Damián-Emilio Gibaja-Romero
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Damián-Emilio Gibaja-Romero has a total of 34 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Rosa María Cantón Croda
Graduate School of Engineering, UPAEP-University, Puebla 72410, Mexico
7 shared publications - José-Luis Martínez-Flores
Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla
5 shared publications - Diana Sánchez-Partida
Popular Autonomous University of the State of Puebla
4 shared publications - Juan José Reyes Salgado
Engineering Department, Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla, Puebla, México
3 shared publications - María Guadalupe Medina Barrera
Instituto Tecnológico de Apizaco
3 shared publications - Aldo-Cesar Zarate-Zapata
UPAEP-University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 October 2025
- Published by Editorial Académica Dragón Azteca in International Journal of Combinatorial Optimization Problems and Informatics
- Vol. 16 (4) , 335-344
A Bayesian Equilibria in the Game of Effort Estimation in Agile Global Software Development
This research examines leader–team interactions in agile software development within a global context, with a focus on effort estimation. Drawing on principal–agent theory, we analyse the interaction on the assumption that the Scrum Master guides the development team under imperfect information. We model the interaction as a sequential game with incomplete information. In the first stage, the Scrum Master allocates resources to the development team; in the second stage, the team exerts effort. Both parties are characterised by types that capture their knowledge and skills. As these types are private information, we derive the Bayesian Nash equilibrium to determine the equilibrium effort levels.
- 12 October 2025
- Published by Editorial Académica Dragón Azteca in International Journal of Combinatorial Optimization Problems and Informatics
- Vol. 16 (4) , 335-344
Open AccessA Bayesian Equilibria in the Game of Effort Estimation in Agile Global Software Development
This research examines leader–team interactions in agile software development within a global context, with a focus on effort estimation. Drawing on principal–agent theory, we analyse the interaction on the assumption that the Scrum Master guides the development team under imperfect information. We model the interaction as a sequential game with incomplete information. In the first stage, the Scrum Master allocates resources to the development team; in the second stage, the team exerts effort. Both parties are characterised by types that capture their knowledge and skills. As these types are private information, we derive the Bayesian Nash equilibrium to determine the equilibrium effort levels.
- 16 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 66 (4) , 995-1028
The Chair Allocation problem
- 16 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 66 (4) , 995-1028
The Chair Allocation problem
- Open Access
- 14 July 2025
- Published by Editorial Académica Dragón Azteca in International Journal of Combinatorial Optimization Problems and Informatics
- Vol. 16 (3) , 73-81
Location of Vaccination Centers in the State of Puebla, Mexico by using the Gravity model
The location of vaccination centers exceeds the challenges imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic on academicians and practitioners. Given the importance of reducing population mobility during such a phenomenon, such a challenge arose. Specifically, centers in low-demand areas motivate people’s mobility to get vaccinated, increasing contagion. In this document, we analyze the allocation of vaccination centers in Puebla, Mexico, to propose their relocation by closing some existing facilities in low-demand areas and opening new ones in regions with higher demand. For such an end, we analyze different scenarios by considering uncertain changes in regions’ vaccine demand. We apply the Gravity location model to relocate and minimize the distance between the region’s population and its vaccination center.
- 14 July 2025
- Published by Editorial Académica Dragón Azteca in International Journal of Combinatorial Optimization Problems and Informatics
- Vol. 16 (3) , 73-81
Open AccessLocation of Vaccination Centers in the State of Puebla, Mexico by using the Gravity model
The location of vaccination centers exceeds the challenges imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic on academicians and practitioners. Given the importance of reducing population mobility during such a phenomenon, such a challenge arose. Specifically, centers in low-demand areas motivate people’s mobility to get vaccinated, increasing contagion. In this document, we analyze the allocation of vaccination centers in Puebla, Mexico, to propose their relocation by closing some existing facilities in low-demand areas and opening new ones in regions with higher demand. For such an end, we analyze different scenarios by considering uncertain changes in regions’ vaccine demand. We apply the Gravity location model to relocate and minimize the distance between the region’s population and its vaccination center.
- 9 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in MRS Advances
- Vol. 10 (7) , 809-814
Mechanical characterization of cold welding doped with graphite
- 9 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in MRS Advances
- Vol. 10 (7) , 809-814
Mechanical characterization of cold welding doped with graphite
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 01-09
Effort Estimation in Insourcing Agile Software Development by a Game Theoretical Framework
Introduction: Effort estimation (EE) is crucial for agile software development to cope with delivery times. Although companies prefer insourcing development with mature teams to avoid uncertainty, determining EE remains challenging since agents strategically interact in a top-down or bottom-up relationship. Objective: We analyze insourcing EE by modeling the scrum master and a mature team's interaction as a sequential game of complete information considering three scenarios in a Scrum environment. Such scenarios assume different leadership styles and relationships between the scrum master and the development team. Methodology: We model such strategic behavior by a gametheoretic framework to find the optimal solution to maximize every iteration's results. In the basic game, the scrum master leads by providing resources while the development team follows striving. In the first variation of the game, agents exchange their roles as leader or follower, and in the second variation, the scrum master acts at different stages as a leader and then as a follower. Results: We provide a closed-form solution to compute resources and effort based on environmental factors. By assuming Cobb-Douglas production functions and quadratic costs functions, a unique sub-game Perfect Nash equilibrium exists in the basis game and its first variation. In contrast, multiple equilibria arise in the second game variation. The main results show that equilibrium effort is independent of the interaction's structure, and agents get their largest benefit at equilibrium when they are followers. Conclusion: The analysis of EE through the lenses of game theory revealed that leadership style assumes a reformulating role in achieving sprint goals.
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 01-09
Effort Estimation in Insourcing Agile Software Development by a Game Theoretical Framework
Introduction: Effort estimation (EE) is crucial for agile software development to cope with delivery times. Although companies prefer insourcing development with mature teams to avoid uncertainty, determining EE remains challenging since agents strategically interact in a top-down or bottom-up relationship. Objective: We analyze insourcing EE by modeling the scrum master and a mature team's interaction as a sequential game of complete information considering three scenarios in a Scrum environment. Such scenarios assume different leadership styles and relationships between the scrum master and the development team. Methodology: We model such strategic behavior by a gametheoretic framework to find the optimal solution to maximize every iteration's results. In the basic game, the scrum master leads by providing resources while the development team follows striving. In the first variation of the game, agents exchange their roles as leader or follower, and in the second variation, the scrum master acts at different stages as a leader and then as a follower. Results: We provide a closed-form solution to compute resources and effort based on environmental factors. By assuming Cobb-Douglas production functions and quadratic costs functions, a unique sub-game Perfect Nash equilibrium exists in the basis game and its first variation. In contrast, multiple equilibria arise in the second game variation. The main results show that equilibrium effort is independent of the interaction's structure, and agents get their largest benefit at equilibrium when they are followers. Conclusion: The analysis of EE through the lenses of game theory revealed that leadership style assumes a reformulating role in achieving sprint goals.
- Open Access
- 23 January 2024
- Published by Universidad de Costa Rica in Revista de Matemática: Teoría y Aplicaciones
- Vol. 31 (1) , 57-97
Vacating a parking lot under uncertainty
Matemática, rmta ucr, universidad de costa rica, costa rica
- 23 January 2024
- Published by Universidad de Costa Rica in Revista de Matemática: Teoría y Aplicaciones
- Vol. 31 (1) , 57-97
Open AccessVacating a parking lot under uncertainty
Matemática, rmta ucr, universidad de costa rica, costa rica
- 3 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in MRS Advances
- Vol. 8 (21) , 1211-1216
Hardness joint distribution as a function of the bevel angle in stainless steel joints
- 3 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in MRS Advances
- Vol. 8 (21) , 1211-1216
Hardness joint distribution as a function of the bevel angle in stainless steel joints
- Open Access
Identification of Patterns in the Stock Market through Unsupervised Algorithms
Making predictions in the stock market is a challenging task. At the same time, several studies have focused on forecasting the future behavior of the market and classifying financial assets. A different approach is to classify correlated data to discover patterns and atypical behaviors in them. In this study, we propose applying unsupervised algorithms to process, model, and cluster related data from two different data sources, i.e., Google News and Yahoo Finance, to identify conditions in the stock market that might help to support the investment decision-making process. We applied principal component analysis (PCA) and a k-means clustering approach to group data according to their principal characteristics. We identified four conditions in the stock market, one comprising the least amount of data, characterized by high volatility. The main results show that, regularly, the stock market tends to have a steady performance. However, atypical conditions are conducive to higher volatility.
Open AccessIdentification of Patterns in the Stock Market through Unsupervised Algorithms
Making predictions in the stock market is a challenging task. At the same time, several studies have focused on forecasting the future behavior of the market and classifying financial assets. A different approach is to classify correlated data to discover patterns and atypical behaviors in them. In this study, we propose applying unsupervised algorithms to process, model, and cluster related data from two different data sources, i.e., Google News and Yahoo Finance, to identify conditions in the stock market that might help to support the investment decision-making process. We applied principal component analysis (PCA) and a k-means clustering approach to group data according to their principal characteristics. We identified four conditions in the stock market, one comprising the least amount of data, characterized by high volatility. The main results show that, regularly, the stock market tends to have a steady performance. However, atypical conditions are conducive to higher volatility.
- Open Access
- 3 November 2022
- Published by Academia de Ciencias Administrativas A.C. in Ciencias Administrativas. Teoría y Praxis
- Vol. 18 (2) , 56-69
Insourcing software projects with mature teams: effort estimation and resource provision at equilibrium
Effort estimation (EE) is crucial for planning software projects since it contributes to delivery goals. Nevertheless, even in agile methodologies, EE is a complex process due to environmental and structural factors surrounding the interaction between the leader and the development team. To simplify EE, companies prefer insourcing development with a mature team and a leader that provides resources. We model the interaction between the leader and the development team as a leader-follower game to understand how they behave at equilibrium. Later, we compare leader and development team equilibrium strategies when they interchange their roles. Our main results provide conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium strategies, and we illustrate the impact of exogenous variables on equilibrium strategies through numerical examples.
- 3 November 2022
- Published by Academia de Ciencias Administrativas A.C. in Ciencias Administrativas. Teoría y Praxis
- Vol. 18 (2) , 56-69
Open AccessInsourcing software projects with mature teams: effort estimation and resource provision at equilibrium
Effort estimation (EE) is crucial for planning software projects since it contributes to delivery goals. Nevertheless, even in agile methodologies, EE is a complex process due to environmental and structural factors surrounding the interaction between the leader and the development team. To simplify EE, companies prefer insourcing development with a mature team and a leader that provides resources. We model the interaction between the leader and the development team as a leader-follower game to understand how they behave at equilibrium. Later, we compare leader and development team equilibrium strategies when they interchange their roles. Our main results provide conditions that guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium strategies, and we illustrate the impact of exogenous variables on equilibrium strategies through numerical examples.