Rabia Malik

A large literature on international labor migration explores how to improve low-skilled migrants’ experience of pursuing and obtaining overseas employment. Much of this scholarship focuses on describing and mitigating difficult, and sometimes exploitative, conditions in the host country. Scholars have paid less attention to factors in home countries that may affect aspiring migrants’ experience of looking for overseas work. We help address this gap by conducting a field experiment in the high out-migration country of Pakistan to examine whether receiving new information about employment brokers and overseas opportunities improves aspiring migrants’ subjective and objective experience of the job-seeking process. After analyzing the effects of information on those who lack alternative sources of information, we report mixed findings. These highlight the need to think carefully about ways to improve aspiring migrants’ job-seeking experiences, especially with regard to the common assumption that if low-skilled migrants simply “knew more” — that is, had more relevant and accurate information — they would not allow themselves to have negative migration experiences; our findings suggest this is not necessarily always the case.

Many international organizations (IOs) rely on voluntary contributions from member states and private actors to fund their operations. Donations from individuals are a significant and increasing income source for these IOs, who rely on marketing strategies such as celebrity endorsement, in the form of Goodwill Ambassadors, to help raise funds. Little is known, however, about the effectiveness of this strategy in the context of IOs although intuition from literatures in marketing and psychology suggests that celebrity endorsement should be effective. We conduct a survey experiment to investigate the effectiveness of Goodwill Ambassadors and, contrary to expectations, find no average effect of celebrity endorsement on donations to, and interest in, IOs and only limited effects among certain sub-groups. We speculate that the context of IOs makes it harder to generate the type of connection between celebrity and cause necessary to make endorsement effective and suggest that further investigation is needed.

Most of the distributive politics literature focuses on how incumbent politicians allocate development resources in the absence of spending rules, and on the politicization of rules when they do determine distribution. What is less clear is whether politically neutral spending rules lead to neutral spending. Using new data on a long-running federal development fund and elections from Pakistan in a regression discontinuity design, the author presents strong evidence that the ruling party manipulated fund distribution to disproportionately benefit its co-partisans and punish the weakest opposition. Considering various factors, partisan bias is the most plausible explanation. These findings are important not only because the purpose of rules-based funds is to prevent politicized distribution but also because they have implications for development patterns and for using such funds to address questions about legislator effort and patronage patterns within constituencies, which requires assuming that legislators do receive their share of funds in the first place.

A growing literature on political accountability focuses on the extent to which voters electorally punish politicians when provided with credible negative information about politicians’ actions. Whether politicians respond to information provision by changing their behavior—thus appearing accountable to voters—is an integral part of this puzzle but has received comparatively little attention. I address this gap by exploiting an unforeseen decision by the Pakistani government to publicly release legislators’ past income tax payments, and measure the effect of the information provision on their tax payments in the following year. Using new data on politicians’ asset ownership and tax payments in a difference-in-differences research design, I provide strong evidence that the pressure to decrease tax evasion was highest for competitively and directly elected legislators. These heterogeneous effects are not explained by differences between legislators or electoral constituencies, supporting the hypothesis that electoral incentives condition legislator responsiveness to information shocks.