Jan Willemson
Research Subjects
Jan Willemson has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Kristjan Krips
University of Tartu
4 shared publications- Priit Vinkel
Estonian National Electoral Committee
3 shared publications Sven Heiberg
Smartmatic-Cybernetica Centre of Excellence for Internet Voting
3 shared publicationsJaan Kristjan Kaasik
Cybernetica AS Tartu Estonia
2 shared publications- Jelizaveta Vakarjuk
Cybernetica AS
2 shared publications - Kristjan Krips
Cybernetica AS
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 35-41
Constructive uses of AI in electronic voting -- application development and security analysis
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 35-41
Open AccessConstructive uses of AI in electronic voting -- application development and security analysis
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) in IET Information Security
- Vol. 2026 (1)
Utilising Video Deepfakes for Paper Voting Privacy Defence
The recent rise of artificial intelligence (AI) solutions has also had a significant impact on electoral processes. Most notably, deepfakes created by generative AI applications can (and have been) used to spread misinformation during the campaigns, but they can also be used for cyberattack automation, biased social media bots, etc. We instead present a positive use case for generative AI in manipulating video material required as proof of voting by potential coercers. For this, we have created a pipeline that takes a video of a voting ballot and replaces its critical content (in our case, the digits on the ballot). To achieve this, a YOLOv11 model is used to find the digits, a WavePaint image inpainting model is used to cover up the old digits and a separate image of the new digits is used to place them into the video. Additionally, we implemented the prototype application in the form of a web service and validated the outcome by asking the humans to distinguish fake ballot images and videos from the real ones. Our results show that humans can still recognise fake ballot videos relatively well, implying that requesting ballot videos is still an efficient attack against voter freedom in the case of paper voting. However, future developments in the generative AI techniques are likely to improve the situation significantly.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) in IET Information Security
- Vol. 2026 (1)
Open AccessUtilising Video Deepfakes for Paper Voting Privacy Defence
The recent rise of artificial intelligence (AI) solutions has also had a significant impact on electoral processes. Most notably, deepfakes created by generative AI applications can (and have been) used to spread misinformation during the campaigns, but they can also be used for cyberattack automation, biased social media bots, etc. We instead present a positive use case for generative AI in manipulating video material required as proof of voting by potential coercers. For this, we have created a pipeline that takes a video of a voting ballot and replaces its critical content (in our case, the digits on the ballot). To achieve this, a YOLOv11 model is used to find the digits, a WavePaint image inpainting model is used to cover up the old digits and a separate image of the new digits is used to place them into the video. Additionally, we implemented the prototype application in the form of a web service and validated the outcome by asking the humans to distinguish fake ballot images and videos from the real ones. Our results show that humans can still recognise fake ballot videos relatively well, implying that requesting ballot videos is still an efficient attack against voter freedom in the case of paper voting. However, future developments in the generative AI techniques are likely to improve the situation significantly.
- Open Access
- 11 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 73-89
End-To-End Verifiable Internet Voting with Partially Private Bulletin Boards
In 2024, Harrison and Haines examined the applicability of STARKs in the context of homomorphically tallied elections. While their work ensures the Recorded-as-Cast and Tallied-as-Recorded properties of a voting system, it lacks Cast-as-Intended verification and does not provide a coercion mitigation mechanism. In this work, we address these challenges and propose an updated voting protocol that achieves all three verification properties, at the same time providing coercion resistance by allowing re-voting. Our approach leverages vector commitment schemes with update mechanisms. We implement our protocol and provide comparative benchmarks to the Harrison and Haines solution. Our approach significantly outperforms the latter, allowing processing a considerably larger number of votes within the same hardware limits.
- 11 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 73-89
Open AccessEnd-To-End Verifiable Internet Voting with Partially Private Bulletin Boards
In 2024, Harrison and Haines examined the applicability of STARKs in the context of homomorphically tallied elections. While their work ensures the Recorded-as-Cast and Tallied-as-Recorded properties of a voting system, it lacks Cast-as-Intended verification and does not provide a coercion mitigation mechanism. In this work, we address these challenges and propose an updated voting protocol that achieves all three verification properties, at the same time providing coercion resistance by allowing re-voting. Our approach leverages vector commitment schemes with update mechanisms. We implement our protocol and provide comparative benchmarks to the Harrison and Haines solution. Our approach significantly outperforms the latter, allowing processing a considerably larger number of votes within the same hardware limits.
- Open Access
- 11 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 208-223
Recommendations to OSCE/ODIHR (on How to Give Better Recommendations for Internet Voting)
This paper takes a critical look at the recommendations OSCE/ODIHR has given for the Estonian Internet voting over the 20 years it has been running. We present examples of recommendations that can not be fulfilled at all, but also examples where fulfilling a recommendation requires a non-trivial trade-off, potentially weakening the system in some other respect. In such cases OSCE/ODIHR should take an explicit position which trade-off it recommends. We also look at the development of the recommendation to introduce end-to-end verifiability. In this case we expect OSCE/ODIHR to define what it exactly means by this property, as well as to give explicit criteria to determine whether and to which extent end-to-end verifiability has been achieved.
- 11 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 208-223
Open AccessRecommendations to OSCE/ODIHR (on How to Give Better Recommendations for Internet Voting)
This paper takes a critical look at the recommendations OSCE/ODIHR has given for the Estonian Internet voting over the 20 years it has been running. We present examples of recommendations that can not be fulfilled at all, but also examples where fulfilling a recommendation requires a non-trivial trade-off, potentially weakening the system in some other respect. In such cases OSCE/ODIHR should take an explicit position which trade-off it recommends. We also look at the development of the recommendation to introduce end-to-end verifiability. In this case we expect OSCE/ODIHR to define what it exactly means by this property, as well as to give explicit criteria to determine whether and to which extent end-to-end verifiability has been achieved.
- Open Access
- 29 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 15 (1) , 1-14
Proving vote correctness in the IVXV internet voting system
This paper studies the practical aspects of adding zero-knowledge proofs of vote correctness to Internet voting, specifically to the IVXV system used in Estonia. We discuss various available alternatives and present a concrete instantiation based on Bulletproofs together with implementation details and benchmarking results. As IVXV currently uses the ElGamal cryptosystem with a 3072-bit prime modulus for vote encryption, but Bulletproofs work most efficiently on elliptic curves, a group switching solution is also implemented and benchmarked. Despite all the extra work required, our solution is very performant and well capable of sustaining the load of votes, even during peak vote submission periods.
- 29 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 15 (1) , 1-14
Open AccessProving vote correctness in the IVXV internet voting system
This paper studies the practical aspects of adding zero-knowledge proofs of vote correctness to Internet voting, specifically to the IVXV system used in Estonia. We discuss various available alternatives and present a concrete instantiation based on Bulletproofs together with implementation details and benchmarking results. As IVXV currently uses the ElGamal cryptosystem with a 3072-bit prime modulus for vote encryption, but Bulletproofs work most efficiently on elliptic curves, a group switching solution is also implemented and benchmarked. Despite all the extra work required, our solution is very performant and well capable of sustaining the load of votes, even during peak vote submission periods.
- Open Access
- 26 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptology
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-33
Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Proofs in Action: Applications to Electronic Voting
This paper studies several building blocks needed for electronic voting in order to prepare for the post-quantum era. In particular, we present lattice-based constructions for a generic zero-knowledge (ZK) proof of ballot correctness, a ZK proof of ballot correctness applicable for the homomorphic tallying scenario, and a ZK proof to achieve cast-as-intended verification during the vote casting period. We implement and benchmark our ballot correctness proofs, giving concrete estimations comparing the performance of homomorphic tallying and mix-net based e-voting systems in case of our lattice-based constructions.
- 26 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptology
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-33
Open AccessLattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Proofs in Action: Applications to Electronic Voting
This paper studies several building blocks needed for electronic voting in order to prepare for the post-quantum era. In particular, we present lattice-based constructions for a generic zero-knowledge (ZK) proof of ballot correctness, a ZK proof of ballot correctness applicable for the homomorphic tallying scenario, and a ZK proof to achieve cast-as-intended verification during the vote casting period. We implement and benchmark our ballot correctness proofs, giving concrete estimations comparing the performance of homomorphic tallying and mix-net based e-voting systems in case of our lattice-based constructions.
- 13 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 147-162
Deploying Post-quantum Algorithms in Existing Applications and Embedded Devices
- 13 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 147-162
Deploying Post-quantum Algorithms in Existing Applications and Embedded Devices
- 30 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 126-135
Analyzing and Improving Eligibility Verifiability of the Proposed Belgian Remote Voting System
- 30 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 126-135
Analyzing and Improving Eligibility Verifiability of the Proposed Belgian Remote Voting System
- Open Access
- 22 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 140-155
Estimating Carbon Footprint of Paper and Internet Voting
This paper compares the carbon footprint of paper voting in polling stations with the emissions of remote vote casting via the Internet. We identify the process steps with the most significant emissions in terms of $$\textrm{CO}_2$$ equivalent, design a methodology to quantify these emissions and give a comparative analysis based on the example of the Estonian parliamentary elections of 2023. Our results show that paper voting has about 180 times higher carbon footprint, owing largely to the need to transport the voters to the polling stations and back.- 22 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 140-155
Open AccessEstimating Carbon Footprint of Paper and Internet Voting
This paper compares the carbon footprint of paper voting in polling stations with the emissions of remote vote casting via the Internet. We identify the process steps with the most significant emissions in terms of $$\textrm{CO}_2$$ equivalent, design a methodology to quantify these emissions and give a comparative analysis based on the example of the Estonian parliamentary elections of 2023. Our results show that paper voting has about 180 times higher carbon footprint, owing largely to the need to transport the voters to the polling stations and back.