Marco Battaglini
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Marco Battaglini has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Stephen Coate
7 shared publicationsThomas R. Palfrey
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, MC 228-77, Pasadena, CA 91125 ()
6 shared publicationsSalvatore Nunnari
Department of Economics, Bocconi University, Via Roentgen 1, 20136 Milano, Italy, and Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) ( )
3 shared publicationsLevon Barseghyan
2 shared publicationsRebecca B. Morton
New York University
2 shared publications- Thomas R. Palfrey
California Institute of Technology
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 June 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 18 (4) , 1969-2012
The Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study
This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment designed to study political distortions in the accumulation of public debt. A legislature bargains over the levels of a public good and of district specific transfers in two periods. The legislature can issue or purchase risk-free bonds in the first period and the level of public debt creates a dynamic linkage across policymaking periods. In line with the theoretical predictions, we find that public policies are inefficient and efficiency is increasing in the size of the majority requirement, with higher investment in public goods and lower debt associated with larger majority requirements. Debt is lower when the probability of a negative shock to the economy in the second period is higher indicating that even in a political equilibrium debt is used to smooth consumption and to insure against economic uncertainty. Also in line with the theoretical predictions, we find that dynamic distortions are eliminated when the first period proposer can commit to a policy for both periods. The experiment, however, highlights two phenomena that are surprising in terms of standard theory and have not been previously documented. First, balancing the budget in each period is a focal point, leading to lower distortions than predicted. Second, higher majority requirements induce significant delays in reaching an agreement.
- 14 June 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 18 (4) , 1969-2012
Open AccessThe Political Economy of Public Debt: A Laboratory Study
This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment designed to study political distortions in the accumulation of public debt. A legislature bargains over the levels of a public good and of district specific transfers in two periods. The legislature can issue or purchase risk-free bonds in the first period and the level of public debt creates a dynamic linkage across policymaking periods. In line with the theoretical predictions, we find that public policies are inefficient and efficiency is increasing in the size of the majority requirement, with higher investment in public goods and lower debt associated with larger majority requirements. Debt is lower when the probability of a negative shock to the economy in the second period is higher indicating that even in a political equilibrium debt is used to smooth consumption and to insure against economic uncertainty. Also in line with the theoretical predictions, we find that dynamic distortions are eliminated when the first period proposer can commit to a policy for both periods. The experiment, however, highlights two phenomena that are surprising in terms of standard theory and have not been previously documented. First, balancing the budget in each period is a focal point, leading to lower distortions than predicted. Second, higher majority requirements induce significant delays in reaching an agreement.
- 5 July 2018
- Published by The R Foundation
econet: Estimation of Parameter-Dependent Network Centrality Measures
- 5 July 2018
- Published by The R Foundation
econet: Estimation of Parameter-Dependent Network Centrality Measures
- 1 May 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 103, 1-18
Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue
- 1 May 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 103, 1-18
Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 134, 240-254
Self-control and peer groups: An empirical analysis
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 134, 240-254
Self-control and peer groups: An empirical analysis
- 13 November 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 132 (1) , 485-549
Public Protests and Policy Making*
Technological advances and the development of social media have made petitions, public protests, and other form of spontaneous activism increasingly common tools for individuals to influence decision makers. To study these phenomena, in this article I present a theory of petitions and public protests that explores their limits as mechanisms to aggregate information. The key assumption is that valuable information is dispersed among citizens. Through petitions and protests, citizens can signal their private information to the policy maker, who can then choose to use it or not. I first show that if citizens’ individual signals are not sufficiently precise, information aggregation is impossible, no matter how large is the population of informed citizens, even if the conflict with the policy maker is small. I then characterize the conditions on conflict and the signal structure that guarantee information aggregation. When these conditions are satisfied, I show that full information aggregation is possible as the population grows to infinity. When they are not satisfied, I show that information aggregation may still be possible if social media are available. JEL Codes: D72, D78, D83.
- 13 November 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 132 (1) , 485-549
Public Protests and Policy Making*
Technological advances and the development of social media have made petitions, public protests, and other form of spontaneous activism increasingly common tools for individuals to influence decision makers. To study these phenomena, in this article I present a theory of petitions and public protests that explores their limits as mechanisms to aggregate information. The key assumption is that valuable information is dispersed among citizens. Through petitions and protests, citizens can signal their private information to the policy maker, who can then choose to use it or not. I first show that if citizens’ individual signals are not sufficiently precise, information aggregation is impossible, no matter how large is the population of informed citizens, even if the conflict with the policy maker is small. I then characterize the conditions on conflict and the signal structure that guarantee information aggregation. When these conditions are satisfied, I show that full information aggregation is possible as the population grows to infinity. When they are not satisfied, I show that information aggregation may still be possible if social media are available. JEL Codes: D72, D78, D83.
- 1 November 2016
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 8 (4) , 268-308
The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study
We report the results of an experiment that investigates free riding in the accumulation of durable public goods. We consider economies with reversibility, where contributions can be positive or negative; and economies with irreversibility, where contributions are nonnegative. Aggregate outcomes support the qualitative predictions of the Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) characterized in Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2014): steady state levels of public good are lower with reversibility than irreversibility; accumulation is inefficiently slow; and the public good is under-provided in both regimes. On the other hand, public good levels are higher than MPE, and some evidence of history dependence is detected. (JEL C91, H41)
- 1 November 2016
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 8 (4) , 268-308
The Dynamic Free Rider Problem: A Laboratory Study
We report the results of an experiment that investigates free riding in the accumulation of durable public goods. We consider economies with reversibility, where contributions can be positive or negative; and economies with irreversibility, where contributions are nonnegative. Aggregate outcomes support the qualitative predictions of the Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) characterized in Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2014): steady state levels of public good are lower with reversibility than irreversibility; accumulation is inefficiently slow; and the public good is under-provided in both regimes. On the other hand, public good levels are higher than MPE, and some evidence of history dependence is detected. (JEL C91, H41)
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 82, 36-51
Political economy of debt and growth
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 82, 36-51
Political economy of debt and growth
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 136, 45-61
The costs and benefits of balanced budget rules: Lessons from a political economy model of fiscal policy
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 136, 45-61
The costs and benefits of balanced budget rules: Lessons from a political economy model of fiscal policy
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 February 2016
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 124 (1) , 160-204
Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements
We analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in which countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible, participants eliminate the holdup problem associated with their investments; however, most countries prefer to free ride rather than participate. If investments are noncontractible, countries face a holdup problem every time they negotiate; but the free-rider problem can be mitigated and significant participation is feasible. Participation becomes attractive because only large coalitions commit to long-term agreements that circumvent the holdup problem. Under well-specified conditions even the first-best outcome is possible when the contract is incomplete.
- 1 February 2016
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 124 (1) , 160-204
Top Cited PapersParticipation and Duration of Environmental Agreements
We analyze participation in international environmental agreements in a dynamic game in which countries pollute and invest in green technologies. If complete contracts are feasible, participants eliminate the holdup problem associated with their investments; however, most countries prefer to free ride rather than participate. If investments are noncontractible, countries face a holdup problem every time they negotiate; but the free-rider problem can be mitigated and significant participation is feasible. Participation becomes attractive because only large coalitions commit to long-term agreements that circumvent the holdup problem. Under well-specified conditions even the first-best outcome is possible when the contract is incomplete.
- 24 May 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 14 (2) , 303-337
A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY OF FISCAL POLICY AND UNEMPLOYMENT
- 24 May 2015
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 14 (2) , 303-337
A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY OF FISCAL POLICY AND UNEMPLOYMENT