Veli Mitova
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Veli Mitova has a total of 87 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alejandro Bortolus
Instituto Patagónico para el Estudio de los Ecosistemas Continentales (IPEEC-CONICET), Puerto Madryn, Argentina
3 shared publications - Anne Schwenkenbecher
Murdoch University
3 shared publications - Brian Porter
Department of History and Philosophy of Science University of Pittsburgh Pittsburgh Pennsylvania USA
3 shared publications - Chad LeRoy Hewitt
Lincoln University
3 shared publications - Emanuele Fabiano
Centre for Social Studies University of Coimbra Coimbra Portugal
3 shared publications - Emelda E. Chukwu
Nigerian Institute of Medical Research
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Personality
The Architecture of Wisdom in Interpersonal Conflict: Structure and Trait, State, and Cultural Expression Across World Regions
Objective: How do individuals across diverse cultures navigate interpersonal conflicts, and what drives variation in their use of wisdom‐related strategies? Method: In two studies spanning eight world regions ( N = 4445), we examined the factor structure of five wisdom‐related strategies (Intellectual Humility, Others' Perspectives, Acknowledgement of Multiple Outcomes, Search for Compromise, Outsider's View), their individual‐difference correlates, and trait–state variance. Results: In Study 1 (autobiographical recall), we identified a three‐factor structure— Perspectival Metacognition , Conflict Resolution , and Outsider's View —that showed approximate measurement invariance across cultures. In Study 2 (standardized scenarios), we replicated this structure and partitioned trait, state, and cultural variance. Cross‐cultural differences accounted for about 4% of variance in expressed wisdom, whereas within‐person variation across situations explained the largest share: People expressed less wisdom in reflections on conflicts involving trust betrayal than social rejection, an effect linked to greater emotional reactivity to betrayal. At the individual level, need for cognition and relational‐interdependent self‐construal showed small‐to‐moderate positive associations with each wisdom‐related feature, whereas a sense of uniqueness was positively related to Conflict Resolution. Conclusions: Wisdom in reflections on interpersonal conflict appears organized around three metacognitive themes that replicate broadly across cultures, with situational affordances (vs. cultural or trait dispositions) accounting for most variation in its expression.
- 7 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Personality
Open AccessThe Architecture of Wisdom in Interpersonal Conflict: Structure and Trait, State, and Cultural Expression Across World Regions
Objective: How do individuals across diverse cultures navigate interpersonal conflicts, and what drives variation in their use of wisdom‐related strategies? Method: In two studies spanning eight world regions ( N = 4445), we examined the factor structure of five wisdom‐related strategies (Intellectual Humility, Others' Perspectives, Acknowledgement of Multiple Outcomes, Search for Compromise, Outsider's View), their individual‐difference correlates, and trait–state variance. Results: In Study 1 (autobiographical recall), we identified a three‐factor structure— Perspectival Metacognition , Conflict Resolution , and Outsider's View —that showed approximate measurement invariance across cultures. In Study 2 (standardized scenarios), we replicated this structure and partitioned trait, state, and cultural variance. Cross‐cultural differences accounted for about 4% of variance in expressed wisdom, whereas within‐person variation across situations explained the largest share: People expressed less wisdom in reflections on conflicts involving trust betrayal than social rejection, an effect linked to greater emotional reactivity to betrayal. At the individual level, need for cognition and relational‐interdependent self‐construal showed small‐to‐moderate positive associations with each wisdom‐related feature, whereas a sense of uniqueness was positively related to Conflict Resolution. Conclusions: Wisdom in reflections on interpersonal conflict appears organized around three metacognitive themes that replicate broadly across cultures, with situational affordances (vs. cultural or trait dispositions) accounting for most variation in its expression.
- Open Access
- 24 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Social Philosophy
Hermeneutical Reparations
- 24 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Social Philosophy
Open AccessHermeneutical Reparations
- Open Access
- 17 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- p. 1-18
How Knowledge Brokers Shape the Evidence-Based Policy Landscape
Knowledge brokers, usually conceptualized as passive intermediaries between scientists and policymakers in evidence-based policymaking, are understudied in the philosophy of science. Here, we challenge that usual conceptualization. As agents in their own right, knowledge brokers have their own goals and incentives, which complicate the effects of their presence at the science–policy interface.We illustrate this in an agent-based model and suggest several avenues for further exploration of the role of knowledge brokers in evidence-based policy.
- 17 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- p. 1-18
Open AccessHow Knowledge Brokers Shape the Evidence-Based Policy Landscape
Knowledge brokers, usually conceptualized as passive intermediaries between scientists and policymakers in evidence-based policymaking, are understudied in the philosophy of science. Here, we challenge that usual conceptualization. As agents in their own right, knowledge brokers have their own goals and incentives, which complicate the effects of their presence at the science–policy interface.We illustrate this in an agent-based model and suggest several avenues for further exploration of the role of knowledge brokers in evidence-based policy.
- Open Access
- 8 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Politics & Policy
- Vol. 54 (2)
Why We Cannot Separate Evidence From Values in Public Policy
Whether or not any particular policy is adequate by EBP's own standard—being evidence‐based—cannot be decided without appeal to value‐based considerations. We support this claim in two steps. First, we argue that which evidence gets used in policy‐making depends on our value commitments, which are rarely made explicit, let alone being the subject of critical and transparent reflection. In other words, value commitments are not just important at the point of spelling out specific policy details and choosing between policy options but they are absolutely essential right from the very beginning of the policy‐making process: all the way from deciding which problem should be addressed by policy or regulation to determining which evidence to use and where to look for it. Second, in order to determine when we have enough evidence, we need to take into account relevant value‐based considerations.
- 8 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Politics & Policy
- Vol. 54 (2)
Open AccessWhy We Cannot Separate Evidence From Values in Public Policy
Whether or not any particular policy is adequate by EBP's own standard—being evidence‐based—cannot be decided without appeal to value‐based considerations. We support this claim in two steps. First, we argue that which evidence gets used in policy‐making depends on our value commitments, which are rarely made explicit, let alone being the subject of critical and transparent reflection. In other words, value commitments are not just important at the point of spelling out specific policy details and choosing between policy options but they are absolutely essential right from the very beginning of the policy‐making process: all the way from deciding which problem should be addressed by policy or regulation to determining which evidence to use and where to look for it. Second, in order to determine when we have enough evidence, we need to take into account relevant value‐based considerations.
- 6 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 183 (3-4) , 785-792
Epistemic reparations and the right to be known: introduction
- 6 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 183 (3-4) , 785-792
Epistemic reparations and the right to be known: introduction
- 6 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 5 (1) , 2
The collective epistemic reasons of social identity groups: reply to critics
- 6 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 5 (1) , 2
The collective epistemic reasons of social identity groups: reply to critics
- Open Access
- 13 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 183 (3-4) , 899-917
Irreparable Epistemic Wrongs
The notion of epistemic reparations has recently gained increasing attention in social epistemology. These are reparations due to victims of distinctively epistemic wrongs attaching to gross human rights violations. An example of such a wrong is not having the true story about yourself known due to being wrongfully convicted of murder (Lackey, 2022). In the last few years, several authors have proposed accounts of epistemic reparations under various labels (Almassi, 2018; Lackey, 2022; Hull, 2022; Song, 2021). Although these views gesture at structural ways in which victims can be wronged, we do not yet have an account of how accepting this structural dimension might introduce distinctive features or difficulties for the notion of epistemic reparations. In this paper, I argue that certain structural wrongs, such as the epistemic wrongs of colonialism, turn out to be irreparable on the existing backward-looking epistemic reparations framework. A more promising model for redressing such injustices, I argue, is Iris Marion Young’s social connection model, supplemented by some tools from the group responsibility literature. The arguments bring into dialogue three bodies of scholarship that are currently not talking to each other—on epistemic reparations, structural injustice, and collective agency. This dialogue will not only be of mutual theoretical benefit to all three but will also up our chances of attaining epistemic justice.
- 13 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 183 (3-4) , 899-917
Open AccessIrreparable Epistemic Wrongs
The notion of epistemic reparations has recently gained increasing attention in social epistemology. These are reparations due to victims of distinctively epistemic wrongs attaching to gross human rights violations. An example of such a wrong is not having the true story about yourself known due to being wrongfully convicted of murder (Lackey, 2022). In the last few years, several authors have proposed accounts of epistemic reparations under various labels (Almassi, 2018; Lackey, 2022; Hull, 2022; Song, 2021). Although these views gesture at structural ways in which victims can be wronged, we do not yet have an account of how accepting this structural dimension might introduce distinctive features or difficulties for the notion of epistemic reparations. In this paper, I argue that certain structural wrongs, such as the epistemic wrongs of colonialism, turn out to be irreparable on the existing backward-looking epistemic reparations framework. A more promising model for redressing such injustices, I argue, is Iris Marion Young’s social connection model, supplemented by some tools from the group responsibility literature. The arguments bring into dialogue three bodies of scholarship that are currently not talking to each other—on epistemic reparations, structural injustice, and collective agency. This dialogue will not only be of mutual theoretical benefit to all three but will also up our chances of attaining epistemic justice.
- Open Access
- 13 August 2025
- Vol. 292 (2052) , 20251355
Decision-making preferences for intuition, deliberation, friends or crowds in independent and interdependent societies
When multiple ways of deciding are laid out side-by-side, which does one favour? We conducted experiments in 12 countries (n = 3517 individuals; 13 languages; two Indigenous communities), with adults choosing among four decision strategies—personal intuition, private deliberation, friends’ advice or crowd wisdom—when working through six everyday dilemmas. In every society, self-reliant decisions (intuition or deliberation) were most commonly preferred and considered the wisest. Expectations for fellow citizens, however, were mixed: advice from friends was expected about as often as self-reliant routes. The self-reliance tilt was strongest in cultures and individuals high in independent self-construal and need for cognition, and weakest where interdependence and self-transcendent reflection were salient. The same patterns emerged when examining ratings of each strategy’s utility and oral protocols with Indigenous groups. Self-reliance appears the modal preference across cultures, but its strength is predictably tempered when cultures, and individuals within them, construe the self in relational rather than autonomous terms.
- 13 August 2025
- Vol. 292 (2052) , 20251355
Open AccessDecision-making preferences for intuition, deliberation, friends or crowds in independent and interdependent societies
When multiple ways of deciding are laid out side-by-side, which does one favour? We conducted experiments in 12 countries (n = 3517 individuals; 13 languages; two Indigenous communities), with adults choosing among four decision strategies—personal intuition, private deliberation, friends’ advice or crowd wisdom—when working through six everyday dilemmas. In every society, self-reliant decisions (intuition or deliberation) were most commonly preferred and considered the wisest. Expectations for fellow citizens, however, were mixed: advice from friends was expected about as often as self-reliant routes. The self-reliance tilt was strongest in cultures and individuals high in independent self-construal and need for cognition, and weakest where interdependence and self-transcendent reflection were salient. The same patterns emerged when examining ratings of each strategy’s utility and oral protocols with Indigenous groups. Self-reliance appears the modal preference across cultures, but its strength is predictably tempered when cultures, and individuals within them, construe the self in relational rather than autonomous terms.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 4 April 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- p. 1-15
Decolonial Epistemic Authority Reparations
According to a recent move in social epistemology, certain types of epistemic wrongs require distinctively epistemic reparations. For instance, if you have been wrongfully convicted of murder, you have not only the right to various kinds of economic and social reparations but also the ‘right to be known’ (Lackey 2022) – crudely, the right to tell the true story about yourself and be listened to. In this paper, I extend this framework to the context of epistemic decolonisation. I argue that the key decolonial epistemic reparations are reparations for the undermined epistemic authority of the colonised. I call these ‘decolonial epistemic authority reparations’ and develop five constraints on a plausible account of them. If the argument is compelling, it will advance both the epistemic reparations framework (which does not talk to the decolonisation literature at present) and the project of epistemic decolonisation (which does not yet canvass epistemic reparations).
- 4 April 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- p. 1-15
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessDecolonial Epistemic Authority Reparations
According to a recent move in social epistemology, certain types of epistemic wrongs require distinctively epistemic reparations. For instance, if you have been wrongfully convicted of murder, you have not only the right to various kinds of economic and social reparations but also the ‘right to be known’ (Lackey 2022) – crudely, the right to tell the true story about yourself and be listened to. In this paper, I extend this framework to the context of epistemic decolonisation. I argue that the key decolonial epistemic reparations are reparations for the undermined epistemic authority of the colonised. I call these ‘decolonial epistemic authority reparations’ and develop five constraints on a plausible account of them. If the argument is compelling, it will advance both the epistemic reparations framework (which does not talk to the decolonisation literature at present) and the project of epistemic decolonisation (which does not yet canvass epistemic reparations).
- Open Access
- 14 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 15 (1) , 1-13
Dimensions of wisdom perception across twelve countries on five continents
Wisdom is the hallmark of social judgment, but how people across cultures recognize wisdom remains unclear—distinct philosophical traditions suggest different views of wisdom’s cardinal features. We explore perception of wise minds across 16 socio-economically and culturally diverse convenience samples from 12 countries. Participants assessed wisdom exemplars, non-exemplars, and themselves on 19 socio-cognitive characteristics, subsequently rating targets’ wisdom, knowledge, and understanding. Analyses reveal two positively related dimensions—Reflective Orientation and Socio-Emotional Awareness. These dimensions are consistent across the studied cultural regions and interact when informing wisdom ratings: wisest targets—as perceived by participants—score high on both dimensions, whereas the least wise are not reflective but moderately socio-emotional. Additionally, individuals view themselves as less reflective but more socio-emotionally aware than most wisdom exemplars. Our findings expand folk psychology and social judgment research beyond the Global North, showing how individuals perceive desirable cognitive and socio-emotional qualities, and contribute to an understanding of mind perception.
- 14 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 15 (1) , 1-13
Open AccessDimensions of wisdom perception across twelve countries on five continents
Wisdom is the hallmark of social judgment, but how people across cultures recognize wisdom remains unclear—distinct philosophical traditions suggest different views of wisdom’s cardinal features. We explore perception of wise minds across 16 socio-economically and culturally diverse convenience samples from 12 countries. Participants assessed wisdom exemplars, non-exemplars, and themselves on 19 socio-cognitive characteristics, subsequently rating targets’ wisdom, knowledge, and understanding. Analyses reveal two positively related dimensions—Reflective Orientation and Socio-Emotional Awareness. These dimensions are consistent across the studied cultural regions and interact when informing wisdom ratings: wisest targets—as perceived by participants—score high on both dimensions, whereas the least wise are not reflective but moderately socio-emotional. Additionally, individuals view themselves as less reflective but more socio-emotionally aware than most wisdom exemplars. Our findings expand folk psychology and social judgment research beyond the Global North, showing how individuals perceive desirable cognitive and socio-emotional qualities, and contribute to an understanding of mind perception.