Magdalena Adamus
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Magdalena Adamus has a total of 202 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jakub Šrol
University of Kent, London and South East University Group
13 shared publications - Eva Ballová Mikušková
Constantine the Philosopher University in Nitra
12 shared publications - Matúš Grežo
Institute of Experimental Psychology of the Centre of Social and Psychological Sciences, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava, Slovakia
7 shared publications Vladimíra Čavojová
Institute of Experimental Psychology, Slovak Academy of Sciences
6 shared publications- Beáta Sobotová
Institute of Psychology Czech Academy of Sciences Brno Czech Republic
5 shared publications Eva Ballová Mikušková
Centre of Social and Psychological Sciences Slovak Academy of Sciences Bratislava Slovakia
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Towards an Integrative, Interdisciplinary, and Multidimensional Approach to Curbing Epistemically Suspect Beliefs: A Commentary on Bronstein et al. (2026)
In this commentary, we endorse the recent call by Bronstein et al. (2026) to open a polyphonic debate and bring clinical psychology into the dialogue on the nature, causes, and consequences of epistemically suspect beliefs. We concur with the authors’ call for creating an integrative approach that would triangulate findings across different disciplines in a much-needed attempt to harmonise knowledge about individual, situational, and structural factors that contribute to the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs. Using economic anxiety as a model case, we then show how the integration of clinical insights could inform innovative, cost-effective, and scalable intervention programmes. Finally, we call for careful consideration of the risks associated with incorporating the clinical perspective, particularly the potential pathologisation of epistemically suspect beliefs and stigmatisation of those who endorse them, as well as the need to carefully distinguish delusions from ill-informed beliefs and rational suspicions.
- 24 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessTowards an Integrative, Interdisciplinary, and Multidimensional Approach to Curbing Epistemically Suspect Beliefs: A Commentary on Bronstein et al. (2026)
In this commentary, we endorse the recent call by Bronstein et al. (2026) to open a polyphonic debate and bring clinical psychology into the dialogue on the nature, causes, and consequences of epistemically suspect beliefs. We concur with the authors’ call for creating an integrative approach that would triangulate findings across different disciplines in a much-needed attempt to harmonise knowledge about individual, situational, and structural factors that contribute to the endorsement of epistemically suspect beliefs. Using economic anxiety as a model case, we then show how the integration of clinical insights could inform innovative, cost-effective, and scalable intervention programmes. Finally, we call for careful consideration of the risks associated with incorporating the clinical perspective, particularly the potential pathologisation of epistemically suspect beliefs and stigmatisation of those who endorse them, as well as the need to carefully distinguish delusions from ill-informed beliefs and rational suspicions.
- Open Access
- 18 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Socio-functional model of attitudes towards migrants: the role of institutional distrust, sense of threat and conspiratorial thinking
Across three studies the current paper unpacks negative attitudes towards migrants in the context of the socio-functional model that binds together the sense of threat, institutional distrust, and conspiratorial thinking. Using a comprehensive multi-country dataset (Study 1) and two longitudinal studies from Slovakia and Czechia (Studies 2 and 3), the paper delves into the roots of anti-migration stances among European citizens. In Study 1 (N = 41,455), we analysed the ESS wave 10 data about conspiracy beliefs, institutional distrust, migration policy preferences, and the sense of threat allegedly posed by migrants. Study 2 (N = 938) shows that, at the between-participants level, conspiracy beliefs about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, institutional distrust and attitudes towards Ukrainian refugees are associated. No clear effects hold at the within-participants level, though. Finally, Study 3 (N = 856) shows that conspiracy mentality – rather than specific conspiracy beliefs about migration – is bidirectionally associated with the sense of threat allegedly posed by the migrants, pointing to conspiratorial thinking as a generalised metacognitive tendency to construe outgroup intentions and actions as malignant. Jointly, the studies explain the logic of anti-migration attitudes as immersed in the socio-functional model in which threat appraisals, conspiratorial thinking and attitudes towards outgroups are intertwined.
- 18 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessSocio-functional model of attitudes towards migrants: the role of institutional distrust, sense of threat and conspiratorial thinking
Across three studies the current paper unpacks negative attitudes towards migrants in the context of the socio-functional model that binds together the sense of threat, institutional distrust, and conspiratorial thinking. Using a comprehensive multi-country dataset (Study 1) and two longitudinal studies from Slovakia and Czechia (Studies 2 and 3), the paper delves into the roots of anti-migration stances among European citizens. In Study 1 (N = 41,455), we analysed the ESS wave 10 data about conspiracy beliefs, institutional distrust, migration policy preferences, and the sense of threat allegedly posed by migrants. Study 2 (N = 938) shows that, at the between-participants level, conspiracy beliefs about the Russian invasion of Ukraine, institutional distrust and attitudes towards Ukrainian refugees are associated. No clear effects hold at the within-participants level, though. Finally, Study 3 (N = 856) shows that conspiracy mentality – rather than specific conspiracy beliefs about migration – is bidirectionally associated with the sense of threat allegedly posed by the migrants, pointing to conspiratorial thinking as a generalised metacognitive tendency to construe outgroup intentions and actions as malignant. Jointly, the studies explain the logic of anti-migration attitudes as immersed in the socio-functional model in which threat appraisals, conspiratorial thinking and attitudes towards outgroups are intertwined.
- Open Access
- 26 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Instrumentalising gender conspiracy theories: how narratives about gender ideology may both reflect and fuel general institutional distrust
In two cross-sectional and one longitudinal study conducted in Slovakia and Czechia (total N = 2339, 50,7% women; aged between 18 and 89 years), we tested whether gender ideology narratives are linked with conspiratorial thinking - operationalised as either specific conspiracy beliefs or conspiracy mentality - and pinpointed their most pronounced correlates as political ideologies and institutional distrust. The cross-sectional results show that support for gender ideology narratives is associated with conspiratorial thinking and, albeit unrelated to sociodemographic variables, shows systematic associations with institutional distrust and political stances as expressed by either collective narcissism or conservative political orientation. The preregistered Study 3 fine-tunes the findings by revealing some bidirectional temporal patterns at the within-participants level only with institutional distrust. The results point to a mutually reinforcing nexus between the gender ideology narratives and distrust thereby fostering the understanding of the narratives as embedded within a wider context of power challenging conspiracy theories. Finally, the paper offers insights into how–by exploiting and instilling the sense of distrust–gender ideology narratives can be instrumentalised to tilt political preferences towards anti-establishment, non-mainstream parties that present themselves as beacons of traditional values.
- 26 August 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessInstrumentalising gender conspiracy theories: how narratives about gender ideology may both reflect and fuel general institutional distrust
In two cross-sectional and one longitudinal study conducted in Slovakia and Czechia (total N = 2339, 50,7% women; aged between 18 and 89 years), we tested whether gender ideology narratives are linked with conspiratorial thinking - operationalised as either specific conspiracy beliefs or conspiracy mentality - and pinpointed their most pronounced correlates as political ideologies and institutional distrust. The cross-sectional results show that support for gender ideology narratives is associated with conspiratorial thinking and, albeit unrelated to sociodemographic variables, shows systematic associations with institutional distrust and political stances as expressed by either collective narcissism or conservative political orientation. The preregistered Study 3 fine-tunes the findings by revealing some bidirectional temporal patterns at the within-participants level only with institutional distrust. The results point to a mutually reinforcing nexus between the gender ideology narratives and distrust thereby fostering the understanding of the narratives as embedded within a wider context of power challenging conspiracy theories. Finally, the paper offers insights into how–by exploiting and instilling the sense of distrust–gender ideology narratives can be instrumentalised to tilt political preferences towards anti-establishment, non-mainstream parties that present themselves as beacons of traditional values.
- Open Access
- 24 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
When Values Meet Incentives: Moral Wiggle Room and Rational-Agent Recommendations Across Generations
We investigate whether self-interested behavior becomes more prevalent when choice architecture explicitly encourages payoff maximization. In a crossgenerational laboratory experiment, we compare Generation Z (Zoomers) and Baby Boomers across three decision-making contexts involving a conflict between values and monetary incentives: charitable giving, performance self-reporting, and a social (Prisoner's) dilemma. We induce moral wiggle room by providing treated participants with rational-agent recommendations identifying the choice that maximizes their own monetary payoff, thereby endorsing selfishness and dishonesty. Baseline results show that Boomers are more generous and more honest than Zoomers, while cooperation is similar across generations. Rational-agent recommendations reduce charitable giving among Zoomers and increase expectations that opponents will defect, which is accompanied by lower rates of cooperation, particularly among Boomers. In contrast, recommendations to behave dishonestly do not significantly increase cheating in either generation. Our findings suggest that moral wiggle room may facilitate self-interested choices at the margin, but that internalized values remain powerful constraints on opportunistic behavior.
- 24 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWhen Values Meet Incentives: Moral Wiggle Room and Rational-Agent Recommendations Across Generations
We investigate whether self-interested behavior becomes more prevalent when choice architecture explicitly encourages payoff maximization. In a crossgenerational laboratory experiment, we compare Generation Z (Zoomers) and Baby Boomers across three decision-making contexts involving a conflict between values and monetary incentives: charitable giving, performance self-reporting, and a social (Prisoner's) dilemma. We induce moral wiggle room by providing treated participants with rational-agent recommendations identifying the choice that maximizes their own monetary payoff, thereby endorsing selfishness and dishonesty. Baseline results show that Boomers are more generous and more honest than Zoomers, while cooperation is similar across generations. Rational-agent recommendations reduce charitable giving among Zoomers and increase expectations that opponents will defect, which is accompanied by lower rates of cooperation, particularly among Boomers. In contrast, recommendations to behave dishonestly do not significantly increase cheating in either generation. Our findings suggest that moral wiggle room may facilitate self-interested choices at the margin, but that internalized values remain powerful constraints on opportunistic behavior.
- Open Access
- 26 April 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Half the Test: A Response to Marques et al.’s (2026) “Testing the socio-functional model”
With this brief contribution, we would like to respond to a recently published paper by Marques et al. (2026) who conclude that their findings falsify the socio-functional model of conspiracy beliefs (Adam-Troian et al., 2023). However, their main analysis focuses on precarity as a predictor, without longitudinally testing the model’s proposed mediator—institutional distrust. This is a critical oversight, as institutional trust is a constitutional element of the socio-functional model and plays a central role in the relationship between precarity and conspiracy belief, as is demonstrated in our own longitudinal study (Adamus et al., 2026), published concurrently in the same issue of BJSP, (https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.70036. Unfortunately, Marques et al. (2026) do not refer to or acknowledge our paper, likely due to the simultaneous publication timing. This oversight is significant, as our findings directly address the limitations of their conclusions. Our response clarifies that: 1) Marques et al.’s (2026) null findings regarding precarity do not invalidate the socio-functional model, as they did not test its full architecture, including the critical mediator of institutional distrust. 2) Our data reveal a bidirectional relationship between institutional distrust and conspiracy beliefs, a dynamic absent from their analysis but essential to the model’s explanatory power. 3) These insights have direct implications for interventions, suggesting that efforts to mitigate conspiracy beliefs should focus on restoring institutional trust rather than solely addressing economic precarity.
- 26 April 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessHalf the Test: A Response to Marques et al.’s (2026) “Testing the socio-functional model”
With this brief contribution, we would like to respond to a recently published paper by Marques et al. (2026) who conclude that their findings falsify the socio-functional model of conspiracy beliefs (Adam-Troian et al., 2023). However, their main analysis focuses on precarity as a predictor, without longitudinally testing the model’s proposed mediator—institutional distrust. This is a critical oversight, as institutional trust is a constitutional element of the socio-functional model and plays a central role in the relationship between precarity and conspiracy belief, as is demonstrated in our own longitudinal study (Adamus et al., 2026), published concurrently in the same issue of BJSP, (https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.70036. Unfortunately, Marques et al. (2026) do not refer to or acknowledge our paper, likely due to the simultaneous publication timing. This oversight is significant, as our findings directly address the limitations of their conclusions. Our response clarifies that: 1) Marques et al.’s (2026) null findings regarding precarity do not invalidate the socio-functional model, as they did not test its full architecture, including the critical mediator of institutional distrust. 2) Our data reveal a bidirectional relationship between institutional distrust and conspiracy beliefs, a dynamic absent from their analysis but essential to the model’s explanatory power. 3) These insights have direct implications for interventions, suggesting that efforts to mitigate conspiracy beliefs should focus on restoring institutional trust rather than solely addressing economic precarity.
- Open Access
- 17 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
The conspicious (conspiracist and suspicious) mindset trap: Longitudinal bidirectional relationships between precarity, institutional trust and conspiracy beliefs
The paper reports findings of a preregistered longitudinal replication examining the extent to which institutional trust mediates the relationship between individuals’ sense of precarity and their adherence to conspiracy beliefs. Across three waves, 925 participants (50.2% female) between the age of 18 and 85 (M = 49.53; SD = 15.81) reported subjective appraisals of their financial situation (precarity), trust in eight institutions (e.g., Slovak government and president, European Union), and adherence to conspiracy beliefs. The results point to a self-enhancing nature of the relationship between the variables which show to be intrinsically intertwined and, with time, reinforce their aversive effects on one another. Unlike cross-sectional studies replicated here, the current results support the view that the sense of precarity is an outcome of adherence to conspiracy beliefs rather than its cause, while institutional (dis)trust and conspiracy beliefs show a consistently bidirectional pattern jointly contributing to the formation of conspicious (conspiracist + suspicious) mindset. As a consequence, conspiracy theorists may fall into a trap of conspiracy beliefs, suspicions, and pessimistic appraisal of their living (economic and institutional) circumstances. The paper discusses theoretical and practical consequences of the bidirectionality as the findings may substantially contribute to our understanding of conspiracy beliefs and consideration of potential interventions aimed at mitigating their real-life ramifications.
- 17 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessThe conspicious (conspiracist and suspicious) mindset trap: Longitudinal bidirectional relationships between precarity, institutional trust and conspiracy beliefs
The paper reports findings of a preregistered longitudinal replication examining the extent to which institutional trust mediates the relationship between individuals’ sense of precarity and their adherence to conspiracy beliefs. Across three waves, 925 participants (50.2% female) between the age of 18 and 85 (M = 49.53; SD = 15.81) reported subjective appraisals of their financial situation (precarity), trust in eight institutions (e.g., Slovak government and president, European Union), and adherence to conspiracy beliefs. The results point to a self-enhancing nature of the relationship between the variables which show to be intrinsically intertwined and, with time, reinforce their aversive effects on one another. Unlike cross-sectional studies replicated here, the current results support the view that the sense of precarity is an outcome of adherence to conspiracy beliefs rather than its cause, while institutional (dis)trust and conspiracy beliefs show a consistently bidirectional pattern jointly contributing to the formation of conspicious (conspiracist + suspicious) mindset. As a consequence, conspiracy theorists may fall into a trap of conspiracy beliefs, suspicions, and pessimistic appraisal of their living (economic and institutional) circumstances. The paper discusses theoretical and practical consequences of the bidirectionality as the findings may substantially contribute to our understanding of conspiracy beliefs and consideration of potential interventions aimed at mitigating their real-life ramifications.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 February 2026
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in American Psychologist
- Vol. 81 (2) , 221-237
The gender gap in the care economy is larger in highly developed countries: Sociocultural explanations for paradoxical findings.
Despite the growing demand for care economy employees (e.g., nurses, teachers, and social workers), men remain underrepresented in these careers. While economically developed countries support more equal rights for women and men, their labor markets are highly gender segregated (Charles, 1992, 2003). We conducted a focused investigation of this paradoxical pattern in the care economy, testing whether gender gaps in care economy career interest are larger in more economically developed countries and, if so, what psychological and cultural factors underlie these patterns. We examined these questions with labor data from 70 countries (Study 1) and a preregistered study of career interests among 19,240 university students from 49 countries (Study 2). Although more economically developed countries tend to promote greater gender equality, our results reveal that the gender gap in care economy representation (Study 1) and interest (Study 2) is especially large in such countries. We did not observe parallel patterns for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics representation or interest. Results from Study 2 supported an integrated theoretical account of this development paradox in care economy interest: Cross-national variation in the gender gap in care economy interest was predicted by country-level variation in economic development and individualism/collectivism but not by self-expression values or country-level gender equality, countering prior (controversial) claims of a gender equality paradox. Furthermore, larger gender gaps in communal values (e.g., men's lower valuing of helping and caring for others) were a proximal predictor of larger gender gaps in care economy interest in highly economically developed countries. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 February 2026
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in American Psychologist
- Vol. 81 (2) , 221-237
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessThe gender gap in the care economy is larger in highly developed countries: Sociocultural explanations for paradoxical findings.
Despite the growing demand for care economy employees (e.g., nurses, teachers, and social workers), men remain underrepresented in these careers. While economically developed countries support more equal rights for women and men, their labor markets are highly gender segregated (Charles, 1992, 2003). We conducted a focused investigation of this paradoxical pattern in the care economy, testing whether gender gaps in care economy career interest are larger in more economically developed countries and, if so, what psychological and cultural factors underlie these patterns. We examined these questions with labor data from 70 countries (Study 1) and a preregistered study of career interests among 19,240 university students from 49 countries (Study 2). Although more economically developed countries tend to promote greater gender equality, our results reveal that the gender gap in care economy representation (Study 1) and interest (Study 2) is especially large in such countries. We did not observe parallel patterns for science, technology, engineering, and mathematics representation or interest. Results from Study 2 supported an integrated theoretical account of this development paradox in care economy interest: Cross-national variation in the gender gap in care economy interest was predicted by country-level variation in economic development and individualism/collectivism but not by self-expression values or country-level gender equality, countering prior (controversial) claims of a gender equality paradox. Furthermore, larger gender gaps in communal values (e.g., men's lower valuing of helping and caring for others) were a proximal predictor of larger gender gaps in care economy interest in highly economically developed countries. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
- 15 December 2025
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 65 (1) , e70036
Longitudinal analysis shows possible distinct patterns of associations between conspiracy beliefs and either institutional distrust or the sense of precarity
The paper reports longitudinal analyses examining the extent to which institutional trust mediates the relationship between individuals' sense of precarity and their adherence to conspiracy beliefs. Across three waves, 925 participants (50.2% female) between the ages of 18 and 85 (M = 49.53; SD = 15.81) reported subjective appraisals of their financial situation (precarity), trust in institutions and adherence to conspiracy beliefs. The current study extends the previous analyses by including three‐wave longitudinal data. The preregistered autoregressive cross‐lagged panel model supports the notion that a sense of precarity follows adherence to conspiracy beliefs rather than preceding them, while institutional (dis)trust and conspiracy beliefs show a bidirectional pattern. However, the random‐intercept cross‐lagged panel model does not corroborate this, suggesting that the effects may be driven by stable between‐person differences rather than actual within‐person changes. Additionally, the latter model reveals two separate temporal patterns linking conspiracy beliefs with either the sense of precarity or institutional trust, opening the possibility that our results were driven by two distinct underlying mechanisms. The paper discusses the importance of longitudinal studies for a more accurate understanding of social‐psychological realities in which conspiracy beliefs and suspicions of institutions may flourish.
- 15 December 2025
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 65 (1) , e70036
Open AccessLongitudinal analysis shows possible distinct patterns of associations between conspiracy beliefs and either institutional distrust or the sense of precarity
The paper reports longitudinal analyses examining the extent to which institutional trust mediates the relationship between individuals' sense of precarity and their adherence to conspiracy beliefs. Across three waves, 925 participants (50.2% female) between the ages of 18 and 85 (M = 49.53; SD = 15.81) reported subjective appraisals of their financial situation (precarity), trust in institutions and adherence to conspiracy beliefs. The current study extends the previous analyses by including three‐wave longitudinal data. The preregistered autoregressive cross‐lagged panel model supports the notion that a sense of precarity follows adherence to conspiracy beliefs rather than preceding them, while institutional (dis)trust and conspiracy beliefs show a bidirectional pattern. However, the random‐intercept cross‐lagged panel model does not corroborate this, suggesting that the effects may be driven by stable between‐person differences rather than actual within‐person changes. Additionally, the latter model reveals two separate temporal patterns linking conspiracy beliefs with either the sense of precarity or institutional trust, opening the possibility that our results were driven by two distinct underlying mechanisms. The paper discusses the importance of longitudinal studies for a more accurate understanding of social‐psychological realities in which conspiracy beliefs and suspicions of institutions may flourish.
- 17 November 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology
- Vol. 35 (6)
Turning a Blind Eye to Climate Change: Moral Disengagement and Negative Climate Emotions as Drivers of the Green Gap
The primary aim of the current study was to investigate whether moral disengagement and associated negative emotions (guilt, shame and anxiety) could explain the green gap, that is, the disparity between environmental values or climate concern and pro‐environmental behaviour. The secondary aim was to test an awareness‐empowerment and a social norm intervention as two ways to enhance pro‐environmental behaviour by reducing moral disengagement. First, in a large cross‐sectional Study 1 ( N = 1233), we investigated moral disengagement and negative climate emotions as serial mediators of the relationship between environmental values, as well as climate concern, and pro‐environmental behaviour. Then, in a two‐wave longitudinal Study 2 ( N = 1308), we attempted to reduce moral disengagement using either an awareness‐empowerment or a social norms intervention. The results of the two studies showed that both environmental values and climate concern predicted pro‐environmental behaviour and this was partially mediated by lower moral disengagement and higher experienced negative emotions. Also, we found awareness‐empowerment, but not social norms, intervention to be effective in reducing moral disengagement and, indirectly, motivating pro‐environmental behaviour. The study provides persuasive evidence that moral disengagement contributes to the green gap and that interventions aimed at its reduction constitute an effective way of motivating pro‐environmental behaviour. Please refer to the Supporting Information section to find this article's .
- 17 November 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology
- Vol. 35 (6)
Turning a Blind Eye to Climate Change: Moral Disengagement and Negative Climate Emotions as Drivers of the Green Gap
The primary aim of the current study was to investigate whether moral disengagement and associated negative emotions (guilt, shame and anxiety) could explain the green gap, that is, the disparity between environmental values or climate concern and pro‐environmental behaviour. The secondary aim was to test an awareness‐empowerment and a social norm intervention as two ways to enhance pro‐environmental behaviour by reducing moral disengagement. First, in a large cross‐sectional Study 1 ( N = 1233), we investigated moral disengagement and negative climate emotions as serial mediators of the relationship between environmental values, as well as climate concern, and pro‐environmental behaviour. Then, in a two‐wave longitudinal Study 2 ( N = 1308), we attempted to reduce moral disengagement using either an awareness‐empowerment or a social norms intervention. The results of the two studies showed that both environmental values and climate concern predicted pro‐environmental behaviour and this was partially mediated by lower moral disengagement and higher experienced negative emotions. Also, we found awareness‐empowerment, but not social norms, intervention to be effective in reducing moral disengagement and, indirectly, motivating pro‐environmental behaviour. The study provides persuasive evidence that moral disengagement contributes to the green gap and that interventions aimed at its reduction constitute an effective way of motivating pro‐environmental behaviour. Please refer to the Supporting Information section to find this article's .