WGWilliam Christopher Gerken

William Christopher Gerken

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


William Christopher Gerken has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Third-Party Quality Certification in the Market for Financial Advice

    by William C. Gerken, Morteza Momeni

    We study third-party quality certification in the market for financial advice. Using Barron’s Top Financial Advisors rankings and multiple identification strategies, we find evidence that being named a top advisor increases both assets under management and accounts for individuals and their firms. The effects increase sharply around state-level thresholds for certification, suggesting that clients value the certification itself and not solely the underlying quality. Contrary to industry folklore about a “Barron’s curse,” we find that after certification, advisors are less likely to engage in misconduct, consistent with reputational models. The certification effect is robust to controlling for increased media attention and operates primarily through certification value rather than visibility, with larger effects for advisors from smaller firms and those with less experience. This paper was accepted by Camelia Kuhnen, finance. Funding: The authors acknowledge the support of the Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.05423 .

  • Racial Concordance in the Market for Financial Advice

    by Christopher P Clifford, William C Gerken, Tian Qiu

    We examine the role of race and racial concordance between financial advisors and their local community. We document significant differences in stock market participation based on community racial composition, as well as differences in the characteristics of communities served by minority advisors. Notably, minority advisors are more likely to serve racially concordant communities, which tend to be poorer. We find that racial concordance has only a modest relation with local stock market participation. However, while minority advisors are more likely to leave the industry, this relation is mitigated among advisors located in more concordant communities. (JEL G20, G50, D14, J15)


  • The Value of Differing Points of View: Evidence from Financial Analysts’ Geographic Diversity

    by William C Gerken, Marcus O Painter

    Using satellite imagery of retail firms’ parking lots to measure time-varying local firm-specific performance, we document that analysts incorporate local information into their forecasts. Analysts rely more on local signals when less firm-wide information is available. This incorporation of noisy local firm information has firm-level implications. Examining across industries, we find causal evidence that geographic concentration of analysts increases consensus forecast errors and decreases firm liquidity. These effects are stronger for harder-to-value stocks. The market values geographic firm information, as the abnormal return around forecast revisions is higher for analysts who cover a firm from a unique location.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Property Rights to Client Relationships and Financial Advisor Incentives

    by Christopher P. Clifford, William C. Gerken

    We study the effect of a change in property rights on employee behavior in the financial advice industry. Our identification comes from staggered firm‐level entry into the Protocol for Broker Recruiting, which waived nonsolicitation clauses for advisor transitions among member firms, effectively transferring ownership of client relationships from the firm to the advisor. After the shock, advisors appear to tend to client relationships more by investing in client‐facing industry licenses, shifting to fee‐based advising, and reducing customer complaints. Our findings support property rights based investment theories of the firm and document offsetting costs to restricting labor mobility.


  • Open Access

    Born to Be Bad

    by Christopher P. Clifford, Jesse A. Ellis, William Christopher Gerken

    Using a geographic measure of unethical culture developed by Parsons, Sulaeman and Titman (2018) and a novel dataset of financial advisors' childhood residences, we show that advisors who grow up in U.S. counties with less ethical cultures are more likely to commit misconduct as adults. Our identification strategy exploits variation in childhood backgrounds between advisors working together in the same branch office in adulthood, thereby overcoming the reflection problem. Our results are robust to controlling for other factors from the early-life experiences literature such as income, education, ethnicity and religiosity. We find that areas with high concentrations of advisors that hail from less ethical cultures have lower levels of household equity participation. Our findings have important implications for how regional cultural norms regarding misconduct evolve.


  • Open Access

    Are Crowded Crowds Still Wise? Evidence from Financial Analysts' Geographic Diversity

    by William Christopher Gerken, Marcus Painter

    Using satellite imagery of retail firms’ parking lots to measure time-varying local firm-specific performance, we document that analysts incorporate local information into their forecasts. Analysts rely more on local signals when less firm-wide information is available. This incorporation of noisy local firm information has firm-level implications. Examining across industries, we find causal evidence that geographic concentration of analysts increases consensus forecast errors and decreases firm liquidity. These effects are stronger for harder-to-value stocks. The market values geographic firm information, as the abnormal return around forecast revisions is higher for analysts who cover a firm from a unique location.


  • Hedge Fund Boards and the Market for Independent Directors

    by Christopher P. Clifford, Jesse A. Ellis, William C. Gerken

    We provide the first examination of hedge fund boards and their directors. The majority of directorships are held by extremely busy independent directors. These directors are sought by funds because they have more reputational capital at stake, making them independent and credible monitors whose presence can certify fund quality to investors. Busy independent directors are more likely to be hired by high-quality funds, and their departure from the board is associated with investor withdrawals. Moreover, funds with busy independent directors are less likely to commit fraud, abuse discretionary liquidity restrictions, or engage in performance-based risk shifting.


  • Open Access

    Real Estate Shocks and Financial Advisor Misconduct

    by Stephen G. Dimmock, William Christopher Gerken, Tyson D. Van Alfen

    We test whether household wealth shocks affect professional misconduct by financial advisors. Using a novel panel containing all home addresses belonging to 434,447 advisors, we exploit within-advisor variation and show that advisors increase misconduct following declines in their homes' values. We find similar results in specifications that exploit variation in cumulative house price return, allowing us to limit the comparison to advisors living in the same ZIP code during the same year. We find evidence that the increase in misconduct is due to willful actions by advisors, such as unauthorized or excess trading, as well as neglect or distraction due to financial pressure.


  • Capital gains lock-in and governance choices

    by Stephen G. Dimmock, William C. Gerken, Zoran Ivković, Scott J. Weisbenner


  • Open Access

    Investment in Human Capital and Labor Mobility: Evidence from a Shock to Property Rights

    by Christopher P. Clifford, William Christopher Gerken

    We show that the assignment of property rights to client relationships affects employee behavior in the industry for financial advice. Our identification comes from staggered firm-level entry into The Protocol for Broker Recruiting. The Protocol effectively transfers the ownership of the client relationship from the firm to the employee. We document that entering into the Protocol increases employee labor mobility among member firms. Further, upon Protocol inclusion, we find that employees are less likely to generate customer complaints, more likely to invest in their own general human capital, but less likely to invest in firm-specific human capital. We use detailed employee-employer matched data for the universe of financial advisors to show these effects hold within the same job spell and across advisors within the same county at the same time. Our results suggest that limiting labor mobility may limit employee incentives to invest in human capital.