Willem H. Boshoff
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Willem H. Boshoff has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Johan Fourie
LEAP, Department of Economics, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa
4 shared publications Laurie H. Binge
2 shared publicationsRossouw van Jaarsveld
Department of Economics, Centre for Competition Law and Economics Stellenbosch University
2 shared publicationsGavin Williams
1 shared publicationJohan Fourie
University of Stellenbosch
1 shared publication- Johannes Paha
Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 69 (2) , 169-204
Capacity Collusion and Overcharge Estimation
Collusion may change price dynamics prior to and, especially, following a formal period of coordination. This paper presents a dynamic model of capacity choice under partial irreversibility to study the implications of a capacity cartel on price dynamics and damage estimates. We study both transitory pre- and post-cartel adjustment effects as well as a long-run effect and find that collusion damage continues after the cartel ends, and may persist indefinitely when demand remains constant. These effects imply biased estimates of cartel overcharge by both dummy-variable and forecasting methods, both of which rely on data during and after the collusion.
- 15 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 69 (2) , 169-204
Open AccessCapacity Collusion and Overcharge Estimation
Collusion may change price dynamics prior to and, especially, following a formal period of coordination. This paper presents a dynamic model of capacity choice under partial irreversibility to study the implications of a capacity cartel on price dynamics and damage estimates. We study both transitory pre- and post-cartel adjustment effects as well as a long-run effect and find that collusion damage continues after the cartel ends, and may persist indefinitely when demand remains constant. These effects imply biased estimates of cartel overcharge by both dummy-variable and forecasting methods, both of which rely on data during and after the collusion.
- Open Access
- 19 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- p. 1-43
Bargaining Competition and Vertical Mergers: The Problem of Model Selection
The assumptions that distinguish bargaining models from one another are rarely observed, but can predetermine their predictions. In this paper, we map various popular bargaining models into vertical merger predictions across two competitive landscapes that consist of either one upstream firm and two downstream firms, or vice-versa. The models’ assumptions vary with respect to: (i) How parties bargain (Derived Demand versus Nash-in-Nash versus Nash-in-Shapley); and (ii) Over what (linear wholesale prices versus two-part prices versus quantity). The paper and accompanying online vertical merger simulator are designed to help economists and enforcers select the bargaining model that best characterizes observed pre-merger competition, and the loss of such competition following a vertical merger, in a given setting. The paper is designed to supplement the horizontal and vertical merger simulators that have been developed by economists who have served at the Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department.
- 19 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- p. 1-43
Open AccessBargaining Competition and Vertical Mergers: The Problem of Model Selection
The assumptions that distinguish bargaining models from one another are rarely observed, but can predetermine their predictions. In this paper, we map various popular bargaining models into vertical merger predictions across two competitive landscapes that consist of either one upstream firm and two downstream firms, or vice-versa. The models’ assumptions vary with respect to: (i) How parties bargain (Derived Demand versus Nash-in-Nash versus Nash-in-Shapley); and (ii) Over what (linear wholesale prices versus two-part prices versus quantity). The paper and accompanying online vertical merger simulator are designed to help economists and enforcers select the bargaining model that best characterizes observed pre-merger competition, and the loss of such competition following a vertical merger, in a given setting. The paper is designed to supplement the horizontal and vertical merger simulators that have been developed by economists who have served at the Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department.
- 16 February 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 60 (3) , 327-360
Characteristics of Prosecuted Cartels and Cartel Enforcement in South Africa
- 16 February 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 60 (3) , 327-360
Characteristics of Prosecuted Cartels and Cartel Enforcement in South Africa
- 7 February 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 60 (3) , 361-401
Non-competition Goals and Their Impact on South African Merger Control: An Empirical Analysis
- 7 February 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 60 (3) , 361-401
Non-competition Goals and Their Impact on South African Merger Control: An Empirical Analysis
- Open Access
- 20 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
- Vol. 21 (3) , 393-409
List Price Collusion
Firms sometimes collude by agreeing on increases in list prices. Yet, the efficacy of such list price collusion is subject to discussion as colluding firms might, in principle, deviate secretly from the elevated prices by granting their customers discounts. This article reviews cases of list price collusion in the USA and Europe, and it presents a theory of harm suggesting that a combination of anchoring, orientation on reference points, and loss aversion may render list price collusion effective in raising transaction prices—even if firms set transaction prices in a non-coordinated fashion.
- 20 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade
- Vol. 21 (3) , 393-409
Open AccessList Price Collusion
Firms sometimes collude by agreeing on increases in list prices. Yet, the efficacy of such list price collusion is subject to discussion as colluding firms might, in principle, deviate secretly from the elevated prices by granting their customers discounts. This article reviews cases of list price collusion in the USA and Europe, and it presents a theory of harm suggesting that a combination of anchoring, orientation on reference points, and loss aversion may render list price collusion effective in raising transaction prices—even if firms set transaction prices in a non-coordinated fashion.
- 29 September 2020
- Published by Wiley in South African Journal of Economics
- Vol. 89 (1) , 112-140
South African competition policy on excessive pricing and its relation to price gouging during the COVID‐19 disaster period
The declaration of a state of national disaster in South Africa, due to the COVID‐19 pandemic, was followed by excessive‐pricing regulations pertaining to certain consumer and medical products and services. The regulations and their application suggest an intertemporal benchmark to judge excessive pricing, deviating from previous practice. Intertemporal comparisons assume a structural shift during COVID‐19 that changes competitive conditions, related to changes in consumer behaviour. Such comparisons must also account for demand and cost changes. While the COVID‐19 regulations allow for cost‐based price increases, demand‐based increases are not explicitly accounted for, suggesting that the regulations are framed more generally as price‐gouging regulations. The differences between price‐gouging and excessive‐pricing benchmarks depends on the type of disaster‐period demand shock. They are similar following a transitory demand spike, provided sufficient time is allowed for dynamic price behaviour, but differ markedly when demand is elevated for the duration of the disaster period. Applying simple cost‐based comparisons in recently concluded cases against smaller retailers are consistent with excessive pricing, given the presence of a demand spike. To the extent that these involve persistently higher demand, cases against wholesalers and larger retailers will be more complicated, as such demand must be reflected in competitive prices.
- 29 September 2020
- Published by Wiley in South African Journal of Economics
- Vol. 89 (1) , 112-140
South African competition policy on excessive pricing and its relation to price gouging during the COVID‐19 disaster period
The declaration of a state of national disaster in South Africa, due to the COVID‐19 pandemic, was followed by excessive‐pricing regulations pertaining to certain consumer and medical products and services. The regulations and their application suggest an intertemporal benchmark to judge excessive pricing, deviating from previous practice. Intertemporal comparisons assume a structural shift during COVID‐19 that changes competitive conditions, related to changes in consumer behaviour. Such comparisons must also account for demand and cost changes. While the COVID‐19 regulations allow for cost‐based price increases, demand‐based increases are not explicitly accounted for, suggesting that the regulations are framed more generally as price‐gouging regulations. The differences between price‐gouging and excessive‐pricing benchmarks depends on the type of disaster‐period demand shock. They are similar following a transitory demand spike, provided sufficient time is allowed for dynamic price behaviour, but differ markedly when demand is elevated for the duration of the disaster period. Applying simple cost‐based comparisons in recently concluded cases against smaller retailers are consistent with excessive pricing, given the presence of a demand spike. To the extent that these involve persistently higher demand, cases against wholesalers and larger retailers will be more complicated, as such demand must be reflected in competitive prices.
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Economic Modelling
- Vol. 88, 113-131
Economic uncertainty in South Africa
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Economic Modelling
- Vol. 88, 113-131
Economic uncertainty in South Africa
- 21 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 9-48
What Do We Know About the South African Business Cycle?
- 21 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 9-48
What Do We Know About the South African Business Cycle?
- 21 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-6
Introduction
- 21 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 285-292
Conclusions