Alexander W. Cappelen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Alexander W. Cappelen has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bertil Tungodden
Norwegian School of Economics
12 shared publications Bertil Tungodden
NHH Norwegian School of Economics Bergen Norway
8 shared publications- Erik Ø. Sørensen
NHH Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway
7 shared publications Cornelius Cappelen
University of Bergen Bergen Norway
2 shared publications- Ole Frithjof Norheim
Department of Global Public Health and Primary Care, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
2 shared publications - Astri Drange Hole
Bergen University College, P.O. Box 7030, 5020 Bergen, Norway
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 21 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Human Behaviour
- Vol. 10 (9) , 1615-1617
Meritocracy and inequality acceptance
- 21 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Human Behaviour
- Vol. 10 (9) , 1615-1617
Meritocracy and inequality acceptance
- Open Access
- 11 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Economic Inequality
- Vol. 23 (3) , 623-636
Inequality acceptance in China: fairness views, inequality beliefs, and policy attitudes in a socialist market economy
Growing inequality poses a fundamental challenge to China’s socialist market economy. In a large-scale comparative study, we examine fairness views and beliefs about the source of inequality in China and compare them with those in two other major economies: the United States and Germany. We find that people in China consider hard work and talent much fairer sources of inequality than luck, and tend to believe that hard work and talent are much more important sources of inequality than luck. The fairness views and inequality beliefs of the Chinese are more similar to those of Americans than of Germans. In contrast, support for governmental redistribution is substantially higher in China than in the United States, comparable to the level of support observed in Germany. Our findings shed light on the challenging situation in China, characterized by high inequality and an underdeveloped welfare system, and underscore the need to balance increasing public demand for redistribution with the pursuit of market-oriented policies.
- 11 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Economic Inequality
- Vol. 23 (3) , 623-636
Open AccessInequality acceptance in China: fairness views, inequality beliefs, and policy attitudes in a socialist market economy
Growing inequality poses a fundamental challenge to China’s socialist market economy. In a large-scale comparative study, we examine fairness views and beliefs about the source of inequality in China and compare them with those in two other major economies: the United States and Germany. We find that people in China consider hard work and talent much fairer sources of inequality than luck, and tend to believe that hard work and talent are much more important sources of inequality than luck. The fairness views and inequality beliefs of the Chinese are more similar to those of Americans than of Germans. In contrast, support for governmental redistribution is substantially higher in China than in the United States, comparable to the level of support observed in Germany. Our findings shed light on the challenging situation in China, characterized by high inequality and an underdeveloped welfare system, and underscore the need to balance increasing public demand for redistribution with the pursuit of market-oriented policies.
- 23 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 237
Cooperation creates moral obligations
- 23 July 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 237
Cooperation creates moral obligations
- 1 May 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (5) , 3983-3995
Cancel the Deal? An Experimental Study on the Exploitation of Irrational Consumers
Consumers can sometimes be exploited because they make mistakes in their valuation of products. We present the results from a large-scale experimental study that examines whether third-party spectators from the general population in the United States cancel a voluntary deal where a buyer has made a mistake in the valuation of a product and agreed to pay more for the product than the seller knows it is worth. We find that the majority of the spectators cancel such deals, even when the seller’s involvement is limited to accepting a proposal made by the buyer. A substantial share of these spectators is also willing to fine the seller. However, a large minority of the spectators are willing to uphold the deal even when the seller has proposed the deal and obfuscated the information provided to the buyer. Our results shed new light on when people view market transactions as acceptable and their attitudes to government regulation of businesses. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This project was financed with support from the Norges Forskningsråd [Centres of Excellence Scheme Centre for Experimental Research on Fairness, Inequality and Rationality Project 262675 Grants 236995, 250415, 262636, and 302145]. The project also received funding from the European Research Council [the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme Grant 788433]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01050 .
- 1 May 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (5) , 3983-3995
Cancel the Deal? An Experimental Study on the Exploitation of Irrational Consumers
Consumers can sometimes be exploited because they make mistakes in their valuation of products. We present the results from a large-scale experimental study that examines whether third-party spectators from the general population in the United States cancel a voluntary deal where a buyer has made a mistake in the valuation of a product and agreed to pay more for the product than the seller knows it is worth. We find that the majority of the spectators cancel such deals, even when the seller’s involvement is limited to accepting a proposal made by the buyer. A substantial share of these spectators is also willing to fine the seller. However, a large minority of the spectators are willing to uphold the deal even when the seller has proposed the deal and obfuscated the information provided to the buyer. Our results shed new light on when people view market transactions as acceptable and their attitudes to government regulation of businesses. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This project was financed with support from the Norges Forskningsråd [Centres of Excellence Scheme Centre for Experimental Research on Fairness, Inequality and Rationality Project 262675 Grants 236995, 250415, 262636, and 302145]. The project also received funding from the European Research Council [the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme Grant 788433]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01050 .
- 23 October 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 142, 866-878
The development gap in economic rationality of future elites
- 23 October 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 142, 866-878
The development gap in economic rationality of future elites
- 21 November 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 133 (651) , 951-970
The Merit Primacy Effect
A long history in economics going back to Adam Smith has argued that people give primacy to merit—rather than luck—in distributive choices. We provide a theoretical framework formalising the merit primacy effect, and study it in a novel experiment where third-party spectators redistribute from high earners to low earners in situations where both merit and luck determine earnings. We identify a strong and consistent merit primacy effect in the spectator behaviour. The results shed new light on inequality acceptance in society, by showing how just a little bit of merit can make people significantly more inequality accepting.
- 21 November 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 133 (651) , 951-970
The Merit Primacy Effect
A long history in economics going back to Adam Smith has argued that people give primacy to merit—rather than luck—in distributive choices. We provide a theoretical framework formalising the merit primacy effect, and study it in a novel experiment where third-party spectators redistribute from high earners to low earners in situations where both merit and luck determine earnings. We identify a strong and consistent merit primacy effect in the spectator behaviour. The results shed new light on inequality acceptance in society, by showing how just a little bit of merit can make people significantly more inequality accepting.
- Open Access
- 10 January 2022
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 119 (3)
Global evidence on the selfish rich inequality hypothesis
Significance: People’s beliefs about why the rich are richer than the poor have the potential to affect both policy attitudes and economic development. We provide global evidence showing that where the fortunes of the rich are perceived to be the result of selfish behavior, inequality is viewed as unfair, and there is stronger support for income redistribution. However, we also observe that belief in selfish rich inequality is highly polarized in many countries and thus a source of political disagreement that might be detrimental to economic development. We find systematic country differences in the extent to which people believe that selfishness is a source of inequality, which sheds light on international differences in public morality, civic virtues, and redistributive policies.
- 10 January 2022
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 119 (3)
Open AccessGlobal evidence on the selfish rich inequality hypothesis
Significance: People’s beliefs about why the rich are richer than the poor have the potential to affect both policy attitudes and economic development. We provide global evidence showing that where the fortunes of the rich are perceived to be the result of selfish behavior, inequality is viewed as unfair, and there is stronger support for income redistribution. However, we also observe that belief in selfish rich inequality is highly polarized in many countries and thus a source of political disagreement that might be detrimental to economic development. We find systematic country differences in the extent to which people believe that selfishness is a source of inequality, which sheds light on international differences in public morality, civic virtues, and redistributive policies.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 66 (7) , 2801-2819
You’ve Got Mail: A Randomized Field Experiment on Tax Evasion
We report from a large-scale randomized field experiment conducted on a unique sample of more than 15,000 taxpayers in Norway who were likely to have misreported their foreign income. By randomly manipulating a letter from the tax authorities, we cleanly identify that moral suasion and the perceived detection probability play a crucial role in shaping taxpayer behavior. The moral letter mainly works on the intensive margin, while the detection letter has a strong effect on the extensive margin. We further show that only the detection letter has long-term effects on tax compliance. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics.
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 66 (7) , 2801-2819
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessYou’ve Got Mail: A Randomized Field Experiment on Tax Evasion
We report from a large-scale randomized field experiment conducted on a unique sample of more than 15,000 taxpayers in Norway who were likely to have misreported their foreign income. By randomly manipulating a letter from the tax authorities, we cleanly identify that moral suasion and the perceived detection probability play a crucial role in shaping taxpayer behavior. The moral letter mainly works on the intensive margin, while the detection letter has a strong effect on the extensive margin. We further show that only the detection letter has long-term effects on tax compliance. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics.
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 65 (6) , 2832-2841
Fairness in Bankruptcies: An Experimental Study
The pari passu principle of awarding claimants proportionally to their pre-insolvency claims is the most prominent principle in the law of insolvency. We report from a lab experiment designed to study whether people find this principle a fair solution to the bankruptcy problem. The experimental design generates situations where participants work and accumulate claims in firms, some of which subsequently go bankrupt. Third-party arbitrators are randomly assigned to determine how the liquidation value of the bankrupt firms should be distributed between claimants. Our main finding is that there is a striking support for the pari passu principle. We estimate a random utility model that allows for the arbitrators to differ in what they consider a fair solution to the bankruptcy problem and find that about 85% of the participants endorse the proportional rule. We also find that a nonnegligible fraction of the arbitrators follow the constrained equal losses rule, while there is almost no support in our experiment for the constrained equal awards rule or other fairness rules suggested in the normative literature. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3029. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, behavioral economics.
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 65 (6) , 2832-2841
Fairness in Bankruptcies: An Experimental Study
The pari passu principle of awarding claimants proportionally to their pre-insolvency claims is the most prominent principle in the law of insolvency. We report from a lab experiment designed to study whether people find this principle a fair solution to the bankruptcy problem. The experimental design generates situations where participants work and accumulate claims in firms, some of which subsequently go bankrupt. Third-party arbitrators are randomly assigned to determine how the liquidation value of the bankrupt firms should be distributed between claimants. Our main finding is that there is a striking support for the pari passu principle. We estimate a random utility model that allows for the arbitrators to differ in what they consider a fair solution to the bankruptcy problem and find that about 85% of the participants endorse the proportional rule. We also find that a nonnegligible fraction of the arbitrators follow the constrained equal losses rule, while there is almost no support in our experiment for the constrained equal awards rule or other fairness rules suggested in the normative literature. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3029. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, behavioral economics.