Klaus M. Schmidt

Zusammenfassung: In diesem Beitrag erörtern Klaus M. Schmidt, Levent Neyse, Marianne Saam, Doreen Siegfried, Lars Vilhuber und Joachim Winter Open Science in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften als Bündel von Praktiken zur Verbesserung von Transparenz, Reproduzierbarkeit und Zugänglichkeit wissenschaftlicher Forschung. Sie zeigen, dass Präregistrierungen und Registered Reports, Open Data und Open Code sowie Open Access die Glaubwürdigkeit empirischer Forschung stärken können, aber disziplinspezifische Grenzen und Zielkonflikte berücksichtigen müssen. Für die Wirtschaftswissenschaften und die Forschungsförderung folgt daraus die Notwendigkeit einer verlässlichen Infrastruktur, klarer Standards und nachhaltiger institutioneller Unterstützung, insbesondere für nicht-kommerzielle Open-Access-Modelle wie Diamond Open Access.

Weitzman, M.L. (2014. Can negotiating a uniform carbon price help to internalize the global warming externality? J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 1: 29–49) proposed that focusing international climate negotiations on a uniform common commitment (such as a uniform carbon price) is more effective than negotiations on individual commitments (as in the Paris agreement) in achieving ambitious climate action. We put this hypothesis to an experimental test by simulating international negotiations on climate change in collaboration with Model United Nations associations. This novel experimental format combines some of the advantages of lab and field experiments. Our results offer support for Weitzman’s hypothesis and indicate that negotiating a common commitment on a uniform carbon price may yield higher emission reductions in the long run and more participation than individual commitments à la Paris.

The scientific advisory board of the federal ministry of economic affairs and climate protection conducted a symposium on sustainability at its 500th meeting. The UN’s sustainable development goals play an increasingly important role in economic policy and regulation. This article gives a survey of the trade-offs and implementation problems that were discussed at the symposium, in particular the operationalisation of sustainability in welfare economics, the implementation of sustainability goals in economic law, the relationship between competition policy and sustainability, the impact of sustainability concerns on monetary policy, and finally, supply chain regulation and sustainability objectives.

International cooperation on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, disarmament, or free trade needs to be negotiated. The success of such negotiations depends on how they are designed. In the context of international climate change policy, it has been proposed [e.g., M. L. Weitzman J. Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. 1, 29–49 (2014)] that shifting the negotiation focus to a uniform common commitment (such as a uniform minimum carbon price) would lead to more ambitious cooperation. Yet, a proof-of-concept for this important claim is lacking. Based on game theoretical analyses, we present experimental evidence that strongly supports this conjecture. In our study, human subjects negotiate contributions to a public good. Subjects differ in their benefits and costs of cooperation. Participation in the negotiations and all commitments are voluntary. We consider treatments in which agreements are enforceable, and treatments in which they have to be self-enforcing. In both situations, negotiating a uniform common commitment is more successful in promoting cooperation than negotiating individual commitments (as in the Paris Agreement) and complex common commitments that tailor the commitment to the specific situation of each party (as attempted with the Kyoto Protocol). Furthermore, as suggested by our model, a uniform common commitment benefits most from being enforced. Significance Climate change and other threats to modern societies require international cooperation. Utilizing a laboratory experiment and game theoretical analysis, we find that the success of negotiations to promote cooperation strongly depends on the kind of commitment negotiated. In the context of international climate policy, our findings indicate that individual commitments (as negotiated in the Paris Agreement) and complex common commitments (as negotiated in the Kyoto Protocol) tend to have only limited success in promoting cooperation. Shifting the negotiation focus to a uniform common commitment, such as a minimum carbon price, may potentially foster more ambitious cooperation and thus help mitigating climate change.

Zusammenfassung: In seiner Thünen-Vorlesung vor dem Verein für Socialpolitik im Herbst 2020 hat Klaus Schmidt das Design von Klimaschutzverhandlungen untersucht. Er geht dabei von einem Vorschlag Martin Weitzmans aus, künftige Verhandlungen auf einen einheitlichen CO₂-Mindestpreis zu fokussieren. Wäre ein solches Vorgehen demjenigen, wie es in den Abkommen von Paris und Kyoto praktiziert wurde, tatsächlich überlegen? Schmidt berichtet von zwei experimentellen Studien, in denen er gemeinsam mit Koautoren Licht auf diese Frage geworfen hat. Die Ergebnisse beider Studien unterstützen den Vorschlag von Weitzman.

A buyer who wants to procure a complex good is often aware that there may be flaws in her initial design, but she does not know what they look like. Potential sellers who discover flaws have no incentive to reveal them early if the buyer uses a price-only auction. We derive an efficient mechanism that induces all sellers to report flaws early and that allocates the project to the seller with the lowest cost. We show that this can be implemented with a simple two-stage auction that does not require any prior knowledge of the set of possible flaws. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.

Analyzing the "Pay What You Want" business model for open access publishing.