Gijs Schoenmakers
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Gijs Schoenmakers has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ralf Peeters
Department of Advanced Computing Sciences, Maastricht University, The Netherlands
5 shared publications - Shuang Zhou
Maastricht University
4 shared publications - Jeroen Kuipers
Maastricht University
3 shared publications János Flesch
Maastricht University
3 shared publicationsKoos Vrieze
Maastricht University
3 shared publicationsEvgueni Smirnov
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 198 (1) , 332-346
Approximating the Value of Zero-Sum Differential Games with Linear Payoffs and Dynamics
We consider two-player zero-sum differential games of fixed duration, where the running payoff and the dynamics are both linear in the controls of the players. Such games have a value, which is determined by the unique viscosity solution of a Hamilton–Jacobi-type partial differential equation. Approximation schemes for computing the viscosity solution of Hamilton–Jacobi-type partial differential equations have been proposed that are valid in a more general setting, and such schemes can of course be applied to the problem at hand. However, such approximation schemes have a heavy computational burden. We introduce a discretized and probabilistic version of the differential game, which is straightforward to solve by backward induction, and prove that the solution of the discrete game converges to the viscosity solution of the partial differential equation, as the discretization becomes finer. The method removes part of the computational burden of existing approximation schemes.
- 4 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 198 (1) , 332-346
Open AccessApproximating the Value of Zero-Sum Differential Games with Linear Payoffs and Dynamics
We consider two-player zero-sum differential games of fixed duration, where the running payoff and the dynamics are both linear in the controls of the players. Such games have a value, which is determined by the unique viscosity solution of a Hamilton–Jacobi-type partial differential equation. Approximation schemes for computing the viscosity solution of Hamilton–Jacobi-type partial differential equations have been proposed that are valid in a more general setting, and such schemes can of course be applied to the problem at hand. However, such approximation schemes have a heavy computational burden. We introduce a discretized and probabilistic version of the differential game, which is straightforward to solve by backward induction, and prove that the solution of the discrete game converges to the viscosity solution of the partial differential equation, as the discretization becomes finer. The method removes part of the computational burden of existing approximation schemes.
- 17 February 2022
- Published by Maastricht University
The profit of skills in repeated and stochastic games
- 17 February 2022
- Published by Maastricht University
The profit of skills in repeated and stochastic games
- Open Access
- 1 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 71 (2) , 603-662
Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games
We consider sequential multi-player games with perfect information and with deterministic transitions. The players receive a reward upon termination of the game, which depends on the state where the game was terminated. If the game does not terminate, then the rewards of the players are equal to zero. We prove that, for every game in this class, a subgame perfect $$\varepsilon $$ -equilibrium exists, for all $$\varepsilon > 0$$ . The proof is constructive and suggests a finite algorithm to calculate such an equilibrium.- 1 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 71 (2) , 603-662
Open AccessSubgame perfection in recursive perfect information games
We consider sequential multi-player games with perfect information and with deterministic transitions. The players receive a reward upon termination of the game, which depends on the state where the game was terminated. If the game does not terminate, then the rewards of the players are equal to zero. We prove that, for every game in this class, a subgame perfect $$\varepsilon $$ -equilibrium exists, for all $$\varepsilon > 0$$ . The proof is constructive and suggests a finite algorithm to calculate such an equilibrium. - Open Access
Construction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games
This paper examines how to construct subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted repeated games with perfect monitoring. We introduce a relatively simple class of strategy profiles that are easy to compute and may give rise to a large set of equilibrium payoffs. These sets are called self-supporting sets, since the set itself provides the continuation payoffs that are required to support the equilibrium strategies. Moreover, the corresponding strategies are simple as the players face the same augmented game on each round but they play different mixed actions after each realized pure-action profile. We find that certain payoffs can be obtained in equilibrium with much lower discount factor values compared to pure strategies. The theory and the concepts are illustrated in 2 × 2 games.
Open AccessConstruction of Subgame-Perfect Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in Repeated Games
This paper examines how to construct subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted repeated games with perfect monitoring. We introduce a relatively simple class of strategy profiles that are easy to compute and may give rise to a large set of equilibrium payoffs. These sets are called self-supporting sets, since the set itself provides the continuation payoffs that are required to support the equilibrium strategies. Moreover, the corresponding strategies are simple as the players face the same augmented game on each round but they play different mixed actions after each realized pure-action profile. We find that certain payoffs can be obtained in equilibrium with much lower discount factor values compared to pure strategies. The theory and the concepts are illustrated in 2 × 2 games.
- 1 October 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Neurocomputing
- Vol. 258, 41-51
Conformity-based source subset selection for instance transfer
- 1 October 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Neurocomputing
- Vol. 258, 41-51
Conformity-based source subset selection for instance transfer
- Open Access
- 17 June 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 81 (1-2) , 85-104
Conformal decision-tree approach to instance transfer
- 17 June 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 81 (1-2) , 85-104
Open AccessConformal decision-tree approach to instance transfer
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Pattern Recognition Letters
- Vol. 88, 64-71
Testing exchangeability for transfer decision
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Pattern Recognition Letters
- Vol. 88, 64-71
Testing exchangeability for transfer decision
- 13 February 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 43 (4) , 945-951
Non-existence of subgame-perfect $\varepsilon $ ε -equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon- 13 February 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 43 (4) , 945-951
Non-existence of subgame-perfect $\varepsilon $ ε -equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon- 1 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- p. 213-225
Existence of Secure Equilibrium in Multi-player Games with Perfect Information
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- p. 213-225
Existence of Secure Equilibrium in Multi-player Games with Perfect Information