Oldřich Krpec

The war in Ukraine has increased attention to Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), though most research focuses on tactical use or effects on public opinion. This article asks whether OSINF can be methodically transformed into reliable strategic intelligence under wartime uncertainty. Using Russia’s defence industry as a case study, we compare three production scenarios: official claims, expert estimates, and an Open Source Information–based (OSINF) model derived from shares in battlefield losses. The OSINT scenario shows large discrepancies, suggesting actual output is much lower than reported. We argue that with proper methodological treatment, presented in the paper, OSINF now offers sufficient detail to assess national defence capacity. Our approach demonstrates OSINT’s potential to complement traditional intelligence by introducing a novel methodological framework for cross-validating OSINT-derived data against official claims and expert estimates. The findings engage scholarly debates on the integration of OSINT with conventional frameworks by providing a replicable and transparent model for producing more accurate strategic assessments, even at the strategic level.

Progress made in European defence-industrial integration has been subjected to the hardest test with the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has had profound implications for European defence industries across the board and spurred on massive investment into the sector. Based on extensive analysis of procurements, adopted policies, and shifts in discourse, we argue that the practical steps undertaken by Central and Eastern European (CEE) defence industries ¹ 1 By CEE defence industries we include those countries that have relevant defence production in the region and are members of the European Union. Namely alphabetically: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. in the wake of the conflict are disintegrational. This is contrary to many discernible indicators which align with European integrational initiatives in defence. Moreover, the paper argues that the pattern of decisions taken by Central and Eastern European countries reinforces structural barriers to potential future European defence-industrial integration. The findings are significant to EU-wide, regional, and bilateral defence-industrial co-operation as well as national defence industrial strategies in reaction to the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Czechoslovakia was the first industrialized economy to substantially increase tariffs after the First World War. At that time, Czechoslovakia was highly export-oriented, with a large trade surplus in industrial goods. We argue that the introduction of tariffs was a consequence of the ethnically heterogeneous structure of the economy. German capital controlled the highly export-oriented light and consumer goods industries; Czech capital dominated in industries that were far less export-oriented or even import-competing, such as machinery, transportation equipment, and electrical goods. Trade and exchange-rate policy preferences of both groups clearly differed; however, the policy decision-making process (at least until 1926) was completely controlled by Czechoslovaks and Czech capital, explicitly committed to a nationalist takeover of Czechoslovakia's economy. This is why it was possible to implement an exchange rate and trade policy that ran contrary to theoretical expectations based on the general (national aggregate) indicators of the national economy.

Since the launching of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, Chinese leaders have sought to diffuse this ambitious overseas infrastructure drive into the Central and Eastern European bloc. From the literature on policy diffusion, we refer here to a process whereby a dominant actor (China) has vigorously promoted a particular strand of its own domestic development policy in other emerging economies. Our focus is on the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, all EU members since 2004. We draw on Etel Solingen's (2012. Of dominoes and firewalls: the domestic, regional, and global politics of international diffusion. International Studies Quarterly, 56 (4), 631–644) seminal framework on policy diffusion, which considers the stimulus, the medium, political agents, and outcomes. It is the dearth of BRI loans and China-backed infrastructure projects in this sub-region that we seek to explain. Our main finding is that China has been its own biggest firewall in the diffusion of BRI into Central Europe. China needs to formulate policies that surpass the pursuit of its own economic interests and devise approaches that resonate with the more developed status of these three Central European countries.

The disruptions of trade flows due to military conflicts leads to changes in economic structures of countries, to the subsequent changes in trade policies, and to the changes of established trade patterns with impact on position of countries in international trade system. This paper deals with three modern time’s conflicts: Napoleonic Wars, WWI and WWII. We argue that the changes resulting from the disruption of trade flows itself, leads to changes and shifts which are relatively permanent, independent on outcomes of the conflicts for individual countries, and do significantly affect regions which did not take part in the conflict.

The Czech Republic (CZ) is a small open economy that has been integrated into the European economy predominantly through its ties to Germany. Traditional analysis has focused on the positive aspects of this process and pointed out the favorable indicators of the Czech economy, strongly influenced by a modernist perspective (model of economic development) and neoliberalism (applied economic policies). The aim of this article is a more critical reflection on some important features of the Czech economic model. The application of some currently emerging analytic instruments of international economic relations allows us to point out many problematic features of the Czech economy—in particular its dependence on foreign capital combined with a weak ability to retain it and the low added value created within the CZ. There are indicators suggesting a dependent growth within a rigid pattern of an international division of labor and wealth distribution. We argue that shortcomings of the neoliberal model of development (even) in the case of a well prepared and governed economy are a good reason to bring the insights of dependency theory back into the discussion.

To discuss the historical roots of contemporary geopolitical economy, this paper aims to explore the complex and influential analysis of Tilly's formation of European national states as a predominant type of territorial political organization in contemporary world. To do this, Tilly described different eras of dominant organization of warfare in relation to state organization: patrimonialism, brokerage, nationalization, specialization. In this paper, we explore the link between the organization of military power and trade policy. We are trying to answer the question, if it is possible to credibly state a connection between the trade policy types pursued by selected states in specific historical periods and Tilly’s eras of dominant form of organization of warfare. For this purpose, we developed a typology of trade policies of important states throughout the history, using the economic history research of leading experts in the field. Our conclusion is that such a connection – between trade policy and Tilly’s eras of organization of warfare – can be made and that this connection is solidly supported by economic history. Our analysis may be of value for any critical assessment of international trade relations in contemporary geopolitical economy – and of influential cosmopolitan interpretations of the liberal trade regime of 19th century or globalization in 20th century.