Alberto Giubilini
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Alberto Giubilini has a total of 50 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Julian Savulescu
Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
16 shared publications Julian Savulescu
Centre for Biomedical Ethics, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
11 shared publicationsMark Harrison
Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
4 shared publications- Angela R. McLean
University of Oxford
3 shared publications - Claas Kirchhelle
INSERM
3 shared publications - Dominic Wilkinson
Uehiro Oxford Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 97-110
Should Religion Be Permitted a Seat at the Table of Bioethics? The Case of Abortion
- 6 October 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 97-110
Open AccessShould Religion Be Permitted a Seat at the Table of Bioethics? The Case of Abortion
- Open Access
- 13 July 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Health Ethics
- Vol. 19 (2) , phag009
Best Interest, Basic Interest, and Parental Autonomy in Child Vaccination Choices. On Roland Pierik and Marcel Verweij's Inducing Immunity?
Roland Pierik and Marcel Verweij, in their excellent book Inducing Immunity?, draw a distinction between 'best interest' and 'basic interest' and use such distinction as a criterion for legitimate state interference with parental choices, including in the case of vaccination. While protection of children's basic interests does provide a solid basis for the justification of state intervention in vaccination decisions, I want to offer some considerations and raise some questions about how the distinction between best and basic interest is conceptualized in the book, about some assumption on the relationship between freedom of choice and best interest that that distinction implies, and about some broader implications for discussion of child vaccination. I will conclude by raising a question about the justification for mandating vaccination within Pierik's and Verweij's ethical framework.
- 13 July 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Public Health Ethics
- Vol. 19 (2) , phag009
Open AccessBest Interest, Basic Interest, and Parental Autonomy in Child Vaccination Choices. On Roland Pierik and Marcel Verweij's Inducing Immunity?
Roland Pierik and Marcel Verweij, in their excellent book Inducing Immunity?, draw a distinction between 'best interest' and 'basic interest' and use such distinction as a criterion for legitimate state interference with parental choices, including in the case of vaccination. While protection of children's basic interests does provide a solid basis for the justification of state intervention in vaccination decisions, I want to offer some considerations and raise some questions about how the distinction between best and basic interest is conceptualized in the book, about some assumption on the relationship between freedom of choice and best interest that that distinction implies, and about some broader implications for discussion of child vaccination. I will conclude by raising a question about the justification for mandating vaccination within Pierik's and Verweij's ethical framework.
- Open Access
Human Identity and Biotechnologies
Human DNA, the capacity for self‐awareness or for symbolic language, a sense of mortality, plasticity and adaptability, the disposition to pray, being created in the image of God. These are only a few of the answers that science, philosophy, (philosophical) anthropology, psychology, and theology have offered to the question of what makes us human. The relevance of the question contrasts sharply with the difficulty of understanding what exactly we are asking.
Open AccessHuman Identity and Biotechnologies
Human DNA, the capacity for self‐awareness or for symbolic language, a sense of mortality, plasticity and adaptability, the disposition to pray, being created in the image of God. These are only a few of the answers that science, philosophy, (philosophical) anthropology, psychology, and theology have offered to the question of what makes us human. The relevance of the question contrasts sharply with the difficulty of understanding what exactly we are asking.
- Open Access
- 18 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 38 (4) , 1-28
Privacy and Human-AI Relationships
Artificial intelligence (AI) agents such as chatbots and personal AI assistants are increasingly popular. These technologies raise new privacy concerns beyond those posed by other AI systems or information technologies. For example, anthropomorphic features of AI chatbots may invite users to disclose more information with these systems than they would otherwise, especially when users interact with chatbots in relationship-like ways. In this paper, we aim to develop a framework for assessing the distinctive privacy ramifications of AI agents, especially as humans begin to interact with them in relationship-like ways. In particular, we draw from prominent theories of privacy and results from human relational psychology to better understand how AI agents may affect human behavior and the flow of personal information. We then assess how these effects could bear on eight distinct values of privacy, such as autonomy, the value of forming and maintaining relationships, security from harm, and more.
- 18 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 38 (4) , 1-28
Open AccessPrivacy and Human-AI Relationships
Artificial intelligence (AI) agents such as chatbots and personal AI assistants are increasingly popular. These technologies raise new privacy concerns beyond those posed by other AI systems or information technologies. For example, anthropomorphic features of AI chatbots may invite users to disclose more information with these systems than they would otherwise, especially when users interact with chatbots in relationship-like ways. In this paper, we aim to develop a framework for assessing the distinctive privacy ramifications of AI agents, especially as humans begin to interact with them in relationship-like ways. In particular, we draw from prominent theories of privacy and results from human relational psychology to better understand how AI agents may affect human behavior and the flow of personal information. We then assess how these effects could bear on eight distinct values of privacy, such as autonomy, the value of forming and maintaining relationships, security from harm, and more.
- Open Access
- 9 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Monash Bioethics Review
- Vol. 44 (S1) , 1-5
Medical humanities, bioethics, and the (im)possibility of interdisciplinarity. Introduction to the special issue on the medical humanities in the 21st century
- 9 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Monash Bioethics Review
- Vol. 44 (S1) , 1-5
Open AccessMedical humanities, bioethics, and the (im)possibility of interdisciplinarity. Introduction to the special issue on the medical humanities in the 21st century
- Open Access
- 26 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Bioethical Inquiry
- Vol. 22 (3) , 527-537
It Is Not About AI, It’s About Humans. Responsibility Gaps and Medical AI
A lot of the language we use to refer to AI, including in healthcare, uses terminology that originally and literally applies to humans and human relationships. Such terminology includes both non-evaluative terms, like “learning,” “memory,” or “intelligence,” and evaluative terms, like “trust” or “responsibility.” In this article I focus on the latter type and the way it is applied specifically to the case of medical AI. Focusing on the discussion of “responsibility gaps” that, according to some, AI generates, I will suggest that such terminology is revealing of the nature of healthcare professional obligations and responsibility prior to and independently of the assessment of the use of AI tools in healthcare. The point I make is generalizable to AI as used and discussed more broadly: the language used to refer to AI often tells more about humans and human relationships than about AI itself and our relationship with it. In healthcare, whatever else AI will allow us to do, it can prompt us to reflect more thoroughly on professional responsibility and professional obligations.
- 26 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Bioethical Inquiry
- Vol. 22 (3) , 527-537
Open AccessIt Is Not About AI, It’s About Humans. Responsibility Gaps and Medical AI
A lot of the language we use to refer to AI, including in healthcare, uses terminology that originally and literally applies to humans and human relationships. Such terminology includes both non-evaluative terms, like “learning,” “memory,” or “intelligence,” and evaluative terms, like “trust” or “responsibility.” In this article I focus on the latter type and the way it is applied specifically to the case of medical AI. Focusing on the discussion of “responsibility gaps” that, according to some, AI generates, I will suggest that such terminology is revealing of the nature of healthcare professional obligations and responsibility prior to and independently of the assessment of the use of AI tools in healthcare. The point I make is generalizable to AI as used and discussed more broadly: the language used to refer to AI often tells more about humans and human relationships than about AI itself and our relationship with it. In healthcare, whatever else AI will allow us to do, it can prompt us to reflect more thoroughly on professional responsibility and professional obligations.
- Open Access
- 24 February 2025
- Published by Wiley in Developing World Bioethics
- Vol. 25 (4) , 268-279
What in the world is global health? A conceptual analysis
This article suggests that the concept of global health – and to an extent the field that it designates ‐ is problematic in various ways. Within public health, the concept of the ‘public’ has been widely investigated. However, “global health” has been introduced in academic, policy, and public discussion with comparably lower level of conceptual, philosophical scrutiny. Thus, while public health ethics addresses the ethical and political issues that the different meanings of ‘public’ allow to identify, global health ethics tends to leave ethical and political issues raised by the concept of ‘global health’ implicit and insufficiently analysed. I will briefly present the debate around the ‘public’ in public health, describing some of the ethical and political questions that might arise, depending on what ‘public’ is taken to mean. I will then use this discussion as a conceptual map for an analogous analysis of the concept of ‘global’ in global health. I will discuss what dimensions ‘global’ adds to the concept of ‘public’. In the second part of the article, I will briefly introduce the philosophical debate on the concept of health, before suggesting that its cultural sensitivity makes it ill‐suited to be qualified as ‘global’. All in all, this article wants to bring to light the ethical implications that the terminology of ‘global health’ introduces in academic research and public policy that goes under that heading, as a first step towards better defining the ethical contours of this discipline.
- 24 February 2025
- Published by Wiley in Developing World Bioethics
- Vol. 25 (4) , 268-279
Open AccessWhat in the world is global health? A conceptual analysis
This article suggests that the concept of global health – and to an extent the field that it designates ‐ is problematic in various ways. Within public health, the concept of the ‘public’ has been widely investigated. However, “global health” has been introduced in academic, policy, and public discussion with comparably lower level of conceptual, philosophical scrutiny. Thus, while public health ethics addresses the ethical and political issues that the different meanings of ‘public’ allow to identify, global health ethics tends to leave ethical and political issues raised by the concept of ‘global health’ implicit and insufficiently analysed. I will briefly present the debate around the ‘public’ in public health, describing some of the ethical and political questions that might arise, depending on what ‘public’ is taken to mean. I will then use this discussion as a conceptual map for an analogous analysis of the concept of ‘global’ in global health. I will discuss what dimensions ‘global’ adds to the concept of ‘public’. In the second part of the article, I will briefly introduce the philosophical debate on the concept of health, before suggesting that its cultural sensitivity makes it ill‐suited to be qualified as ‘global’. All in all, this article wants to bring to light the ethical implications that the terminology of ‘global health’ introduces in academic research and public policy that goes under that heading, as a first step towards better defining the ethical contours of this discipline.
- Open Access
- 15 December 2024
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 52 (1) , 58-65
Professional obligations and the demandingness of acting against one’s conscience
Conscience is typically invoked in healthcare to defend a right to conscientious objection, that is, the refusal by healthcare professionals to perform certain activities in the name of personal moral or religious views. On this approach, freedom of conscience should be respected when the individual is operating in a professional capacity. Others would argue, however, that a conscientious professional is one who can set aside one’s own moral or religious views when they conflict with professional obligations. The debate on conscientious objection has by and large crystallised around these two positions, with compromise positions aiming at striking a balance between the two, for instance, by arguing for referral requirements by objecting healthcare professionals. In this article, I suggest that the debate on conscientious objection in healthcare could benefit from being reframed as a problem around demandingness rather than one about freedom of conscience and moral integrity. Being a professional, and a healthcare professional specifically, typically requires taking on additional burdens compared with non-professionals. For instance, healthcare professionals are expected to take on themselves higher risks than the rest of the population. However, it is also widely agreed that there are limits to the additional risks and burdens that healthcare professionals should be expected to take on themselves. Thus, a question worth exploring is whether, among the extra burdens that healthcare professionals should be expected to take on themselves as a matter of professional obligation, there is the burden of acting against one’s own conscience.
- 15 December 2024
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 52 (1) , 58-65
Open AccessProfessional obligations and the demandingness of acting against one’s conscience
Conscience is typically invoked in healthcare to defend a right to conscientious objection, that is, the refusal by healthcare professionals to perform certain activities in the name of personal moral or religious views. On this approach, freedom of conscience should be respected when the individual is operating in a professional capacity. Others would argue, however, that a conscientious professional is one who can set aside one’s own moral or religious views when they conflict with professional obligations. The debate on conscientious objection has by and large crystallised around these two positions, with compromise positions aiming at striking a balance between the two, for instance, by arguing for referral requirements by objecting healthcare professionals. In this article, I suggest that the debate on conscientious objection in healthcare could benefit from being reframed as a problem around demandingness rather than one about freedom of conscience and moral integrity. Being a professional, and a healthcare professional specifically, typically requires taking on additional burdens compared with non-professionals. For instance, healthcare professionals are expected to take on themselves higher risks than the rest of the population. However, it is also widely agreed that there are limits to the additional risks and burdens that healthcare professionals should be expected to take on themselves. Thus, a question worth exploring is whether, among the extra burdens that healthcare professionals should be expected to take on themselves as a matter of professional obligation, there is the burden of acting against one’s own conscience.
- Open Access
- 21 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Science and Engineering Ethics
- Vol. 30 (6) , 1-15
Know Thyself, Improve Thyself: Personalized LLMs for Self-Knowledge and Moral Enhancement
In this paper, we suggest that personalized LLMs trained on information written by or otherwise pertaining to an individual could serve as artificial moral advisors (AMAs) that account for the dynamic nature of personal morality. These LLM-based AMAs would harness users’ past and present data to infer and make explicit their sometimes-shifting values and preferences, thereby fostering self-knowledge. Further, these systems may also assist in processes of self-creation, by helping users reflect on the kind of person they want to be and the actions and goals necessary for so becoming. The feasibility of LLMs providing such personalized moral insights remains uncertain pending further technical development. Nevertheless, we argue that this approach addresses limitations in existing AMA proposals reliant on either predetermined values or introspective self-knowledge.
- 21 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Science and Engineering Ethics
- Vol. 30 (6) , 1-15
Open AccessKnow Thyself, Improve Thyself: Personalized LLMs for Self-Knowledge and Moral Enhancement
In this paper, we suggest that personalized LLMs trained on information written by or otherwise pertaining to an individual could serve as artificial moral advisors (AMAs) that account for the dynamic nature of personal morality. These LLM-based AMAs would harness users’ past and present data to infer and make explicit their sometimes-shifting values and preferences, thereby fostering self-knowledge. Further, these systems may also assist in processes of self-creation, by helping users reflect on the kind of person they want to be and the actions and goals necessary for so becoming. The feasibility of LLMs providing such personalized moral insights remains uncertain pending further technical development. Nevertheless, we argue that this approach addresses limitations in existing AMA proposals reliant on either predetermined values or introspective self-knowledge.
- Open Access
- 26 March 2024
- Published by Medknow in Singapore Medical Journal
- Vol. 65 (3) , 150-158
Ethics of artificial intelligence in medicine
This article reviews the main ethical issues that arise from the use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in medicine. Issues around trust, responsibility, risks of discrimination, privacy, autonomy, and potential benefits and harms are assessed. For better or worse, AI is a promising technology that can revolutionise healthcare delivery. It is up to us to make AI a tool for the good by ensuring that ethical oversight accompanies the design, development and implementation of AI technology in clinical practice.
- 26 March 2024
- Published by Medknow in Singapore Medical Journal
- Vol. 65 (3) , 150-158
Open AccessEthics of artificial intelligence in medicine
This article reviews the main ethical issues that arise from the use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in medicine. Issues around trust, responsibility, risks of discrimination, privacy, autonomy, and potential benefits and harms are assessed. For better or worse, AI is a promising technology that can revolutionise healthcare delivery. It is up to us to make AI a tool for the good by ensuring that ethical oversight accompanies the design, development and implementation of AI technology in clinical practice.