Wesley H. Holliday

In the context of voting with ranked ballots, an important class of voting rules is the class of margin-based rules (also called pairwise rules). A voting rule is margin-based if whenever two elections generate the same head-to-head margins of victory or loss between candidates, the voting rule yields the same outcome in both elections. Although this is a mathematically natural invariance property to consider, whether it should be regarded as a normative axiom on voting rules is less clear. In this paper, we address this question for voting rules with any kind of output, whether a set of candidates, a ranking, a probability distribution, etc. We prove that a voting rule is margin-based if and only if it satisfies some axioms with clearer normative content. A key axiom is what we call Preferential Equality, stating that if two voters both rank a candidate x immediately above a candidate y , then either voter switching to rank y immediately above x will have the same effect on the election outcome as if the other voter made the switch, so each voter’s preference for y over x is treated equally.

We prove that there is no preferential voting method satisfying the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, positive involvement (if a candidate x wins in an initial preference profile, then adding a voter who ranks x uniquely first cannot cause x to lose), and n-voter resolvability (if x initially ties for winning, then x can be made the unique winner by adding some set of up to n voters). This impossibility theorem holds for any positive integer n. It also holds if either the Condorcet loser criterion is replaced by independence of clones or positive involvement is replaced by negative involvement.

May’s Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method satisfying several simple axioms. Here we show that by adding some desirable axioms to May’s axioms, we can uniquely determine how to vote on three alternatives (setting aside tiebreaking). In particular, we add two axioms stating that the voting method should mitigate spoiler effects and the so-called strong no show paradox . We prove a theorem stating that any preferential voting method satisfying our enlarged set of axioms, which includes some weak homogeneity and preservation axioms, must choose from among the Minimax winners in all three-alternative elections. When applied to more than three alternatives, our axioms also distinguish Minimax from other known voting methods that coincide with or refine Minimax for three alternatives.

By classic results in social choice theory, any reasonable preferential voting method sometimes gives individuals an incentive to report an insincere preference. The extent to which different voting methods are more or less resistant to such strategic manipulation has become a key consideration for comparing voting methods. Here we measure resistance to manipulation by whether neural networks of varying sizes can learn to profitably manipulate a given voting method in expectation, given different types of limited information about how other voters will vote. We trained over 100,000 neural networks of 26 sizes to manipulate against 8 different voting methods, under 6 types of limited information, in committee-sized elections with 5-21 voters and 3-6 candidates. We find that some voting methods, such as Borda, are highly manipulable by networks with limited information, while others, such as Instant Runoff, are not, despite being quite profitably manipulated by an ideal manipulator with full information. For the three probability models for elections that we use, the overall least manipulable of the 8 methods we study are Condorcet methods, namely Minimax and Split Cycle.

There is an extensive literature in social choice theory studying the consequences of weakening the assumptions of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. Much of this literature suggests that there is no escape from Arrow-style impossibility theorems, while remaining in an ordinal preference setting, unless one drastically violates the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). In this paper, we present a more positive outlook. We propose a model of comparing candidates in elections, which we call the Advantage-Standard (AS) model. The requirement that a collective choice rule (CCR) be representable by the AS model captures a key insight of IIA but is weaker than IIA; yet it is stronger than what is known in the literature as weak IIA (two profiles alike on x, y cannot have opposite strict social preferences on x and y). In addition to motivating violations of IIA, the AS model makes intelligible violations of another Arrovian assumption: the negative transitivity of the strict social preference relation P. While previous literature shows that only weakening IIA to weak IIA or only weakening negative transitivity of P to acyclicity still leads to impossibility theorems, we show that jointly weakening IIA to AS representability and weakening negative transitivity of P leads to no such impossibility theorems. Indeed, we show that several appealing CCRs are AS representable, including even transitive CCRs.