JSJean-François Seznec

Jean-François Seznec

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Jean-François Seznec has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:

  • Fareed Mohamedi

    The following is an edited transcript of the sixtieth in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was held Thursday, April 22, 2010, with Thomas R. Mattair presiding

    1 shared publication
  • John Duke Anthony

    The following is an edited transcript of the fifty‐third in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was held on Friday, June 20, 2008, in the Caucus Room of the Cannon House Office Building with Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., presiding

    1 shared publication
  • Lucian Pugliaresi

    The following is an edited transcript of the sixtieth in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was held Thursday, April 22, 2010, with Thomas R. Mattair presiding

    1 shared publication
  • Nathaniel Kern

    The following is an edited transcript of the sixtieth in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was held Thursday, April 22, 2010, with Thomas R. Mattair presiding

    1 shared publication
  • Tayyar Ari

    The following is an edited transcript of the fifty‐third in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was held on Friday, June 20, 2008, in the Caucus Room of the Cannon House Office Building with Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., presiding

    1 shared publication
  • Wayne E. White

    The following is an edited transcript of the fifty‐third in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was held on Friday, June 20, 2008, in the Caucus Room of the Cannon House Office Building with Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., presiding

    1 shared publication

Latest Publications

  • Why US-Saudi Arabia relations will continue to be close, even when climate action reduces demand for oil

    by Jean-Francois Seznec

    The old paradigm of oil-for-security as the cornerstone of Saudi-US relationship will increasingly become moot when renewables start replacing oil. However, the relationship between the two countries will continue for two main reasons. The first is that the role of oil as the base of security decreases, but it becomes replaced by the fear of Iran, viewed by both Saudi Arabia and the United States as an implacable foe and dangerous hegemon. Second, Saudi Arabia is on its way to start replacing its dependence on crude oil by becoming a world leader in carbon-based value-adding products, like advanced chemicals, allowing it in the near future to reduce its oil production. But Saudi success in transitioning away from oil and the US ability to sell goods to the Kingdom will both depend on open maritime trade routes guaranteed by the United States.


  • The Financial Markets of the Arabian Gulf

    by Jean-François Seznec

    Originally published in 1987, The Financial Markets of the Arabian Gulf looks at the importance of finance and the flow of funds to the development of the countries in the Arabian Gulf. Examining in detail the financial markets of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the book looks at how each of these markets has developed differently because of the political choices made by each government and how each is faced with different cultural and sociological variables which has influenced future of the financial markets. This book provides a look at the fiber of each of these three Arab Nations in respect of their financial markets.

  • Saudi Arabia’s sell-off of Aramco: Risk or opportunity?

    by Jean-Francois Seznec

    For several decades, the source of Saudi Arabia’s wealth has been the country’s oil. Or, to be more precise, the control and operation of Saudi Aramco – the company dedicated to the exploration, extraction, and export of the country’s oil – state-owned since the mid-1980s. Now, Saudi Arabia wants to sell 5% of the shares in the firm to the public and transfer ownership to the country’s sovereign wealth fund, making it the world’s largest such fund. They say that this will be a major step in attempting to wean the Saudi economy from its reliance on oil and make it more diverse. But can this attempt to deal with the economic and environmental disadvantages of oil and gas succeed? Can the desert kingdom be transformed into a cutting-edge, industrial country – a vision described as “an Arab Germany”? This article examines some of the difficulties in making Saudi Aramco’s ownership transform from opaque to transparent. It evaluates the potential upheavals this process could trigger in Saudi society and lists a few of the international security ramifications if the transition succeeds – and if it fails.


  • Gulf Oil and Gas: What are the Producers Thinking?

    by Nathaniel Kern, Fareed Mohamedi, Lucian Pugliaresi, Jean-François Seznec


  • War with Iran: Regional Reactions and Requirements

    by John Duke Anthony, Jean-François Seznec, Tayyar Ari, Wayne E. White


  • Democratization in the Arab World? Stirrings in Saudi Arabia

    by Jean-François Seznec

    Journal of Democracy 13.4 (2002) 33-40 At first blush, an article on democracy in Saudi Arabia—a state often described as an absolute monarchy—could be very short indeed. The secret services are strong and imposing. Most nongovernmental organizations and associations are forbidden. The press is entirely controlled, and the largest press groups are actually owned by members of the royal family. Elections, local or national, have never been held, and King Fahd has said that there is "no place" for them. There are no political parties. Arrests are arbitrary. The judicial establishment is politically dependent. And, while the political clout of radical Islamists is greatly overplayed in the Western media, the regime actively sponsors a conservative form of Islam that is highly repressive, particularly regarding the freedom and equality of women. Given this litany of nondemocratic features, Saudi Arabia would seem to be a perfect example of an authoritarian state. On the ground, however, Saudi Arabia's authoritarian character is not so obvious. One can even detect protodemocratic stirrings. Granted, if we were to plot the country on Robert Dahl's famous chart ranging regimes between "closed hegemonies" and "polyarchies," we would find it very near the former end of the spectrum. 1 But its political trajectory today is discernibly toward the latter. Since 1992, Saudi Arabia's rulers have allowed for more consultation with those whom they rule, more inclusiveness in institutions, a limited liberalization of the press, and less repression of the Shi'ite Muslims who make up an estimated 3 to 5 percent of the kingdom's total population of approximately 22 million. [End Page 33] It has been a custom of the king and the major princes to open their doors to petitioners once a week in well-publicized—and now televised—meetings called majlis (the word refers to the salon or reception room where these meetings take place). While today the king's poor health precludes his own involvement, one can see a senior prince receiving thousands of petitioners at each majlis. The petitioners will kiss him deferentially and usually hand him a piece of paper bearing a request, perhaps for a land grant or a small sum of money. This paper is passed on to the prince's staff, which will then provide a response. It is a system in which the princes dole out largesse in order to display and reaffirm their eminence. The royal family, and the king in particular, traditionally wield enormous power, but it is power that traces its roots to a Bedouin society which was itself quite egalitarian. Tribal leaders were normally chosen for their valor and wisdom, not their birth. Today, the king is named according to a procedure defined in the Basic Law of 1992, but that law only codifies a Bedouin tradition long followed by the House of Saud: A king-to-be is not born heir apparent. He must be approved by the rest of the family, even if also ultimately endorsed by the existing king. One of the consequences of this arrangement is that a potential king must show his ability to negotiate, to maneuver, and to manage his family and some affairs of state before being chosen and enthroned. De facto, then, the king is elected by his family members. And since the family is very large—there may be as many as 15,000 royal princes—the competition for power is keen. It can be argued that while the Saudi state is authoritarian, the ruling class governs itself internally in ways that at least approximate democratic procedures. 2 This tradition of choosing the princely candidate who seems most able to win acceptance and cooperation from his relatives has been the key to the kingdom's political stability. In one form or another, aside from two hiatuses totaling 35 years, the Al Saud family has been in power in central Arabia since 1744. Unlike other ruling Bedouin families in the region, they have tended to transfer power to one another peacefully...