Mohammed M. Hafez
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Mohammed M. Hafez has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Creighton Mullins
Department of National Security AffairsNaval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA, USA
1 shared publication- Emily Kalah Gade
Emory University, USA
1 shared publication Michael Gabbay
Applied Physics Laboratory, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
1 shared publication- Michael Gabbay
Applied Physics Laboratory, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA
1 shared publication Sean C. Reynolds
United States Embassy, Amman, Jordan
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 28 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
- p. 1-22
The Nearest Enemy: How Fragmentation and Localization Are Unraveling Transnational Jihadism
In the two decades since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States and its allies have invested trillions of dollars in dismantling the transnational jihadist movement through wars...
- 28 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
- p. 1-22
The Nearest Enemy: How Fragmentation and Localization Are Unraveling Transnational Jihadism
In the two decades since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States and its allies have invested trillions of dollars in dismantling the transnational jihadist movement through wars...
- 8 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
- p. 1-25
Choosing Sides in Forever Wars: How Wedge Threats Shape Ideological Alignment in Fragmented Warscapes
- 8 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
- p. 1-25
Choosing Sides in Forever Wars: How Wedge Threats Shape Ideological Alignment in Fragmented Warscapes
- 13 October 2023
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 43-58
The power of ideology in the Middle East and its limits
Ideology is an important feature of Middle East politics. It helps to legitimize state and nonstate actors, and it articulates the complexity of national aspirations and collective grievances into simple narratives about ingroups and outgroups, alternative sociopolitical institutions, and territorial aspirations. Ideology can inspire both loyalty and opposition to the state, facilitate collective mobilization against adversaries, and foster individual commitments to sacrifice for a cause. However, despite the power of ideology to transform political hierarchies, two ideological movements in the Middle East - pan-Arab nationalism and pan-Islamism - have failed in their main objectives to redraw the territorial boundaries of the Middle East or fundamentally reorder the regional distribution of power between status quo and revisionist states. Two factors - internal fragmentation and external intervention - help explain their failure. Both Arabism and Islamism were plagued with factional rivalries, enabling a divide-and-conquer strategy on the part of their state adversaries. External military intervention during critical periods of ascendancy proved to be an insurmountable obstacle for these ideological movements. In the Middle East, the power of ideology has encountered its limits.
- 13 October 2023
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 43-58
The power of ideology in the Middle East and its limits
Ideology is an important feature of Middle East politics. It helps to legitimize state and nonstate actors, and it articulates the complexity of national aspirations and collective grievances into simple narratives about ingroups and outgroups, alternative sociopolitical institutions, and territorial aspirations. Ideology can inspire both loyalty and opposition to the state, facilitate collective mobilization against adversaries, and foster individual commitments to sacrifice for a cause. However, despite the power of ideology to transform political hierarchies, two ideological movements in the Middle East - pan-Arab nationalism and pan-Islamism - have failed in their main objectives to redraw the territorial boundaries of the Middle East or fundamentally reorder the regional distribution of power between status quo and revisionist states. Two factors - internal fragmentation and external intervention - help explain their failure. Both Arabism and Islamism were plagued with factional rivalries, enabling a divide-and-conquer strategy on the part of their state adversaries. External military intervention during critical periods of ascendancy proved to be an insurmountable obstacle for these ideological movements. In the Middle East, the power of ideology has encountered its limits.
- 20 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Terrorism and Political Violence
- Vol. 34 (8) , 1-3
Jihad in the City: Militant Islam and Contentious Politics in Tripoli
The phenomenon of militant Islamism continues to garner a great deal of scholarly attention, despite decades of concerted theoretical inquiry and empirical research about its diverse movements, ide...
- 20 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Terrorism and Political Violence
- Vol. 34 (8) , 1-3
Jihad in the City: Militant Islam and Contentious Politics in Tripoli
The phenomenon of militant Islamism continues to garner a great deal of scholarly attention, despite decades of concerted theoretical inquiry and empirical research about its diverse movements, ide...
- 16 December 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
- Vol. 47 (9) , 963-983
Consolidation of Nonstate Armed Actors in Fragmented Conflicts: Introducing an Emerging Research Program
How do armed groups consolidate power in conflict landscapes packed with rival factions, paramilitary militias, and local warlords? Extant scholarship has studied the causes and consequences of rebel fragmentation, but the reverse process in which power that is dispersed among many armed actors becomes concentrated among a handful of factions is underexplored. In this special issue, we bring together eight case studies to illustrate at least three pathways to militant consolidation. Cooperative consolidation involves organizations growing consensually through alliance formation and mergers. Competitive consolidation entails a gradual process of increasing political and military power by outcompeting rival groups for fighters, popular support, and international sponsors. Coercive consolidation occurs when militant organizations violently eliminate rivals. This framing article considers several factors that may explain the choice of consolidation mode, including the role of territorial control, permeability of group boundaries, and state sponsorship. By investigating this under-examined aspect of civil conflict, we forge fundamentally new theoretical ground in the study of internal wars and weakly-governed societies.
- 16 December 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
- Vol. 47 (9) , 963-983
Consolidation of Nonstate Armed Actors in Fragmented Conflicts: Introducing an Emerging Research Program
How do armed groups consolidate power in conflict landscapes packed with rival factions, paramilitary militias, and local warlords? Extant scholarship has studied the causes and consequences of rebel fragmentation, but the reverse process in which power that is dispersed among many armed actors becomes concentrated among a handful of factions is underexplored. In this special issue, we bring together eight case studies to illustrate at least three pathways to militant consolidation. Cooperative consolidation involves organizations growing consensually through alliance formation and mergers. Competitive consolidation entails a gradual process of increasing political and military power by outcompeting rival groups for fighters, popular support, and international sponsors. Coercive consolidation occurs when militant organizations violently eliminate rivals. This framing article considers several factors that may explain the choice of consolidation mode, including the role of territorial control, permeability of group boundaries, and state sponsorship. By investigating this under-examined aspect of civil conflict, we forge fundamentally new theoretical ground in the study of internal wars and weakly-governed societies.
- 29 November 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Terrorism and Political Violence
- Vol. 32 (3) , 604-629
Fratricidal Rebels: Ideological Extremity and Warring Factionalism in Civil Wars
Why do rebels kill each other? When confronting a formidable regime, rebels often descend into warring factionalism rather than forge unity across their ranks to reap the advantages of cooperation. This article tackles the puzzle of inter-rebel fratricide. It explores power and resource competition arguments, and contrasts them with ideological mechanisms that can drive inter-rebel violence. It argues that ideological extremity is central to rebel fratricide. Rebel organizations with common ideological origins can still compete with each other based on their degree of centrism and extremism, making them ideologically distant. This proximity-distance paradox makes their cohabitation mutually threatening. Ideological challengers from the same family tree are particularly threatening to one’s group cohesion, and if successful, guarantee one’s political marginalization within the broader movement. Extremist groups are likely to respond to these threats with fratricide, while ideologically centrist ones will rely on other strategies such as balancing, outbidding, or defecting to manage their rivalries. Algeria’s civil war, 1992–2002, is a plausibility probe case study that illustrates these causal mechanisms. The study contributes to a burgeoning literature on the role of ideology in armed civil conflicts.
- 29 November 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Terrorism and Political Violence
- Vol. 32 (3) , 604-629
Fratricidal Rebels: Ideological Extremity and Warring Factionalism in Civil Wars
Why do rebels kill each other? When confronting a formidable regime, rebels often descend into warring factionalism rather than forge unity across their ranks to reap the advantages of cooperation. This article tackles the puzzle of inter-rebel fratricide. It explores power and resource competition arguments, and contrasts them with ideological mechanisms that can drive inter-rebel violence. It argues that ideological extremity is central to rebel fratricide. Rebel organizations with common ideological origins can still compete with each other based on their degree of centrism and extremism, making them ideologically distant. This proximity-distance paradox makes their cohabitation mutually threatening. Ideological challengers from the same family tree are particularly threatening to one’s group cohesion, and if successful, guarantee one’s political marginalization within the broader movement. Extremist groups are likely to respond to these threats with fratricide, while ideologically centrist ones will rely on other strategies such as balancing, outbidding, or defecting to manage their rivalries. Algeria’s civil war, 1992–2002, is a plausibility probe case study that illustrates these causal mechanisms. The study contributes to a burgeoning literature on the role of ideology in armed civil conflicts.
- 14 February 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Terrorism and Political Violence
- Vol. 31 (4) , 661-686
Social Network Analysis of German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq
Why do Westerners become foreign fighters in civil conflicts? We explore this question through original data collection on German foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, and test three sets of hypotheses that revolve around socioeconomic integration, online radicalization, and social network mobilization. We conduct link analysis to map the network of German foreign fighters prior to their mobilization, and marshal evidence to assess the validity of competing explanations. We find only modest support for the integration deficit hypothesis, and meager support for the social media radicalization theory. Instead, the preponderance of evidence suggests that interpersonal ties largely drive the German foreign fighter phenomenon. Recruitment featured clustered mobilization and bloc recruitment within interconnected radical milieus, leading us to conclude that peer-to-peer networks are the most important mobilization factor for German foreign fighters.
- 14 February 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Terrorism and Political Violence
- Vol. 31 (4) , 661-686
Social Network Analysis of German Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq
Why do Westerners become foreign fighters in civil conflicts? We explore this question through original data collection on German foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, and test three sets of hypotheses that revolve around socioeconomic integration, online radicalization, and social network mobilization. We conduct link analysis to map the network of German foreign fighters prior to their mobilization, and marshal evidence to assess the validity of competing explanations. We find only modest support for the integration deficit hypothesis, and meager support for the social media radicalization theory. Instead, the preponderance of evidence suggests that interpersonal ties largely drive the German foreign fighter phenomenon. Recruitment featured clustered mobilization and bloc recruitment within interconnected radical milieus, leading us to conclude that peer-to-peer networks are the most important mobilization factor for German foreign fighters.
- 6 July 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Journal of Middle East Studies
- Vol. 48 (3) , 607-609
Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai, Political Islam in the Age of Democratization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Pp. 280. $110.00 cloth, $36.00 paper. ISBNs: 9781137008480, 9781137008046
The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020743816000660Reviewed is Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai, Political Islam in the Age of Democratization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013)
- 6 July 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Journal of Middle East Studies
- Vol. 48 (3) , 607-609
Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai, Political Islam in the Age of Democratization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Pp. 280. $110.00 cloth, $36.00 paper. ISBNs: 9781137008480, 9781137008046
The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020743816000660Reviewed is Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai, Political Islam in the Age of Democratization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013)
- Top Cited Papers
- 5 August 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
- Vol. 38 (11) , 958-975
The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism
Why and how do individuals residing in relatively peaceful and affluent Western societies come to embrace extremist ideologies that emanate from distant places? We summarize the most recent empirical literature on the causes and dynamics of radicalization, and evaluate the state of the art in the study of Islamist homegrown extremism in the West. We propose a theoretical synthesis based on four factors that come together to produce violent radicalization: personal and collective grievances, networks and interpersonal ties, political and religious ideologies, and enabling environments and support structures. We propose adopting a “puzzle” metaphor that represents a multifactor and contextualized approach to understanding how ordinary individuals transform into violent extremists. We concluded with three recommendations to strengthen the empirical foundations of radicalization studies.
- 5 August 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
- Vol. 38 (11) , 958-975
Top Cited PapersThe Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism
Why and how do individuals residing in relatively peaceful and affluent Western societies come to embrace extremist ideologies that emanate from distant places? We summarize the most recent empirical literature on the causes and dynamics of radicalization, and evaluate the state of the art in the study of Islamist homegrown extremism in the West. We propose a theoretical synthesis based on four factors that come together to produce violent radicalization: personal and collective grievances, networks and interpersonal ties, political and religious ideologies, and enabling environments and support structures. We propose adopting a “puzzle” metaphor that represents a multifactor and contextualized approach to understanding how ordinary individuals transform into violent extremists. We concluded with three recommendations to strengthen the empirical foundations of radicalization studies.