Ryohei Mogi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ryohei Mogi has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Vladimir Canudas-Romo
School of Demography, The Australian National University, Canberra, 2601, Australia
3 shared publications - Ester Lazzari
Department of Demography, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
2 shared publications - Fumiya Uchikoshi
Harvard University
2 shared publications Vladimir Canudas-Romo
School of Demography, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
2 shared publicationsAlbert Esteve
Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics, CERCA, Barcelona, Spain
1 shared publication- Albert Esteve
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Centre d'Estudis Demogràfics (CED-CERCA), Spain
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 September 2024
- Published by Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in Demographic Research
- Vol. 51, 625-636
Lowest low fertility in Spain: Insights from the 2018 Spanish Fertility Survey
Volume 51 - Article 19 | Pages 625–636
- 10 September 2024
- Published by Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in Demographic Research
- Vol. 51, 625-636
Open AccessLowest low fertility in Spain: Insights from the 2018 Spanish Fertility Survey
Volume 51 - Article 19 | Pages 625–636
- Open Access
- 7 June 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek Bamberg in Journal of Family Research
- Vol. 36, 160-177
Employment conditions and non-coresidential partnership in very-low fertility countries: Italy and Japan
Objective: Our study analyses the relationship between employment conditions and non-coresidential partnership status among women and men in two very-low fertility countries: Italy and Japan. Background: Having a partner is the initial stage of any subsequent family formation. Several studies have reported that precarious employment conditions have negative effects on both union formation and fertility; however, less is known about the previous step, namely, having a non-coresidential partner. Method: We use two nationally representative surveys and examine the association between employment condition and partnership status among individuals aged 23–43 who have not yet had children and are not currently cohabiting or married at the survey, employing logistic regression models. Results: Our results suggest that employment conditions do not have statistically significant associations with partnership status except women who have a precarious employment status (i.e. those who do not know their contract type) as well as unemployed/inactive women in Japan and self-employed men in Italy. We interpret our findings as suggesting that in Italy, employment conditions do not significantly matter for starting a relationship for both men and women, likely due to the prevalence of employment uncertainty among young Italians. As for Japanese women, those who are unemployed/inactive, as well as those who do not know their contract type, may face challenges in finding a partner with their desired earning capacity. Conclusion: This is one of the few studies focusing on non-coresidential partnership as the initial step of further family formation.
- 7 June 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek Bamberg in Journal of Family Research
- Vol. 36, 160-177
Open AccessEmployment conditions and non-coresidential partnership in very-low fertility countries: Italy and Japan
Objective: Our study analyses the relationship between employment conditions and non-coresidential partnership status among women and men in two very-low fertility countries: Italy and Japan. Background: Having a partner is the initial stage of any subsequent family formation. Several studies have reported that precarious employment conditions have negative effects on both union formation and fertility; however, less is known about the previous step, namely, having a non-coresidential partner. Method: We use two nationally representative surveys and examine the association between employment condition and partnership status among individuals aged 23–43 who have not yet had children and are not currently cohabiting or married at the survey, employing logistic regression models. Results: Our results suggest that employment conditions do not have statistically significant associations with partnership status except women who have a precarious employment status (i.e. those who do not know their contract type) as well as unemployed/inactive women in Japan and self-employed men in Italy. We interpret our findings as suggesting that in Italy, employment conditions do not significantly matter for starting a relationship for both men and women, likely due to the prevalence of employment uncertainty among young Italians. As for Japanese women, those who are unemployed/inactive, as well as those who do not know their contract type, may face challenges in finding a partner with their desired earning capacity. Conclusion: This is one of the few studies focusing on non-coresidential partnership as the initial step of further family formation.
- Open Access
- 17 May 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Statistics, Politics and Policy
- Vol. 15 (2) , 117-136
Is Intending to Have Children Rightist? A Research Note on Political Ideology and Fertility Intentions
Social scientists have long been interested in how attitudes and values influence fertility intentions and behaviors. The role of political ideology has, on the contrary, been overlooked. Right-wing people tend to be more religious, to hold more traditional views on gender roles and on the importance of the family. Therefore, right-wing people may be more likely to hold positive fertility intentions that individuals with other political orientations. In addition, political ideology may have an effect on fertility intention independent of other attitudes. Using two rounds of the European Social Survey, we show that people that position at the extreme right of the political ideology scale are more likely to intend to have a child during the three years following the interview. This association holds even after accounting for several socio-demographic and economic factors, values and attitudes. Heterogeneity tests show that the association is restricted to younger individuals (aged 20–34), with higher levels of education (at least upper secondary), and individuals in Eastern Europe. In Southern Europe right-wing individuals show significantly higher predicted probabilities of a positive fertility intention compared people that locate themselves in the political center. The statistically significant associations are also sizeable (differences in terms of predicted probabilities vary between 4 and 9 percentage points). These results point to the importance of considering a neglected factor in fertility research and contribute to the growing field of Political Demography.
- 17 May 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Statistics, Politics and Policy
- Vol. 15 (2) , 117-136
Open AccessIs Intending to Have Children Rightist? A Research Note on Political Ideology and Fertility Intentions
Social scientists have long been interested in how attitudes and values influence fertility intentions and behaviors. The role of political ideology has, on the contrary, been overlooked. Right-wing people tend to be more religious, to hold more traditional views on gender roles and on the importance of the family. Therefore, right-wing people may be more likely to hold positive fertility intentions that individuals with other political orientations. In addition, political ideology may have an effect on fertility intention independent of other attitudes. Using two rounds of the European Social Survey, we show that people that position at the extreme right of the political ideology scale are more likely to intend to have a child during the three years following the interview. This association holds even after accounting for several socio-demographic and economic factors, values and attitudes. Heterogeneity tests show that the association is restricted to younger individuals (aged 20–34), with higher levels of education (at least upper secondary), and individuals in Eastern Europe. In Southern Europe right-wing individuals show significantly higher predicted probabilities of a positive fertility intention compared people that locate themselves in the political center. The statistically significant associations are also sizeable (differences in terms of predicted probabilities vary between 4 and 9 percentage points). These results point to the importance of considering a neglected factor in fertility research and contribute to the growing field of Political Demography.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World
- Vol. 10
Trends of the Delay and Variance of Childbirth Timing by Completed Number of Children
The timing of childbirth has undergone significant changes in the past decades. However, it may not be feasible for individuals with many children to further delay the timing of each childbirth given the biological constraints on fecundability and social age deadline for childbirth. Thus, the delay in having children and the increasing heterogeneity in its timing may present different trends when analyzed retrospectively by completed number of children. This study investigates the age at childbirth by birth order among women age 40+ in 17 European countries and Canada based on the number of children they have. Our findings show that individuals having more children tend to have each child at earlier ages, with less variation in timing, compared to the counterparts with fewer children. This suggests that changes in the timing of childbirth are more pronounced among individuals having fewer children and less so among those with having more children.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World
- Vol. 10
Open AccessTrends of the Delay and Variance of Childbirth Timing by Completed Number of Children
The timing of childbirth has undergone significant changes in the past decades. However, it may not be feasible for individuals with many children to further delay the timing of each childbirth given the biological constraints on fecundability and social age deadline for childbirth. Thus, the delay in having children and the increasing heterogeneity in its timing may present different trends when analyzed retrospectively by completed number of children. This study investigates the age at childbirth by birth order among women age 40+ in 17 European countries and Canada based on the number of children they have. Our findings show that individuals having more children tend to have each child at earlier ages, with less variation in timing, compared to the counterparts with fewer children. This suggests that changes in the timing of childbirth are more pronounced among individuals having fewer children and less so among those with having more children.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in Demographic Research
- Vol. 49, 423-464
An alternative version of the second demographic transition? Changing pathways to first marriage in Japan
Volume 49 - Article 16 | Pages 423–464
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in Demographic Research
- Vol. 49, 423-464
Open AccessAn alternative version of the second demographic transition? Changing pathways to first marriage in Japan
Volume 49 - Article 16 | Pages 423–464
- 28 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Population
- Vol. 38 (5) , 1333-1346
The Decline of Spanish Fertility: The Role of Religion
The Spanish total fertility rate declined from 2.8 to below 1.4 children per woman from 1975 to 2020. Spain is categorized as a “lowest-low fertility” country. Although there have been many attempts to explain the Spanish fertility decline, there has been an insufficient focus been given to religion. This brief report aims to analyse how religious affiliation, particularly being Catholics, associates with fertility behaviours—entering parenthood and the total number of children. Using three nationally representative surveys, we show that, compared with the religiously non-affiliated, Catholic women have a higher likelihood of entering parenthood after controlling for demographic, union status and educational characteristics. After controlling for changes in education and union formation, changes in religious affiliation account for approximately 4% of the cohort variation in the age at first birth, but there is no significant contribution for men nor to the total number of children for both sexes
- 28 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal of Population
- Vol. 38 (5) , 1333-1346
The Decline of Spanish Fertility: The Role of Religion
The Spanish total fertility rate declined from 2.8 to below 1.4 children per woman from 1975 to 2020. Spain is categorized as a “lowest-low fertility” country. Although there have been many attempts to explain the Spanish fertility decline, there has been an insufficient focus been given to religion. This brief report aims to analyse how religious affiliation, particularly being Catholics, associates with fertility behaviours—entering parenthood and the total number of children. Using three nationally representative surveys, we show that, compared with the religiously non-affiliated, Catholic women have a higher likelihood of entering parenthood after controlling for demographic, union status and educational characteristics. After controlling for changes in education and union formation, changes in religious affiliation account for approximately 4% of the cohort variation in the age at first birth, but there is no significant contribution for men nor to the total number of children for both sexes
- Open Access
- 12 April 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Population Studies
- Vol. 77 (1) , 1-14
Cross-sectional average length of life by parity: Country comparisons
This study aims to present an alternative measure of fertility—cross-sectional average length of life by parity (CALP)—which: (1) is a period fertility indicator using all available cohort information; (2) captures the dynamics of parity transitions; and (3) links information on fertility quantum and timing together as part of a single phenomenon. Using data from the Human Fertility Database, we calculate CALP for 12 countries in the Global North. Our results show that women spend the longest time at parity zero on average, and in countries where women spend comparatively longer time at parity zero, they spend fewer years at parities one and two. The analysis is extended by decomposing the differences in CALPs between Sweden and the United States, revealing age- and cohort-specific contributions to population-level differences in parity-specific fertility patterns. The decomposition illustrates how high teenage fertility in the United States dominates the differences between these two countries in the time spent at different parities. Supplementary material for this article is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2022.2049857
- 12 April 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Population Studies
- Vol. 77 (1) , 1-14
Open AccessCross-sectional average length of life by parity: Country comparisons
This study aims to present an alternative measure of fertility—cross-sectional average length of life by parity (CALP)—which: (1) is a period fertility indicator using all available cohort information; (2) captures the dynamics of parity transitions; and (3) links information on fertility quantum and timing together as part of a single phenomenon. Using data from the Human Fertility Database, we calculate CALP for 12 countries in the Global North. Our results show that women spend the longest time at parity zero on average, and in countries where women spend comparatively longer time at parity zero, they spend fewer years at parities one and two. The analysis is extended by decomposing the differences in CALPs between Sweden and the United States, revealing age- and cohort-specific contributions to population-level differences in parity-specific fertility patterns. The decomposition illustrates how high teenage fertility in the United States dominates the differences between these two countries in the time spent at different parities. Supplementary material for this article is available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2022.2049857
- 5 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Population Research
- Vol. 39 (4) , 495-511
The influence of social and economic ties to the spread of COVID-19 in Europe
By late January 2020, the 2019 novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) had reached Europe and most European countries had registered cases by March 1. However, the spread of the virus has been uneven in both prevalence and speed of propagation. We analyse the association of social, economic, and demographic factors in the initial spread of the coronavirus disease COVID-19 across 23 European countries between March 1 and April 30, 2020. Diagnosed COVID-19 cases from Johns Hopkins University and data from the European Social Survey and other sources were used to estimate bivariate associations between cumulative reported case numbers at ten-day intervals and nine social, demographic, and economic variables. To avoid overfitting, we first reduce these variables to three factors by factor analysis before conducting a multiple regression analysis. We also perform a sensitivity analysis using rates and new cases between two time periods. Results showed that social and economic factors are strongly and positively associated with COVID-19 throughout the studied period, while the association with population density and cultural factors was initially low, but by April, was higher than the earlier mentioned factors. For future influenza-like pandemics, implementing strict movement restrictions from early on will be crucial to curb the spread of such diseases in economically, socially, and culturally vibrant and densely populated countries.
- 5 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Population Research
- Vol. 39 (4) , 495-511
The influence of social and economic ties to the spread of COVID-19 in Europe
By late January 2020, the 2019 novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) had reached Europe and most European countries had registered cases by March 1. However, the spread of the virus has been uneven in both prevalence and speed of propagation. We analyse the association of social, economic, and demographic factors in the initial spread of the coronavirus disease COVID-19 across 23 European countries between March 1 and April 30, 2020. Diagnosed COVID-19 cases from Johns Hopkins University and data from the European Social Survey and other sources were used to estimate bivariate associations between cumulative reported case numbers at ten-day intervals and nine social, demographic, and economic variables. To avoid overfitting, we first reduce these variables to three factors by factor analysis before conducting a multiple regression analysis. We also perform a sensitivity analysis using rates and new cases between two time periods. Results showed that social and economic factors are strongly and positively associated with COVID-19 throughout the studied period, while the association with population density and cultural factors was initially low, but by April, was higher than the earlier mentioned factors. For future influenza-like pandemics, implementing strict movement restrictions from early on will be crucial to curb the spread of such diseases in economically, socially, and culturally vibrant and densely populated countries.
- 29 March 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Population Studies
- Vol. 75 (2) , 153-167
Educational composition and parity contribution to completed cohort fertility change in low-fertility settings
Extensive literature has documented the contribution of rising women’s education to decreases in completed cohort fertility (CCF). A key question related to the education–fertility relationship is to what extent the decrease in fertility is the result of changes in educational composition vs changes in fertility behaviours within educational categories. This study quantified the effect of educational expansion on fertility levels by decomposing the overall change in CCF into educational composition and education-specific fertility, and explored the changes in parity-specific components of CCF by education for cohorts born between 1940 and 1970. The results show that, despite the decline in CCF being caused mostly by changes in fertility behaviours, educational composition had a considerable impact for some cohorts. The decline in third and higher-order births played a central role in the fall in CCF across educational groups, while the effects of transitions to first and second births varied substantially.
- 29 March 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Population Studies
- Vol. 75 (2) , 153-167
Educational composition and parity contribution to completed cohort fertility change in low-fertility settings
Extensive literature has documented the contribution of rising women’s education to decreases in completed cohort fertility (CCF). A key question related to the education–fertility relationship is to what extent the decrease in fertility is the result of changes in educational composition vs changes in fertility behaviours within educational categories. This study quantified the effect of educational expansion on fertility levels by decomposing the overall change in CCF into educational composition and education-specific fertility, and explored the changes in parity-specific components of CCF by education for cohorts born between 1940 and 1970. The results show that, despite the decline in CCF being caused mostly by changes in fertility behaviours, educational composition had a considerable impact for some cohorts. The decline in third and higher-order births played a central role in the fall in CCF across educational groups, while the effects of transitions to first and second births varied substantially.