KCKurt A. Carlson

Kurt A. Carlson

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Kurt A. Carlson has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Preference Refinement after a Budget Contraction

    by Gretchen R Ross, Margaret G Meloy, Kurt A Carlson

    How does coping with a resource loss of time, space, or money change a consumer? In the current work, we argue that resource losses that give rise to budget contractions require a coping strategy that not only influences choice in the moment but also changes underlying consumer preferences. We show that the preference restructuring that occurs when coping with a budget loss also leads to stabilization of preferences. Specifically, a consumer who allocates a budget to a set of items prior to a budget contraction and allocates that same budget post-contraction when the budget is fully restored will allocate the restored budget to fewer options in the set. Coping with the contraction helps consumers prioritize what matters to them, leading to refinement of preference. This within-consumer preference refinement effect exists for budgets of time, space, and money. We identify boundary conditions (i.e., significant budget contractions and self-determined contraction allocations are necessary for prioritization to occur) and rule out non-prioritization explanations (e.g., anchoring and under-adjusting). These findings suggest that marketers should focus on capturing consumers who are dealing with budget contractions as this is one of the moments where individuals revisit and rediscover what matters most to them.


  • Specialist Competitor Referrals: How Salespeople can Use Competitor Referrals for Nonfocal Products to Increase Focal Product Sales

    by Simon J. Blanchard, Mahima Hada, Kurt A. Carlson

    Intuition suggests that a salesperson should not refer consumers to a competitor for products that they both sell. However, myriad examples reveal salespeople doing just that. The authors study specialist competitor referrals, a sales strategy by which one increases consumers’ purchase likelihood of a focal product (e.g., a painting at an art gallery) by (1) referring consumers to a competitor (e.g., a frame warehouse store) that offers a nonfocal product (e.g., a frame) at a lower price, while (2) stating that the stores differ in their specializations (i.e., the stores concentrate their efforts on different goods). Using a study and survey with salespeople, experimental studies, an incentivized negotiation experiment, and a field study, the authors show that specialist competitor referrals can indeed benefit sellers. Specifically, they build on equity theory to show that specialist competitor referrals increase focal product sales by reducing consumers’ perceived overpayment risk for the focal product via increasing perceived equity in the exchange. The authors also show that competitor referrals for nonfocal products that do not justify the price difference on the nonfocal product are ineffective.


  • Seeking advice from experts: A cautionary tale

    by Robin L. Dillon, Kurt Carlson

    Experts are considered assets for most projects. Expert judgment is widely used in almost all major processes in the “Project Management Book of Knowledge 5th edition” [1], and for some of the processes it is the only technique mentioned. Most project teams will have their own internal experts, but many teams will seek outside expertise from project consultants, user groups, subject matter experts, or senior management people. The ultimate outcome of the process, usually the decision quality, will depend critically on whether the prospective advisor should or should not provide advice based on his or her knowledge of the problem area. There is a significant amount of research that examines why or when a decision maker will or will not use an advisor's advice [2,3]. This paper examines the other side of the relationship - why and when an advisor will agree to provide advice and identifies moderators that influence an advisor's willingness to give advice.

  • The Favor Request Effect: Requesting a Favor from Consumers to Seal the Deal

    by Simon J. Blanchard, Kurt A. Carlson, Jamie D. Hyodo

    In situations in which consumers and sellers negotiate on price, the seller’s goal is to complete the sale at a profitable price. Sellers that pair a discounted offer with a favor request can increase the probability that a consumer will accept the deal, an effect we refer to as the “favor request effect.” The favor request effect is found across multiple shopping contexts and multiple types of favor requests (experiment 1) and in negotiations involving financial consequences (experiment 2). The favor request effect operates by increasing consumers’ perceptions that the interaction with the seller is reciprocal, which in turn increases their confidence that they have obtained the lowest price (experiments 3 and 4). Finally, the moderating role of the magnitude of the discount offered on effectiveness of the favor request is explored (experiment 5).


  • The Budget Contraction Effect: How Contracting Budgets Lead to Less Varied Choice

    by Kurt A. Carlson, Jared Wolfe, Simon J. Blanchard, Joel C. Huber, Dan Ariely

    How do consumers adjust their spending when their budget changes? A common view is that the allocation of one's current budget should not depend on previous budget allocations. Contrary to this, the authors find that when the budget contracts to a particular level, consumers select less variety (as measured by the number of different items with some of the budget allocated to them) than when their budget expands to that same level. This budget contraction effect stems from a reduction in variety under the contracting budget, not from variety expansion under the expanding budget. Evidence from five experiments indicates that the effect is driven by a desire to avoid feelings of loss associated with spreading allocation cuts (relative to reference quantities from previous allocations) across many items.


  • Biased Predecisional Processing of Leading and Nonleading Alternatives

    by Simon J. Blanchard, Kurt A. Carlson, Margaret G. Meloy

    When people obtain information about choice alternatives in a set one attribute at a time, they rapidly identify a leading alternative. Although previous research has established that people then distort incoming information, it is unclear whether distortion occurs through favoring of the leading alternative, disfavoring of the trailing alternative, or both. Prior examinations have not explored the predecisional treatment of the nonleading alternative (or alternatives) because they conceptualized distortion as a singular construct in binary choice and measured it using a relative item comparing the evaluation of both alternatives simultaneously. In this article, we introduce a measure of distortion at the level of the alternative, which allows for measuring whether predecisional distortion favors or disfavors every alternative being considered in choice sets of various sizes. We report that both proleader and antitrailer distortion occur and that the use of antitrailer processing differs between binary choices and multiple-options choices.


  • When Three Charms but Four Alarms: Identifying the Optimal Number of Claims in Persuasion Settings

    by Suzanne B. Shu, Kurt A. Carlson

    How many positive claims should firms use to produce the most positive impression of a product or service? This article posits that when consumers know that the message source has a persuasion motive, the optimal number of positive claims is three. Increasing the number of claims improves consumer perceptions until the fourth claim, at which point consumers’ persuasion knowledge causes them to view all the claims with skepticism. The studies herein establish and explore this pattern, which the authors refer to as the “charm of three.” An initial experiment indicates that impressions peak at three claims for sources with a persuasion motive but not for sources without a persuasion motive. The second experiment indicates that this effect occurs for attitudes and impressions and that increased skepticism at four or more claims explains the effect. Two final experiments examine the mental process by which the charm of three occurs by investigating how cognitive load and sequential claims influence the effect.


  • Catching nonconscious goals in the act of decision making

    by Kurt A. Carlson, Robin J. Tanner, Margaret G. Meloy, J. Edward Russo


  • Goal Reversion in Consumer Choice

    by Kurt A. Carlson, Margaret G. Meloy, Elizabeth G. Miller

    How do consumers manage goal conflicts before making a choice? This question was studied by examining emerging preferences in choices involving two p