MÖMagnus Öberg

Magnus Öberg

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Magnus Öberg has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Organized violence 1989–2025, and violent political protests

    by Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson, Magnus Öberg

    This article examines global trends in organized violence from 1989 to 2025 using new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2025, fatalities increased sharply to 244,600, up from approximately 187,000 in 2024. This marked a significant rise, with one-sided violence seeing a fivefold increase, largely driven by large-scale violence against civilians in Sudan, resulting in the highest fatality levels since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The number of state-based conflicts reached a record high of 65, with interstate conflicts doubling for the second consecutive year, highlighting an increasing trend in international tensions. State-based fatalities, though slightly lower than in previous years, remained high at 153,600, reflecting the intensity of ongoing armed conflicts, particularly in Ukraine, Israel, and Sudan. Non-state violence, on the other hand, continued its decline, with fatalities dropping to their lowest level since 2013. These developments take place in a broader context of mass mobilization, where some events escalate into violence or are met with repression, sometimes overlapping with patterns of organized violence. To capture this dynamic, the article also presents updated data on violent political protests, an established but intermittently published UCDP category, extended here to 2025.


  • Open Access

    Measurement issues in conflict event data: Addressing some misconceptions about what drives differences between human-coded event datasets

    by Magnus Öberg, Mert Can Yilmaz

    Clionadh Raleigh, Roudabeh Kishi, and Andrew Linke recently compared their own Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset (ACLED) to three other conflict event datasets in Humanities & Social Sciences Communications. In this article, we investigate their claims about what drives differences between the two researcher led projects the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and ACLED. In the process, we address some general issues that arise in event data collection, including the importance of stable definitions, how demands on sourcing varies with the type of data collected, and how strategies for dealing with uncertainty and ambiguity impact the data. Contrary to the claims made in the target article, the differences between ACLED and UCDP in the cases put forth by the authors are not primarily due to differences in sourcing or inclusion thresholds. Analyzing the same cases, we show that most of the differences are due to auxiliary coding rules, standards for source evaluation and misrepresentations of UCDP data in the original article.


  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Organized violence 1989–2024, and the challenges of identifying civilian victims

    by Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson, Margareta Sollenberg, Magnus Öberg

    This article examines global trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2024, the number of state-based armed conflicts rose from 59 to 61, marking the second consecutive year in which the UCDP recorded a historically high number of conflicts. The number of wars increased from nine to 11, the highest count since 2016. The UCDP recorded marginal declines in both state-based fatalities and organized violence as a whole. In contrast, one-sided violence saw a sharp increase, driven primarily by escalating attacks by Islamic State in Africa and widespread killings by non-state actors in Haiti. Non-state conflict declined, both in the number of active conflicts and in total fatalities. In total, the UCDP recorded almost 160,000 deaths in organized violence in 2024. The article also addresses challenges in the classification of casualties, highlighting how limitations in data quality and information access contribute to uncertainty around the civilian-to-combatant fatality ratio. These challenges are particularly acute in cases of organized crime violence, in which the distinction between civilians and combatants is often blurred, and in which indiscriminate types of warfare, such as artillery and aerial bombardment, are used in urban settings.


  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Organized violence 1989–2023, and the prevalence of organized crime groups

    by Shawn Davies, Garoun Engström, Therése Pettersson, Magnus Öberg

    This article examines trends in organized violence based on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2023, fatalities from organized violence decreased for the first time since the rapid increase observed in 2020, dropping from 310,000 in 2022 to 154,000 in 2023. Despite this decline, these figures represent some of the highest fatality rates recorded since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, surpassed only by those of 2022 and 2021. The decrease was primarily attributed to the end of the conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, which accounted for about 60% of battle-related deaths in both 2022 and 2021. Despite this positive development, the number of active state-based armed conflicts increased by three in 2023, reaching the highest level ever recorded by the UCDP, totaling 59. Non-state conflicts and one-sided violence decreased in 2023 when compared to 2022, evident in both the reduction of the active conflicts/actors and the decrease in fatalities attributed to these forms of violence. However, despite this overall decrease, fatalities resulting from non-state conflicts remained at historically high levels in 2023. Analysis of non-state conflict data spanning the past decade reveals that it comprises the ten most violent years on record. Organized crime groups have predominantly fueled this escalation. Unlike rebel groups, organized crime groups typically lack political goals and are primarily motivated by economic gain. Conflicts between these groups tend to intensify around drug smuggling routes and in urban areas, driven by shifts in alliances and leadership dynamics among the actors.


  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Organized violence 1989–2022, and the return of conflict between states

    by Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson, Magnus Öberg

    This article reports on trends in organized violence, building on new data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In 2022, fatalities from organized violence increased by a staggering 97%, compared to the previous year, from 120,000 in 2021 to 237,000 in 2022, making 2022 the deadliest year since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The increase was driven by two, particularly deadly, state-based armed conflicts: the Russia–Ukraine war, and the war in Ethiopia against TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front). With more than 81,500 and 101,000 fatalities respectively, these are the two most deadly state-based conflict-years recorded in the post-1989 period. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the first large-scale interstate war in 20 years, and the first interstate armed conflict since World War II where a major power in the international system seeks both territorial gains for itself and the subjugation of another state through regime change. We have witnessed an emerging trend of increased conflict between states in the last decade, including cases where major powers support opposite sides in internationalized intrastate conflict. UCDP recorded 55 active state-based armed conflicts in 2022, an increase of one compared to the previous year. Eight of these conflicts reached the level of war. While the fatalities caused by non-state conflict decreased somewhat when compared to 2021, the number of non-state conflicts, as well as both the number of civilians killed in one-sided violence and the number of actors carrying out such violence, increased in 2022.


  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Organized violence 1989–2021 and drone warfare

    by Shawn Davies, Therése Pettersson, Magnus Öberg

    This article reports on trends in organized violence, building on new data by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The falling trend in fatalities stemming from organized violence in the world, observed between 2014 and 2019, was decisively reversed in 2021 as fatalities increased significantly. UCDP registered more than 119,100 deaths in organized violence in 2021, a 46% increase from the previous year. The increase was largely driven by escalating conflicts in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Yemen. Fatalities increased in all three categories of organized violence, despite a decrease in the number of active state-based conflicts, as well as the number of actors carrying out one-sided violence against civilians. UCDP recorded 54 state-based conflicts in 2021, a decrease by two compared to the previous year. Five of the conflicts were active at the intensity of war, the lowest number of wars since 2010. Violence in 2021 was thus concentrated to fewer but bloodier conflicts. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, have become increasingly important features of modern conflicts, and the trend in their usage is discussed in the special feature section. UAV usage has since 2019 dispersed among a significant larger number of actors, even as the downscaling in the involvement of the United States in the war on terror has led to a decrease in drone-related fatalities.


  • Top Cited Papers
    Open Access

    Organized violence 1989–2020, with a special emphasis on Syria

    by Therése Pettersson, Shawn Davies, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, Margareta Sollenberg, Magnus Öberg

    This article reports on trends in organized violence, building on new data by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The falling trend in fatalities stemming from organized violence in the world, observed for five consecutive years, broke upwards in 2020 and deaths in organized violence seem to have settled on a high plateau. UCDP registered more than 80,100 deaths in organized violence in 2020, compared to 76,300 in 2019. The decrease in violence in Afghanistan and Syria was countered by escalating conflicts in, for example, Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), Azerbaijan and Tigray, Ethiopia. Moreover, the call for a global ceasefire following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic failed to produce any results. In fact, the number of active state-based and non-state conflicts, as well as the number of actors carrying out one-sided violence against civilians, increased when compared to 2019. UCDP noted a record-high number of 56 state-based conflicts in 2020, including eight wars. Most of the conflicts occurred in Africa, as the region registered 30 state-based conflicts, including nine new or restarted ones.


  • Are ‘New Wars’ More Atrocious? Battle Severity, Civilians Killed and Forced Migration Before and After the End of the Cold War

    by Erik Melander, Magnus Öberg, Jonathan Hall

    It is widely believed that the human impact of civil conflict in the present era is especially destructive. Proponents of the ‘new wars’ thesis hold that today’s conflicts are fuelled by exclusive identities, motivated by greed in the absence of strong states, and unchecked by the disinterested great powers, resulting in increased battle severity, civilian death and displacement. The ratio of civilian to military casualties is claimed to have tilted, so that the overwhelming majority of those killed today are civilians. Using systematic data that are comparable across cases and over time we find that, contrary to the ‘new wars’ thesis, the human impact of civil conflict is considerably lower in the post-Cold War period. We argue that this pattern reflects the decline of ideological conflict, the restraining influence of globalization on governments, and the increasing rarity of superpower campaigns of destabilization and counter-insurgency through proxy warfare.


  • The Threat of Violence and Forced Migration: Geographical Scope Trumps Intensity of Fighting

    by Erik Melander, Magnus Öberg

    Civil war and other forms of generalized violence have been identified as the main determinants of forced migration. Yet, there are still large variations across armed conflicts that have not been accounted for. In this article we examine new measures of armed conflict that indicate the magnitude and scope of fighting. We find that the geographical scope of fighting and the extent to which urban centres are affected determine a significant portion of the variation in the expected number of forced migrants across conflicts. Contrary to our expectations, our results show that the intensity of the armed conflict is not significantly related to the number of forced migrants. These findings suggest that the threat perceived by potential forced migrants is more related to where the fighting is taking place, than to the overall intensity of the fighting.


  • Time to Go? Duration Dependence in Forced Migration

    by Erik Melander, Magnus Öberg

    In this paper we introduce some theoretical and methodological refinements to account for effects of duration dependence in forced migration flows that have not been noticed in previous research. The engine of previous theoretical arguments on forced migration has been a decision theoretic model in which the potential migrants estimate the threat to their security and then weigh this threat against costs and benefits of leaving. Moreover, in previous arguments and empirical tests the costs and benefits for relocating have been treated as being the same for all people in a country. We relax this assumption, allowing the costs and benefits of relocating to be different for different individuals. This implies that some people more readily relocate than others. Over time this generates a selection effect in the population that remains behind, such that the remaining population will become increasingly unwilling or unable to relocate. The implications of our theoretical refinement are borne out empirically. Contrary to previous research we find that the accumulated stock of forced migrants decrease rather than increase the probability of new migration. Furthermore, we find that forced migrant flows abate rather than soar over time.