Zhiwu Chen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Zhiwu Chen has a total of 50 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gurdip S. Bakshi
Temple University-Fox School of Business
5 shared publications - Jinhui Luo
Is a managing director at ICBC Asset Management in Beijing, China
3 shared publications Chicheng Ma
2 shared publicationsHong Zhang
Tsinghua University - PBC School of Finance
2 shared publicationsJan Jindra
Is an assistant professor at Menlo College in Atherton, CA
2 shared publicationsMasahiro Watanabe
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 November 2026
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 123 (47)
Stature reveals changing patterns of the biological standard of living in Europe and Asia over the past 7,000 y
Human stature is a valuable indicator of nutritional status and health. Reconstructing this indicator allows insights into which types of societies were providing better health and nutrition—also termed the “biological standard of living” in the literature. Yet, archaeological evidence has not previously been assembled on a scale large enough for systematic comparison across premodern Eurasia. We present a dataset of 18,457 stature observations based on 783 sites from Asia and Europe, roughly spanning the 7,000 y before the twentieth century. Using harmonized estimates derived from long bones, we document broad regional variation in stature over time and examine how these patterns relate to population density and historical indicators of technological development. We observe marked declines in stature in most regions during the 500–1900 CE period, in both Asia and Europe. To interpret these patterns, we combine our stature series with estimates of population density, technological advancement, and related controls. As [Q. Ashraf, O. Galor, Am. Econ. Rev. 101 , 2003–2041 (2011)] predicted, higher technology levels were associated with higher population density, but not correlated with higher stature before the modern era. This relationship also holds after controlling for other potentially confounding factors such as latitude or transport access. By assembling the largest archaeological stature dataset for Eurasia to date and linking it to long-term demographic and historical indicators, this study provides an empirical basis for comparative research on premodern health, nutrition, and population pressure.
- 16 November 2026
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 123 (47)
Open AccessStature reveals changing patterns of the biological standard of living in Europe and Asia over the past 7,000 y
Human stature is a valuable indicator of nutritional status and health. Reconstructing this indicator allows insights into which types of societies were providing better health and nutrition—also termed the “biological standard of living” in the literature. Yet, archaeological evidence has not previously been assembled on a scale large enough for systematic comparison across premodern Eurasia. We present a dataset of 18,457 stature observations based on 783 sites from Asia and Europe, roughly spanning the 7,000 y before the twentieth century. Using harmonized estimates derived from long bones, we document broad regional variation in stature over time and examine how these patterns relate to population density and historical indicators of technological development. We observe marked declines in stature in most regions during the 500–1900 CE period, in both Asia and Europe. To interpret these patterns, we combine our stature series with estimates of population density, technological advancement, and related controls. As [Q. Ashraf, O. Galor, Am. Econ. Rev. 101 , 2003–2041 (2011)] predicted, higher technology levels were associated with higher population density, but not correlated with higher stature before the modern era. This relationship also holds after controlling for other potentially confounding factors such as latitude or transport access. By assembling the largest archaeological stature dataset for Eurasia to date and linking it to long-term demographic and historical indicators, this study provides an empirical basis for comparative research on premodern health, nutrition, and population pressure.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Kinship Networks and the Adoption of New Technology: Western Medicine in China, 1835-1935
Whether traditional kinship institutions impede or facilitate the adoption of new technology is contested. We study the diffusion of Western medicine as a new technology in China, 1835-1935. Using newly digitized prefecture-level data on Western-style hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, and physicians, we find that after Christian missionary arrival, prefectures with stronger pre-1835 kinship organizations built 43.5 percent more indigenously founded hospitals. Exploiting epidemics as exogenous shocks, we show that hospital construction responded more prominently in strong-clan prefectures; physician sorting confirms a supply-rather than demand-side channel. The clan effect vanishes under the 1949-1978 planned economy and re-emerges after the market reforms. Kinship institutions can accelerate, not obstruct, modern technology diffusion.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessKinship Networks and the Adoption of New Technology: Western Medicine in China, 1835-1935
Whether traditional kinship institutions impede or facilitate the adoption of new technology is contested. We study the diffusion of Western medicine as a new technology in China, 1835-1935. Using newly digitized prefecture-level data on Western-style hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, and physicians, we find that after Christian missionary arrival, prefectures with stronger pre-1835 kinship organizations built 43.5 percent more indigenously founded hospitals. Exploiting epidemics as exogenous shocks, we show that hospital construction responded more prominently in strong-clan prefectures; physician sorting confirms a supply-rather than demand-side channel. The clan effect vanishes under the 1949-1978 planned economy and re-emerges after the market reforms. Kinship institutions can accelerate, not obstruct, modern technology diffusion.
- Open Access
- 10 February 2025
- Published by Wiley in Asia‐Pacific Economic History Review
- Vol. 65 (1) , 3-38
Rise of the south: How Arab‐led maritime trade transformed China, 671–1371 CE
China's center of socioeconomic activities was in the North prior to the Tang dynasty but is in the South today. We demonstrate that Arab and Persian Muslim traders triggered that transition when they came to China in the late seventh century, by lifting maritime trade along the South Coast and re‐creating the South. Between 742 and 1393 CE, prefectures with better access to maritime trade, or higher porcelain trade participation, experienced significantly higher population growth, but the predictive coefficient weakened substantially after the maritime trade ban of 1371 CE. These findings are robust after controlling for many confounding factors.
- 10 February 2025
- Published by Wiley in Asia‐Pacific Economic History Review
- Vol. 65 (1) , 3-38
Open AccessRise of the south: How Arab‐led maritime trade transformed China, 671–1371 CE
China's center of socioeconomic activities was in the North prior to the Tang dynasty but is in the South today. We demonstrate that Arab and Persian Muslim traders triggered that transition when they came to China in the late seventh century, by lifting maritime trade along the South Coast and re‐creating the South. Between 742 and 1393 CE, prefectures with better access to maritime trade, or higher porcelain trade participation, experienced significantly higher population growth, but the predictive coefficient weakened substantially after the maritime trade ban of 1371 CE. These findings are robust after controlling for many confounding factors.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Christian Missionaries and International Trade, 1580-1936
Christian missionaries are shown to have contributed to the historical rise of international trade by bridging the information gap between Europe and unfamiliar overseas lands from the 16 th century onward. To prove that they unintentionally mitigated information barriers for early traders, we focus on the experience of historical China where European missionaries arrived from 1580 onward but maritime foreign trade was largely banned between 1371 and 1842. Our analysis demonstrates that following China's forced opening for international trade in 1842, regions with longer past missionary presence typically bought foreign goods earlier, imported more in terms of both value and goods diversity, and exported more local products, as these places had more foreign interactions and appeared more frequently in the missionaries' letters and publications back in Europe. Our findings substantiate the importance of the information channel through which the missionaries accelerated trade globalization.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessChristian Missionaries and International Trade, 1580-1936
Christian missionaries are shown to have contributed to the historical rise of international trade by bridging the information gap between Europe and unfamiliar overseas lands from the 16 th century onward. To prove that they unintentionally mitigated information barriers for early traders, we focus on the experience of historical China where European missionaries arrived from 1580 onward but maritime foreign trade was largely banned between 1371 and 1842. Our analysis demonstrates that following China's forced opening for international trade in 1842, regions with longer past missionary presence typically bought foreign goods earlier, imported more in terms of both value and goods diversity, and exported more local products, as these places had more foreign interactions and appeared more frequently in the missionaries' letters and publications back in Europe. Our findings substantiate the importance of the information channel through which the missionaries accelerated trade globalization.
- Open Access
- 8 August 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Banking on the Confucian Clan: Why Did China Miss the Financial Revolution?
What made finance develop in the West but not in China? We argue that long before modern finance, China chose to rely on the kinship-based Confucian clan, whereas the West chose the corporate entity combined with impersonal instruments, to deal with the challenges of interpersonal risk sharing and resource pooling. That difference in choice led to two distinct institutional-development paths. Pre-modern China was ordered hierarchically around patrilineal clans that each served as an informal internal financial market for members, where intra-clan pooling and sharing obligations were rigidly enforced through Confucian rules and rituals. For more than two millennia, institutional innovations focused almost exclusively on solidifying the clan system to minimise the uncertainty and transaction costs of implicit intra-clan exchange. By the early nineteenth century, the clan as an internal financial market and as a business corporation served China well. However, it came at the cost of ignoring the development of the impersonal institutions needed for formal finance. Even when formal finance was transplanted in the late nineteenth century, its adoption was not smooth. We provide empirical evidence that the Confucian clan competed with and indeed inhibited the development of modern banking in the early twentieth century, and that Confucianism continues to limit finance in contemporary China.
- 8 August 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessBanking on the Confucian Clan: Why Did China Miss the Financial Revolution?
What made finance develop in the West but not in China? We argue that long before modern finance, China chose to rely on the kinship-based Confucian clan, whereas the West chose the corporate entity combined with impersonal instruments, to deal with the challenges of interpersonal risk sharing and resource pooling. That difference in choice led to two distinct institutional-development paths. Pre-modern China was ordered hierarchically around patrilineal clans that each served as an informal internal financial market for members, where intra-clan pooling and sharing obligations were rigidly enforced through Confucian rules and rituals. For more than two millennia, institutional innovations focused almost exclusively on solidifying the clan system to minimise the uncertainty and transaction costs of implicit intra-clan exchange. By the early nineteenth century, the clan as an internal financial market and as a business corporation served China well. However, it came at the cost of ignoring the development of the impersonal institutions needed for formal finance. Even when formal finance was transplanted in the late nineteenth century, its adoption was not smooth. We provide empirical evidence that the Confucian clan competed with and indeed inhibited the development of modern banking in the early twentieth century, and that Confucianism continues to limit finance in contemporary China.
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Finance
- Vol. 23 (5) , 961-991
Social Norms and Household Savings Rates in China
We study the effects of Confucian social norms on savings rates in China. In our simple two-period model, parents have the option to invest in either a risk-free asset or their children’s human capital. We assume that the filial piety norms and thus the enforcement mechanisms for supporting old-age parents differ across regions. Consequently, the probability of children’s non-performance of their repayment obligations to parents and the returns parents can expect from investing in their children vary. We test the model predictions using data from the China Household Finance Survey. We find that stronger Confucian social norms reduce the gap in the savings rate between families with sons and with daughters. Modeling default by children as a function of the prevailing social norms gives us the flexibility to study the impacts of declining Confucian influence on consumption–savings trends in China.
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Review of Finance
- Vol. 23 (5) , 961-991
Social Norms and Household Savings Rates in China
We study the effects of Confucian social norms on savings rates in China. In our simple two-period model, parents have the option to invest in either a risk-free asset or their children’s human capital. We assume that the filial piety norms and thus the enforcement mechanisms for supporting old-age parents differ across regions. Consequently, the probability of children’s non-performance of their repayment obligations to parents and the returns parents can expect from investing in their children vary. We test the model predictions using data from the China Household Finance Survey. We find that stronger Confucian social norms reduce the gap in the savings rate between families with sons and with daughters. Modeling default by children as a function of the prevailing social norms gives us the flexibility to study the impacts of declining Confucian influence on consumption–savings trends in China.
- Open Access
- 27 June 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Confucianism, Social Norms and Household Savings Rates in China
We study the effect of (declining) Confucian social norms on human capital investment and savings rates in China. In our simple two-period model, parents have the option to invest in either a risk-free asset or the human capital of their child. We assume that social norms, and thus enforcement mechanisms, for supporting old-age parents may differ across regions. Consequently, these cultural norms for acceptable filial piety determine the probability of children’s non-performance on their repayment obligations to parents, which in turn affects the variation in returns that parents can expect from investing in their children. Modeling default by children as a function of the prevailing social norms gives us the flexibility to study the impact of the declining Confucian influence on China’s consumption-saving trends. Using data from the China Household Finance Survey, this paper adds to the current literature in several ways. First, we provide evidence to support the key assumption in the life-cycle hypothesis in Modigliani and Cao [2004] that parents view their children, especially sons, as a source of retirement income. Thus, parents’ investment in children’s human capital is not altruistic; nor are intergenerational transfers from adult children to old-age parents. Second, we offer an alternative explanation for high household savings in China. In addition to the One Child Policy and the gender imbalance-induced pressure to save more, the lack of financial development and the declining influence of Confucianism are also significant contributors to China’s rising savings rates.
- 27 June 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessConfucianism, Social Norms and Household Savings Rates in China
We study the effect of (declining) Confucian social norms on human capital investment and savings rates in China. In our simple two-period model, parents have the option to invest in either a risk-free asset or the human capital of their child. We assume that social norms, and thus enforcement mechanisms, for supporting old-age parents may differ across regions. Consequently, these cultural norms for acceptable filial piety determine the probability of children’s non-performance on their repayment obligations to parents, which in turn affects the variation in returns that parents can expect from investing in their children. Modeling default by children as a function of the prevailing social norms gives us the flexibility to study the impact of the declining Confucian influence on China’s consumption-saving trends. Using data from the China Household Finance Survey, this paper adds to the current literature in several ways. First, we provide evidence to support the key assumption in the life-cycle hypothesis in Modigliani and Cao [2004] that parents view their children, especially sons, as a source of retirement income. Thus, parents’ investment in children’s human capital is not altruistic; nor are intergenerational transfers from adult children to old-age parents. Second, we offer an alternative explanation for high household savings in China. In addition to the One Child Policy and the gender imbalance-induced pressure to save more, the lack of financial development and the declining influence of Confucianism are also significant contributors to China’s rising savings rates.
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Explorations in Economic History
- Vol. 63, 8-25
Social-economic change and its impact on violence: Homicide history of Qing China
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Explorations in Economic History
- Vol. 63, 8-25
Social-economic change and its impact on violence: Homicide history of Qing China
- 31 January 2015
- Published by With Intelligence LLC in The Journal of Portfolio Management
- Vol. 41 (5) , 9-30
The Asset Management Industry in China: Its Past Performance and Future Prospects
After 20 years of rapid growth, the asset management industry in China has reached total assets under management of $2.8 trillion—and more than $6.12 trillion when trust and bank wealth-management products are included. In its early development years, the industry experienced much growing pain. With the joint efforts of regulators and market participants over the past 20 years, China’s asset management industry has substantially improved. In this article, the authors review the industry’s historical development, composition, competition among various sub-industries, and key players, as well as its institutional and regulatory environment. It would be difficult to understand the past, present, or future of this industry without knowing the political economy as well as the ideological background of China’s economy in general and its capital market in particular. The authors review the background of the political economy to aid readers in understanding the mindset and perspectives of regulators, policymakers, and key players in this space. The authors also discuss future opportunities in the asset management industry, as the massive household wealth created during China’s 30 years of fast economic growth continues to look for reliable vehicles for investment. Outbound investment from China is a growing trend.
- 31 January 2015
- Published by With Intelligence LLC in The Journal of Portfolio Management
- Vol. 41 (5) , 9-30
The Asset Management Industry in China: Its Past Performance and Future Prospects
After 20 years of rapid growth, the asset management industry in China has reached total assets under management of $2.8 trillion—and more than $6.12 trillion when trust and bank wealth-management products are included. In its early development years, the industry experienced much growing pain. With the joint efforts of regulators and market participants over the past 20 years, China’s asset management industry has substantially improved. In this article, the authors review the industry’s historical development, composition, competition among various sub-industries, and key players, as well as its institutional and regulatory environment. It would be difficult to understand the past, present, or future of this industry without knowing the political economy as well as the ideological background of China’s economy in general and its capital market in particular. The authors review the background of the political economy to aid readers in understanding the mindset and perspectives of regulators, policymakers, and key players in this space. The authors also discuss future opportunities in the asset management industry, as the massive household wealth created during China’s 30 years of fast economic growth continues to look for reliable vehicles for investment. Outbound investment from China is a growing trend.
- 31 January 2015
- Published by With Intelligence LLC in The Journal of Portfolio Management
- Vol. 41 (5) , 41-56
Discounts and Investment Performance of Chinese PIPEs
The Chinese private investment in public equity (PIPE) market offers a unique window into China’s capital markets and their regulatory environment and culture. Chinese PIPEs share many common features with their counterparts in other countries, such as price discounts relative to their publicly traded sister share prices, lock-ups creating illiquidity and incentive distortions, concentrated positions with a few buyers, and a preferred financing tool for companies without other options. But some characteristics of this market are specific to China. Since the regulatory guidelines were introduced in 2006, PIPEs have become the main and, most of the time, the only available equity financing option for listed companies. PIPE applications with the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) are often approved within a few months, whereas IPOs and seasoned equity offerings can take a couple of years to approve (if they’re ever approved at all) and are subject to much tougher requirements. In recent years, the IPO option was simply closed most of the time by the CSRC. As a result, PIPE offerings are, on average, more than 35% of the total shares outstanding and can be as high as 90% or more. PIPE deals are distributed across industries, much like the structure of the Chinese economy: PIPE financing is dominated by firms in industries that have experienced the worst capacity overexpansion, with relatively few deals done in industries that have minimal overcapacity issues. The authors analyze determinants of PIPE discounts, post-PIPE financial performance changes, and post-PIPE excess stock returns. They discuss and design optimal investment strategies to take advantage of PIPE offerings in China and backtest the strategies. The authors conclude that on a risk-adjusted basis, Chinese PIPEs present attractive opportunities.
- 31 January 2015
- Published by With Intelligence LLC in The Journal of Portfolio Management
- Vol. 41 (5) , 41-56
Discounts and Investment Performance of Chinese PIPEs
The Chinese private investment in public equity (PIPE) market offers a unique window into China’s capital markets and their regulatory environment and culture. Chinese PIPEs share many common features with their counterparts in other countries, such as price discounts relative to their publicly traded sister share prices, lock-ups creating illiquidity and incentive distortions, concentrated positions with a few buyers, and a preferred financing tool for companies without other options. But some characteristics of this market are specific to China. Since the regulatory guidelines were introduced in 2006, PIPEs have become the main and, most of the time, the only available equity financing option for listed companies. PIPE applications with the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) are often approved within a few months, whereas IPOs and seasoned equity offerings can take a couple of years to approve (if they’re ever approved at all) and are subject to much tougher requirements. In recent years, the IPO option was simply closed most of the time by the CSRC. As a result, PIPE offerings are, on average, more than 35% of the total shares outstanding and can be as high as 90% or more. PIPE deals are distributed across industries, much like the structure of the Chinese economy: PIPE financing is dominated by firms in industries that have experienced the worst capacity overexpansion, with relatively few deals done in industries that have minimal overcapacity issues. The authors analyze determinants of PIPE discounts, post-PIPE financial performance changes, and post-PIPE excess stock returns. They discuss and design optimal investment strategies to take advantage of PIPE offerings in China and backtest the strategies. The authors conclude that on a risk-adjusted basis, Chinese PIPEs present attractive opportunities.