José Luis Ferreira
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
José Luis Ferreira has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
I. Gilboa
1 shared publication- Jesús Zamora Bonilla
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
1 shared publication Jesús Zamora-Bonilla
1 shared publication- Luc Bovens
London School of Economics and Political Science
1 shared publication M. Maschler
Tilburg University
1 shared publicationPaula Corcho
Universidad de Extremadura
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 July 2016
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 11 (7) , e0158098
Multiple Openings and Competitiveness of Forward Markets: Experimental Evidence
We test the competition enhancing effect of selling forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly with multiple forward markets. We find that two forward periods yields competitive outcomes and that the results are very close to the predicted theoretical results for quantity setting duopolies and quadropolies. Our experiments lend strong support to the hypothesis that forward markets are competition enhancing. We then test a new market that allows for endogenously determined indefinitely many forward periods that only close when sellers coordinate on selling a zero amount in a forward market. We find that the outcomes under an endogenous close rule are also very competitive. These results hold for both duopolies and quadropolies.
- 21 July 2016
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 11 (7) , e0158098
Open AccessMultiple Openings and Competitiveness of Forward Markets: Experimental Evidence
We test the competition enhancing effect of selling forward in experimental Cournot duopoly and quadropoly with multiple forward markets. We find that two forward periods yields competitive outcomes and that the results are very close to the predicted theoretical results for quantity setting duopolies and quadropolies. Our experiments lend strong support to the hypothesis that forward markets are competition enhancing. We then test a new market that allows for endogenously determined indefinitely many forward periods that only close when sellers coordinate on selling a zero amount in a forward market. We find that the outcomes under an endogenous close rule are also very competitive. These results hold for both duopolies and quadropolies.
- 1 February 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 122 (2) , 362-364
Capacity precommitment, price competition and forward markets
- 1 February 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 122 (2) , 362-364
Capacity precommitment, price competition and forward markets
- 1 March 2011
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in International Game Theory Review
- Vol. 13 (01) , 93-104
A NOTE ON BAGWELL'S PARADOX AND FORWARD INDUCTION IN THREE CLASSIC GAMES
Stackelberg-like games show a situation where there is a clear advantage in moving first. In a thought provoking article, Bagwell [1995] shows that this advantage may not be robust against imperfect observations of the first move. We explore these ideas in the context of forward induction in three classic games, namely, the outside option game, the game of burning a dollar before the battle of the sexes and the beer-quiche game.
- 1 March 2011
- Published by World Scientific Pub Co Pte Ltd in International Game Theory Review
- Vol. 13 (01) , 93-104
A NOTE ON BAGWELL'S PARADOX AND FORWARD INDUCTION IN THREE CLASSIC GAMES
Stackelberg-like games show a situation where there is a clear advantage in moving first. In a thought provoking article, Bagwell [1995] shows that this advantage may not be robust against imperfect observations of the first move. We explore these ideas in the context of forward induction in three classic games, namely, the outside option game, the game of burning a dollar before the battle of the sexes and the beer-quiche game.
- Open Access
- 15 November 2010
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 6 (4) , 341-354
Strategic profit sharing between firms
We introduce the possibility of unilaterally giving profits away to the rival in different oligopolistic contexts. We find that this strategy may be profitable in some circumstances, thus providing a context for partial tacit collusion in one‐shot oligopolistic interactions. Although the strategy in itself may look unrealistic, we argue that it may be hidden behind a more complicated relation of the firms.
- 15 November 2010
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 6 (4) , 341-354
Open AccessStrategic profit sharing between firms
We introduce the possibility of unilaterally giving profits away to the rival in different oligopolistic contexts. We find that this strategy may be profitable in some circumstances, thus providing a context for partial tacit collusion in one‐shot oligopolistic interactions. Although the strategy in itself may look unrealistic, we argue that it may be hidden behind a more complicated relation of the firms.
- 28 April 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 70 (3) , 473-481
Monty Hall drives a wedge between Judy Benjamin and the Sleeping Beauty: a reply to Bovens
Bovens (2010) points out that there is a structural analogy between the Judy Benjamin problem (JB) and the Sleeping Beauty problem (SB). On grounds of this structural analogy, he argues that both should receive the same solution, viz. the posterior probability of the eastern region of the matrix in Table 1 should equal 1/3. Hence, P*(Red) = 1/3 in the JB and P*(Heads) = 1/3 in the SB.
- 28 April 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 70 (3) , 473-481
Monty Hall drives a wedge between Judy Benjamin and the Sleeping Beauty: a reply to Bovens
Bovens (2010) points out that there is a structural analogy between the Judy Benjamin problem (JB) and the Sleeping Beauty problem (SB). On grounds of this structural analogy, he argues that both should receive the same solution, viz. the posterior probability of the eastern region of the matrix in Table 1 should equal 1/3. Hence, P*(Red) = 1/3 in the JB and P*(Heads) = 1/3 in the SB.
- 1 September 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Methodology
- Vol. 15 (3) , 285-299
The surprise exam paradox, rationality, and pragmatics: a simple game‐theoretic analysis
The surprise exam paradox has attracted the attention of prominent logicians, mathematicians and philosophers for decades. Although the paradox itself has been resolved at least since Quine ( 1953 Quine, W. V. O. 1953. “On a So‐Called Paradox,”. Mind, 62: 65–67. [Google Scholar] ), some aspects of it are still being discussed. In this paper we propose, following Sober ( 1998 Sober, E. 1998. “To Give a Surprise Exam, Use Game Theory,”. Synthese, 115: 355–373. [Google Scholar] ), to translate the paradox into the language of game theory to clarify these aspects. Our main conclusions are that a much simpler game‐theoretic analysis of the paradox is possible, which solves most of the puzzles related to it, and that this way of analysing the paradox can also throw light on our comprehension of the pragmatics of linguistic communication.
- 1 September 2008
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Economic Methodology
- Vol. 15 (3) , 285-299
The surprise exam paradox, rationality, and pragmatics: a simple game‐theoretic analysis
The surprise exam paradox has attracted the attention of prominent logicians, mathematicians and philosophers for decades. Although the paradox itself has been resolved at least since Quine ( 1953 Quine, W. V. O. 1953. “On a So‐Called Paradox,”. Mind, 62: 65–67. [Google Scholar] ), some aspects of it are still being discussed. In this paper we propose, following Sober ( 1998 Sober, E. 1998. “To Give a Surprise Exam, Use Game Theory,”. Synthese, 115: 355–373. [Google Scholar] ), to translate the paradox into the language of game theory to clarify these aspects. Our main conclusions are that a much simpler game‐theoretic analysis of the paradox is possible, which solves most of the puzzles related to it, and that this way of analysing the paradox can also throw light on our comprehension of the pragmatics of linguistic communication.
- 11 July 2006
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Economics and Philosophy
- Vol. 22 (2) , 191-212
AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC RULES
Empirical reports on scientific competition show that scientists can be depicted as self-interested, strategically behaving agents. Nevertheless, we argue that recognition-seeking scientists will have an interest in establishing methodological norms which tend to select theories of a high epistemic value, and that these norms will be still more stringent if the epistemic value of theories appears in the utility function of scientists, either directly or instrumentally.
- 11 July 2006
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Economics and Philosophy
- Vol. 22 (2) , 191-212
AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC RULES
Empirical reports on scientific competition show that scientists can be depicted as self-interested, strategically behaving agents. Nevertheless, we argue that recognition-seeking scientists will have an interest in establishing methodological norms which tend to select theories of a high epistemic value, and that these norms will be still more stringent if the epistemic value of theories appears in the utility function of scientists, either directly or instrumentally.
- 1 March 2003
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 54 (2) , 163-184
Generalized externality games
- 1 March 2003
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 54 (2) , 163-184
Generalized externality games
- Open Access
- 1 January 2003
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 108 (1) , 141-151
Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets
- 1 January 2003
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 108 (1) , 141-151
Open AccessStrategic interaction between futures and spot markets
- 30 September 2001
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 72 (3) , 303-307
Extending communication-proof equilibrium to infinite games
- 30 September 2001
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 72 (3) , 303-307
Extending communication-proof equilibrium to infinite games