William S. Robinson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- 1 February 2024
- Published by Imprint Academic Ltd in Journal of Consciousness Studies
- Vol. 31 (1) , 149-172
Panexperientialism and Radical Emergence
Panexperientialists hold that experience is a fundamental feature of our universe, and that their view avoids radical emergence by providing an intelligible ground for our human experiences. This paper argues that they face a radical emergence problem of their own, and that they can avoid radical emergence only by adopting a strategy that can also be used by dualists (whose view they reject). It also argues that panexperientialists must either hold that all experiential properties they regard as simple must have been actually instantiated since the earliest days of our universe, or accept radical emergence, or avoid radical emergence by a strategy that can also be adopted by dualists.
- 1 February 2024
- Published by Imprint Academic Ltd in Journal of Consciousness Studies
- Vol. 31 (1) , 149-172
Panexperientialism and Radical Emergence
Panexperientialists hold that experience is a fundamental feature of our universe, and that their view avoids radical emergence by providing an intelligible ground for our human experiences. This paper argues that they face a radical emergence problem of their own, and that they can avoid radical emergence only by adopting a strategy that can also be used by dualists (whose view they reject). It also argues that panexperientialists must either hold that all experiential properties they regard as simple must have been actually instantiated since the earliest days of our universe, or accept radical emergence, or avoid radical emergence by a strategy that can also be adopted by dualists.
- 29 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 69 (2) , 222-244
Dispensing with experiential acquaintance
Experiential acquaintance is an alleged relation between ourselves and our experiences that has sometimes been hypothesised as necessary for knowledge of our experiences. This paper begins with a clarification of ‘acquaintance’ and an explanation of ‘experience’ that focuses attention on a famous, but flawed, argument by G. E. Moore. It goes on to critically examine several recent arguments concerning experiential acquaintance and to show how internalist foundationalism can respond to a famous Sellarsian dilemma without appeal to a relation of acquaintance with our experiences. It concludes that we can dispense with experiential acquaintance.
- 29 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 69 (2) , 222-244
Dispensing with experiential acquaintance
Experiential acquaintance is an alleged relation between ourselves and our experiences that has sometimes been hypothesised as necessary for knowledge of our experiences. This paper begins with a clarification of ‘acquaintance’ and an explanation of ‘experience’ that focuses attention on a famous, but flawed, argument by G. E. Moore. It goes on to critically examine several recent arguments concerning experiential acquaintance and to show how internalist foundationalism can respond to a famous Sellarsian dilemma without appeal to a relation of acquaintance with our experiences. It concludes that we can dispense with experiential acquaintance.
- 20 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 14 (4) , 1219-1236
Dis-Illusioning Experiences
- 20 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 14 (4) , 1219-1236
Dis-Illusioning Experiences
- 1 March 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 7 (1) , 71-89
Hidden Nature Physicalism
- 1 March 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 7 (1) , 71-89
Hidden Nature Physicalism
- 12 June 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 64-86
Philosophical challenges
Most contemporary philosophers would accept that the intelligence is provided by the material brains, and thus would be disinclined to challenge the possibility of artificially intelligent devices on the ground of their materiality. The questions and problems about artificial intelligence (AI) that remain can be divided into those that are largely independent of particular approaches to AI, and those that are prompted by more specific ideas about artificially realizable cognitive architectures. The chapter shows that questions about representations and their use play an important role in many challenges to AI. Connectionist devices are characterized by their rule for finding a set of connection weights that will yield patterns on their output units that are appropriate to each pattern on their input units. Dynamical systems theory (DST) views cognition as depending on a continuous interaction of a cognitive agent with its surroundings.
- 12 June 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 64-86
Philosophical challenges
Most contemporary philosophers would accept that the intelligence is provided by the material brains, and thus would be disinclined to challenge the possibility of artificially intelligent devices on the ground of their materiality. The questions and problems about artificial intelligence (AI) that remain can be divided into those that are largely independent of particular approaches to AI, and those that are prompted by more specific ideas about artificially realizable cognitive architectures. The chapter shows that questions about representations and their use play an important role in many challenges to AI. Connectionist devices are characterized by their rule for finding a set of connection weights that will yield patterns on their output units that are appropriate to each pattern on their input units. Dynamical systems theory (DST) views cognition as depending on a continuous interaction of a cognitive agent with its surroundings.
- 8 July 2013
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 93-101
A Wake Up Call
- 28 November 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 4 (2) , 185-192
Experiencing is not Observing: A Response to Dwayne Moore on Epiphenomenalism and Self-Stultification
- 28 November 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 4 (2) , 185-192
Experiencing is not Observing: A Response to Dwayne Moore on Epiphenomenalism and Self-Stultification
- 5 February 2010
- Published by Wiley in WIREs Cognitive Science
- Vol. 1 (4) , 539-547
Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalists hold that mental properties are not reducible to neural properties and are not efficacious. The view and its motivations are explained for two kinds of mental properties. Objections, and replies on behalf of epiphenomenalism, are considered. While strict epiphenomenalism is a philosophical view, there are related views that have some empirical support. Examples of this work are discussed, and their relation to the strictly philosophical view is explained. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness
- 5 February 2010
- Published by Wiley in WIREs Cognitive Science
- Vol. 1 (4) , 539-547
Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalists hold that mental properties are not reducible to neural properties and are not efficacious. The view and its motivations are explained for two kinds of mental properties. Objections, and replies on behalf of epiphenomenalism, are considered. While strict epiphenomenalism is a philosophical view, there are related views that have some empirical support. Examples of this work are discussed, and their relation to the strictly philosophical view is explained. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness
- 23 November 2006
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 19 (6) , 743-765
What Is it Like to Like?
The liking of a sensation, e.g., a taste, is a conscious occurrent but does not consist in having the liked sensation accompanied by a “pleasure sensation”—for there is no such sensation. Several alternative accounts of liking, including Aydede's “feeling episode” theory and Schroeder's representationalist theory are considered. The proposal that liking a sensation is having the non-sensory experience of liking directed upon it is explained and defended. The pleasure provided by thoughts, conversations, walks, etc., is analyzed and brought into relation to the account of liking one's sensations.
- 23 November 2006
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 19 (6) , 743-765
What Is it Like to Like?
The liking of a sensation, e.g., a taste, is a conscious occurrent but does not consist in having the liked sensation accompanied by a “pleasure sensation”—for there is no such sensation. Several alternative accounts of liking, including Aydede's “feeling episode” theory and Schroeder's representationalist theory are considered. The proposal that liking a sensation is having the non-sensory experience of liking directed upon it is explained and defended. The pleasure provided by thoughts, conversations, walks, etc., is analyzed and brought into relation to the account of liking one's sensations.