Martin C. Steinwand
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Martin C. Steinwand has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bernhard Reinsberg
University of Glasgow
3 shared publications - Nils W. Metternich
Department of Political Science, University College London, London, UK
2 shared publications - Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir
Department of Politics, Bates College, Lewiston, ME, USA
2 shared publications Alexandra Hennessy
1 shared publicationMarco Binetti
1 shared publication- Marco Nicola Binetti
Bremen Universität, Institut für Interkulturelle und Internationale Studien, UNICOM
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- p. 1-28
Shifting political influence? UN General Assembly behavior during debt crisis
This paper looks at the political influence that China and Western official creditors exert on how debtor countries vote at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The theoretical framework emphasizes the common agency problem that both China and the West face. Starting from the premise that countries that owe more debt to China than the West are more aligned with Chinese positions at the UNGA, we argue that debt crisis changes voting behavior to be more in line with the West. Empirically, we construct a dataset of debt exposure and UNGA voting behavior covering 2000 to 2020 and perform panel analysis with two-way fixed effects. Identification is addressed by arguing that omitted variable bias resulting from political proximity to China likely has a conservative direction and a formal sensitivity analysis. We find that countries with a high debt exposure to China move towards US UNGA policy positions when they default on their sovereign debt obligations, indicating lowered political Chinese influence.
- 21 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- p. 1-28
Open AccessShifting political influence? UN General Assembly behavior during debt crisis
This paper looks at the political influence that China and Western official creditors exert on how debtor countries vote at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The theoretical framework emphasizes the common agency problem that both China and the West face. Starting from the premise that countries that owe more debt to China than the West are more aligned with Chinese positions at the UNGA, we argue that debt crisis changes voting behavior to be more in line with the West. Empirically, we construct a dataset of debt exposure and UNGA voting behavior covering 2000 to 2020 and perform panel analysis with two-way fixed effects. Identification is addressed by arguing that omitted variable bias resulting from political proximity to China likely has a conservative direction and a formal sensitivity analysis. We find that countries with a high debt exposure to China move towards US UNGA policy positions when they default on their sovereign debt obligations, indicating lowered political Chinese influence.
- Open Access
- 15 July 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
- Vol. 43 (4) , 347-367
Aid targeting in post-conflict Nepal
This study investigates the political underpinnings of aid allocations during Nepal's post-conflict transition. Were post-conflict aid allocations sensitive to civilian support for the rebels during the war, or driven by new electoral coalitions after the end of fighting? Constructing a municipal-level dataset, we leverage the geo-location of Nepalese army barracks prior to the conflict as instrument for civilians killed by the government, which in turn proxies government support. We find that rebel support significantly increased post-war aid allocations, while voting for the rebel party after the war did not.
- 15 July 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
- Vol. 43 (4) , 347-367
Open AccessAid targeting in post-conflict Nepal
This study investigates the political underpinnings of aid allocations during Nepal's post-conflict transition. Were post-conflict aid allocations sensitive to civilian support for the rebels during the war, or driven by new electoral coalitions after the end of fighting? Constructing a municipal-level dataset, we leverage the geo-location of Nepalese army barracks prior to the conflict as instrument for civilians killed by the government, which in turn proxies government support. We find that rebel support significantly increased post-war aid allocations, while voting for the rebel party after the war did not.
- Open Access
- 25 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 37 (2) , 811-825
Lead or Follow? Participation Decisions in Collective Development Initiatives
When and how do donors cooperate? While a growing literature emphasizes the importance of donor coordination for aid effectiveness, little is known about when and why donors join forces to advance common causes. We leverage the proliferation of special‐purpose trust funds at multilateral organizations to cast light on this issue. We argue that not only the decision whether to engage but also when to engage—either as “lead donor” or as “follower” after other donors already contributed—carries important (yet overlooked) informational value. We develop expectations about how donors engage with trust funds building on theories of competitive regime creation and bureaucratic politics. We test these expectations using a novel data set of time‐stamped funding commitment decisions by 30 OECD/DAC donors in 190 World Bank trust funds established between 1990 and 2020. We find that a donor is more likely to serve as lead donor if it is engaged in similar sectors as its peers. In addition, a donor is more likely to contribute to a fund already controlled by a group of donors if its own policy preferences are aligned with those of the existing members. The results have important implications for our understanding of donor coordination in an increasingly crowded multilateral development architecture.
- 25 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 37 (2) , 811-825
Open AccessLead or Follow? Participation Decisions in Collective Development Initiatives
When and how do donors cooperate? While a growing literature emphasizes the importance of donor coordination for aid effectiveness, little is known about when and why donors join forces to advance common causes. We leverage the proliferation of special‐purpose trust funds at multilateral organizations to cast light on this issue. We argue that not only the decision whether to engage but also when to engage—either as “lead donor” or as “follower” after other donors already contributed—carries important (yet overlooked) informational value. We develop expectations about how donors engage with trust funds building on theories of competitive regime creation and bureaucratic politics. We test these expectations using a novel data set of time‐stamped funding commitment decisions by 30 OECD/DAC donors in 190 World Bank trust funds established between 1990 and 2020. We find that a donor is more likely to serve as lead donor if it is engaged in similar sectors as its peers. In addition, a donor is more likely to contribute to a fund already controlled by a group of donors if its own policy preferences are aligned with those of the existing members. The results have important implications for our understanding of donor coordination in an increasingly crowded multilateral development architecture.
- Open Access
- 3 November 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 66 (4)
Who Joins and Who Fights? Explaining Tacit Coalition Behavior among Civil War Actors
Which armed organizations form coalitions despite the inherent difficulties of cooperation in civil wars? We introduce the concept of tacit coalitions, which pertains to strategic and informal coalition behavior between civil war actors to address this puzzle. Our theoretical model of coalition behavior takes in theater-wide conflict behavior to allow for predictions that coalitions are more likely to form. It provides novel insights into the way military synergies within potential coalitions affect the trade-off between pooling resources and worrying about the division of gains. The empirical section finds considerable support for our theoretical argument that actors are more likely to engage in tacit coalition behavior (1) if potential coalitions are power balanced, (2) if joint capability of potential coalitions is not too high, and (3) when coalitions can unlock synergies. In addition, it produces evidence for the important role of geography and ethnic ties in generating military synergies.
- 3 November 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 66 (4)
Open AccessWho Joins and Who Fights? Explaining Tacit Coalition Behavior among Civil War Actors
Which armed organizations form coalitions despite the inherent difficulties of cooperation in civil wars? We introduce the concept of tacit coalitions, which pertains to strategic and informal coalition behavior between civil war actors to address this puzzle. Our theoretical model of coalition behavior takes in theater-wide conflict behavior to allow for predictions that coalitions are more likely to form. It provides novel insights into the way military synergies within potential coalitions affect the trade-off between pooling resources and worrying about the division of gains. The empirical section finds considerable support for our theoretical argument that actors are more likely to engage in tacit coalition behavior (1) if potential coalitions are power balanced, (2) if joint capability of potential coalitions is not too high, and (3) when coalitions can unlock synergies. In addition, it produces evidence for the important role of geography and ethnic ties in generating military synergies.
- 25 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of International Relations and Development
- Vol. 25 (3) , 709-738
Donor bureaucratic organisation and the pursuit of performance-based aid through multilateral trust funds
- 25 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of International Relations and Development
- Vol. 25 (3) , 709-738
Donor bureaucratic organisation and the pursuit of performance-based aid through multilateral trust funds
- Open Access
- 24 March 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Collusion in the Provision of Foreign Aid: The Rise of Lead Donorship
Donor proliferation and the fragmentation of aid delivery is an important problem besetting foreign aid policy. Yet, existing works have failed to explain under which circumstances donors allow an individual country to become a lead donor with an unrivaled sphere of influence. We fill this gap by analyzing lead donorship as a specific form of coordination wherein donors collude in the provision of aid in order to realize private gains. Employing an event history analysis on bilateral aid data covering the period 1970-2010, we find that lead donorship becomes more likely a) when donor countries expect economic benefits (such as oil exports and exports markets for goods) and b) when donor and recipient have a shared history of colonialism. Conversely, the presence of natural disasters and civil war discourages lead donorship, promoting donor fragmentation instead.
- 24 March 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessCollusion in the Provision of Foreign Aid: The Rise of Lead Donorship
Donor proliferation and the fragmentation of aid delivery is an important problem besetting foreign aid policy. Yet, existing works have failed to explain under which circumstances donors allow an individual country to become a lead donor with an unrivaled sphere of influence. We fill this gap by analyzing lead donorship as a specific form of coordination wherein donors collude in the provision of aid in order to realize private gains. Employing an event history analysis on bilateral aid data covering the period 1970-2010, we find that lead donorship becomes more likely a) when donor countries expect economic benefits (such as oil exports and exports markets for goods) and b) when donor and recipient have a shared history of colonialism. Conversely, the presence of natural disasters and civil war discourages lead donorship, promoting donor fragmentation instead.
- Open Access
- 21 April 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Power-Sharing Coalitions and Ethnic Armed Conflict
Which multiethnic coalitions reduce the risk of violent conflict? We argue that government leaders form larger ruling coalitions as the uncertainty over violent threats from radical sub-groups increases. We formalize this argument in a novel multi-actor model. Our game-theoretic approach illustrates how ruling elites reduce the risk of rebellion by sharing power with internally fragmented ethnic groups, while only slightly increasing the risk of coups. Empirically, we rely on a novel selection estimator and data on ethnic coalitions to investigate the predictions from our theoretical model. Our findings show that the conflict-reducing effect of power sharing increases once we consider the endogeneity of coalition formation and conflict, and that power-sharing coalitions are most effective when including internally fragmented groups. Our study advances our understanding of when power sharing works in ethnically divided societies.
- 21 April 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessPower-Sharing Coalitions and Ethnic Armed Conflict
Which multiethnic coalitions reduce the risk of violent conflict? We argue that government leaders form larger ruling coalitions as the uncertainty over violent threats from radical sub-groups increases. We formalize this argument in a novel multi-actor model. Our game-theoretic approach illustrates how ruling elites reduce the risk of rebellion by sharing power with internally fragmented ethnic groups, while only slightly increasing the risk of coups. Empirically, we rely on a novel selection estimator and data on ethnic coalitions to investigate the predictions from our theoretical model. Our findings show that the conflict-reducing effect of power sharing increases once we consider the endogeneity of coalition formation and conflict, and that power-sharing coalitions are most effective when including internally fragmented groups. Our study advances our understanding of when power sharing works in ethnically divided societies.
- Open Access
- 18 April 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Aid Targeting in Post Conflict Nepal
International aid is vital for reconstruction in post-conflict societies. It also plays an important role in distributional politics, as aid can redress grievances underlying the conflict. We study the political underpinnings of aid allocations during Nepal's post-conflict transition. The former rebel party, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), CPN(M), enjoyed a surprise victory in the country's first post-war elections. We seek to answer the question whether aid allocations were sensitive to this electoral success, or instead rewarded the narrower support base of the rebels during the civil war. We construct a geo-coded dataset of municipal-level aid allocations, civilians killed by the government as proxy for rebel support, voting results in the 2008 post-war elections, and various controls for civil war destruction and economic need. Using the location of Nepalese army barracks prior to the conflict as instrument for civilians killed by the government, we can show that rebel support significantly increased post-war aid allocations, especially in infrastructure aid. In contrast, voting for the CPN(M) did not.
- 18 April 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessAid Targeting in Post Conflict Nepal
International aid is vital for reconstruction in post-conflict societies. It also plays an important role in distributional politics, as aid can redress grievances underlying the conflict. We study the political underpinnings of aid allocations during Nepal's post-conflict transition. The former rebel party, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), CPN(M), enjoyed a surprise victory in the country's first post-war elections. We seek to answer the question whether aid allocations were sensitive to this electoral success, or instead rewarded the narrower support base of the rebels during the civil war. We construct a geo-coded dataset of municipal-level aid allocations, civilians killed by the government as proxy for rebel support, voting results in the 2008 post-war elections, and various controls for civil war destruction and economic need. Using the location of Nepalese army barracks prior to the conflict as instrument for civilians killed by the government, we can show that rebel support significantly increased post-war aid allocations, especially in infrastructure aid. In contrast, voting for the CPN(M) did not.
- Open Access
- 18 April 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Multilateral aid to the rescue? Sectoral fragmentation of bilateral development aid and the role of the World Bank
Bilateral aid projects continue to proliferate in an uncoordinated fashion, leading to fragmented aid delivery. In this paper, we explore the role of the World Bank in promulgating best practices and enhancing sectoral coordination among bilateral donors. We concentrate on sectoral aid allocations and identify possible venues through which the World Bank can affect bilateral donor behavior and increase allocative efficiency, including as Lead Partner, Balancer, and by leading by example through Best Practices. Based on project-level data from 1998 to 2013, we find that bilateral donors and the World Bank allocate projects in a complementary fashion across most sectors, with the exception of the Finance and Trade sectors. Furthermore, World Bank and bilateral project numbers move together and there is some evidence that bilateral donors emulate World Bank behavior. There is very limited evidence that World Bank activities help to reduce bilateral aid fragmentation.
- 18 April 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessMultilateral aid to the rescue? Sectoral fragmentation of bilateral development aid and the role of the World Bank
Bilateral aid projects continue to proliferate in an uncoordinated fashion, leading to fragmented aid delivery. In this paper, we explore the role of the World Bank in promulgating best practices and enhancing sectoral coordination among bilateral donors. We concentrate on sectoral aid allocations and identify possible venues through which the World Bank can affect bilateral donor behavior and increase allocative efficiency, including as Lead Partner, Balancer, and by leading by example through Best Practices. Based on project-level data from 1998 to 2013, we find that bilateral donors and the World Bank allocate projects in a complementary fashion across most sectors, with the exception of the Finance and Trade sectors. Furthermore, World Bank and bilateral project numbers move together and there is some evidence that bilateral donors emulate World Bank behavior. There is very limited evidence that World Bank activities help to reduce bilateral aid fragmentation.
- Open Access
- 9 March 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Who joins and who fights? Explaining tacit coalition behavior among civil war actors
We provide a bottom-up system approach to explain tacit coalition behavior among civil conflict actors. We introduce the concept of tacit coalitions, which pertains to strategic and informal coalition behavior between civil war actors. Our theoretical model of coalition behavior focuses on the trade-off between reaping benefits from pooling resources, while at the same time worrying about the division of spoils in case the coalition is successful in winning the conflict. It provides novel insights to the way synergies within potential coalitions affect this trade-off. The empirical section finds considerable support for our theoretical argument that actors are more likely to engage in tacit coalition behavior if a) potential coalitions are power balanced, b) joint capability of potential coalitions is not too high, and c) when coalitions can unlock synergies.
- 9 March 2020
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessWho joins and who fights? Explaining tacit coalition behavior among civil war actors
We provide a bottom-up system approach to explain tacit coalition behavior among civil conflict actors. We introduce the concept of tacit coalitions, which pertains to strategic and informal coalition behavior between civil war actors. Our theoretical model of coalition behavior focuses on the trade-off between reaping benefits from pooling resources, while at the same time worrying about the division of spoils in case the coalition is successful in winning the conflict. It provides novel insights to the way synergies within potential coalitions affect this trade-off. The empirical section finds considerable support for our theoretical argument that actors are more likely to engage in tacit coalition behavior if a) potential coalitions are power balanced, b) joint capability of potential coalitions is not too high, and c) when coalitions can unlock synergies.