Yilong Xu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Yilong Xu has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Steven Tucker
Department of Economics University of Waikato Hamilton New Zealand
6 shared publications Charles N. Noussair
2 shared publicationsAdriana Breaban
1 shared publication- Andis Sofianos
Durham University, Durham DH1 3LE, United Kingdom
1 shared publication - Carol Luengo1 shared publication
Charles Noussair
University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Who Blows the Bubble? Smart Money and Speculative Incentives
We test whether speculation is necessary for large price bubbles in an experimental asset market. The TAX treatment imposes a 100% tax on positive resale gains, removing the financial incentive to speculate while preserving the trading institution, dividend process, and scope for confusion and mistakes. Prices remain close to fundamental value, and the large overpricing observed in Baseline disappears. Individual behavior provides evidence on the mechanism. In Baseline, sophisticated traders with higher scores on Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices earn greater capital gains from resale and are more likely to lead market activity. Under TAX, sophisticated traders reduce their bids more sharply than less sophisticated traders, and their advantage in resale trading disappears. Decision errors remain under TAX, but they do not develop into large, sustained bubbles. Taken together, the findings are consistent with a mechanism in which speculative incentives allow smart money to exploit and potentially amplify the errors of less sophisticated traders, contributing to large asset price bubbles.
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWho Blows the Bubble? Smart Money and Speculative Incentives
We test whether speculation is necessary for large price bubbles in an experimental asset market. The TAX treatment imposes a 100% tax on positive resale gains, removing the financial incentive to speculate while preserving the trading institution, dividend process, and scope for confusion and mistakes. Prices remain close to fundamental value, and the large overpricing observed in Baseline disappears. Individual behavior provides evidence on the mechanism. In Baseline, sophisticated traders with higher scores on Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices earn greater capital gains from resale and are more likely to lead market activity. Under TAX, sophisticated traders reduce their bids more sharply than less sophisticated traders, and their advantage in resale trading disappears. Decision errors remain under TAX, but they do not develop into large, sustained bubbles. Taken together, the findings are consistent with a mechanism in which speculative incentives allow smart money to exploit and potentially amplify the errors of less sophisticated traders, contributing to large asset price bubbles.
- Open Access
- 4 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Role of Communication in Asset Market Experiments
This study investigates the effect of continuous, free-form communication among traders on mispricing in experimental asset markets. We compare three fundamental value regimes: a constant fundamental value without interest, a decreasing fundamental value, and a constant fundamental value generated by dividends and interest on cash. Evidence indicates that the constant fundamental value with interest environment is the one participants find hardest to understand. Communication's impact is examined by allowing participants to engage in unrestricted text chat during market trading sessions. We hypothesized that the benefits of communication, such as reducing confusion, correcting misconceptions, and promoting common beliefs, would be larger in market environments that traders find harder to understand. We find a marginal reduction in mispricing only in the environment participants found hardest to understand. Overall, communication has, at best, a marginal effect on pricing efficiency, and only in the most demanding of the three environments.
- 4 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Role of Communication in Asset Market Experiments
This study investigates the effect of continuous, free-form communication among traders on mispricing in experimental asset markets. We compare three fundamental value regimes: a constant fundamental value without interest, a decreasing fundamental value, and a constant fundamental value generated by dividends and interest on cash. Evidence indicates that the constant fundamental value with interest environment is the one participants find hardest to understand. Communication's impact is examined by allowing participants to engage in unrestricted text chat during market trading sessions. We hypothesized that the benefits of communication, such as reducing confusion, correcting misconceptions, and promoting common beliefs, would be larger in market environments that traders find harder to understand. We find a marginal reduction in mispricing only in the environment participants found hardest to understand. Overall, communication has, at best, a marginal effect on pricing efficiency, and only in the most demanding of the three environments.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Commentary Incentives and Asset Bubbles: Evidence from Learningto-Forecast Experiments
This paper examines how alternative incentive structures for public online commentary affect asset-price dynamics in a learning-to-forecast environment. We compare four settings: a baseline without commentary, non-incentivized commentary, commentary with peer endorsement, and commentary with financial incentives. We find that allowing commentary is associated with lower mispricing than the baseline. Adding a like mechanism reverses much of that improvement, leading to larger bubbles and slower convergence. When a financial incentive is added to the like-based system, mispricing and volatility are significantly lower than in the like-only treatment. Contextual analysis (employing 100 coders and an LLM) offers suggestive evidence that financial rewards encourage high-quality comments that stabilize subsequent market expectations, especially those offering fundamental insights. However, in a like-only environment, the desire for social recognition often associates with negative emotional venting, resulting in a failure to break speculative price momentum.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCommentary Incentives and Asset Bubbles: Evidence from Learningto-Forecast Experiments
This paper examines how alternative incentive structures for public online commentary affect asset-price dynamics in a learning-to-forecast environment. We compare four settings: a baseline without commentary, non-incentivized commentary, commentary with peer endorsement, and commentary with financial incentives. We find that allowing commentary is associated with lower mispricing than the baseline. Adding a like mechanism reverses much of that improvement, leading to larger bubbles and slower convergence. When a financial incentive is added to the like-based system, mispricing and volatility are significantly lower than in the like-only treatment. Contextual analysis (employing 100 coders and an LLM) offers suggestive evidence that financial rewards encourage high-quality comments that stabilize subsequent market expectations, especially those offering fundamental insights. However, in a like-only environment, the desire for social recognition often associates with negative emotional venting, resulting in a failure to break speculative price momentum.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Misperceiving the Frontier: Managerial Beliefs and the Allocation of AI
Generative AI is a prominent example of a broader challenge firms face when adopting new technologies: their benefits are often uneven across tasks and workers, exhibiting a "jagged technological frontier." We study whether managers anticipate that the benefits of new technologies are uneven across tasks and workers, and how the information environment affects deployment. In a linked worker-manager experiment, workers complete real-effort tasks with and without generative AI, allowing us to estimate AI effects by task and worker type. Managers then predict AI-assisted performance and make incentivized deployment decisions. Without feedback, most managers mistakenly expect AI to improve performance on both sides of the frontier. Performance feedback reduces average optimism, but substantial overestimation remains for outside-frontier tasks. We further examine incentive-compatible deployment decisions for two new tasks (one inside and one outside the frontier). Managers' willingness to pay (WTP) is high across all tasks, and even higher for the outside-frontier task where AI does not add value. An information-design intervention in the Feedback condition that makes salient which tasks are inside or outside the frontier reduces WTP for outside-frontier deployment relative to inside-frontier deployment. This evidence is consistent with salience-based memory retrieval: the negative effects of AI are only corrected when the boundaries of the technology are made salient. The findings suggest that realizing organizational gains from new technologies depends not only on technical capability, but on information environments that make the limits of those capabilities visible to decision-makers.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMisperceiving the Frontier: Managerial Beliefs and the Allocation of AI
Generative AI is a prominent example of a broader challenge firms face when adopting new technologies: their benefits are often uneven across tasks and workers, exhibiting a "jagged technological frontier." We study whether managers anticipate that the benefits of new technologies are uneven across tasks and workers, and how the information environment affects deployment. In a linked worker-manager experiment, workers complete real-effort tasks with and without generative AI, allowing us to estimate AI effects by task and worker type. Managers then predict AI-assisted performance and make incentivized deployment decisions. Without feedback, most managers mistakenly expect AI to improve performance on both sides of the frontier. Performance feedback reduces average optimism, but substantial overestimation remains for outside-frontier tasks. We further examine incentive-compatible deployment decisions for two new tasks (one inside and one outside the frontier). Managers' willingness to pay (WTP) is high across all tasks, and even higher for the outside-frontier task where AI does not add value. An information-design intervention in the Feedback condition that makes salient which tasks are inside or outside the frontier reduces WTP for outside-frontier deployment relative to inside-frontier deployment. This evidence is consistent with salience-based memory retrieval: the negative effects of AI are only corrected when the boundaries of the technology are made salient. The findings suggest that realizing organizational gains from new technologies depends not only on technical capability, but on information environments that make the limits of those capabilities visible to decision-makers.
- Open Access
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Green Premium or Brown Discount? Evidence from Experimental Asset Markets
Researchers and practitioners typically measure sustainability preferences at the individual level, but it is unclear whether they are the same in competitive markets. To address this, we first conduct laboratory asset-market experiments in which traders face an explicit tradeoff: the asset that generates positive externalities (green) offers lower pecuniary payoffs than the one that generates zero (gray) or negative externalities (brown). We observe a robust aversion to brown assets leading to significant underpricing ( a ``brown discount''), but little evidence of a green premium. When speculative trading is discouraged, green prices move closer to fundamentals, implying that any green premium is more consistent with speculation than with sustainability preferences. To further delve into the underlying mechanism, we conducted an online survey experiment with a British investor sample. We document a significant moral loss aversion effect that can potentially reconcile the asymmetry we find in the lab: causing environmental harm is judged less socially appropriate than forgoing the same amount of environmental benefit. Finally, only incentivized measures of individual sustainability preferences, not stated preferences, predict market outcomes.
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessGreen Premium or Brown Discount? Evidence from Experimental Asset Markets
Researchers and practitioners typically measure sustainability preferences at the individual level, but it is unclear whether they are the same in competitive markets. To address this, we first conduct laboratory asset-market experiments in which traders face an explicit tradeoff: the asset that generates positive externalities (green) offers lower pecuniary payoffs than the one that generates zero (gray) or negative externalities (brown). We observe a robust aversion to brown assets leading to significant underpricing ( a ``brown discount''), but little evidence of a green premium. When speculative trading is discouraged, green prices move closer to fundamentals, implying that any green premium is more consistent with speculation than with sustainability preferences. To further delve into the underlying mechanism, we conducted an online survey experiment with a British investor sample. We document a significant moral loss aversion effect that can potentially reconcile the asymmetry we find in the lab: causing environmental harm is judged less socially appropriate than forgoing the same amount of environmental benefit. Finally, only incentivized measures of individual sustainability preferences, not stated preferences, predict market outcomes.
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (3) , 1865-1888
Does Mining Fuel Bubbles? An Experimental Study on Cryptocurrency Markets
We investigate how key features associated with the Proof-of-Work consensus mechanism of Bitcoin (commonly referred to as mining) affect pricing. In a controlled laboratory experiment, we observe that price bubble formation can be attributed to mining. Moreover, overpricing is more pronounced if the mining capacity is centralized to a small group of individuals. The order book data reveal that miners seem to play a crucial role in bubble formation. Further probing the mechanism in a second study, we find that both mining costs and decisions jointly with the sluggish rate of supply of the asset contribute to the bubble formation. Our results demonstrate that erratic pricing is an inherent feature of cryptocurrencies based on a mining protocol, thus seriously limiting any prospects for such assets becoming a medium of exchange. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: The funding provided by the University of Heidelberg, Hanken Foundation [Grant 271-6250], and Durham University is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01238 .
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (3) , 1865-1888
Does Mining Fuel Bubbles? An Experimental Study on Cryptocurrency Markets
We investigate how key features associated with the Proof-of-Work consensus mechanism of Bitcoin (commonly referred to as mining) affect pricing. In a controlled laboratory experiment, we observe that price bubble formation can be attributed to mining. Moreover, overpricing is more pronounced if the mining capacity is centralized to a small group of individuals. The order book data reveal that miners seem to play a crucial role in bubble formation. Further probing the mechanism in a second study, we find that both mining costs and decisions jointly with the sluggish rate of supply of the asset contribute to the bubble formation. Our results demonstrate that erratic pricing is an inherent feature of cryptocurrencies based on a mining protocol, thus seriously limiting any prospects for such assets becoming a medium of exchange. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: The funding provided by the University of Heidelberg, Hanken Foundation [Grant 271-6250], and Durham University is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01238 .
- 6 December 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 217, 631-646
The role of emotions in public goods games with and without punishment opportunities
- 6 December 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 217, 631-646
The role of emotions in public goods games with and without punishment opportunities
- Open Access
- 9 August 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economic Surveys
- Vol. 37 (5) , 1529-1533
Fairness, (perception of) inequality, and redistribution preferences
This special issue consists of nine surveys that delve into the recent development in the literature on inequality, examining its perception, sources, implications, and potential solutions. The review synthesizes key aspects, from the conceptualization of inequality perception to its profound consequences such as deteriorated social cohesion, unethical behaviors, and even violent conflicts. The papers underscore the complexity of individuals' preferences for redistribution, influenced by myriad factors like procedural fairness, societal norms, and ethnicity composition. They also explore the potential for interventions, such as wage transparency reforms, to tackle inequality. This synthesis underscores the persistent challenge posed by inequality, while also pointing towards unexplored avenues for future research, thus advancing our understanding of the socio‐economic implications of inequality.
- 9 August 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economic Surveys
- Vol. 37 (5) , 1529-1533
Open AccessFairness, (perception of) inequality, and redistribution preferences
This special issue consists of nine surveys that delve into the recent development in the literature on inequality, examining its perception, sources, implications, and potential solutions. The review synthesizes key aspects, from the conceptualization of inequality perception to its profound consequences such as deteriorated social cohesion, unethical behaviors, and even violent conflicts. The papers underscore the complexity of individuals' preferences for redistribution, influenced by myriad factors like procedural fairness, societal norms, and ethnicity composition. They also explore the potential for interventions, such as wage transparency reforms, to tackle inequality. This synthesis underscores the persistent challenge posed by inequality, while also pointing towards unexplored avenues for future research, thus advancing our understanding of the socio‐economic implications of inequality.
- Open Access
- 25 April 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economic Surveys
- Vol. 37 (5) , 1562-1588
The (negative) effects of inequality on Social Capital
Inequality is perhaps one of the most challenging issues of our time. Empirical literature, using observational data, indicates that higher inequality is associated with lower social capital. Oftentimes, however, the causal effects of inequality are difficult to establish based on survey and empirical observations. To this end, we review a large body of experimental literature and assess the causal effects of inequality on experimental proxies for social capital. We find compelling evidence that inequality undermines trust, discourages cooperation, and encourages unethical behaviors. The overall effect on generosity is, however, less clear.
- 25 April 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economic Surveys
- Vol. 37 (5) , 1562-1588
Open AccessThe (negative) effects of inequality on Social Capital
Inequality is perhaps one of the most challenging issues of our time. Empirical literature, using observational data, indicates that higher inequality is associated with lower social capital. Oftentimes, however, the causal effects of inequality are difficult to establish based on survey and empirical observations. To this end, we review a large body of experimental literature and assess the causal effects of inequality on experimental proxies for social capital. We find compelling evidence that inequality undermines trust, discourages cooperation, and encourages unethical behaviors. The overall effect on generosity is, however, less clear.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 177, 327-340
Social information and selfishness
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 177, 327-340
Social information and selfishness