Antoinette Baujard
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Antoinette Baujard has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jean-François Laslier
CNRS, Paris School of Economics, Paris, France
9 shared publications - Herrade Igersheim
BETA, University of Strasbourg
6 shared publications - Isabelle Lebon
Compte-rendu de l'expérimentation des votes par approbation et par note lors des élections Saint-Étienne 2012 Strasbourg et Louvigny
6 shared publications Herrade Igersheim
5 shared publicationsIsabelle Lebon
Normandy University, Unicaen, CREM, Caen, France
5 shared publicationsFrédéric Gavrel
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought
- Vol. 33 (5) , 1007-1035
The history of economic thought matters for economics: Lessons from welfarism in welfare economics
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought
- Vol. 33 (5) , 1007-1035
The history of economic thought matters for economics: Lessons from welfarism in welfare economics
- 3 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Methodology
- p. 1-17
Value judgments and economic expertise: revisiting the division of labor model
1. Economic expertise plays an important role in public policymaking, and yet its democratic legitimacy is sometimes questioned. A major concern is that the economists’ own value judgments influenc...
- 3 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Methodology
- p. 1-17
Value judgments and economic expertise: revisiting the division of labor model
1. Economic expertise plays an important role in public policymaking, and yet its democratic legitimacy is sometimes questioned. A major concern is that the economists’ own value judgments influenc...
- Open Access
Ethical criteria and evaluation of public policy: Freedom, equality, efficiency?
Dans un cadre welfariste strict, les objectifs poursuivis par une politique publique se concentrent sur un objectif d'efficacité. Le plus souvent, il s'agit de valoriser au mieux l'utilité des individus, avec la plus grande économie de moyens, tout en négligeant d'autres critères potentiellement désirables. Les approches dites non welfaristes, auxquelles Daniel Serra a apporté plusieurs contributions, ont permis de questionner plus largement les politiques publiques en introduisant de nouveaux arguments liés à la justice sociale : l'égalité, la liberté, le non-paternalisme. Dans cet article, nous proposons de montrer l'apport de ces approches alternatives à travers deux études de cas : celle du taux de remplissage des trains et celle de la gratuité dans les musées. Nous en tirons deux conclusions générales. Conformément à la démarche de l'économie normative, la priorité accordée à un critère éthique plutôt qu'à un autre conduit à suggérer des politiques publiques différentes. La mesure de politique qui satisfait un critère éthique donné diffère selon le contexte du cas étudié.
Open AccessEthical criteria and evaluation of public policy: Freedom, equality, efficiency?
Dans un cadre welfariste strict, les objectifs poursuivis par une politique publique se concentrent sur un objectif d'efficacité. Le plus souvent, il s'agit de valoriser au mieux l'utilité des individus, avec la plus grande économie de moyens, tout en négligeant d'autres critères potentiellement désirables. Les approches dites non welfaristes, auxquelles Daniel Serra a apporté plusieurs contributions, ont permis de questionner plus largement les politiques publiques en introduisant de nouveaux arguments liés à la justice sociale : l'égalité, la liberté, le non-paternalisme. Dans cet article, nous proposons de montrer l'apport de ces approches alternatives à travers deux études de cas : celle du taux de remplissage des trains et celle de la gratuité dans les musées. Nous en tirons deux conclusions générales. Conformément à la démarche de l'économie normative, la priorité accordée à un critère éthique plutôt qu'à un autre conduit à suggérer des politiques publiques différentes. La mesure de politique qui satisfait un critère éthique donné diffère selon le contexte du cas étudié.
- Open Access
Citizen participation in experiments on voting rules
In Situ experimentations provide opportunities for exchanges between researchers and citizens. This article describes their potential impact on research regarding political studies and voting rules in particular. It comments the citizens perception of these experiments, and which social expectations they raise. It also illustrates two cases for which the active participation of voters made research questions evolve: firstly, the importance of expressive voting for voters, and secondly, the forms and challenges of understanding and explaining voting rules. These cases all uncover the prominence of voters’ agency, and draw attention on the need for scientists’ axiological neutrality in political studies.
Open AccessCitizen participation in experiments on voting rules
In Situ experimentations provide opportunities for exchanges between researchers and citizens. This article describes their potential impact on research regarding political studies and voting rules in particular. It comments the citizens perception of these experiments, and which social expectations they raise. It also illustrates two cases for which the active participation of voters made research questions evolve: firstly, the importance of expressive voting for voters, and secondly, the forms and challenges of understanding and explaining voting rules. These cases all uncover the prominence of voters’ agency, and draw attention on the need for scientists’ axiological neutrality in political studies.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by OpenEdition in Droit et Cultures
- Vol. 88 (88)
L’invisibilisation du commun
Cet article adopte une perspective analytique et normative pour décrire comment les sciences économiques ont opéré une réduction du collectif à ses seules composantes individuelles. Après avoir illustré comment le questionnement normatif du niveau collectif en économie a été ignoré en économie du bien-être, l’article rappelle le contexte dans lequel s’est imposé le « welfarisme », le cadre d’étude dans lequel le bien-être social ne dépend que des seules utilités individuelles. L’article expose les enseignements du théorème d’impossibilité d’Arrow et celui du Parétien libéral de Sen pour montrer en quoi ces restrictions informationnelles de la question sociale ont conduit à l’invisibilisation du commun et permet, en creux, d’identifier précisément des pistes pour les prendre au sérieux. En conclusion, il invite à repenser l’implication des membres d’une communauté dans les décisions collectives.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by OpenEdition in Droit et Cultures
- Vol. 88 (88)
Open AccessL’invisibilisation du commun
Cet article adopte une perspective analytique et normative pour décrire comment les sciences économiques ont opéré une réduction du collectif à ses seules composantes individuelles. Après avoir illustré comment le questionnement normatif du niveau collectif en économie a été ignoré en économie du bien-être, l’article rappelle le contexte dans lequel s’est imposé le « welfarisme », le cadre d’étude dans lequel le bien-être social ne dépend que des seules utilités individuelles. L’article expose les enseignements du théorème d’impossibilité d’Arrow et celui du Parétien libéral de Sen pour montrer en quoi ces restrictions informationnelles de la question sociale ont conduit à l’invisibilisation du commun et permet, en creux, d’identifier précisément des pistes pour les prendre au sérieux. En conclusion, il invite à repenser l’implication des membres d’une communauté dans les décisions collectives.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by OpenEdition in OEconomia
- Vol. 14-4 (14-4) , 861-878
Citizen Knowledge and the Debate on Information in Welfare Economics in Perspective: Beyond the True-False and the Positive-Normative Entanglements
Lisa Herzog’s book, Citizen Knowledge, focuses on knowledge, markets and democracy. Lisa Herzog elaborates from the claim that we can hardly retrieve reliable knowledge from either the markets or voting expression, and she highlights the knowledge issue. She shows convincingly why this is an urgent and central problem for liberal democracies and people’s well-being. Among others, the fact that public decisions are technocratic and that citizens foster resentment against technocracy is a major...
- 1 January 2024
- Published by OpenEdition in OEconomia
- Vol. 14-4 (14-4) , 861-878
Open AccessCitizen Knowledge and the Debate on Information in Welfare Economics in Perspective: Beyond the True-False and the Positive-Normative Entanglements
Lisa Herzog’s book, Citizen Knowledge, focuses on knowledge, markets and democracy. Lisa Herzog elaborates from the claim that we can hardly retrieve reliable knowledge from either the markets or voting expression, and she highlights the knowledge issue. She shows convincingly why this is an urgent and central problem for liberal democracies and people’s well-being. Among others, the fact that public decisions are technocratic and that citizens foster resentment against technocracy is a major...
- Open Access
Citizen Knowledge and the debate on information in welfare economics in perspective. Beyond the True-False and the Positive-Normative Entanglements
This paper shows how the debate on information in Welfare Economics is enriched from the perspective of Lisa Herzog's thesis on citizen knowledge, and conversely. First, the two sources of information for welfare enhancing public decisions, individual utilities and knowledge, need articulated justification, insofar as knowledge may be used to revise individual utilities. The process of preference revisions implicitly assumes the coincidence between knowledge and truth, but there are compelling arguments why this assumption should be debated. Second, public decisions are ultimately based on an additional third component of information: collective ethical norms. They are decisive, but their legitimacy is conditional to their transparency in the debate between experts and citizens. Transparency on which knowledge is judged relevant hence constitutes a minimal condition for the design of democratic infrastructures involving public decision making.
Open AccessCitizen Knowledge and the debate on information in welfare economics in perspective. Beyond the True-False and the Positive-Normative Entanglements
This paper shows how the debate on information in Welfare Economics is enriched from the perspective of Lisa Herzog's thesis on citizen knowledge, and conversely. First, the two sources of information for welfare enhancing public decisions, individual utilities and knowledge, need articulated justification, insofar as knowledge may be used to revise individual utilities. The process of preference revisions implicitly assumes the coincidence between knowledge and truth, but there are compelling arguments why this assumption should be debated. Second, public decisions are ultimately based on an additional third component of information: collective ethical norms. They are decisive, but their legitimacy is conditional to their transparency in the debate between experts and citizens. Transparency on which knowledge is judged relevant hence constitutes a minimal condition for the design of democratic infrastructures involving public decision making.
- 3 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Homo Oeconomicus
- Vol. 42 (1) , 65-86
Retelling the Story of the 2017 French Presidential Election: The contribution of Approval Voting
- 3 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Homo Oeconomicus
- Vol. 42 (1) , 65-86
Retelling the Story of the 2017 French Presidential Election: The contribution of Approval Voting
- 10 June 2022
- Published by Duke University Press in History of Political Economy
- Vol. 54 (5) , 1005-1010
Home in the World: A Memoir
- 10 June 2022
- Published by Duke University Press in History of Political Economy
- Vol. 54 (5) , 1005-1010
Home in the World: A Memoir
- Open Access
Not-so-strategic voters. Evidence from an in situ experiment during the 2017 French presidential election
An experiment carried out in situ during the 2017 French presidential election provides the natural conditions in which to disentangle the motivations of expressive voting and strategic voting as determinants of voters' choice. Under the two-round plurality rule, when voters vote for a single candidate in the first round, they may wish primarily to express which is their favorite candidate, or, rather, to influence the outcome of the second-round outcome by strategic voting. These two motives may coincide or conflict. We show that insincere strategic voting is relatively low in this context since it represents less than 7% of the votes cast. When the expressive and the strategic motives conflict with each other, i.e., where expression requires giving up any influence on the outcome of the election, we show that voters are twice as likely to eschew strategic voting as to vote strategically.
Open AccessNot-so-strategic voters. Evidence from an in situ experiment during the 2017 French presidential election
An experiment carried out in situ during the 2017 French presidential election provides the natural conditions in which to disentangle the motivations of expressive voting and strategic voting as determinants of voters' choice. Under the two-round plurality rule, when voters vote for a single candidate in the first round, they may wish primarily to express which is their favorite candidate, or, rather, to influence the outcome of the second-round outcome by strategic voting. These two motives may coincide or conflict. We show that insincere strategic voting is relatively low in this context since it represents less than 7% of the votes cast. When the expressive and the strategic motives conflict with each other, i.e., where expression requires giving up any influence on the outcome of the election, we show that voters are twice as likely to eschew strategic voting as to vote strategically.