Aviad Rubin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Aviad Rubin has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ibrahim Khatib
Doha Institute for Graduate Studies
3 shared publications - Ofir D. Rubin
Affiliation Department of Public Policy & Management, Guilford Glazer Faculty of Business & Management (GGFBM), Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel
3 shared publications As'AD Ghanem
2 shared publications- Daphna Canetti
University of Haifa
2 shared publications Doron Navot
2 shared publicationsEhud Eiran
Division of International Relations, School of Political Science, University of Haifa, Israel
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 September 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
In the name of love: The asymmetric effects of love rhetoric on political support
This study examines how different expressions of love in political rhetoric influence individual emotional responses and support for leaders. Using a survey experiment with a representative sample of 525 Jewish adults, we tested the effects of compassionate universal love ( agape ), protective particularistic love ( eros ), and neutral rhetoric (control) in a simulated official communication about Israel’s policy toward Ukrainian refugees fleeing the Ukraine–Russia conflict. Participants evaluated the same speaker announcing the acceptance of refugees from Ukraine under one of these three conditions. Our findings indicate that only protective particularistic love elicited positive emotional responses and political support for the leader, while compassionate universal love and neutral rhetoric had no comparable effect. By situating love within the broader moral-emotional dynamics of immigration politics, these results contribute to understanding the emotional power of eros in political communication and its implications for leadership appeal and public persuasion.
- 22 September 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
Open AccessIn the name of love: The asymmetric effects of love rhetoric on political support
This study examines how different expressions of love in political rhetoric influence individual emotional responses and support for leaders. Using a survey experiment with a representative sample of 525 Jewish adults, we tested the effects of compassionate universal love ( agape ), protective particularistic love ( eros ), and neutral rhetoric (control) in a simulated official communication about Israel’s policy toward Ukrainian refugees fleeing the Ukraine–Russia conflict. Participants evaluated the same speaker announcing the acceptance of refugees from Ukraine under one of these three conditions. Our findings indicate that only protective particularistic love elicited positive emotional responses and political support for the leader, while compassionate universal love and neutral rhetoric had no comparable effect. By situating love within the broader moral-emotional dynamics of immigration politics, these results contribute to understanding the emotional power of eros in political communication and its implications for leadership appeal and public persuasion.
- 5 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Ethnopolitics
- Vol. 23 (4) , 1-30
Conflicting Identities? Self-identification in Conflict Settings: Evidence from Israel and Arab States
How does self-identification impact warring individuals’ attitudes towards political compromise? How individuals from different parties to a protracted conflict self-identify is more often than not assumed rather than tested. This work remedies this deficiency by measuring how individuals living within protracted conflict self-identify and the implications for willingness to compromise. Based on two surveys (411 and 2171 participants) conducted in two different periods, we test the impact of self-identification on attitudes towards compromise. The results problematize scholars’ tendency to label dominant identities in a conflict in monolithic terms which may be a crucial impasse to conflict resolution. The results show a difference in the main self-identification that Palestinians, Jordanians, Tunisians and Israelis hold; Palestinians, Jordanians, and Tunisians adopt religious identification in the context of the conflict and Israeli Jews adopt civic-national identification. Religious identification in the different groups leads to decreased willingness to compromise, and civic identification in a conflict context increases it.
- 5 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Ethnopolitics
- Vol. 23 (4) , 1-30
Conflicting Identities? Self-identification in Conflict Settings: Evidence from Israel and Arab States
How does self-identification impact warring individuals’ attitudes towards political compromise? How individuals from different parties to a protracted conflict self-identify is more often than not assumed rather than tested. This work remedies this deficiency by measuring how individuals living within protracted conflict self-identify and the implications for willingness to compromise. Based on two surveys (411 and 2171 participants) conducted in two different periods, we test the impact of self-identification on attitudes towards compromise. The results problematize scholars’ tendency to label dominant identities in a conflict in monolithic terms which may be a crucial impasse to conflict resolution. The results show a difference in the main self-identification that Palestinians, Jordanians, Tunisians and Israelis hold; Palestinians, Jordanians, and Tunisians adopt religious identification in the context of the conflict and Israeli Jews adopt civic-national identification. Religious identification in the different groups leads to decreased willingness to compromise, and civic identification in a conflict context increases it.
- Open Access
- 14 September 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 65 (2-3) , 342-371
Naval Power and Effects of Third-Party Trade on Conflict
This study argues that the effect of third-party trade on dyadic conflicts is conditional on the naval power of both the potential conflict initiator and its target state. This conditional effect occurs mainly because naval power allows trade-integrated initiators to reduce their trade dependence on a given trade partner and its allies more easily. At the same time, the target’s naval power increases the costs that conflict inflict on the initiator’s trade. As maritime trade accounts for about 80 percent of world trade volume, naval capability has an important effect on combatant states’ ability to substitute trading partners during a conflict and to mitigate trade-related costs, thereby affecting the relationship between third-party trade and conflict. The findings of our statistical analyses support our theoretical expectation that the pacifying effect of third-party trade diminishes as the initiator’s naval power increases, yet increases as the naval power of the potential target increases.
- 14 September 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 65 (2-3) , 342-371
Open AccessNaval Power and Effects of Third-Party Trade on Conflict
This study argues that the effect of third-party trade on dyadic conflicts is conditional on the naval power of both the potential conflict initiator and its target state. This conditional effect occurs mainly because naval power allows trade-integrated initiators to reduce their trade dependence on a given trade partner and its allies more easily. At the same time, the target’s naval power increases the costs that conflict inflict on the initiator’s trade. As maritime trade accounts for about 80 percent of world trade volume, naval capability has an important effect on combatant states’ ability to substitute trading partners during a conflict and to mitigate trade-related costs, thereby affecting the relationship between third-party trade and conflict. The findings of our statistical analyses support our theoretical expectation that the pacifying effect of third-party trade diminishes as the initiator’s naval power increases, yet increases as the naval power of the potential target increases.
- 27 June 2019
- Published by Wiley in Sustainable Development
- Vol. 27 (6) , 1076-1084
Privatization, demographic growth, and perceived sustainability: Lessons from the Israeli renewing kibbutzim
In 2005, the State of Israel established a new classification—renewing kibbutzim. This study examines the relationship between the extent of privatization and the various forms of demographic growth that were permissible under the new classification and their impact on the perceived sustainability of the kibbutz in these communal communities. We collected data at the kibbutz level via interviews with community managers and at the individual level through questionnaires among community members in 19 kibbutzim. We employed the “nearest neighbor” methodology to create pairs who were demographically eligible for a before and after comparison. Although our results about perceived sustainability suggest that kibbutzim across the board have overcome the struggle to survive and have been able to recover, unlike commonly assumed, changes they adopted in the direction of more privatization and diversified statuses are clearly correlated with smaller increases in levels of perceived sustainability. Our findings may offer lessons for wider sociological questions concerning processes of privatization and stratification.
- 27 June 2019
- Published by Wiley in Sustainable Development
- Vol. 27 (6) , 1076-1084
Privatization, demographic growth, and perceived sustainability: Lessons from the Israeli renewing kibbutzim
In 2005, the State of Israel established a new classification—renewing kibbutzim. This study examines the relationship between the extent of privatization and the various forms of demographic growth that were permissible under the new classification and their impact on the perceived sustainability of the kibbutz in these communal communities. We collected data at the kibbutz level via interviews with community managers and at the individual level through questionnaires among community members in 19 kibbutzim. We employed the “nearest neighbor” methodology to create pairs who were demographically eligible for a before and after comparison. Although our results about perceived sustainability suggest that kibbutzim across the board have overcome the struggle to survive and have been able to recover, unlike commonly assumed, changes they adopted in the direction of more privatization and diversified statuses are clearly correlated with smaller increases in levels of perceived sustainability. Our findings may offer lessons for wider sociological questions concerning processes of privatization and stratification.
- 21 March 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
- Vol. 56 (6) , 737-752
Framing and fighting: The impact of conflict frames on political attitudes
How does the subjective conceptual framing of conflict impact the warring parties’ attitudes towards political compromise and negotiation? To assess strategies for conflict resolution, researchers frequently try to determine the defining dispute of a given conflict. However, involved parties often view the conflict through fundamentally distinct lenses. Currently, researchers do not possess a clear theoretical or methodological way to conceptualize the complexity of such competing frames and their effects on conflict resolution. This article addresses this gap. Using the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a case study, we run a series of focus groups and three surveys among Jewish citizens of Israel, Palestinian citizens of Israel (PCIs), and Palestinians in the West Bank. Results reveal that three conflict frames are prominent – material, nationalist, and religious. However, the parties to the conflict differ in their dominant interpretation of the conflict. Jewish Israelis mostly frame the conflict as nationalist, whereas Palestinians, in both the West Bank and Israel, frame it as religious. Moreover, these frames impact conflict attitudes: a religious frame was associated with significantly less willingness to compromise in potential diplomatic negotiations among both Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel. Interestingly, differing frames had no significant impact on the political attitudes of West Bank Palestinians, suggesting that the daily realities of conflict there may be creating more static, militant attitudes among that population. These results challenge the efficacy of material solutions to the conflict and demonstrate the micro-foundations underpinning civilians’ conflict attitudes and their implications for successful conflict resolution.
- 21 March 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
- Vol. 56 (6) , 737-752
Framing and fighting: The impact of conflict frames on political attitudes
How does the subjective conceptual framing of conflict impact the warring parties’ attitudes towards political compromise and negotiation? To assess strategies for conflict resolution, researchers frequently try to determine the defining dispute of a given conflict. However, involved parties often view the conflict through fundamentally distinct lenses. Currently, researchers do not possess a clear theoretical or methodological way to conceptualize the complexity of such competing frames and their effects on conflict resolution. This article addresses this gap. Using the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as a case study, we run a series of focus groups and three surveys among Jewish citizens of Israel, Palestinian citizens of Israel (PCIs), and Palestinians in the West Bank. Results reveal that three conflict frames are prominent – material, nationalist, and religious. However, the parties to the conflict differ in their dominant interpretation of the conflict. Jewish Israelis mostly frame the conflict as nationalist, whereas Palestinians, in both the West Bank and Israel, frame it as religious. Moreover, these frames impact conflict attitudes: a religious frame was associated with significantly less willingness to compromise in potential diplomatic negotiations among both Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel. Interestingly, differing frames had no significant impact on the political attitudes of West Bank Palestinians, suggesting that the daily realities of conflict there may be creating more static, militant attitudes among that population. These results challenge the efficacy of material solutions to the conflict and demonstrate the micro-foundations underpinning civilians’ conflict attitudes and their implications for successful conflict resolution.
- 18 February 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Israel Affairs
- Vol. 25 (2) , 234-255
Israel’s ‘turn to the sea’ and its effect on Israeli regional policy
The article analyses the effect of Israel’s new maritime orientation on its foreign policy. It first demonstrates that in the last two decades Israel has changed its maritime posture in three important ways: it has developed energy dependence on offshore gas, begun extensive seawater desalination and dramatically expanded its navy’s platforms and missions. The paper then investigates the effects of these changes on Israel’s bilateral relations with its neighbours. Finally, the paper highlights the cumulative effect of these changes as well as some of their implications for Israel’s foreign policy.
- 18 February 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Israel Affairs
- Vol. 25 (2) , 234-255
Israel’s ‘turn to the sea’ and its effect on Israeli regional policy
The article analyses the effect of Israel’s new maritime orientation on its foreign policy. It first demonstrates that in the last two decades Israel has changed its maritime posture in three important ways: it has developed energy dependence on offshore gas, begun extensive seawater desalination and dramatically expanded its navy’s platforms and missions. The paper then investigates the effects of these changes on Israel’s bilateral relations with its neighbours. Finally, the paper highlights the cumulative effect of these changes as well as some of their implications for Israel’s foreign policy.
- 21 November 2018
- Published by The Middle East Journal in The Middle East Journal
- Vol. 72 (4) , 610-630
Israel Turns to the Sea
Since the mid-1990s, both the Israeli state and Israeli society have been developing and implementing several separate new policies regarding the country's seas. These include the extraction of offshore hydrocarbons; expansion of the navy; massive desalination projects; and several legislative, planning, and zoning initiatives. Put together, these changes amount to a "turn to the sea" that profoundly affects Israel's economy, foreign policy, and military. This article compares this shift to historical precedents, offering Israel as a template for a new, cumulative model that does not conform to the existing narratives of how polities have turned to the maritime domain.
- 21 November 2018
- Published by The Middle East Journal in The Middle East Journal
- Vol. 72 (4) , 610-630
Israel Turns to the Sea
Since the mid-1990s, both the Israeli state and Israeli society have been developing and implementing several separate new policies regarding the country's seas. These include the extraction of offshore hydrocarbons; expansion of the navy; massive desalination projects; and several legislative, planning, and zoning initiatives. Put together, these changes amount to a "turn to the sea" that profoundly affects Israel's economy, foreign policy, and military. This article compares this shift to historical precedents, offering Israel as a template for a new, cumulative model that does not conform to the existing narratives of how polities have turned to the maritime domain.
- 4 April 2018
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Conflict Management
- Vol. 29 (3) , 376-397
Conflict perception: a new scale with evidence from Israel and Palestine
Purpose: The current work aims to introduce the concept of conflict perception and construct a scale that measures individual differences in perceptions about conflicts along religious, national and material dimensions. The concept and the measure are developed in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.Design/methodology/approach: The research design combines three methodological elements: 14 focus groups in Israel and the West Bank, which represent diversity in place of residence, religion, age and political background; an expert panel review; and a survey of 411 student respondents that was conducted between September 29 and October 9, 2013, among university students in Israel and Palestine.Findings: The findings show that conflict perception is an individual’s subjective view regarding the essence of the conflict and its central issues, the identities of the parties involved and their motivations, which may include material, ideological or symbolic motives, or any combination thereof. A novel scale consisting of five statements that can measure conflict perception that was developed, validated and implemented via a survey sample showed that Palestinians in the West Bank and in Israel have a religious perception of the conflict, whereas Jews have a national perception of the conflict.Originality/value: First, the paper introduces a new concept that sheds additional light on the micro foundations of peoples’ attitudes in conflict situations. Second, it develops and validates a measurement tool for conflict perception that may be usable, with necessary adjustments, in other conflicts. Third, it demonstrates that parties to the conflict do not necessarily share similar perceptions about the conflict, a finding with far-reaching consequences for conflict resolution at both the scholarly and policy levels.
- 4 April 2018
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Conflict Management
- Vol. 29 (3) , 376-397
Conflict perception: a new scale with evidence from Israel and Palestine
Purpose: The current work aims to introduce the concept of conflict perception and construct a scale that measures individual differences in perceptions about conflicts along religious, national and material dimensions. The concept and the measure are developed in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.Design/methodology/approach: The research design combines three methodological elements: 14 focus groups in Israel and the West Bank, which represent diversity in place of residence, religion, age and political background; an expert panel review; and a survey of 411 student respondents that was conducted between September 29 and October 9, 2013, among university students in Israel and Palestine.Findings: The findings show that conflict perception is an individual’s subjective view regarding the essence of the conflict and its central issues, the identities of the parties involved and their motivations, which may include material, ideological or symbolic motives, or any combination thereof. A novel scale consisting of five statements that can measure conflict perception that was developed, validated and implemented via a survey sample showed that Palestinians in the West Bank and in Israel have a religious perception of the conflict, whereas Jews have a national perception of the conflict.Originality/value: First, the paper introduces a new concept that sheds additional light on the micro foundations of peoples’ attitudes in conflict situations. Second, it develops and validates a measurement tool for conflict perception that may be usable, with necessary adjustments, in other conflicts. Third, it demonstrates that parties to the conflict do not necessarily share similar perceptions about the conflict, a finding with far-reaching consequences for conflict resolution at both the scholarly and policy levels.
- 24 September 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Citizenship Studies
- Vol. 21 (8) , 872-888
Turkish citizenship: the perils of hegemonic tendencies and the 'shadow of securitization'
The current article delineates the qualified nature of citizenship in the Turkish Republic. Its primary argument is that the content of citizenship in Turkey has been shaped and reshaped since its establishment by a continuous struggle for social and political hegemony. Throughout this struggle the incumbent regimes, Kemalist, populist, and Islamist, subjected the full range of citizenship rights to conceived – internal and external, real and imagined – security threats, which further legitimized restrictions on Turkish citizenship. The recent downturn in Turkish citizenship, which started in 2011 and peaked following the failed coup attempt in summer 2016 and the referendum of April 2017, should be understood in relation to the contemporary turmoil in the Middle East which confronted the Turkish state with a plethora of security challenges and justified further infringement of citizenship rights in Turkish society.
- 24 September 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Citizenship Studies
- Vol. 21 (8) , 872-888
Turkish citizenship: the perils of hegemonic tendencies and the 'shadow of securitization'
The current article delineates the qualified nature of citizenship in the Turkish Republic. Its primary argument is that the content of citizenship in Turkey has been shaped and reshaped since its establishment by a continuous struggle for social and political hegemony. Throughout this struggle the incumbent regimes, Kemalist, populist, and Islamist, subjected the full range of citizenship rights to conceived – internal and external, real and imagined – security threats, which further legitimized restrictions on Turkish citizenship. The recent downturn in Turkish citizenship, which started in 2011 and peaked following the failed coup attempt in summer 2016 and the referendum of April 2017, should be understood in relation to the contemporary turmoil in the Middle East which confronted the Turkish state with a plethora of security challenges and justified further infringement of citizenship rights in Turkish society.
- 1 May 2017
- Published by The Middle East Journal in The Middle East Journal
- Vol. 71 (2) , 248-268
The 2015 Israeli General Election: The Triumph of Jewish Skepticism, the Emergence of Arab Faith
The results of the 2015 Israeli election, primarily the sweeping victory of Binyamin Netanyahu's Likud party, surprised most analysts. In this article we employ political scientist Michael Oakeshott's distinction in arguing that the campaign dynamics and the consequent electoral results reflect the triumph of a "politics of skepticism" among Jews, and the emergence of a "politics of faith" among Israel 's Arab-Palestinian citizens. Both derive from a combination of external and domestic circumstances and their effective exploitation by charismatic political leaders.
- 1 May 2017
- Published by The Middle East Journal in The Middle East Journal
- Vol. 71 (2) , 248-268
The 2015 Israeli General Election: The Triumph of Jewish Skepticism, the Emergence of Arab Faith
The results of the 2015 Israeli election, primarily the sweeping victory of Binyamin Netanyahu's Likud party, surprised most analysts. In this article we employ political scientist Michael Oakeshott's distinction in arguing that the campaign dynamics and the consequent electoral results reflect the triumph of a "politics of skepticism" among Jews, and the emergence of a "politics of faith" among Israel 's Arab-Palestinian citizens. Both derive from a combination of external and domestic circumstances and their effective exploitation by charismatic political leaders.