Christian Gillitzer
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Christian Gillitzer has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Joel Slemrod
Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
3 shared publications - Anthony Richards
Reserve Bank of Australia
1 shared publication - Henrik Jacobsen Kleven
London School of Economics and Political Science London WC2A 2AE UK
1 shared publication Jin Cong Wang
Reserve Bank of Australia
1 shared publicationJoel Slemrod
1 shared publicationMariano Kulish
Reserve Bank of Australia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 10 April 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 53 (4) , 605-634
Political Attitudes and Inflation Expectations: Evidence and Implications
We show that for the United States and Australia consumers expect significantly lower inflation when the political party they support holds executive office. This finding cannot be explained by previously documented sources of heterogeneity in consumer inflation expectations. It is consistent with stereotypical thinking (Bordalo et al. 2016), pointing to the use of heuristics in the formation of macro‐economic beliefs. Our findings have implications for consumers' understanding of central bank independence and its connection with inflation stabilization.
- 10 April 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
- Vol. 53 (4) , 605-634
Political Attitudes and Inflation Expectations: Evidence and Implications
We show that for the United States and Australia consumers expect significantly lower inflation when the political party they support holds executive office. This finding cannot be explained by previously documented sources of heterogeneity in consumer inflation expectations. It is consistent with stereotypical thinking (Bordalo et al. 2016), pointing to the use of heuristics in the formation of macro‐economic beliefs. Our findings have implications for consumers' understanding of central bank independence and its connection with inflation stabilization.
- 7 March 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Econometrics
- Vol. 34 (5) , 850-857
Does global inflation help forecast inflation in industrialized countries?
Summary: Ciccarelli and Mojon (CM; Review of Economics and Statistics, 2010, 92(3), 524–535) propose an inflation forecasting model incorporating a global inflation factor and show that it consistently beats several standard forecasting benchmarks. We show that CM's global inflation model does not improve upon the Atkeson and Ohanian (AO; Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 2001, 25(1), 2–11) naive benchmark. However, we find that augmenting the AO model with a global inflation factor improves forecast accuracy at longer horizons, supporting CM's claim about the usefulness of global inflation.
- 7 March 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Econometrics
- Vol. 34 (5) , 850-857
Does global inflation help forecast inflation in industrialized countries?
Summary: Ciccarelli and Mojon (CM; Review of Economics and Statistics, 2010, 92(3), 524–535) propose an inflation forecasting model incorporating a global inflation factor and show that it consistently beats several standard forecasting benchmarks. We show that CM's global inflation model does not improve upon the Atkeson and Ohanian (AO; Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 2001, 25(1), 2–11) naive benchmark. However, we find that augmenting the AO model with a global inflation factor improves forecast accuracy at longer horizons, supporting CM's claim about the usefulness of global inflation.
- Open Access
- 9 June 2018
- Published by American Economic Association
Nudging Businesses to Pay Their Taxes: Does Timing Matter?
- 9 June 2018
- Published by American Economic Association
Open AccessNudging Businesses to Pay Their Taxes: Does Timing Matter?
- 6 January 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Economic Papers
- Vol. 70 (3) , 892-916
The use of third-party information reporting for tax deductions: evidence and implications from charitable deductions in Denmark
We show that the introduction of information reporting for charitable tax deductions in Denmark in 2008 was associated with a doubling in the number of deductions claimed, and a 15% rise in the total value of claims, which can be credibly attributed to previously unclaimed deductions. This contradicts the presumption that evasion is the main source of non-compliance for deductions, and that the use of information reporting raises revenue collections. A pre-reform randomized audit experiment did not detect the unclaimed deductions, implying audits overstate evasion relative to extensive-margin underreporting. Various tests suggest that compliance cost, passive choice and overwithholding suppressed self-reporting of deductions.
- 6 January 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Oxford Economic Papers
- Vol. 70 (3) , 892-916
The use of third-party information reporting for tax deductions: evidence and implications from charitable deductions in Denmark
We show that the introduction of information reporting for charitable tax deductions in Denmark in 2008 was associated with a doubling in the number of deductions claimed, and a 15% rise in the total value of claims, which can be credibly attributed to previously unclaimed deductions. This contradicts the presumption that evasion is the main source of non-compliance for deductions, and that the use of information reporting raises revenue collections. A pre-reform randomized audit experiment did not detect the unclaimed deductions, implying audits overstate evasion relative to extensive-margin underreporting. Various tests suggest that compliance cost, passive choice and overwithholding suppressed self-reporting of deductions.
- 1 May 2017
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
- Vol. 9 (2) , 189-227
Do Output Contractions Cause Investment in Fiscal Capacity?
This paper shows that an economic slump can induce a government to invest in fiscal capacity. Large negative income shocks stress the revenue-raising capability of narrow tax bases, making an increase in tax base breadth desirable relative to its fixed implementation cost. A broader tax base enables revenue to be raised at lower tax rates, and so lower deadweight loss. The behavior of US state governments during the Great Depression supports the model: states experiencing larger than average negative income shocks were more likely to adopt a retail sales tax than were states experiencing smaller than average income shocks. (JEL E32, E62, H25, H71, N42, N92)
- 1 May 2017
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
- Vol. 9 (2) , 189-227
Do Output Contractions Cause Investment in Fiscal Capacity?
This paper shows that an economic slump can induce a government to invest in fiscal capacity. Large negative income shocks stress the revenue-raising capability of narrow tax bases, making an increase in tax base breadth desirable relative to its fixed implementation cost. A broader tax base enables revenue to be raised at lower tax rates, and so lower deadweight loss. The behavior of US state governments during the Great Depression supports the model: states experiencing larger than average negative income shocks were more likely to adopt a retail sales tax than were states experiencing smaller than average income shocks. (JEL E32, E62, H25, H71, N42, N92)
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 119 (2) , 240-267
A Characteristics Approach to Optimal Taxation: Line Drawing and Tax‐Driven Product Innovation
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 119 (2) , 240-267
A Characteristics Approach to Optimal Taxation: Line Drawing and Tax‐Driven Product Innovation
- 16 August 2016
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 16 (4)
Does Evasion Invalidate the Welfare Sufficiency of the ETI?
In an influential article, Raj Chetty (2009, “Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 1 (2):31–52) argues that in the presence of tax evasion the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is no longer a sufficient statistic for the marginal efficiency cost of funds (MECF). We show that, under Chetty’s (2009, “Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 1 (2):31–52) risk-neutrality assumption, correctly measuring the standard MECF only requires adding detected evasion inclusive of penalties. In the more general case of risk aversion, it further requires amending the formula to address the private risk-bearing cost of tax evasion.
- 16 August 2016
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 16 (4)
Does Evasion Invalidate the Welfare Sufficiency of the ETI?
In an influential article, Raj Chetty (2009, “Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 1 (2):31–52) argues that in the presence of tax evasion the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is no longer a sufficient statistic for the marginal efficiency cost of funds (MECF). We show that, under Chetty’s (2009, “Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 1 (2):31–52) risk-neutrality assumption, correctly measuring the standard MECF only requires adding detected evasion inclusive of penalties. In the more general case of risk aversion, it further requires amending the formula to address the private risk-bearing cost of tax evasion.
- 9 June 2016
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 92 (299) , 548-567
The Sticky Information Phillips Curve: Evidence for Australia
- 9 June 2016
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 92 (299) , 548-567
The Sticky Information Phillips Curve: Evidence for Australia
- 6 June 2016
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 92 (S1) , 30-51
Housing Wealth Effects: Cross‐sectional Evidence from New Vehicle Registrations
We investigate the relationship between housing wealth and consumption using postcode‐level variation in house prices and administrative data on new passenger vehicle registrations as a proxy for consumption. We find a robust cross‐sectional relationship, and in our preferred specification estimate an elasticity of new passenger vehicle registrations with respect to gross housing wealth of 0.4–0.5, which based on our preferred calibration implies a marginal propensity to consume for total consumption of less than 0.5 cents. Notably, we find evidence that the relationship between house prices and new vehicle registrations is heterogeneous in income.
- 6 June 2016
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 92 (S1) , 30-51
Housing Wealth Effects: Cross‐sectional Evidence from New Vehicle Registrations
We investigate the relationship between housing wealth and consumption using postcode‐level variation in house prices and administrative data on new passenger vehicle registrations as a proxy for consumption. We find a robust cross‐sectional relationship, and in our preferred specification estimate an elasticity of new passenger vehicle registrations with respect to gross housing wealth of 0.4–0.5, which based on our preferred calibration implies a marginal propensity to consume for total consumption of less than 0.5 cents. Notably, we find evidence that the relationship between house prices and new vehicle registrations is heterogeneous in income.
- 13 December 2013
- Published by MIT Press
Tax Systems
An approach to taxation that goes beyond an emphasis on tax rates to consider such aspects as administration, compliance, and remittance. Despite its theoretical elegance, the standard optimal tax model has significant limitations. In this book, Joel Slemrod and Christian Gillitzer argue that tax analysis must move beyond the emphasis on optimal tax rates and bases to consider such aspects of taxation as administration, compliance, and remittance. Slemrod and Gillitzer explore what they term a tax-systems approach, which takes tax evasion seriously; revisits the issue of remittance, or who writes the check to cover tax liability (employer or employee, retailer or consumer); incorporates administrative and compliance costs; recognizes a range of behavioral responses to tax rates; considers nonstandard instruments, including tax base breadth and enforcement effort; and acknowledges that tighter enforcement is sometimes a more socially desirable way to raise revenue than an increase in statutory tax rates. Policy makers, Slemrod and Gillitzer argue, would be well advised to recognize the interrelationship of tax rates, bases, enforcement, and administration, and acknowledge that tax policy is really tax-systems policy.
- 13 December 2013
- Published by MIT Press
Tax Systems
An approach to taxation that goes beyond an emphasis on tax rates to consider such aspects as administration, compliance, and remittance. Despite its theoretical elegance, the standard optimal tax model has significant limitations. In this book, Joel Slemrod and Christian Gillitzer argue that tax analysis must move beyond the emphasis on optimal tax rates and bases to consider such aspects of taxation as administration, compliance, and remittance. Slemrod and Gillitzer explore what they term a tax-systems approach, which takes tax evasion seriously; revisits the issue of remittance, or who writes the check to cover tax liability (employer or employee, retailer or consumer); incorporates administrative and compliance costs; recognizes a range of behavioral responses to tax rates; considers nonstandard instruments, including tax base breadth and enforcement effort; and acknowledges that tighter enforcement is sometimes a more socially desirable way to raise revenue than an increase in statutory tax rates. Policy makers, Slemrod and Gillitzer argue, would be well advised to recognize the interrelationship of tax rates, bases, enforcement, and administration, and acknowledge that tax policy is really tax-systems policy.