Xinwei Feng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Xinwei Feng has a total of 38 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jianhui Huang
Department of Applied Mathematics, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, China
4 shared publications - Ge Zhang
Department of Microbial and Biochemical Pharmacy, School of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China
2 shared publications - Jianhui Huang
Department of Applied Mathematics, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, China
2 shared publications - Jiongmin Yong
Department of Mathematics, University of Central Florida, Orlando, USA
2 shared publications - Qi-Man Shao
Southern University of Science and Technology
2 shared publications - Yue Zhou
School of Mathematics and Statistics Central South University Changsha Hunan China
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 26 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 209 (1) , 22
Mean-Field Team with Nested Model Uncertainty: A Stackelberg-Type Robust Analysis
- 26 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 209 (1) , 22
Mean-Field Team with Nested Model Uncertainty: A Stackelberg-Type Robust Analysis
- 8 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Applied Mathematics & Optimization
- Vol. 91 (2) , 1-38
Linear-Quadratic Mean-Field Backward Stackelberg Game with Mixed Terminal Perturbation
- 8 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Applied Mathematics & Optimization
- Vol. 91 (2) , 1-38
Linear-Quadratic Mean-Field Backward Stackelberg Game with Mixed Terminal Perturbation
- Open Access
Two-barriers-reflected BSDE with Rank-based Data
We investigate two-barriers-reflected backward stochastic differential equations with data from rank-based stochastic differential equation. More specifically, we focus on the solution of backward stochastic differential equations restricted to two prescribed upper-boundary and lower-boundary processes. We rigorously show that this solution gives a probabilistic expression to the viscosity solution of some obstacle problems for the corresponding parabolic partial differential equations. As an application, the pricing problem of an American game option is studied.
Open AccessTwo-barriers-reflected BSDE with Rank-based Data
We investigate two-barriers-reflected backward stochastic differential equations with data from rank-based stochastic differential equation. More specifically, we focus on the solution of backward stochastic differential equations restricted to two prescribed upper-boundary and lower-boundary processes. We rigorously show that this solution gives a probabilistic expression to the viscosity solution of some obstacle problems for the corresponding parabolic partial differential equations. As an application, the pricing problem of an American game option is studied.
- Open Access
- 11 June 2024
- Published by EDP Sciences in ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations
- Vol. 30, 47
Linear-quadratic two-person differential game: Nash game versus stackelberg game, local information versus global information
In this paper, we present a unified framework to study a variety of two-person dynamic decision problems, including stochastic (zero-sum, non-zero-sum) Nash game, Stackelberg game with global information. For these games, the solvability of these problems is discussed via progressive formulations respectively: the abstract quadratic functional, Hamiltonian system for open-loop, and Riccati equation for closed-loop (feedback) representation. Based on the unified framework, time consistency/inconsistency property of related equilibrium is studied. Then we introduce a new type of game, Stackelberg game with local information. For this, the classical best-response machinery adopted for global information is no longer workable. As resolution, a repeated game approach is employed to construct the equilibrium strategies via a backward- and forward-procedure. Moreover, connection of local information pattern to time-inconsistency is also revealed. Finally, relations among zero-sum Nash game, zero-sum Stackelberg game with global information and local information are also identified.
- 11 June 2024
- Published by EDP Sciences in ESAIM: Control, Optimisation and Calculus of Variations
- Vol. 30, 47
Open AccessLinear-quadratic two-person differential game: Nash game versus stackelberg game, local information versus global information
In this paper, we present a unified framework to study a variety of two-person dynamic decision problems, including stochastic (zero-sum, non-zero-sum) Nash game, Stackelberg game with global information. For these games, the solvability of these problems is discussed via progressive formulations respectively: the abstract quadratic functional, Hamiltonian system for open-loop, and Riccati equation for closed-loop (feedback) representation. Based on the unified framework, time consistency/inconsistency property of related equilibrium is studied. Then we introduce a new type of game, Stackelberg game with local information. For this, the classical best-response machinery adopted for global information is no longer workable. As resolution, a repeated game approach is employed to construct the equilibrium strategies via a backward- and forward-procedure. Moreover, connection of local information pattern to time-inconsistency is also revealed. Finally, relations among zero-sum Nash game, zero-sum Stackelberg game with global information and local information are also identified.
- 23 May 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena
- Vol. 466
A theoretical model for a vane with stochastic rotation
- 23 May 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena
- Vol. 466
A theoretical model for a vane with stochastic rotation
- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Mathematical Control and Related Fields
- Vol. 14 (3) , 1193-1220
Mixed Nash games and social optima for linear-quadratic forward-backward mean-field systems
We consider a new class of mixed linear-quadratic Nash games and social optimization for two types of interactive agents. One is called a major agent and the others are minor agents. By 'mixed', we mean that all minor agents team up with each other to compete against this major agent for their contradictory cost functions. Different from the standard setup, this major's state is governed by some linear stochastic differential equation where the diffusion term and drift term both contain a control process, while the states of these minors are all weakly-coupled and driven by some linear backward stochastic differential equations because their terminal conditions are specified. To construct decentralized strategies for these two types of agents respectively, the backward person-by-person optimization method, combining some variational method and mean-field approximation are applied. Under some suitable conditions, we also verify the asymptotic optimality of these decentralized strategies.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Mathematical Control and Related Fields
- Vol. 14 (3) , 1193-1220
Mixed Nash games and social optima for linear-quadratic forward-backward mean-field systems
We consider a new class of mixed linear-quadratic Nash games and social optimization for two types of interactive agents. One is called a major agent and the others are minor agents. By 'mixed', we mean that all minor agents team up with each other to compete against this major agent for their contradictory cost functions. Different from the standard setup, this major's state is governed by some linear stochastic differential equation where the diffusion term and drift term both contain a control process, while the states of these minors are all weakly-coupled and driven by some linear backward stochastic differential equations because their terminal conditions are specified. To construct decentralized strategies for these two types of agents respectively, the backward person-by-person optimization method, combining some variational method and mean-field approximation are applied. Under some suitable conditions, we also verify the asymptotic optimality of these decentralized strategies.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Mathematical Control and Related Fields
- Vol. 14 (2) , 769-799
Stackelberg equilibrium with social optima in linear-quadratic-Gaussian mean-field system
A linear quadratic social optimal problem with a leader and a vast amount of weakly coupled followers is investigated in this paper. To be specific, the followers cooperate to minimize the social cost after the leader first announces his/her strategy, while the leader will then optimize his/her own cost functional on consideration of the followers' reactions. We assume that the controls are involved in both the followers' and the leader's state equations. Meanwhile, the followers' average control and average state terms enter into the drift term of the leader's state equation, reflecting that the leader's state is influenced by the followers' decisions and states. In order to obtain the asymptotic optimal strategies, two corresponding auxiliary problems are present using variational and person-by-person technologies. Furthermore, we construct the decentralized strategies for this leader-follower system by virtue of a solvable consistency condition system and the corresponding asymptotic Stackelberg equilibrium is demonstrated rigorously. Eventually, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the theoretical results.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Mathematical Control and Related Fields
- Vol. 14 (2) , 769-799
Stackelberg equilibrium with social optima in linear-quadratic-Gaussian mean-field system
A linear quadratic social optimal problem with a leader and a vast amount of weakly coupled followers is investigated in this paper. To be specific, the followers cooperate to minimize the social cost after the leader first announces his/her strategy, while the leader will then optimize his/her own cost functional on consideration of the followers' reactions. We assume that the controls are involved in both the followers' and the leader's state equations. Meanwhile, the followers' average control and average state terms enter into the drift term of the leader's state equation, reflecting that the leader's state is influenced by the followers' decisions and states. In order to obtain the asymptotic optimal strategies, two corresponding auxiliary problems are present using variational and person-by-person technologies. Furthermore, we construct the decentralized strategies for this leader-follower system by virtue of a solvable consistency condition system and the corresponding asymptotic Stackelberg equilibrium is demonstrated rigorously. Eventually, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the theoretical results.
- 7 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Automatica
- Vol. 149
Bang–bang control for a class of optimal stochastic control problems with symmetric cost functional
- 7 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Automatica
- Vol. 149
Bang–bang control for a class of optimal stochastic control problems with symmetric cost functional
- 9 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Neurocomputing
- Vol. 518, 401-407
Optimal distributions of rewards for a two-armed slot machine
- 9 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Neurocomputing
- Vol. 518, 401-407
Optimal distributions of rewards for a two-armed slot machine
- 28 December 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 67 (12) , 6858-6865
Mixed Social Optima and Nash Equilibrium in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Mean-Field System
This paper investigates a class of mixed stochastic linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) social optimization and Nash game in the context of a large-scale system. Two types of interactive agents are involved: a major agent and a large number of weakly-coupled minor agents. All minor agents are cooperative to minimize the social cost as the sum of their individual costs, whereas such social cost is conflictive to that of the major agent. Thus, the major agent and all minor agents are further competitive to reach some nonzero-sum Nash equilibrium. Applying the mean-field approximations and person-by-person optimality, we obtain auxiliary control problems for the major agent and minor agents, respectively. The decentralized social strategy is derived by a class of new consistency condition (CC) system, which consists of mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equations. The well-posedness of CC system is obtained by the discounting method. The related asymptotic social optimality for minor agents and Nash equilibrium for major-minor agents are also verified.
- 28 December 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Vol. 67 (12) , 6858-6865
Mixed Social Optima and Nash Equilibrium in Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian Mean-Field System
This paper investigates a class of mixed stochastic linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) social optimization and Nash game in the context of a large-scale system. Two types of interactive agents are involved: a major agent and a large number of weakly-coupled minor agents. All minor agents are cooperative to minimize the social cost as the sum of their individual costs, whereas such social cost is conflictive to that of the major agent. Thus, the major agent and all minor agents are further competitive to reach some nonzero-sum Nash equilibrium. Applying the mean-field approximations and person-by-person optimality, we obtain auxiliary control problems for the major agent and minor agents, respectively. The decentralized social strategy is derived by a class of new consistency condition (CC) system, which consists of mean-field forward-backward stochastic differential equations. The well-posedness of CC system is obtained by the discounting method. The related asymptotic social optimality for minor agents and Nash equilibrium for major-minor agents are also verified.