Thomas Colley
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Thomas Colley has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Carolijn van Noort
Independent Researcher
9 shared publications Mark Workman
3 shared publicationsMartin Moore
Department of Political Economy, King’s College London, London, UK
2 shared publications- Carolijn van Noort
Aalborg University
1 shared publication Francesca Granelli
1 shared publicationGéraldine Satre Buisson
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 October 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of International Security
- Vol. 11 (4) , 623-643
International lulz: Exploring the strategic logic of trolling in diplomacy
This article examines trolling in international diplomacy. It explores a developing trend in diplomatic communications: encounters which have historically been characterised by formality and politeness have increasingly been used by political leaders to troll their targets. While the second Trump administration embodies this ‘trolling turn’ in diplomacy, it extends beyond MAGA. Many leaders, particularly authoritarians and those with authoritarian tendencies, employ trolling within their communications strategies. Despite growing commentary on this phenomenon, its strategic logic remains underexplored in international relations scholarship. This article outlines a new theoretical framework explaining the strategic logic of trolling in international diplomacy and details a research agenda to investigate it further. The framework argues that there are five functions of diplomatic trolling: coercion, agenda setting, identification, delegitimisation and ( dis)ordering . Using examples from across the world, it highlights that trolling – characterised by aggression, humour, and deception – enables leaders to pursue maximalist objectives while avoiding political costs by denying the seriousness of their comments when challenged. It is an especially attractive strategy for actors who wish to disrupt the existing international order. However, it is a strategy laden with risk. By illuminating diplomatic trolling’s strategic logic, this article enhances understanding of a pressing issue in contemporary statecraft.
- 24 October 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of International Security
- Vol. 11 (4) , 623-643
Open AccessInternational lulz: Exploring the strategic logic of trolling in diplomacy
This article examines trolling in international diplomacy. It explores a developing trend in diplomatic communications: encounters which have historically been characterised by formality and politeness have increasingly been used by political leaders to troll their targets. While the second Trump administration embodies this ‘trolling turn’ in diplomacy, it extends beyond MAGA. Many leaders, particularly authoritarians and those with authoritarian tendencies, employ trolling within their communications strategies. Despite growing commentary on this phenomenon, its strategic logic remains underexplored in international relations scholarship. This article outlines a new theoretical framework explaining the strategic logic of trolling in international diplomacy and details a research agenda to investigate it further. The framework argues that there are five functions of diplomatic trolling: coercion, agenda setting, identification, delegitimisation and ( dis)ordering . Using examples from across the world, it highlights that trolling – characterised by aggression, humour, and deception – enables leaders to pursue maximalist objectives while avoiding political costs by denying the seriousness of their comments when challenged. It is an especially attractive strategy for actors who wish to disrupt the existing international order. However, it is a strategy laden with risk. By illuminating diplomatic trolling’s strategic logic, this article enhances understanding of a pressing issue in contemporary statecraft.
- 25 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 160-177
China's Belt and Road Initiative
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been China’s flagship foreign policy since Xi Jinping launched it in 2013. With over 140 affiliated countries, it has provided much-needed infrastructure worldwide. This chapter examines how China’s communication about the BRI has evolved. It reveals China’s successes in persuading countries to join the initiative across the Global South and its struggles to convince richer liberal democracies to join. It shows how COVID-19 harmed China’s international image, but caused few changes in how countries approached the BRI. The chapter also considers the new infrastructure initiatives established by China’s competitors, the United States and the European Union, and the difficulties they face matching the BRI. Finally, the chapter shows how the BRI became less prominent during the 20th Party Congress of 2022, with China prioritizing its new Global Development Initiative, which raises questions about the future of the BRI.
- 25 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 160-177
China's Belt and Road Initiative
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been China’s flagship foreign policy since Xi Jinping launched it in 2013. With over 140 affiliated countries, it has provided much-needed infrastructure worldwide. This chapter examines how China’s communication about the BRI has evolved. It reveals China’s successes in persuading countries to join the initiative across the Global South and its struggles to convince richer liberal democracies to join. It shows how COVID-19 harmed China’s international image, but caused few changes in how countries approached the BRI. The chapter also considers the new infrastructure initiatives established by China’s competitors, the United States and the European Union, and the difficulties they face matching the BRI. Finally, the chapter shows how the BRI became less prominent during the 20th Party Congress of 2022, with China prioritizing its new Global Development Initiative, which raises questions about the future of the BRI.
- Open Access
- 9 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of International Communication
- Vol. 29 (1) , 82-103
News as geopolitics: China, CGTN and the 2020 US presidential election
Recently, authoritarian states have invested heavily in state-sponsored international news. Some states have instrumentalised this news geopolitically, with Russian electoral interference especially prominent. In comparison, we know less about how China’s international news outlets cover – and try to influence – other countries’ politics. This article asks whether China used its state-sponsored media to influence the 2020 US election. It examines CGTN’s coverage of the election and the 2021 Capitol riots, across its website, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. Tellingly, it finds no concerted effort to influence the outcome. CGTN’s coverage was mostly cautious and neutral. Contrastingly, its geopolitical coverage of the US and China was entirely one-sided, persistently excoriating the US while praising China. We identify three news values differentiating CGTN’s coverage: deference, relevance (to China), and national sovereignty. These news values reveal CGTN’s geopolitical function: to convey Chinese media’s apparent impartiality, while promoting China at its competitors’ expense.
- 9 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of International Communication
- Vol. 29 (1) , 82-103
Open AccessNews as geopolitics: China, CGTN and the 2020 US presidential election
Recently, authoritarian states have invested heavily in state-sponsored international news. Some states have instrumentalised this news geopolitically, with Russian electoral interference especially prominent. In comparison, we know less about how China’s international news outlets cover – and try to influence – other countries’ politics. This article asks whether China used its state-sponsored media to influence the 2020 US election. It examines CGTN’s coverage of the election and the 2021 Capitol riots, across its website, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. Tellingly, it finds no concerted effort to influence the outcome. CGTN’s coverage was mostly cautious and neutral. Contrastingly, its geopolitical coverage of the US and China was entirely one-sided, persistently excoriating the US while praising China. We identify three news values differentiating CGTN’s coverage: deference, relevance (to China), and national sovereignty. These news values reveal CGTN’s geopolitical function: to convey Chinese media’s apparent impartiality, while promoting China at its competitors’ expense.
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 47-67
China’s Belt and Road Strategic Narratives up to the Second Belt and Road Forum
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 47-67
China’s Belt and Road Strategic Narratives up to the Second Belt and Road Forum
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 19-45
Strategic Narratives, Ontological Security and Policy Change
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 19-45
Strategic Narratives, Ontological Security and Policy Change
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 135-171
Rejecting the Belt and Road Initiative: The US and India
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 135-171
Rejecting the Belt and Road Initiative: The US and India
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 265-294
Conclusion
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-17
Introduction: Strategic Narratives and Global Policy Initiatives
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-17
Introduction: Strategic Narratives and Global Policy Initiatives
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 69-99
Accepting the Belt and Road Initiative: Kazakhstan and Italy
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 69-99
Accepting the Belt and Road Initiative: Kazakhstan and Italy
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 211-263
China’s COVID-19 Strategic Narratives in 2020 and How States Responded to Them
- 15 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 211-263
China’s COVID-19 Strategic Narratives in 2020 and How States Responded to Them