Difference in difference (DID) and spatial Durbin-difference in difference (SDM-DID) model is used for estimate the relationship between ATI and ISURB.Findings: First, ATI can improve ISURB by 11.4% higher than other regions. Second, theoretical analysis model of ATI on ISURB is constructed from four aspects of “drive–push–pull–block.” The results show that ATI can promote ISURB by increasing upgrading of rural industries, rural employment demand and income capacity, whereas ATI may inhibit ISURB by reducing farmland. Third, considering changes in institutional, hard and soft factors, rural collective economy, information infrastructure and digital finance all promote positive impact of ATI on ISURB. Fourth, ATI will produce spillover effects on ISURB in neighboring regions, which is more pronounced in the central and western regions.Research limitations/implications: This study lacks quantification of ATI, so future studies are encouraged to further quantify ATI at the county level.Practical implications: This study has policy significance for constructing ATI demonstration counties and promoting ISURB in China's counties.Social implications: It is of great practical value to promote China's ISURB. By stimulating ATI, it can improve income and employment capacity of rural residents and stimulate ISURB of China.Originality/value: This study enriches the theoretical and practical research on industrial integration behaviors during the process of ISURB.Highlights: Use county data to measure in situ urbanization (ISURB) Agriculture–tourism integration (ATI) can increase ISURB Constructs a “drive-push-pull-block” model to explain the influence mechanism Use spatial Durbin-difference in difference (SDM-DID) models Consider collective economy, rural information infrastructure and digital finance Graphical

Green finance aims to intervene in investment and financing behaviors through financial means, so as to promote upgrading of heavily polluting industries. Whether it can reduce illegal pollution discharge behaviors is the focus of this paper. This paper is to explore the impact of green finance on illegal emissions of heavy polluting firms. Taking green finance pilot zones (GFPZ) in 2017 as a quasi-natural experiment, the paper measures illegal emission behaviors based on day-night difference of PM_2.5 at the nearest atmospheric monitoring points and tests the impact of GFPZ on illegal emissions based on triple difference model (DDD). The results show that GFPZ inhibits illegal emissions. Influence path result shows that GFPZ reduces illegal emissions by increasing financing constraint, green innovation, and fulfilling social responsibility. At the same time, this paper also notes that regulatory distance has an interference effect on GFPZ. GFPZ aggravates illegal emission as heavy polluting firms — financial institution’s distance is more than 40 km. GFPZ curbs illegal pollution more significantly as heavy polluting firms — environmental protection bureau distance is within 30 km. This paper aims to reveal the guiding effect of green finance on emission behavior of polluting firms and provide policy references for reducing emission and promoting green finance.

This paper mainly studies the impact of environmental protection tax (EPT) on the illegal emission behaviors of heavy polluting enterprises. Based on the real-time data from the nearest air monitoring points, this paper calculates the day-night difference of PM_2.5 to measure whether there are illegal emission behaviors. And, difference in difference method (DID) is used based on the quasi-natural experiment of EPT. First, the baseline DID results show that EPT reduces day-night difference of PM_2.5, and inhibits illegal emissions. Second, the influence paths results show that EPT can inhibit illegal emission by increasing innovation, environmental responsibility performance, and environmental penalty cost, and EPT aggravate illegal emissions by increasing environmental costs and environmental corruption. Third, the influence of different pollutant pricing on illegal emissions is further analyzed. The effect of air pollutant pricing on illegal emissions is inhibited first and then promoted, while higher water pollutant pricing will aggravate illegal emissions. This paper provides enlightenment on adjusting EPT policy for local governments to curb illegal emissions, and provides an economic explanation for the differences of illegal pollution discharge in different places.

Considering the situation of the frequent turnover of Chinese environmental protection officials (EPOT), this paper analyzes its impact on transboundary water pollution. The results show that EPOT can reduce transboundary pollution. EPOT can reduce the concentration of DO by 0.261 and NH3-N by 0.167 in the downstream river. And the impact shows a first strong and then weak change over time. EPOT can restrain transboundary pollution by reducing the production of polluting enterprises and promoting public pollution reporting, and it aggravates transboundary pollution by reducing environmental law enforcement and collaborative governance. In addition, the impact of EPOT on transboundary pollution has a distance effect. Within the regulatory distance of 50 km, EPOT has strong inhibition on transboundary pollution. When the governor and the environmental protection official (EPO) change tenure at the same time, the inhibition of transboundary pollution is the strongest. In addition, EPOs from the central government and with working experience in environmental protection departments can control transboundary pollution better.