Christoph Kelp
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Christoph Kelp has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mona Simion
University of Glasgow
17 shared publications - Igor Douven
University of Groningen
5 shared publications Mona Simion
COGITO Epistemology Research Centre University of Glasgow 67-69 Oakfield Avenue Glasgow G12 8LP
4 shared publications- Harmen Ghijsen
Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
2 shared publications - Mona Simion
Philosophy, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK
2 shared publications Philosophy Documentation Center
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 113 (3) , 618-628
The Epistemology and Semantics of Ignorance
This paper is concerned with ignorance. It develops a novel, full account of the nature and epistemic normativity of objectual and factual ignorance, degrees of ignorance, comparative ignorance, and the semantics of permissible outright attributions of ignorance of facts and phenomena. On this account, objectual ignorance of a phenomenon P is inversely proportional to fully comprehensive and maximally well‐connected knowledge of P: The closer an agent A approximates fully comprehensive and maximally well‐connected knowledge of P, the lower the degree of ignorance of A with regard to P. In turn, “A is ignorant with regard to a phenomenon P” is true in a context c just in case A approximates fully comprehensive and well‐connected knowledge of P distantly enough to surpass a threshold on degrees of objectual ignorance determined by c . Factual ignorance wh‐ of a fact F is directly proportional to the number of possible answers to the embedded wh‐ question that one must properly eliminate in order to have a complete answer to the embedded wh‐ question: The closer an agent A approximates a full answer to the embedded wh‐ question, the lower the degree of ignorance of A with regard to F. In turn, “A is ignorant wh‐ of a fact F” is true in context c if and only if A approximates a full answer to the embedded wh‐ question distantly enough to surpass a threshold of degrees of factual ignorance determined by c.
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 113 (3) , 618-628
Open AccessThe Epistemology and Semantics of Ignorance
This paper is concerned with ignorance. It develops a novel, full account of the nature and epistemic normativity of objectual and factual ignorance, degrees of ignorance, comparative ignorance, and the semantics of permissible outright attributions of ignorance of facts and phenomena. On this account, objectual ignorance of a phenomenon P is inversely proportional to fully comprehensive and maximally well‐connected knowledge of P: The closer an agent A approximates fully comprehensive and maximally well‐connected knowledge of P, the lower the degree of ignorance of A with regard to P. In turn, “A is ignorant with regard to a phenomenon P” is true in a context c just in case A approximates fully comprehensive and well‐connected knowledge of P distantly enough to surpass a threshold on degrees of objectual ignorance determined by c . Factual ignorance wh‐ of a fact F is directly proportional to the number of possible answers to the embedded wh‐ question that one must properly eliminate in order to have a complete answer to the embedded wh‐ question: The closer an agent A approximates a full answer to the embedded wh‐ question, the lower the degree of ignorance of A with regard to F. In turn, “A is ignorant wh‐ of a fact F” is true in context c if and only if A approximates a full answer to the embedded wh‐ question distantly enough to surpass a threshold of degrees of factual ignorance determined by c.
- Open Access
- 4 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
Understanding, justification and the agglomeration of risks of error
A common motivation for denying the closure of justification under conjunction introduction is that it leads to paradox. In this paper, we argue that any adequate account of understanding involves rejecting the idea that agglomeration of justification across conjunctions is limited in the way critics of closure think it is, and we explore some of the epistemological implications of this insight.
- 4 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
Open AccessUnderstanding, justification and the agglomeration of risks of error
A common motivation for denying the closure of justification under conjunction introduction is that it leads to paradox. In this paper, we argue that any adequate account of understanding involves rejecting the idea that agglomeration of justification across conjunctions is limited in the way critics of closure think it is, and we explore some of the epistemological implications of this insight.
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 123-129
Expressive Power, Hermeneutical Injustice, and Conceptual Access
This chapter discusses and defends a novel view of hermeneutical injustice (HI), i.e. the kind of injustice that renders epistemic agents incapable of interpreting their experiences due to conceptual lacks and deficiencies. To this effect, it starts by arguing that Miranda Fricker’s account is of HI too restrictive: HI is, alas, more ubiquitous than her account allows. That is because, pace Fricker, conceptual ignorance is not necessary for HI: hermeneutical injustice essentially involves a failure in concept application rather than in concept possession. The chapter shows that, if this view right, HI is a form of conceptual distributive injustice, and affords the corresponding traditional normative theorizing.
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 123-129
Expressive Power, Hermeneutical Injustice, and Conceptual Access
This chapter discusses and defends a novel view of hermeneutical injustice (HI), i.e. the kind of injustice that renders epistemic agents incapable of interpreting their experiences due to conceptual lacks and deficiencies. To this effect, it starts by arguing that Miranda Fricker’s account is of HI too restrictive: HI is, alas, more ubiquitous than her account allows. That is because, pace Fricker, conceptual ignorance is not necessary for HI: hermeneutical injustice essentially involves a failure in concept application rather than in concept possession. The chapter shows that, if this view right, HI is a form of conceptual distributive injustice, and affords the corresponding traditional normative theorizing.
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 49-61
Normative Restrictions on Conceptual Engineering
This chapter focuses on the normative limits of conceptual engineering: when is it permissible to engage in engineering projects? It argues that the ameliorative project has, so far, been too modest; there is little value-theoretic reason to normatively restrict the project to remedying deficient representational devices, rather than go on a more ambitious quest: conceptual improvement. That being said, it also identifies a limitation to the optimistic claim, showing that ameliorative projects suffer from a ‘wrong-kind-of-reasons’ problem: not just any reason to engineer will deliver conceptual amelioration. Last but not least, the chapter sketches a proposal of normative constraining meant to address both the above results.
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 49-61
Normative Restrictions on Conceptual Engineering
This chapter focuses on the normative limits of conceptual engineering: when is it permissible to engage in engineering projects? It argues that the ameliorative project has, so far, been too modest; there is little value-theoretic reason to normatively restrict the project to remedying deficient representational devices, rather than go on a more ambitious quest: conceptual improvement. That being said, it also identifies a limitation to the optimistic claim, showing that ameliorative projects suffer from a ‘wrong-kind-of-reasons’ problem: not just any reason to engineer will deliver conceptual amelioration. Last but not least, the chapter sketches a proposal of normative constraining meant to address both the above results.
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 137-138
Conclusion
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 16-24
The Case Against Conceptual Engineering
This chapter focuses on sceptical arguments aimed to show that conceptual engineering is not possible. It introduces the famous charges that conceptual engineering amounts to changing the subject, that conceptual engineering leads to an unacceptable form of proliferation of engineering projects, that conceptual engineering cannot be squared with semantic externalism 9Putnam 1875), that there cannot be success conditions for conceptual engineering projects, and that there is simply no good track record of successful conceptual engineering projects. In this way, this chapter develops a set of desiderata for a theory of conceptual engineering. Any adequate account of conceptual engineering had better provide viable solutions to these problems.
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 16-24
The Case Against Conceptual Engineering
This chapter focuses on sceptical arguments aimed to show that conceptual engineering is not possible. It introduces the famous charges that conceptual engineering amounts to changing the subject, that conceptual engineering leads to an unacceptable form of proliferation of engineering projects, that conceptual engineering cannot be squared with semantic externalism 9Putnam 1875), that there cannot be success conditions for conceptual engineering projects, and that there is simply no good track record of successful conceptual engineering projects. In this way, this chapter develops a set of desiderata for a theory of conceptual engineering. Any adequate account of conceptual engineering had better provide viable solutions to these problems.
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 62-76
Conceptual Ignorance
The previous chapter argued in favour of epistemic normative constraints on conceptual engineering. This chapter unpacks these epistemic limits further in terms of conceptual ignorance: an engineering project generates representational loss just in case it carries a disposition to increase one’s degree of conceptual ignorance. In turn, we understand C-conceptual ignorance as knowledge of what a C is. We argue that a subject S’s conceptual ignorance of C is directly proportional to the number of possible answers to ‘What is a c?’ that S needs to properly eliminate: the closer a subject S approximates a complete answer to the question, the lower the degree of ignorance of S with regard to C. The relevant sense of possibility has to do with close metaphysical, epistemic, and doxastic possibility. In turn, outright attributions of conceptual ignorance to S are context-sensitive—they have to do with whether S surpasses a threshold of open answers to the question ‘What is a c?’ determined by the relevant contextual contrast class.
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 62-76
Conceptual Ignorance
The previous chapter argued in favour of epistemic normative constraints on conceptual engineering. This chapter unpacks these epistemic limits further in terms of conceptual ignorance: an engineering project generates representational loss just in case it carries a disposition to increase one’s degree of conceptual ignorance. In turn, we understand C-conceptual ignorance as knowledge of what a C is. We argue that a subject S’s conceptual ignorance of C is directly proportional to the number of possible answers to ‘What is a c?’ that S needs to properly eliminate: the closer a subject S approximates a complete answer to the question, the lower the degree of ignorance of S with regard to C. The relevant sense of possibility has to do with close metaphysical, epistemic, and doxastic possibility. In turn, outright attributions of conceptual ignorance to S are context-sensitive—they have to do with whether S surpasses a threshold of open answers to the question ‘What is a c?’ determined by the relevant contextual contrast class.
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 130-136
On Conceptual Disinformation
Disinformation is widespread and harmful. This is common knowledge. It is also more widely spread than we think: disinformation is not, as commonly assumed, false content (misinformation) spread with the intention, or function to mislead. Disinformation campaigns, when cleverly done, are not operating with false content: we are often too clever to fall for blunt falsehoods. Most of us, however, are much more vulnerable to subtly misleading content. Furthermore, as disinformation spread by convinced conspiracy theorists and black-box artificial intelligences shows, neither the intention nor the function to mislead is required for disinformation. This chapter discusses an important variety of disinformation that remains underexplored, and thus flies below the radar of extant disinformation tracking efforts: conceptual disinformation. We build on our view of conceptual ignorance to show that conceptual disinformation is achieved via increasing the audience’s degree of conceptual ignorance. Conceptual disinformation detaches us from meanings.
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 130-136
On Conceptual Disinformation
Disinformation is widespread and harmful. This is common knowledge. It is also more widely spread than we think: disinformation is not, as commonly assumed, false content (misinformation) spread with the intention, or function to mislead. Disinformation campaigns, when cleverly done, are not operating with false content: we are often too clever to fall for blunt falsehoods. Most of us, however, are much more vulnerable to subtly misleading content. Furthermore, as disinformation spread by convinced conspiracy theorists and black-box artificial intelligences shows, neither the intention nor the function to mislead is required for disinformation. This chapter discusses an important variety of disinformation that remains underexplored, and thus flies below the radar of extant disinformation tracking efforts: conceptual disinformation. We build on our view of conceptual ignorance to show that conceptual disinformation is achieved via increasing the audience’s degree of conceptual ignorance. Conceptual disinformation detaches us from meanings.
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 77-98
Expressive Power and Duties of Meaning Production
This chapter puts forth a full-fledged, systematic account of duties of meaning production. Unsurprisingly, the account is functionalist. It proposes that a linguistic community has an obligation to generate a particular representational device insofar as there is a categorical need of an increase in expressive power in the community at stake, which would thereby be alleviated; there is capacity to generate the representational device in question on the part of the linguistic community at stake; and there are no overriding reasons against doing so. In turn, categorical needs pertaining to expressive power are unpacked as pertaining to proper cognitive functioning.
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 77-98
Expressive Power and Duties of Meaning Production
This chapter puts forth a full-fledged, systematic account of duties of meaning production. Unsurprisingly, the account is functionalist. It proposes that a linguistic community has an obligation to generate a particular representational device insofar as there is a categorical need of an increase in expressive power in the community at stake, which would thereby be alleviated; there is capacity to generate the representational device in question on the part of the linguistic community at stake; and there are no overriding reasons against doing so. In turn, categorical needs pertaining to expressive power are unpacked as pertaining to proper cognitive functioning.
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 3-15
Conceptual Engineering
This chapter does two things. First, it offers a brief survey of the field, tracing it back to Carnap’s explication, by focusing on the main research questions pursued. Second, it explores the various shapes that conceptual engineering can take, including repair, replacement, and innovation, as well as the various objects that may be the targets of conceptual engineering, including words, meanings, and concepts. It also introduces several central foundational questions about conceptual engineering and develops a taxonomy for pessimistic and optimistic approaches to conceptual engineering depending on how these questions are answered. Finally, the chapter introduces the functionalist approach to conceptual engineering that the remainder of the book will pursue.
- 27 February 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 3-15
Conceptual Engineering
This chapter does two things. First, it offers a brief survey of the field, tracing it back to Carnap’s explication, by focusing on the main research questions pursued. Second, it explores the various shapes that conceptual engineering can take, including repair, replacement, and innovation, as well as the various objects that may be the targets of conceptual engineering, including words, meanings, and concepts. It also introduces several central foundational questions about conceptual engineering and develops a taxonomy for pessimistic and optimistic approaches to conceptual engineering depending on how these questions are answered. Finally, the chapter introduces the functionalist approach to conceptual engineering that the remainder of the book will pursue.