Natasha Korotkova
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Natasha Korotkova has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Pranav Anand
1 shared publication- Pranav Anand
Department of Linguistics, University of California, Santa Cruz
1 shared publication - Yury Lander
HSE University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Linguistics and Philosophy
- Vol. 45 (3) , 619-681
How to theorize about subjective language: a lesson from ‘de re’
Subjective language has attracted substantial attention in the recent literature in formal semantics and philosophy of language (see overviews in MacFarlane in Assessment sensitivity: relative truth and its applications, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014; van Wijnbergen-Huitink, in Meier, and van Wijnbergen-Huitink (eds) Subjective meaning: alternatives to relativism, De Gruyter, Berlin, pp 1–19, 2016; Lasersohn in Subjectivity and perspective in truth-theoretic semantics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017; Vardomskaya in Sources of subjectivity, Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, IL, 2018; Zakkou in Faultless disagreement: a defense of contextualism in the realm of personal taste, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M., 2019b). Most current theories argue thatSubjective Predicates(SPs), which express matters of opinion, semantically differ from ordinary predicates, which express matters of fact. We will call this view “SP exceptionalism”. This paper addresses SP exceptionalism by scrutinizing the behavior of SPs in attitude reports, which, as we will argue, significantly constrains the space of analytical options and rules out some of the existing theories. As first noticed by Stephenson (Linguist Philos 30(4):487–525, 2007a; Towards a theory of subjective meaning, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 2007b), the most prominent reading of embedded SPs is one where they talk about the attitude holder’s subjective judgment. As is remarked sometimes (Sæbø in Linguist Philos 32(4):327–352, 2009; Pearson in J Semant 30(1):103–154, 2013a), this reading is not the only one: embedded SPs may also talk about someone else’s, non-local, judgment. We concentrate specifically on such cases and show that non-local judgment is possible if and only if SPs are used within a DP that is outside main predicate position and that entire DP is readde re. We demonstrate that the behavior of SPs in attitude reports does not differ from that of ordinary predicates: it follows from general constraints on intersective modification and intensional quantification (Farkas in Szabolcsi (ed) Ways of scope taking, Springer, Dordrecht, pp 183–215, 1997; Musan in On the temporal interpretation of noun phrases, Garland, New York, 1997; Percus in Nat Lang Semant 8(3):173–229, 2000; Keshet in Good intensions: paving two roads to a theory of the de re/de dicto distinction, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 2008). We argue that this unexceptional behavior of SPs in fact has unexpected consequences for SP exceptionalism. Precisely because SPs have been argued to be semantically different from ordinary predicates, not all theories correctly predict these less-studied data: some overgenerate (e.g. Stephenson 2007a, b; Stojanovic in Linguist Philos 30(6):691–706, 2007; Sæbø 2009) and some undergenerate (e.g. McCready in McNally, and Puig-Waldmüller (ed) Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung, vol 11, pp 433–447, 2007; Pearson 2013a). Out of the currently available theories, only relativist accounts (Lasersohn in Linguist Philos 28(6):643–686, 2005; MacFarlane 2014; Bylinina in J Semant 34(2), 291–331, 2017; Coppock in Linguist Philos 41(2):125–164, 2018) predict the right interpretation, and only that interpretation. We thus present a novel empirical argument for relativism, and, more generally, formulate a constraint that has to be taken into consideration by any view that advocates SP exceptionalism.
- 6 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Linguistics and Philosophy
- Vol. 45 (3) , 619-681
Open AccessHow to theorize about subjective language: a lesson from ‘de re’
Subjective language has attracted substantial attention in the recent literature in formal semantics and philosophy of language (see overviews in MacFarlane in Assessment sensitivity: relative truth and its applications, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014; van Wijnbergen-Huitink, in Meier, and van Wijnbergen-Huitink (eds) Subjective meaning: alternatives to relativism, De Gruyter, Berlin, pp 1–19, 2016; Lasersohn in Subjectivity and perspective in truth-theoretic semantics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017; Vardomskaya in Sources of subjectivity, Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, IL, 2018; Zakkou in Faultless disagreement: a defense of contextualism in the realm of personal taste, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M., 2019b). Most current theories argue thatSubjective Predicates(SPs), which express matters of opinion, semantically differ from ordinary predicates, which express matters of fact. We will call this view “SP exceptionalism”. This paper addresses SP exceptionalism by scrutinizing the behavior of SPs in attitude reports, which, as we will argue, significantly constrains the space of analytical options and rules out some of the existing theories. As first noticed by Stephenson (Linguist Philos 30(4):487–525, 2007a; Towards a theory of subjective meaning, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 2007b), the most prominent reading of embedded SPs is one where they talk about the attitude holder’s subjective judgment. As is remarked sometimes (Sæbø in Linguist Philos 32(4):327–352, 2009; Pearson in J Semant 30(1):103–154, 2013a), this reading is not the only one: embedded SPs may also talk about someone else’s, non-local, judgment. We concentrate specifically on such cases and show that non-local judgment is possible if and only if SPs are used within a DP that is outside main predicate position and that entire DP is readde re. We demonstrate that the behavior of SPs in attitude reports does not differ from that of ordinary predicates: it follows from general constraints on intersective modification and intensional quantification (Farkas in Szabolcsi (ed) Ways of scope taking, Springer, Dordrecht, pp 183–215, 1997; Musan in On the temporal interpretation of noun phrases, Garland, New York, 1997; Percus in Nat Lang Semant 8(3):173–229, 2000; Keshet in Good intensions: paving two roads to a theory of the de re/de dicto distinction, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 2008). We argue that this unexceptional behavior of SPs in fact has unexpected consequences for SP exceptionalism. Precisely because SPs have been argued to be semantically different from ordinary predicates, not all theories correctly predict these less-studied data: some overgenerate (e.g. Stephenson 2007a, b; Stojanovic in Linguist Philos 30(6):691–706, 2007; Sæbø 2009) and some undergenerate (e.g. McCready in McNally, and Puig-Waldmüller (ed) Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung, vol 11, pp 433–447, 2007; Pearson 2013a). Out of the currently available theories, only relativist accounts (Lasersohn in Linguist Philos 28(6):643–686, 2005; MacFarlane 2014; Bylinina in J Semant 34(2), 291–331, 2017; Coppock in Linguist Philos 41(2):125–164, 2018) predict the right interpretation, and only that interpretation. We thus present a novel empirical argument for relativism, and, more generally, formulate a constraint that has to be taken into consideration by any view that advocates SP exceptionalism.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by MIT Press in Linguistic Inquiry
- Vol. 52 (1) , 210-226
The Embedding Puzzle: Constraints on Evidentials in Complement Clauses
The Embedding Puzzle: Constraints on Evidentials in Complement Clauses
- 1 January 2021
- Published by MIT Press in Linguistic Inquiry
- Vol. 52 (1) , 210-226
The Embedding Puzzle: Constraints on Evidentials in Complement Clauses
The Embedding Puzzle: Constraints on Evidentials in Complement Clauses
- Open Access
- 4 April 2020
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Pragmatics
- Vol. 13 (4) , 4
Evidential meaning and (not-)at-issueness
Evidential meaning and (not-)at-issueness
- 4 April 2020
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Pragmatics
- Vol. 13 (4) , 4
Open AccessEvidential meaning and (not-)at-issueness
Evidential meaning and (not-)at-issueness
- 1 January 2018
- Published by University Library J. C. Senckenberg in ZAS Papers in Linguistics
- Vol. 60, 55-72
Acquaintance content and obviation
This paper is about what Ninan (2014) (following Wollheim 1980) calls the AcquaintanceInference (AI): a firsthand experience requirement imposed by several subjective expressions such asPredicates of Personal Taste (PPTs) (delicious). In general, one is entitled to calling something deliciousonly upon having tried it. This requirement can be lifted, disappearing in scope of elements that we willcall obviators. The paper investigates the patterns of AI obviation for PPTs and similar constructions(e.g., psych predicates and subjective attitudes). We show that the cross-constructional variation in whenacquaintance requirements can be obviated presents challenges for previous accounts of the AI (Pearson2013, Ninan 2014). In place of these, we argue for the existence of two kinds of acquaintance content:(i) that of bare PPTs; and (ii) that of psych predicates, subjective attitudes and overt experiencer PPTs.For (i), we propose that the AI arises from an evidential restriction that is dependent on a parameterof interpretation which obviators update. For (ii), we argue that the AI is a classic presupposition. Wemodel both (i) and (ii) using von Fintel and Gillies’s (2010) framework for directness and thus connecttwo strands of research: that on PPTs and that on epistemic modals. Both phenomena are sensitive toa broad direct-indirect distinction, and analyzing them along similar lines can help shed light on hownatural language conceptualizes evidence in general.Keywords: evidentiality, firsthand experience, knowledge, predicates of personal taste, subjectivity
- 1 January 2018
- Published by University Library J. C. Senckenberg in ZAS Papers in Linguistics
- Vol. 60, 55-72
Acquaintance content and obviation
This paper is about what Ninan (2014) (following Wollheim 1980) calls the AcquaintanceInference (AI): a firsthand experience requirement imposed by several subjective expressions such asPredicates of Personal Taste (PPTs) (delicious). In general, one is entitled to calling something deliciousonly upon having tried it. This requirement can be lifted, disappearing in scope of elements that we willcall obviators. The paper investigates the patterns of AI obviation for PPTs and similar constructions(e.g., psych predicates and subjective attitudes). We show that the cross-constructional variation in whenacquaintance requirements can be obviated presents challenges for previous accounts of the AI (Pearson2013, Ninan 2014). In place of these, we argue for the existence of two kinds of acquaintance content:(i) that of bare PPTs; and (ii) that of psych predicates, subjective attitudes and overt experiencer PPTs.For (i), we propose that the AI arises from an evidential restriction that is dependent on a parameterof interpretation which obviators update. For (ii), we argue that the AI is a classic presupposition. Wemodel both (i) and (ii) using von Fintel and Gillies’s (2010) framework for directness and thus connecttwo strands of research: that on PPTs and that on epistemic modals. Both phenomena are sensitive toa broad direct-indirect distinction, and analyzing them along similar lines can help shed light on hownatural language conceptualizes evidence in general.Keywords: evidentiality, firsthand experience, knowledge, predicates of personal taste, subjectivity
- 3 April 2017
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Linguistic Theory
- Vol. 25, 676-694
Evidentials and (relayed) speech acts: hearsay as quotation
This paper is devoted to what I will call quotative uses of hearsay evidentials, wherein they report a speech act made by a third party. Occasionally mentioned in the typological literature, quotative uses were first given a formal semantic account by Faller 2002 and have received little attention since. The goal of this paper is to put the spotlight on them. An ongoing debate in the literature is on the semantic status of evidentials and the place of evidentiality among other categories (see Matthewson 2012 and references therein). For Faller (2002, 2007), quotative uses are among the empirical tests that diagnose illocutionary evidentials, ones that deal with the structure of speech acts. In this paper, I re-implement Faller's original proposal within Krifka's (2014) framework that provides an explicit syntax-pragmatics interface. I then show that quotative readings may be the only argument, out of the currently provided in the literature, in favor of the existence of illocutionary evidentials. However, the status of such readings requires further research. I conclude by discussing quotative uses within a broader context of reported speech strategies.
- 3 April 2017
- Published by Linguistic Society of America in Semantics and Linguistic Theory
- Vol. 25, 676-694
Evidentials and (relayed) speech acts: hearsay as quotation
This paper is devoted to what I will call quotative uses of hearsay evidentials, wherein they report a speech act made by a third party. Occasionally mentioned in the typological literature, quotative uses were first given a formal semantic account by Faller 2002 and have received little attention since. The goal of this paper is to put the spotlight on them. An ongoing debate in the literature is on the semantic status of evidentials and the place of evidentiality among other categories (see Matthewson 2012 and references therein). For Faller (2002, 2007), quotative uses are among the empirical tests that diagnose illocutionary evidentials, ones that deal with the structure of speech acts. In this paper, I re-implement Faller's original proposal within Krifka's (2014) framework that provides an explicit syntax-pragmatics interface. I then show that quotative readings may be the only argument, out of the currently provided in the literature, in favor of the existence of illocutionary evidentials. However, the status of such readings requires further research. I conclude by discussing quotative uses within a broader context of reported speech strategies.
- 27 October 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Morphology
- Vol. 20 (2) , 299-319
Deriving affix ordering in polysynthesis: evidence from Adyghe
- 27 October 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Morphology
- Vol. 20 (2) , 299-319
Deriving affix ordering in polysynthesis: evidence from Adyghe