Timothy N. Bond

We assess the impact of a rapid rise in Japanese import competition on the growth in racial earnings and employment gaps during the 1970s and 80s. Using commuting zone level variation in exposure, we find Japanese competition led to a decrease in manufacturing employment and labour force participation for blacks. This was driven by a shift in demand for skill in manufacturing. The difference in effects between the 10th percentile most and least exposed commuting zone was equivalent to 36–46% of the relative rise in black non-labour force participation, and 78–96% of the relative decline in black median male earnings.

We develop a theoretical framework to analyze the effects of immigration on native job amenities, focusing on work schedules. Immigrants have a comparative advantage in production at, and lower disamenity cost for nighttime work, which leads them to disproportionately choose nighttime employment. Because day and night tasks are imperfect substitutes, the relative price of day tasks increases as their supply becomes relatively more scarce. We provide empirical support for our theory. Native workers in local labor markets that experienced higher rates of immigration are more likely to work day shifts and receive a lower compensating differential for nighttime work. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

We measure the black–white achievement gap from kindergarten through seventh grade on an interval scale created by tying each grade–test score combination to average eventual education. After correcting for various sources of test measurement error, some of which are unique to forward-looking scales, we find no racial component in the evolution of the achievement gap through the first eight years of schooling. Further, most, if not all, of the gap can be explained by socioeconomic differences. Our results suggest that the rising racial test gap in previous studies probably reflects excessive measurement error in testing in the early grades.

We develop a model of migration in the face of geographic information asymmetries. Firms from a given city observe whether or not a local worker is a member of a disadvantaged local community, a negative indicator of productivity, but do not have this information for migrants to this city. With this knowledge, workers must decide whether to migrate and obscure information about their community of origin. Our model generates results consistent with recent trends in intergenerational mobility and internal migration as well as new predictions about the relationship between migrant outcomes and income segregation. We confirm these predictions using data from the U.S. census.

Traditional models of promotion have difficulty explaining why many firms do not favor internal employees for advancement. I develop a new model to explain this phenomenon. My model generates an equilibrium where some, but not all, ex ante identical firms recruit strictly internally. These firms employ higher quality entry-level workers, since they hire supervisors exclusively from their lower ranks. The scarcity of high-quality workers limits the use of this strategy. I derive several testable predictions on wage-tenure profile differences across firms with varying recruitment practices and confirm these predictions using matched employer–employee data from the United Kingdom. (JEL M50, J31)

We estimate whether students update their college application portfolios in response to large, unanticipated information shocks generated by the release of SAT scores -- a primary component of admissions decisions. Exploiting new population data on the timing of college selection and a policy that induces students to choose colleges prior to taking exam, we find that the release of scores causes students to update their portfolios in terms of selectivity, tuition, and sector. However, the magnitude of updating is too modest to significantly reduce unexplained variation across students, suggesting that non-academic factors may be the dominant determinants of college choice.

Traditional models of promotion have difficulty explaining why many firms do not favor internal employees for advancement. I develop a new model to explain this