DCDave Cliff

Dave Cliff

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Dave Cliff has a total of 39 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    On Random-patch Initialization in Simulations of Evolutionary Spatial Cyclic Games

    by Dave Cliff

    A recent and frequently cited 2023 paper by Park, Chen, and Szolnoki (Chaos, Solitons and Fractals, 166: 113004) argued for a novel method for initialising Evolutionary Spatial Cyclic Games (ECSGs), a widely studied and long-standing class of minimal agent-based simulations of ecosystems diversity and species coexistence. Park et al.'s novel ECSG initialization method is called "Random Patch" (RP) initialization, and Park et al. argue that RP is a superior approach to the traditional Uniform Random (UR) initialization that is the de facto standard approach in ESCG simulations. In this paper I first replicate key results from Park et al.'s paper, and then demonstrate that Park et al.'s RP-initialization is fundamentally flawed because it can introduce major and highly undesirable asymmetries in species densities at the time t=0 point when the simulation model is initialised, and these initial asymmetries can then go on to bias the final outcome of the simulation studies. Here I introduce a new RP-based initialization algorithm called RPSC that provably guarantees all species densities will be equal (i.e., wholly symmetric) at t=0. I present results from using RPSC which demonstrate that Park et al.'s claim that (when sufficiently large) their ESCG converges to the same final outcomes, regardless of whether the initialization method used is UR or RP, is incorrect.

  • Open Access

    Correction: Editorial to the special issue on ZIMI

    by Dave Cliff, Dan K. Gode, Shyam Sunder

  • Open Access

    Never Mind The No-Ops: Faster and Less Volatile Simulation Modelling of Co-Evolutionary Species Interactions via Spatial Cyclic Games

    by Dave Cliff

    Issues in co-evolutionary population dynamics have long been studied via computationally intensive simulations of minimally simple agent-based models, known as Evolutionary Spatial Cyclic Games (ESCGs), involving multiple interacting biological species in which each agent has its own unique spatial location in a cell on a regular lattice, and can move from cell to cell over time. Many papers have been published exploring the dynamics of ESCGs where competitive inter-species predator/prey relationships are modelled via the cyclic game Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) for three species, or Rock-Paper-Scissors-Lizard-Spock (RPSLS) for five. At the core of these simulations is the "Elementary Step" (ES), in which one or two agents are chosen at random to either compete to the death, or to reproduce, or to move location. ESCG studies typically involve executing trillions of ESs and hence the computational efficiency of the core ES algorithm is a key concern. In this paper I demonstrate that the de facto standard "Original ES" (OES) algorithm is computationally inefficient both in time and in space due to the implicit execution of many "no-op" commands (i.e., commands that do nothing) and because at steady state large numbers of cells can be empty, and yet empty cells serve no purpose. I present a new "Revised ES" (RES) algorithm which eliminates these inefficiencies, and I show empirically that ESCGs with RES exhibit qualitatively the same characteristics as those with OES, and are also markedly more stable. The more stable dynamics of RES-based simulations means that they can be run with smaller lattices than when using OES, leading to reductions in total simulation times of 85% or more. Python source code developed for the experiments reported here is freely available on GitHub.

  • Open Access

    Tournament versus Circulant: On Simulating 7-Species Evolutionary Spatial Cyclic Games with Ablated Predator-Prey Networks as Models of Biodiversity

    by Dave Cliff

    Computer simulations of minimal population-dynamics models have long been used to explore questions in ecosystems coexistence and species biodiversity, via simple agent-based models of three interacting species, referred to as $R$, $P$, and $S$, and where individual agents compete with one another in predator/prey contests that are determined by the cyclic dominance rules of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game. Recent publications have explored the dynamics of five-species models, based on the Rock-Paper-Scissors-Lizard-Spock (RPSLS) game. A 2022 paper by Zhong et al. reported simulation studies of species coexistence in spatial RPSLS systems in which one or more directed edges are ablated from the five-vertex tournament digraph defining the RPSLS game: Zhong et al. showed that the ablation of a single inter-species interaction can lead to a collapse in biodiversity. In this paper I present first results from simulation studies of evolutionary spatial cyclic games where there are seven species, but where each species is still in its own local five-species RPSLS-like interaction network: the dominance networks I use for this are a subset of the $n$-node $k$-regular circulant digraphs $D(n,Ω)$ for odd-numbered $n$ and $|Ω|=2$. My results indicate that Zhong et al.'s results are due to the specific fully-connected tournament dominance network used in their RPSLS model: when other, equally realistic, RPSLS-style dominance networks are used instead, no such sudden collapse in biodiversity occurs. The Python source-code used for the work reported here is freely available on GitHub.

  • Open Access

    On Long-Term Species Coexistence in Five-Species Evolutionary Spatial Cyclic Games with Ablated and Non-Ablated Dominance Networks

    by Dave Cliff

    I present a replication and, to some extent, a refutation of key results published by Zhong, Zhang, Li, Dai, & Yang in their 2022 paper “Species coexistence in spatial cyclic game of five species” ( Chaos, Solitons and Fractals , 156: 111806), where ecosystem species coexistence was explored via simulation studies of the evolutionary spatial cyclic game (E scg ) Rock-Paper-Scissors-Lizard-Spock (R psls ) with certain predator-prey relationships removed from the game’s “interaction structure”, i.e. with specific arcs ab-lated in the E scg ’s dominance network, and with the E scg run for 10 5 Monte Carlo Steps ( mcs ) to identify its asymptotic behaviors. I replicate the results presented by Zhong et al. for interaction structures with one, two, three, and four arcs ablated from the dominance network. I then empiri-cally demonstrate that the dynamics of the R psls E scg have sufficiently long time constants that the true asymptotic outcomes can often only be identified after running the ablated E scg for 10 7 mcs or longer, and that the true long-term outcomes can be markedly less diverse than those reported by Zhong et al. as asymptotic. Finally I demonstrate that, when run for sufficiently many mcs , the original unablated R psls system exhibits essentially the same asymptotic outcomes as the ablated R psls systems, and in this sense the only causal effect of the ablations is to alter the time required for the system to converge to the long-term asymptotic states that the unablated system eventually settles to anyhow. Graphical Highlights: I replicate key results from Zhong et al. (2022) where biodiversity was explored via the game Rock-Paper-Scissors-Lizard-Spock (R psls ). Zhong et al. reported results from R psls games where specific predatorprey interactions were ablated from the game’s dominance network. My replication reveals problems in Zhong et al.’s design of experiments. Zhong et al. did not run their simulations for sufficiently long to reveal the true asymptotic behavior of the ablated R psls systems. Zhong et al. did not present control outcomes from the unablated R p - sls system, so there is no baseline data for comparison to the treatment outcomes. I present results from simulations that are run for 100 to 1000 times longer than the experiments reported by Zhong et al., thereby revealing the true asymptotic behaviors of the system. The asymptotic outcomes are remarkably uniform – practically indistinguishable – in the cases where one, two, or three arcs are ablated from the R psls dominance network. My asymptotic results for the baseline original unablated system are also very similar to those for the one-two- and three-ablation systems. My results question whether the ablations have any effect other than speeding the system’s convergence to its eventual asymptotic state. Results from Zhong et al.’s four-ablation system do not fit so well with the lower-ablation-count systems: potential reasons for this, and avenues for further research on it, are discussed.


  • Open Access

    Editorial to the special issue on ZIMI

    by Dave Cliff, Dan K. Gode, Shyam Sunder

  • Open Access

    Co-Evolution Causes Instability: Differential Evolution of ZIP Automated Traders in a Simulated Financial Market

    by Dave Cliff

    This paper reports results and analysis from simulation experiments in which a population of adaptive automated traders compete with one another and co-evolve their trading behaviors on a high-fidelity model of a contemporary electronic financial exchange. The automated traders are all using the adaptive Zero Intelligence Plus (ZIP) trading strategy, which was proven in 2001 to consistently outperform human traders in controlled laboratory experiments. ZIP adapts its trading strategies second-by second using a simple form of machine learning (ML), and for any one ZIP trader the performance of its ML is controlled by the values of five real-valued hyperparameters. The novel contribution of this paper is that here each ZIP trader has been extended to continuously use Differential Evolution (DE) to try to find the vector of five hyperparameter values that gives rise to the most profitable trading behavior in the current market conditions: this extended version of ZIP is referred to as ZIPDE. Because the current profitability of any one trader is largely dependent on the current trading behaviors of other traders in the market, and each trader's behavior can potentially be undergoing continuous change as a result of the simultaneous operation of the ML and DE adaptivity, this is an inherently co-evolutionary system. Results presented here come from long-term simulations in which continuous second-by-second trading interactions occur in the market continuously (24 x 7) for 365 days, during which some traders in the market will plausibly execute more than two million transactions. The results reveal that the continuous co-evolutionary interactions among traders give rise to unpredictable long-term instabilities in the traders' individual strategies. The instabilities seen in the new results presented here are qualitatively the same as those seen previously in simpler models of co-evolutionary markets involving less sophisticated adaptation mechanisms (i.e., stochastic hill climbers, rather than DE) operating on less sophisticated trader-agents (i.e., with PRZI agents rather than ZIP): thus, the results presented here add weight to the hypothesis that co-evolutionary markets are inherently unstable in strategy space, and hence that the long-term strategy instabilities seen in simpler simulation models of co-evolutionary markets are not mere artefacts of those models' simplifying assumptions. The Python source-code used in these experiments is being made freely available on GitHub, for other researchers to replicate and extend the results presented here.

  • Open Access

    Parameterised-Response Zero-Intelligence Traders

    by Dave Cliff

    I introduce PRZI (Parameterised-Response Zero Intelligence), a new form of zero-intelligence trader intended for use in simulation studies of the dynamics of continuous double auction markets. Like Gode & Sunder's classic ZIC trader, PRZI generates quote-prices from a random distribution over some specified domain of allowable quote-prices. Unlike ZIC, which uses a uniform distribution to generate prices, the probability distribution in a PRZI trader is parameterised in such a way that its probability mass function (PMF) is determined by a real-valued control variable s in the range [-1.0, +1.0] that determines the _strategy_ for that trader. When s=0, a PRZI trader is identical to ZIC, with a uniform PMF; but when |s|=~1 the PRZI trader's PMF becomes maximally skewed to one extreme or the other of the price-range, thereby making its quote-prices more or less urgent, biasing the quote-price distribution toward or away from the trader's limit-price. To explore the co-evolutionary dynamics of populations of PRZI traders that dynamically adapt their strategies, I show results from long-term market experiments in which each trader uses a simple stochastic hill-climber algorithm to repeatedly evaluate alternative s-values and choose the most profitable at any given time. In these experiments the profitability of any particular s-value may be non-stationary because the profitability of one trader's strategy at any one time can depend on the mix of strategies being played by the other traders at that time, which are each themselves continuously adapting. Results from these market experiments demonstrate that the population of traders' strategies can exhibit rich dynamics, with periods of stability lasting over hundreds of thousands of trader interactions interspersed by occasional periods of change. Python source-code for the work reported here has been made publicly available on GitHub.