Alicia García-Herrero
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Alicia García-Herrero has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Théo Storella
Bruegel (Belgium)
3 shared publications - Bertin Martens
Bruegel (Brussels) and Tilburg Law and Economics Centre Tilburg University Tilburg Netherlands
2 shared publications Jianwei Xu
Bruegel Brussels
2 shared publicationsRajeswari Sengupta
2 shared publicationsAlicia Garcia-Herrero Natixisand
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA)
1 shared publicationAnalisis Del
Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics) CNRS & EHESS
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 28 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
Understanding China's External Competitiveness: Consequences for Europe
- 28 October 2026
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
Understanding China's External Competitiveness: Consequences for Europe
- Open Access
- 2 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The EU Needs Semiconductor Supply Security to Achieve Digital Sovereignty
With the growing geopolitical tensions, the European Union (EU) will not be able to achieve its goal of maintaining security and digital sovereignty without a stronger focus on semiconductors. The EU is heavily reliant on imports, with 92% of global manufacturing capacity located in Asia, and the US leading high-level chip design. Such dependence can be a more important issue than ever, as advanced semiconductors are almost a prerequisite for Artificial Intelligence (AI) development, leading to problems for competitiveness and supply chain resilience. The heavy concentration of manufacturing capacity in Taiwan may also face disruption from natural disasters and geopolitical risks from China. We argue that the EU should consider producing some chips domestically as a safety net and climb the supply chain participation ladder by R&D, especially in design, meaning industrial policy is necessary. In this regard, China’s policies to reduce its external dependence on semiconductors were introduced before the US, and therefore, more lessons can be drawn about their effectiveness. The comparison with the world will help in analysing the current EU measures, namely the Chips Act. We conclude that a clearer distribution of responsibilities at the EU and the national level is needed to avoid excessive competition among member states through subsidies. A good model could be the Airbus project applied to the semiconductor supply chain, not only because it is pan-European but also open to the rest of the world. Finally, partnerships with existing high-end chip producers from like-minded governments and guaranteeing access to abundant critical raw materials are equally important.
- 2 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe EU Needs Semiconductor Supply Security to Achieve Digital Sovereignty
With the growing geopolitical tensions, the European Union (EU) will not be able to achieve its goal of maintaining security and digital sovereignty without a stronger focus on semiconductors. The EU is heavily reliant on imports, with 92% of global manufacturing capacity located in Asia, and the US leading high-level chip design. Such dependence can be a more important issue than ever, as advanced semiconductors are almost a prerequisite for Artificial Intelligence (AI) development, leading to problems for competitiveness and supply chain resilience. The heavy concentration of manufacturing capacity in Taiwan may also face disruption from natural disasters and geopolitical risks from China. We argue that the EU should consider producing some chips domestically as a safety net and climb the supply chain participation ladder by R&D, especially in design, meaning industrial policy is necessary. In this regard, China’s policies to reduce its external dependence on semiconductors were introduced before the US, and therefore, more lessons can be drawn about their effectiveness. The comparison with the world will help in analysing the current EU measures, namely the Chips Act. We conclude that a clearer distribution of responsibilities at the EU and the national level is needed to avoid excessive competition among member states through subsidies. A good model could be the Airbus project applied to the semiconductor supply chain, not only because it is pan-European but also open to the rest of the world. Finally, partnerships with existing high-end chip producers from like-minded governments and guaranteeing access to abundant critical raw materials are equally important.
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economic and Political Studies
- p. 1-21
China’s influence in the United Nations: Words and deeds
Understanding China’s influence in the United Nations (UN) is essential for comprehending contemporary international relations, governance, and the future of global cooperation. As one of the five ...
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economic and Political Studies
- p. 1-21
China’s influence in the United Nations: Words and deeds
Understanding China’s influence in the United Nations (UN) is essential for comprehending contemporary international relations, governance, and the future of global cooperation. As one of the five ...
- 12 February 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 192-209
Public debt dynamics
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Lessons for the renminbi from the yen internationalisation story
Like Japan, China internationalises its currency as a large creditor, but wariness of dollar dependence and a protected economy set the renminbi apart
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Lessons for the renminbi from the yen internationalisation story
Like Japan, China internationalises its currency as a large creditor, but wariness of dollar dependence and a protected economy set the renminbi apart
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
China’s outbound AI strategy starts with models and governance and ends with chips
Beijing is strategically planning to export AI rules and models before its chips; how should Europe engage?
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
China’s outbound AI strategy starts with models and governance and ends with chips
Beijing is strategically planning to export AI rules and models before its chips; how should Europe engage?
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
China’s artificial intelligence goals and strategic choices for Europe
In its 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), China has placed artificial intelligence at the centre of its industrial strategy, but with apparently clashing goals. China wants technological self-reliance and substantial safeguards around its domestic market, but also freely adaptable AI models, international diffusion of Chinese AI models and greater cooperation in global AI governance. However, while these objectives appear contradictory, a closer look reveals that they’re different facets of a unified strategy. Chinese President Xi Jinping detailed the strategy at the 17-20 July 2026 World AI Conference in Shanghai. He presented AI as a “rare, historic opportunity” for open development, collaboration and sharing, and promoted the newly established Shanghai-based World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) as a vehicle for a “just and equitable” system of global AI governance (Xi, 2026). In this analysis, we examine how China seeks to assert AI leadership with itself at the centre of innovation, diffusion, standard-setting and adoption, while also insulating its domestic market. We also compare this strategy with those of the United States and the European Union.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
China’s artificial intelligence goals and strategic choices for Europe
In its 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), China has placed artificial intelligence at the centre of its industrial strategy, but with apparently clashing goals. China wants technological self-reliance and substantial safeguards around its domestic market, but also freely adaptable AI models, international diffusion of Chinese AI models and greater cooperation in global AI governance. However, while these objectives appear contradictory, a closer look reveals that they’re different facets of a unified strategy. Chinese President Xi Jinping detailed the strategy at the 17-20 July 2026 World AI Conference in Shanghai. He presented AI as a “rare, historic opportunity” for open development, collaboration and sharing, and promoted the newly established Shanghai-based World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) as a vehicle for a “just and equitable” system of global AI governance (Xi, 2026). In this analysis, we examine how China seeks to assert AI leadership with itself at the centre of innovation, diffusion, standard-setting and adoption, while also insulating its domestic market. We also compare this strategy with those of the United States and the European Union.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Programmable sovereignty: coordinated specialisation as a response to the N-2 problem in artificial intelligence
The dominant academic and political framing of power in artificial intelligence treats sovereignty as a function of production: a state is sovereign over AI to the extent that it builds, owns and can reproduce the AI stack. By this definition, meaningful AI sovereignty has been achieved only by the United States and, to a lesser extent, China. We term this the N‑2 problem: all other states face structural dependence on one or both of these AI superpowers. A separate and largely disconnected line of analysis treats digital sovereignty as a function of governance: in other words, the capacity to shape technology through rules, standards and market leverage, regardless of who builds the underlying systems. We combine insights from these two literatures to make two contributions. First, we introduce the notion of ‘programmable sovereignty’: soft governance anchored by enough hard-stack control (especially pooled compute capacity) to make governance commitments credible and dependence reversible, without requiring full-stack AI autonomy. Second, we propose ‘coordinated specialisation’ as an institutional mechanism through which states facing the N-2 dilemma can pool capacities into a credible shared AI stack. We outline criteria for membership of this coalition, with reference to three institutional precedents (EuroHPC, India Stack and the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework). We conclude with policy implications.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Programmable sovereignty: coordinated specialisation as a response to the N-2 problem in artificial intelligence
The dominant academic and political framing of power in artificial intelligence treats sovereignty as a function of production: a state is sovereign over AI to the extent that it builds, owns and can reproduce the AI stack. By this definition, meaningful AI sovereignty has been achieved only by the United States and, to a lesser extent, China. We term this the N‑2 problem: all other states face structural dependence on one or both of these AI superpowers. A separate and largely disconnected line of analysis treats digital sovereignty as a function of governance: in other words, the capacity to shape technology through rules, standards and market leverage, regardless of who builds the underlying systems. We combine insights from these two literatures to make two contributions. First, we introduce the notion of ‘programmable sovereignty’: soft governance anchored by enough hard-stack control (especially pooled compute capacity) to make governance commitments credible and dependence reversible, without requiring full-stack AI autonomy. Second, we propose ‘coordinated specialisation’ as an institutional mechanism through which states facing the N-2 dilemma can pool capacities into a credible shared AI stack. We outline criteria for membership of this coalition, with reference to three institutional precedents (EuroHPC, India Stack and the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework). We conclude with policy implications.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Beyond tariffs: why Europe and India must prioritise investment into manufacturing
The signing of the EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in January 2026 represents a significant milestone in bilateral economic relations, for both sides. However, it fails to address a more critical challenge: India's persistent struggle to attract manufacturing foreign direct investment (FDI). This paper argues that India requires more manufacturing FDI not only for financial resources, but as the principal means of knowledge transfer and boosting employment creation. This paper documents India’s substantial underperformance in attracting FDI compared to China and ASEAN countries. China's manufacturing FDI ecosystem has yielded high returns for foreign investors and technological spillovers for domestic firms. In contrast, India has primarily attracted capital to the services sector, where investment has flowed largely into captive, foreign-owned offshore units with limited backward linkages to independent domestic firms, or into private equity and venture capital funds that typically acquire existing assets, thereby weakening the typical knowledge-transfer channels. The European Union, already India's largest investor and the world's leading source of outward FDI, possesses both the strategic interest and the financial means to help bridge this gap, especially as European firms re-evaluate their exposure to China, and because India offers a vast and rapidly growing consumer market. Despite this, EU FDI into Indian manufacturing remains significantly lower than what India's growth rate and investment returns would suggest. A lack of credible investor protection could be partially responsible for this, and the FTA, as it stands, lacks investment-protection provisions which could play a vital role in meaningfully redirecting European manufacturing capital towards India.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
Beyond tariffs: why Europe and India must prioritise investment into manufacturing
The signing of the EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in January 2026 represents a significant milestone in bilateral economic relations, for both sides. However, it fails to address a more critical challenge: India's persistent struggle to attract manufacturing foreign direct investment (FDI). This paper argues that India requires more manufacturing FDI not only for financial resources, but as the principal means of knowledge transfer and boosting employment creation. This paper documents India’s substantial underperformance in attracting FDI compared to China and ASEAN countries. China's manufacturing FDI ecosystem has yielded high returns for foreign investors and technological spillovers for domestic firms. In contrast, India has primarily attracted capital to the services sector, where investment has flowed largely into captive, foreign-owned offshore units with limited backward linkages to independent domestic firms, or into private equity and venture capital funds that typically acquire existing assets, thereby weakening the typical knowledge-transfer channels. The European Union, already India's largest investor and the world's leading source of outward FDI, possesses both the strategic interest and the financial means to help bridge this gap, especially as European firms re-evaluate their exposure to China, and because India offers a vast and rapidly growing consumer market. Despite this, EU FDI into Indian manufacturing remains significantly lower than what India's growth rate and investment returns would suggest. A lack of credible investor protection could be partially responsible for this, and the FTA, as it stands, lacks investment-protection provisions which could play a vital role in meaningfully redirecting European manufacturing capital towards India.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
To what extent can infrastructure investment mitigate China’s clean-energy overcapacity?
China’s industrial policies have made it the global leader in the manufacturing of solar panels, wind turbines and other renewable technologies, but at the cost of severe overcapacity that is now compressing margins across the entire sector. This paper evaluates greater investment in power infrastructure as a potential solution to stimulate energy demand, reduce curtailment and alleviate the renewable tech manufacturing overcapacity problem. Using scenario analysis, we show that grid expansion provides meaningful near-term demand relief, though supply-side consolidation remains necessary to restore durable market equilibrium.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Bruegel
To what extent can infrastructure investment mitigate China’s clean-energy overcapacity?
China’s industrial policies have made it the global leader in the manufacturing of solar panels, wind turbines and other renewable technologies, but at the cost of severe overcapacity that is now compressing margins across the entire sector. This paper evaluates greater investment in power infrastructure as a potential solution to stimulate energy demand, reduce curtailment and alleviate the renewable tech manufacturing overcapacity problem. Using scenario analysis, we show that grid expansion provides meaningful near-term demand relief, though supply-side consolidation remains necessary to restore durable market equilibrium.