Masaki Tanaka
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Masaki Tanaka has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jun Tanimoto
Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
4 shared publications- Jun Tanimoto
Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences Kyushu University 816-8580 Fukuoka Japan
3 shared publications - Rajib Arefin
University of Dhaka, 1
2 shared publications Ahsan Habib
1 shared publication- K. M. Ariful Kabir
Department of Mathematics, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, Dhaka, Bangladesh
1 shared publication - Kazuki Kuga
Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in BioSystems
- Vol. 209, 104532
Proposal of an apposite strategy-updating rule for the vaccination game where hubs refer to hubs and lower-degree agents refer to lower-degree agents.
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in BioSystems
- Vol. 209, 104532
Proposal of an apposite strategy-updating rule for the vaccination game where hubs refer to hubs and lower-degree agents refer to lower-degree agents.
- Open Access
- 3 February 2021
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
- Vol. 477 (2246) , 20200769
Pair approximation model for the vaccination game: predicting the dynamic process of epidemic spread and individual actions against contagion
We successfully establish a theoretical framework of pairwise approximation for the vaccination game in which both the dynamic process of epidemic spread and individual actions in helping prevent social behaviours are quantitatively evaluated. In contrast with mean-field approximation, our model captures higher-order effects from neighbours by using an underlying network that shows how the disease spreads and how individual decisions evolve over time. This model considers not only imperfect vaccination but also intermediate protective measures other than vaccines. Our analytical predictions are validated by multi-agent simulation results that estimate random regular graphs at varying degrees.
- 3 February 2021
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
- Vol. 477 (2246) , 20200769
Open AccessPair approximation model for the vaccination game: predicting the dynamic process of epidemic spread and individual actions against contagion
We successfully establish a theoretical framework of pairwise approximation for the vaccination game in which both the dynamic process of epidemic spread and individual actions in helping prevent social behaviours are quantitatively evaluated. In contrast with mean-field approximation, our model captures higher-order effects from neighbours by using an underlying network that shows how the disease spreads and how individual decisions evolve over time. This model considers not only imperfect vaccination but also intermediate protective measures other than vaccines. Our analytical predictions are validated by multi-agent simulation results that estimate random regular graphs at varying degrees.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 138
How does conformity promote the enhancement of cooperation in the network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma games?
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 138
How does conformity promote the enhancement of cooperation in the network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma games?
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 138
Automated vehicle control systems need to solve social dilemmas to be disseminated
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 138
Automated vehicle control systems need to solve social dilemmas to be disseminated
- Open Access
- 29 July 2020
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
- Vol. 476 (2239) , 20200327
Vaccinating behaviour guided by imitation and aspiration
Vaccinating decisions can be influenced by imitation as well as self-evaluation or aspiration. This work analyses vaccinating behaviours by coupling both imitation and aspiration update rules, adopting an existing set-up of the mean-field vaccination game. We incorporate the imitation mechanism with several variants of the aspiration protocol, encompassing constant and adaptive aspirations. Equations of the combined dynamics have been derived by grouping the population according to (i) vaccinating strategies and (ii) healthy and infected status within each strategy. If aspiration levels are fixed but differentiated by vaccinating strategies, then vaccinators aspiring less than non-vaccinators are found to ameliorate the vaccination coverage, thereby yielding a less infectious state. The adaptive aspirations maintain a positive correlation with the vaccine efficacy while keeping the opposite relation with vaccination cost. When vaccinating strategies, aspirations and update rules are allowed to evolve synchronously, then either the imitation or aspiration process takes over the entire population. If aspiration rules prevail, then vaccinees and non-vaccinees coexist equally (according to (i)) or vaccine uptake follows a non-monotonic trend with the efficacy (according to (ii)). The imitative rule performs better when vaccination is less expensive or cheap, while aspiration updating safeguards the tenacity of vaccinees despite vaccination being expensive.
- 29 July 2020
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
- Vol. 476 (2239) , 20200327
Open AccessVaccinating behaviour guided by imitation and aspiration
Vaccinating decisions can be influenced by imitation as well as self-evaluation or aspiration. This work analyses vaccinating behaviours by coupling both imitation and aspiration update rules, adopting an existing set-up of the mean-field vaccination game. We incorporate the imitation mechanism with several variants of the aspiration protocol, encompassing constant and adaptive aspirations. Equations of the combined dynamics have been derived by grouping the population according to (i) vaccinating strategies and (ii) healthy and infected status within each strategy. If aspiration levels are fixed but differentiated by vaccinating strategies, then vaccinators aspiring less than non-vaccinators are found to ameliorate the vaccination coverage, thereby yielding a less infectious state. The adaptive aspirations maintain a positive correlation with the vaccine efficacy while keeping the opposite relation with vaccination cost. When vaccinating strategies, aspirations and update rules are allowed to evolve synchronously, then either the imitation or aspiration process takes over the entire population. If aspiration rules prevail, then vaccinees and non-vaccinees coexist equally (according to (i)) or vaccine uptake follows a non-monotonic trend with the efficacy (according to (ii)). The imitative rule performs better when vaccination is less expensive or cheap, while aspiration updating safeguards the tenacity of vaccinees despite vaccination being expensive.
- 1 February 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 486, 110059
Is subsidizing vaccination with hub agent priority policy really meaningful to suppress disease spreading?
- 1 February 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 486, 110059
Is subsidizing vaccination with hub agent priority policy really meaningful to suppress disease spreading?
- Open Access
- 18 December 2019
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
- Vol. 475 (2232) , 20190608
Interplay between cost and effectiveness in influenza vaccine uptake: a vaccination game approach
Pre-emptive vaccination is regarded as one of the most protective measures to control influenza outbreak. There are mainly two types of influenza viruses—influenza A and B with several subtypes—that are commonly found to circulate among humans. The traditional trivalent (TIV) flu vaccine targets two strains of influenza A and one strain of influenza B. The quadrivalent (QIV) vaccine targets one extra B virus strain that ensures better protection against influenza; however, the use of QIV vaccine can be costly, hence impose an extra financial burden to society. This scenario might create a dilemma in choosing vaccine types at the individual level. This article endeavours to explain such a dilemma through the framework of a vaccination game, where individuals can opt for one of the three options: choose either of QIV or TIV vaccine or none. Our approach presumes a mean-field framework of a vaccination game in an infinite and well-mixed population, entangling the disease spreading process of influenza with the coevolution of two types of vaccination decision-making processes taking place before an epidemic season. We conduct a series of numerical simulations as an attempt to illustrate different scenarios. The framework has been validated by the so-called multi-agent simulation (MAS) approach.
- 18 December 2019
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
- Vol. 475 (2232) , 20190608
Open AccessInterplay between cost and effectiveness in influenza vaccine uptake: a vaccination game approach
Pre-emptive vaccination is regarded as one of the most protective measures to control influenza outbreak. There are mainly two types of influenza viruses—influenza A and B with several subtypes—that are commonly found to circulate among humans. The traditional trivalent (TIV) flu vaccine targets two strains of influenza A and one strain of influenza B. The quadrivalent (QIV) vaccine targets one extra B virus strain that ensures better protection against influenza; however, the use of QIV vaccine can be costly, hence impose an extra financial burden to society. This scenario might create a dilemma in choosing vaccine types at the individual level. This article endeavours to explain such a dilemma through the framework of a vaccination game, where individuals can opt for one of the three options: choose either of QIV or TIV vaccine or none. Our approach presumes a mean-field framework of a vaccination game in an infinite and well-mixed population, entangling the disease spreading process of influenza with the coevolution of two types of vaccination decision-making processes taking place before an epidemic season. We conduct a series of numerical simulations as an attempt to illustrate different scenarios. The framework has been validated by the so-called multi-agent simulation (MAS) approach.