Benjamin Green
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Benjamin Green has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Hutchison
Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
4 shared publications - Richard Derbyshire
Orange Cyberdefense, London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
4 shared publications - Alexander Staves
Lancaster University,United Kingdom
3 shared publications - Daniel Prince
Lancaster University
3 shared publications - Sam Maesschalck
Security Lancaster, Lancaster University Lancaster UK
3 shared publications - Angelos K. Marnerides
University of Cyprus
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Digital Threats: Research and Practice
- Vol. 5 (3) , 1-24
Dead Man’s PLC: Towards Viable Cyber Extortion for Operational Technology
For decades, operational technology (OT) has enjoyed the luxury of being suitably inaccessible, and thus has experienced directly targeted cyber attacks from only the most advanced and well-resourced adversaries. However, security via obscurity cannot last forever, and indeed a shift is happening whereby less advanced adversaries are showing an appetite for targeting OT. With this shift in adversary demographics, there will likely also be a shift in attack goals, from clandestine process degradation and espionage to overt cyber extortion (Cy-X). Even if encryption-based Cy-X techniques were launched against OT assets, typical recovery practices designed for engineering processes would provide adequate resilience. In response, this article introduces Dead Man’s PLC (DM-PLC), a pragmatic step towards viable OT Cy-X that acknowledges and weaponises the resilience processes typically encountered in any OT environment. Using only existing functionality, DM-PLC considers an entire environment as the entity under ransom, whereby all assets constantly send one another heartbeats to ensure the attack remains untampered with, treating any deviations as a detonation trigger akin to a DM switch. A proof of concept of DM-PLC is implemented and evaluated on a peer reviewed and industry validated OT testbed to demonstrate its malicious potential.
- 30 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in Digital Threats: Research and Practice
- Vol. 5 (3) , 1-24
Open AccessDead Man’s PLC: Towards Viable Cyber Extortion for Operational Technology
For decades, operational technology (OT) has enjoyed the luxury of being suitably inaccessible, and thus has experienced directly targeted cyber attacks from only the most advanced and well-resourced adversaries. However, security via obscurity cannot last forever, and indeed a shift is happening whereby less advanced adversaries are showing an appetite for targeting OT. With this shift in adversary demographics, there will likely also be a shift in attack goals, from clandestine process degradation and espionage to overt cyber extortion (Cy-X). Even if encryption-based Cy-X techniques were launched against OT assets, typical recovery practices designed for engineering processes would provide adequate resilience. In response, this article introduces Dead Man’s PLC (DM-PLC), a pragmatic step towards viable OT Cy-X that acknowledges and weaponises the resilience processes typically encountered in any OT environment. Using only existing functionality, DM-PLC considers an entire environment as the entity under ransom, whereby all assets constantly send one another heartbeats to ensure the attack remains untampered with, treating any deviations as a detonation trigger akin to a DM switch. A proof of concept of DM-PLC is implemented and evaluated on a peer reviewed and industry validated OT testbed to demonstrate its malicious potential.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 358-362
To me, to you: Towards Secure PLC Programming through a Community-Driven Open-Source Initiative
Over the last decade, industrial control systems (ICS) have experienced an increasing frequency of cyber attacks. At the heart of these systems are programmable logic controller (PLC), responsible for the monitoring, control, and automation of physical operational processes. As an increasing number of adversaries are attaining the capability to gain a foothold in ICS environments, with the goal of operational process manipulation, PLCs are becoming a primary target. Unlike conventional IT software, PLCs are programmed via unique industrial languages and the notion of secure PLC programming practices is in its infancy. This has led to vulnerabilities within the very logic PLCs use to interact with the physical world, notably in code provided by vendors, which is proprietary and unable to be viewed or edited to implement secure programming practices. These vulnerabilities then affords adversaries an attack surface to achieve their goals. In this positional paper, a conceptual framework is introduced positing the notion of a communitydriven hub. This hub incorporates a set of processes that draw from existing literature, to provide secure, verified, open-source PLC code. The goal of which is to not only provide PLC programmers with a convenient alternative to vulnerable vendor provided libraries, but increase the awareness and importance of secure PLC programming practices.
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 358-362
Open AccessTo me, to you: Towards Secure PLC Programming through a Community-Driven Open-Source Initiative
Over the last decade, industrial control systems (ICS) have experienced an increasing frequency of cyber attacks. At the heart of these systems are programmable logic controller (PLC), responsible for the monitoring, control, and automation of physical operational processes. As an increasing number of adversaries are attaining the capability to gain a foothold in ICS environments, with the goal of operational process manipulation, PLCs are becoming a primary target. Unlike conventional IT software, PLCs are programmed via unique industrial languages and the notion of secure PLC programming practices is in its infancy. This has led to vulnerabilities within the very logic PLCs use to interact with the physical world, notably in code provided by vendors, which is proprietary and unable to be viewed or edited to implement secure programming practices. These vulnerabilities then affords adversaries an attack surface to achieve their goals. In this positional paper, a conceptual framework is introduced positing the notion of a communitydriven hub. This hub incorporates a set of processes that draw from existing literature, to provide secure, verified, open-source PLC code. The goal of which is to not only provide PLC programmers with a convenient alternative to vulnerable vendor provided libraries, but increase the awareness and importance of secure PLC programming practices.
- Open Access
Walking Under the Ladder Logic: PLC-VBS, a PLC Control Logic Vulnerability Discovery Tool
Cyber security risk assessments provide a pivotal starting point towards the understanding of existing risk exposure, through which suitable mitigation strategies can be formed. Where risk is viewed as a product of threat, vulnerability, and impact, understanding each element is of equal importance. This can be a challenge in Industrial Control System (ICS) environments, where adopted technologies are typically not only bespoke, but interact directly with the physical world. To date, existing vulnerability identification has focused on traditional vulnerability categories. While this provides risk assessors with a baseline understanding, and the ability to hypothesize on potential resulting impacts, it is high level, operating at a level of abstraction that would be viewed as incomplete within a traditional information system context. The work presented in this paper takes the understanding of ICS device vulnerabilities one step further. It offers a tool, PLC-VBS, that helps identify Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) vulnerabilities, specifically within logic used to monitor, control, and automate operational processes. PLC-VBS gives risk assessors a more coherent picture about the potential impact should the identified vulnerabilities be exploited; this applies specifically to operational process elements.
Open AccessWalking Under the Ladder Logic: PLC-VBS, a PLC Control Logic Vulnerability Discovery Tool
Cyber security risk assessments provide a pivotal starting point towards the understanding of existing risk exposure, through which suitable mitigation strategies can be formed. Where risk is viewed as a product of threat, vulnerability, and impact, understanding each element is of equal importance. This can be a challenge in Industrial Control System (ICS) environments, where adopted technologies are typically not only bespoke, but interact directly with the physical world. To date, existing vulnerability identification has focused on traditional vulnerability categories. While this provides risk assessors with a baseline understanding, and the ability to hypothesize on potential resulting impacts, it is high level, operating at a level of abstraction that would be viewed as incomplete within a traditional information system context. The work presented in this paper takes the understanding of ICS device vulnerabilities one step further. It offers a tool, PLC-VBS, that helps identify Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) vulnerabilities, specifically within logic used to monitor, control, and automate operational processes. PLC-VBS gives risk assessors a more coherent picture about the potential impact should the identified vulnerabilities be exploited; this applies specifically to operational process elements.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection
- Vol. 35
Looking back to look forward: Lessons learnt from cyber-attacks on Industrial Control Systems
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection
- Vol. 35
Top Cited PapersLooking back to look forward: Lessons learnt from cyber-attacks on Industrial Control Systems
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 110
PCaaD: Towards automated determination and exploitation of industrial systems
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 110
PCaaD: Towards automated determination and exploitation of industrial systems
- Open Access
- 1 April 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 103, 102163
“Talking a different Language”: Anticipating adversary attack cost for cyber risk assessment
- 1 April 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 103, 102163
Open Access“Talking a different Language”: Anticipating adversary attack cost for cyber risk assessment
- 17 December 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 253-263
Extended Abstract - Transformers: Intrusion Detection Data in Disguise
- 17 December 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 253-263
Extended Abstract - Transformers: Intrusion Detection Data in Disguise
- Open Access
- 7 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- Vol. 12223, 67-88
Fast and Furious: Outrunning Windows Kernel Notification Routines from User-Mode
Modern Operating Systems (OSs) enable user processes to obtain full access control over other processes initiated by the same user. In scenarios of sensitive security processes (e.g., antivirus software), protection schemes are enforced at the kernel level such as to confront arbitrary user processes overtaking with malicious intent. Within the Windows family of OSs, the kernel driver is notified via dedicated routines for user-mode processes that require protection. In such cases the kernel driver establishes a callback mechanism triggered whenever a handle request for the original user-mode process is initiated by a different user process. Subsequently, the kernel driver performs a selective permission removal process (e.g., read access to the process memory) prior to passing a handle to the requesting process. In this paper we are the first to demonstrate a fundamental user-mode process access control vulnerability, existing in Windows 7 up to the most recent Windows 10 OSs. We show that a user-mode process can indeed obtain a fully privileged access handle before the kernel driver is notified, thus prior to the callback mechanism establishment. Our study shows that this flaw can be exploited by a method to (i) disable the anti-malware suite Symantec Endpoint Protection; (ii) overtake VirtualBox protected processes; (iii) circumvent two major video game anti-cheat protection solutions, BattlEye and EasyAntiCheat. Finally we provide recommendations on how to address the discovered vulnerability.
- 7 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- Vol. 12223, 67-88
Open AccessFast and Furious: Outrunning Windows Kernel Notification Routines from User-Mode
Modern Operating Systems (OSs) enable user processes to obtain full access control over other processes initiated by the same user. In scenarios of sensitive security processes (e.g., antivirus software), protection schemes are enforced at the kernel level such as to confront arbitrary user processes overtaking with malicious intent. Within the Windows family of OSs, the kernel driver is notified via dedicated routines for user-mode processes that require protection. In such cases the kernel driver establishes a callback mechanism triggered whenever a handle request for the original user-mode process is initiated by a different user process. Subsequently, the kernel driver performs a selective permission removal process (e.g., read access to the process memory) prior to passing a handle to the requesting process. In this paper we are the first to demonstrate a fundamental user-mode process access control vulnerability, existing in Windows 7 up to the most recent Windows 10 OSs. We show that a user-mode process can indeed obtain a fully privileged access handle before the kernel driver is notified, thus prior to the callback mechanism establishment. Our study shows that this flaw can be exploited by a method to (i) disable the anti-malware suite Symantec Endpoint Protection; (ii) overtake VirtualBox protected processes; (iii) circumvent two major video game anti-cheat protection solutions, BattlEye and EasyAntiCheat. Finally we provide recommendations on how to address the discovered vulnerability.
- Open Access
- 20 December 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-17
Everything Is Awesome! or Is It? Cyber Security Risks in Critical Infrastructure
- 20 December 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-17
Open AccessEverything Is Awesome! or Is It? Cyber Security Risks in Critical Infrastructure
- Open Access
- 16 October 2015
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 23-29
The Impact of Social Engineering on Industrial Control System Security
In assessing the security posture of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), several approaches have been proposed, including attack graphs, attack trees, Bayesian networks and security ideals. Predominantly focusing on technical vulnerabilities, challenges stemming from social and organisational factors are often reviewed in isolation, if at all. Taking a mean time-to-compromise (MTTC) metric as a base for expansion, we explore the impact social engineering attack vectors (malicious e-mails) could have on such assessments. The applied method takes a holistic view, to better understand the potential impact of social engineering across a small European utility company. The results of this review are analysed and discussed, highlighting the level of access an attacker could gain through social engineering, and the need for assessment metrics to include vulnerabilities stemming not only from technical factors, but social and organisational ones as well
- 16 October 2015
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 23-29
Open AccessThe Impact of Social Engineering on Industrial Control System Security
In assessing the security posture of Industrial Control Systems (ICS), several approaches have been proposed, including attack graphs, attack trees, Bayesian networks and security ideals. Predominantly focusing on technical vulnerabilities, challenges stemming from social and organisational factors are often reviewed in isolation, if at all. Taking a mean time-to-compromise (MTTC) metric as a base for expansion, we explore the impact social engineering attack vectors (malicious e-mails) could have on such assessments. The applied method takes a holistic view, to better understand the potential impact of social engineering across a small European utility company. The results of this review are analysed and discussed, highlighting the level of access an attacker could gain through social engineering, and the need for assessment metrics to include vulnerabilities stemming not only from technical factors, but social and organisational ones as well