Steve Fetter
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Steve Fetter has a total of 68 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Charles L. Glaser
Charles L. Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University; he directs the Elliott School's Institute for Security and Conflict Studies
7 shared publications- Frank von Hippel
Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey
3 shared publications John P. Holdren
Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
3 shared publications- Bob van der Zwaan
Faculty of Science (HIMS), University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2 shared publications Frank von Hippel
2 shared publicationsMatthew Bunn
Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 October 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Security Studies
- Vol. 34 (5) , 868-898
Distinction Without a Difference: The UK Shift from Population to Leadership Nuclear Targeting
- 20 October 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Security Studies
- Vol. 34 (5) , 868-898
Open AccessDistinction Without a Difference: The UK Shift from Population to Leadership Nuclear Targeting
- 3 April 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Washington Quarterly
- Vol. 48 (2) , 95-114
Can the Iron Dome Be Transmuted into a Golden Dome?
- 3 April 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Washington Quarterly
- Vol. 48 (2) , 95-114
Can the Iron Dome Be Transmuted into a Golden Dome?
- 11 December 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Strategic Studies
- Vol. 48 (2) , 252-296
Emerging technologies and challenges to nuclear stability
- 11 December 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Strategic Studies
- Vol. 48 (2) , 252-296
Emerging technologies and challenges to nuclear stability
- 2 January 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Washington Quarterly
- Vol. 45 (1) , 25-37
Legal, but Lethal: The Law of Armed Conflict and US Nuclear Strategy
Starting around a decade or so ago, the law of armed conflict (LOAC) acquired new prominence in the development of US nuclear strategy. This was stimulated in part by a series of major intergovernm...
- 2 January 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Washington Quarterly
- Vol. 45 (1) , 25-37
Legal, but Lethal: The Law of Armed Conflict and US Nuclear Strategy
Starting around a decade or so ago, the law of armed conflict (LOAC) acquired new prominence in the development of US nuclear strategy. This was stimulated in part by a series of major intergovernm...
- 2 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Washington Quarterly
- Vol. 43 (3) , 47-62
Reexamining Homeland Missile Defense against North Korea
(2020). Reexamining Homeland Missile Defense against North Korea. The Washington Quarterly: Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 47-62.
- 2 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Washington Quarterly
- Vol. 43 (3) , 47-62
Reexamining Homeland Missile Defense against North Korea
(2020). Reexamining Homeland Missile Defense against North Korea. The Washington Quarterly: Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 47-62.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2018
- Published by AIP Publishing in Physics Today
- Vol. 71 (4) , 32-39
Nuclear weapons dangers and policy options
With the end of the Cold War, most physicists turned their attention away from the nuclear threat. It is now time for us to reengage in the debate over how to reduce the dangers from nuclear weapons.
- 1 April 2018
- Published by AIP Publishing in Physics Today
- Vol. 71 (4) , 32-39
Open AccessNuclear weapons dangers and policy options
With the end of the Cold War, most physicists turned their attention away from the nuclear threat. It is now time for us to reengage in the debate over how to reduce the dangers from nuclear weapons.
- Open Access
- 2 January 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament
- Vol. 1 (1) , 102-114
No First Use and Credible Deterrence
Despite progress in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the largest arsenals, a number of states are now looking to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons not only for deterrence, but also for coercion or war fighting. There is scant evidence that nuclear weapons are effective or well suited for these roles, and the risks of relying on nuclear weapons for more than deterrence of nuclear attack are under appreciated. We review the evolution of US nuclear strategy and assesses the prospects for establishing a policy of no first use. A no first use policy would in no way reduce deterrence of nuclear attack against the United States or its allies. Nuclear weapons are not an effective deterrent against non-nuclear attack because there are few if any scenarios in which a US threat to use nuclear weapons first in response to non-nuclear aggression against the United States or its allies would be credible. The benefits of adopting a policy of no first use include reducing the risks of accidental nuclear escalation or nuclear use from miscalculation, as well as supporting nonproliferation and disarmament efforts.
- 2 January 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament
- Vol. 1 (1) , 102-114
Open AccessNo First Use and Credible Deterrence
Despite progress in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the largest arsenals, a number of states are now looking to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons not only for deterrence, but also for coercion or war fighting. There is scant evidence that nuclear weapons are effective or well suited for these roles, and the risks of relying on nuclear weapons for more than deterrence of nuclear attack are under appreciated. We review the evolution of US nuclear strategy and assesses the prospects for establishing a policy of no first use. A no first use policy would in no way reduce deterrence of nuclear attack against the United States or its allies. Nuclear weapons are not an effective deterrent against non-nuclear attack because there are few if any scenarios in which a US threat to use nuclear weapons first in response to non-nuclear aggression against the United States or its allies would be credible. The benefits of adopting a policy of no first use include reducing the risks of accidental nuclear escalation or nuclear use from miscalculation, as well as supporting nonproliferation and disarmament efforts.
- 2 September 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Science & Global Security
- Vol. 25 (3) , 125-142
Estimating the Amount of Nuclear Weapon-usable Material Outside Government Control Using Data on Reported Seizures
Terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons by using weapon-usable nuclear material that was stolen or otherwise diverted from legitimate authorities. Multiple well-documented seizures suggest the existence of a black market that draws on an unknown stock of weapon-usable nuclear material that is not under the control of authorities. We estimate the total amount of uncontrolled material based on publicly reported seizures and several different statistical methods and models. We estimate that 90 to 250 kilograms—sufficient for up to ten nuclear weapons—remain outside the control of legitimate authorities. While this estimate is subject to large uncertainties and potential bias, governments may have additional information about nuclear material seizures that could be used to improve estimates.
- 2 September 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Science & Global Security
- Vol. 25 (3) , 125-142
Estimating the Amount of Nuclear Weapon-usable Material Outside Government Control Using Data on Reported Seizures
Terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons by using weapon-usable nuclear material that was stolen or otherwise diverted from legitimate authorities. Multiple well-documented seizures suggest the existence of a black market that draws on an unknown stock of weapon-usable nuclear material that is not under the control of authorities. We estimate the total amount of uncontrolled material based on publicly reported seizures and several different statistical methods and models. We estimate that 90 to 250 kilograms—sufficient for up to ten nuclear weapons—remain outside the control of legitimate authorities. While this estimate is subject to large uncertainties and potential bias, governments may have additional information about nuclear material seizures that could be used to improve estimates.
- 11 July 2017
- Published by Wiley in Risk Analysis
- Vol. 38 (2) , 242-254
An Expert Elicitation of the Proliferation Resistance of Using Small Modular Reactors (SMR) for the Expansion of Civilian Nuclear Systems
To facilitate the use of nuclear energy globally, small modular reactors (SMRs) may represent a viable alternative or complement to large reactor designs. One potential benefit is that SMRs could allow for more proliferation resistant designs, manufacturing arrangements, and fuel‐cycle practices at widespread deployment. However, there is limited work evaluating the proliferation resistance of SMRs, and existing proliferation assessment approaches are not well suited for these novel arrangements. Here, we conduct an expert elicitation of the relative proliferation resistance of scenarios for future nuclear energy deployment driven by Generation III+ light‐water reactors, fast reactors, or SMRs. Specifically, we construct the scenarios to investigate relevant technical and institutional features that are postulated to enhance the proliferation resistance of SMRs. The experts do not consistently judge the scenario with SMRs to have greater overall proliferation resistance than scenarios that rely on conventional nuclear energy generation options. Further, the experts disagreed on whether incorporating a long‐lifetime sealed core into an SMR design would strengthen or weaken proliferation resistance. However, regardless of the type of reactor, the experts judged that proliferation resistance would be enhanced by improving international safeguards and operating several multinational fuel‐cycle facilities rather than supporting many more national facilities.
- 11 July 2017
- Published by Wiley in Risk Analysis
- Vol. 38 (2) , 242-254
An Expert Elicitation of the Proliferation Resistance of Using Small Modular Reactors (SMR) for the Expansion of Civilian Nuclear Systems
To facilitate the use of nuclear energy globally, small modular reactors (SMRs) may represent a viable alternative or complement to large reactor designs. One potential benefit is that SMRs could allow for more proliferation resistant designs, manufacturing arrangements, and fuel‐cycle practices at widespread deployment. However, there is limited work evaluating the proliferation resistance of SMRs, and existing proliferation assessment approaches are not well suited for these novel arrangements. Here, we conduct an expert elicitation of the relative proliferation resistance of scenarios for future nuclear energy deployment driven by Generation III+ light‐water reactors, fast reactors, or SMRs. Specifically, we construct the scenarios to investigate relevant technical and institutional features that are postulated to enhance the proliferation resistance of SMRs. The experts do not consistently judge the scenario with SMRs to have greater overall proliferation resistance than scenarios that rely on conventional nuclear energy generation options. Further, the experts disagreed on whether incorporating a long‐lifetime sealed core into an SMR design would strengthen or weaken proliferation resistance. However, regardless of the type of reactor, the experts judged that proliferation resistance would be enhanced by improving international safeguards and operating several multinational fuel‐cycle facilities rather than supporting many more national facilities.