Guy Fletcher
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Guy Fletcher has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Claudia Trudel-Fitzgerald
Department of Psychology, Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, Trois-Rivières, Canada.
2 shared publications - Colin Farrelly
Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University , Kingston, Ontario
2 shared publications Donald E. Frederick
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
2 shared publications- Dorota Weziak-Bialowolska
Human Flourishing Program Harvard University Cambridge Massachusetts USA
2 shared publications - Eileen McNeely
Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA, USA
2 shared publications - Eric S. Kim
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 January 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
All's well that ends well? A new holism about lifetime well-being
Is there more to how well a life goes overall (its lifetime well-being) than simply the aggregate goodness and badness of its moments (its momentary well-being)? Atomists about lifetime well-being say ‘no’. Holists hold that there is more to lifetime well-being than aggregate momentary well-being (with different holists offering different candidates for why this might be). This paper presents and defends a novel form of holism about lifetime well-being, which I call ‘End of Life’. This is the view that the momentary goodness or badness of the end of lives has a disproportionate effect upon lifetime well-being. More precisely: a welfare subject's level of momentary well-being at the end of their life contributes more to their lifetime well-being than their level of momentary well-being at other points.
- 23 January 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
Open AccessAll's well that ends well? A new holism about lifetime well-being
Is there more to how well a life goes overall (its lifetime well-being) than simply the aggregate goodness and badness of its moments (its momentary well-being)? Atomists about lifetime well-being say ‘no’. Holists hold that there is more to lifetime well-being than aggregate momentary well-being (with different holists offering different candidates for why this might be). This paper presents and defends a novel form of holism about lifetime well-being, which I call ‘End of Life’. This is the view that the momentary goodness or badness of the end of lives has a disproportionate effect upon lifetime well-being. More precisely: a welfare subject's level of momentary well-being at the end of their life contributes more to their lifetime well-being than their level of momentary well-being at other points.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
- Vol. 28 (1) , 141-150
Not Living My Best Life: A Reply to Masny
In a recent paper, Michal Masny put forward a novel, interesting, theory of the goodness of a life: the Dual Theory. As Masny’s discussion demonstrates, the Dual Theory, if true, would have very significant implications for various issues related to the goodness of lives and for normative ethics. It is thus worthy of serious attention. In this paper, I first explain the Dual Theory and the motivation Masny provides for it. I then aim to show three general problems for the view.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
- Vol. 28 (1) , 141-150
Open AccessNot Living My Best Life: A Reply to Masny
In a recent paper, Michal Masny put forward a novel, interesting, theory of the goodness of a life: the Dual Theory. As Masny’s discussion demonstrates, the Dual Theory, if true, would have very significant implications for various issues related to the goodness of lives and for normative ethics. It is thus worthy of serious attention. In this paper, I first explain the Dual Theory and the motivation Masny provides for it. I then aim to show three general problems for the view.
- Open Access
- 14 May 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 217-228
Philosophy of Well-Being for the Social Sciences
In this chapter, the author provides an introduction to philosophical work on well-being. He begins by explaining the specific kinds of questions that philosophers are interested in when it comes to well-being. The author then seeks to explain the role of thought experiments in philosophical work on well-being. He explains why such cases are useful and nongratuitous and describes the methodological assumptions that underlie their use. Finally, the author explains how philosophers seek to preserve a common subject matter for debate—well-being—even in the presence of radical disagreement about which theory is correct.
- 14 May 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 217-228
Open AccessPhilosophy of Well-Being for the Social Sciences
In this chapter, the author provides an introduction to philosophical work on well-being. He begins by explaining the specific kinds of questions that philosophers are interested in when it comes to well-being. The author then seeks to explain the role of thought experiments in philosophical work on well-being. He explains why such cases are useful and nongratuitous and describes the methodological assumptions that underlie their use. Finally, the author explains how philosophers seek to preserve a common subject matter for debate—well-being—even in the presence of radical disagreement about which theory is correct.
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Preventive Medicine
- Vol. 135, 106095
Brief well-being assessments, or nothing at all?
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Preventive Medicine
- Vol. 135, 106095
Brief well-being assessments, or nothing at all?
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 April 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Preventive Medicine
- Vol. 133, 106004
Current recommendations on the selection of measures for well-being
- 1 April 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Preventive Medicine
- Vol. 133, 106004
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessCurrent recommendations on the selection of measures for well-being
- 13 June 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 70-94
Taking Prudence Seriously
Philosophers have long theorized about which things make people’s lives go well, and why, and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. Yet little time has been spent on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse. This is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and, as such, cries out for further investigation. Chapter 4 takes up two major meta-prudential questions. It first examines whether there is a set of prudential reasons, generated by evaluative prudential properties, and defends the view that evaluative well-being facts generate agent-relative reasons (for action or for attitudes) for the relevant agent. It also investigates whether prudential discourse is normative. It is proposed that prudential discourse is normative by arguing that prudential judgements are normative judgements. The case for this is presented by analogy with moral discourse by showing that the features of moral judgements that metaethicists appeal to when articulating, explaining, and justifying the claim that moral judgements are normative are also possessed by prudential judgements. Various objections to the analogy are also considered.
- 13 June 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 70-94
Taking Prudence Seriously
Philosophers have long theorized about which things make people’s lives go well, and why, and the extent to which morality and self-interest can be reconciled. Yet little time has been spent on meta-prudential questions, questions about prudential discourse. This is surprising given that prudence is, prima facie, a normative form of discourse and, as such, cries out for further investigation. Chapter 4 takes up two major meta-prudential questions. It first examines whether there is a set of prudential reasons, generated by evaluative prudential properties, and defends the view that evaluative well-being facts generate agent-relative reasons (for action or for attitudes) for the relevant agent. It also investigates whether prudential discourse is normative. It is proposed that prudential discourse is normative by arguing that prudential judgements are normative judgements. The case for this is presented by analogy with moral discourse by showing that the features of moral judgements that metaethicists appeal to when articulating, explaining, and justifying the claim that moral judgements are normative are also possessed by prudential judgements. Various objections to the analogy are also considered.
- 21 May 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
- Vol. 69 (277) , 699-720
Against Contextualism about Prudential Discourse
In recent times, there has been a surge of interest in, and enthusiasm for, contextualist views about prudential discourse—thought and talk about what has prudential value or contributes to someone's well-being. In this paper, I examine and reject two cases for radical forms of prudential contextualism, proposed by Anna Alexandrova and Steve Campbell. Alexandrova holds that the semantic content of terms like ‘well-being’ and ‘doing well’ varies across contexts. Campbell proposes that there are plural prudential concepts at play in prudential discourse (and in philosophical reflection upon such discourse) and that we find evidence of this in the conflicting commitments of prudential discourse. The negative aim of the paper is to show that Alexandrova and Campbell have not given us a good case for ambitious forms of contextualism about prudential discourse. The positive aim of the paper is to provide alternative, aspectualist, explanations of the features of prudential discourse that their discussions highlight.
- 21 May 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
- Vol. 69 (277) , 699-720
Against Contextualism about Prudential Discourse
In recent times, there has been a surge of interest in, and enthusiasm for, contextualist views about prudential discourse—thought and talk about what has prudential value or contributes to someone's well-being. In this paper, I examine and reject two cases for radical forms of prudential contextualism, proposed by Anna Alexandrova and Steve Campbell. Alexandrova holds that the semantic content of terms like ‘well-being’ and ‘doing well’ varies across contexts. Campbell proposes that there are plural prudential concepts at play in prudential discourse (and in philosophical reflection upon such discourse) and that we find evidence of this in the conflicting commitments of prudential discourse. The negative aim of the paper is to show that Alexandrova and Campbell have not given us a good case for ambitious forms of contextualism about prudential discourse. The positive aim of the paper is to provide alternative, aspectualist, explanations of the features of prudential discourse that their discussions highlight.
- 8 October 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 96 (3) , 474-482
Pain for the Moral Error Theory? A New Companions-in-Guilt Argument
The moral error theorist claims that moral discourse is irredeemably in error because it is committed to the existence of properties that do not exist. A common response has been to postulate ‘companions in guilt’—forms of discourse that seem safe from error despite sharing the putatively problematic features of moral discourse. The most developed instance of this pairs moral discourse with epistemic discourse. In this paper, I present a new, prudential, companions-in-guilt argument and argue for its superiority over the epistemic alternative.
- 8 October 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 96 (3) , 474-482
Pain for the Moral Error Theory? A New Companions-in-Guilt Argument
The moral error theorist claims that moral discourse is irredeemably in error because it is committed to the existence of properties that do not exist. A common response has been to postulate ‘companions in guilt’—forms of discourse that seem safe from error despite sharing the putatively problematic features of moral discourse. The most developed instance of this pairs moral discourse with epistemic discourse. In this paper, I present a new, prudential, companions-in-guilt argument and argue for its superiority over the epistemic alternative.
- 8 December 2014
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 9 (12) , 848-863
Hybrid Views in Meta‐ethics: Pragmatic Views
A common starting point for ‘going hybrid’ is the thought that moral discourse somehow combines belief and desire‐like aspects, or is both descriptive and expressive. Hybrid meta‐ethical theories aim to give an account of moral discourse that is sufficiently sensitive to both its cognitive and its affective, or descriptive and expressive, dimensions. They hold at least one of the following: (i) moral thought: moral judgements have belief and desire‐like aspects or elements; (ii) moral language: moral utterances both ascribe properties and express desire‐like attitudes. This entry concerns hybrid theories of moral language. The main division within such theories is between those treating the expression of desire‐like attitudes (hereafter ‘attitudes’) as semantic and those treating it as pragmatic. This entry exclusively focuses on pragmatic forms of (ii) and examines the prospects for treating moral attitude expression as working via certain standard pragmatic mechanisms. I explain these mechanisms, outline the properties that standardly define them, and test to see whether moral attitude expression matches them. At the end, I briefly explain a more minimal pragmatic alternative. The main conclusions are that we should disregard presupposition and conventional implicature views and that the most plausible options for a pragmatic hybrid view are a generalised conversational implicature view and a more minimal pragmatic view.
- 8 December 2014
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy Compass
- Vol. 9 (12) , 848-863
Hybrid Views in Meta‐ethics: Pragmatic Views
A common starting point for ‘going hybrid’ is the thought that moral discourse somehow combines belief and desire‐like aspects, or is both descriptive and expressive. Hybrid meta‐ethical theories aim to give an account of moral discourse that is sufficiently sensitive to both its cognitive and its affective, or descriptive and expressive, dimensions. They hold at least one of the following: (i) moral thought: moral judgements have belief and desire‐like aspects or elements; (ii) moral language: moral utterances both ascribe properties and express desire‐like attitudes. This entry concerns hybrid theories of moral language. The main division within such theories is between those treating the expression of desire‐like attitudes (hereafter ‘attitudes’) as semantic and those treating it as pragmatic. This entry exclusively focuses on pragmatic forms of (ii) and examines the prospects for treating moral attitude expression as working via certain standard pragmatic mechanisms. I explain these mechanisms, outline the properties that standardly define them, and test to see whether moral attitude expression matches them. At the end, I briefly explain a more minimal pragmatic alternative. The main conclusions are that we should disregard presupposition and conventional implicature views and that the most plausible options for a pragmatic hybrid view are a generalised conversational implicature view and a more minimal pragmatic view.
- 25 November 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 173-198
Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression, and Implicature
A recent trend in metaethics has been the development of so-called hybrid theories of moral thought and language. One interesting subclass of hybrid views and one of the most developed is implicaturist hybrid views of moral language. This chapter examines implicaturist hybrid theories by examining how closely attitude expression by moral utterances fits with the varieties of implicature (conventional, particular conversational, generalized conversational) using five standard criteria for implicature: indeterminacy, reinforceability, nondetachability, cancelability, and calculability. It argues (1) that conventional implicature is a clear nonstarter as a model of attitude expression by moral utterances, (2) that generalized conversational implicature yields the most plausible implicaturist hybrid, but (3) that a nonimplicaturist and nonhybrid alternative might in fact be superior.
- 25 November 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 173-198
Moral Utterances, Attitude Expression, and Implicature
A recent trend in metaethics has been the development of so-called hybrid theories of moral thought and language. One interesting subclass of hybrid views and one of the most developed is implicaturist hybrid views of moral language. This chapter examines implicaturist hybrid theories by examining how closely attitude expression by moral utterances fits with the varieties of implicature (conventional, particular conversational, generalized conversational) using five standard criteria for implicature: indeterminacy, reinforceability, nondetachability, cancelability, and calculability. It argues (1) that conventional implicature is a clear nonstarter as a model of attitude expression by moral utterances, (2) that generalized conversational implicature yields the most plausible implicaturist hybrid, but (3) that a nonimplicaturist and nonhybrid alternative might in fact be superior.