Yannis Karagiannis
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Yannis Karagiannis has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mattia Guidi
University of Siena
3 shared publications Adrienne Héritier
1 shared publication- Magnus G. Schoeller
Centre for European Integration Research (EIF), Department of Political Science, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
1 shared publication Nikitas Konstantinidis
University of Cambridge
1 shared publication- Nikitas Konstantinidis
School of Global & Public Affairs, IE University, Madrid, Spain
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 21 (1)
Does the European Union ‘Rule the World’? Competition Law Diffusion to Singapore and Hong Kong
This article examines why Singapore and Hong Kong adopted competition law by testing four diffusion mechanisms: coercion, competition, learning, and the Brussels Effect. Using structured process tracing and extensive archival evidence, it evaluates the distinct observable implications of each mechanism. Singapore—often cited as a most‐likely case for the Brussels Effect—adopted competition law only when the United States made it a requirement of the USSFTA. Hong Kong, despite its greater exposure to EU competition enforcement, resisted reform for nearly 15 years and shifted only when Beijing signaled support for a general competition law. In both jurisdictions, firms did not internalize EU standards or lobby for EU‐style rules, and neither regime adopted EU‐type merger control. Competitive interdependence receives no empirical support, while learning operates mainly as an adaptive tool once external pressure is present. The findings refine the scope conditions of market‐driven regulatory diffusion and highlight the political foundations of ‘economic constitutions.’
- 20 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 21 (1)
Open AccessDoes the European Union ‘Rule the World’? Competition Law Diffusion to Singapore and Hong Kong
This article examines why Singapore and Hong Kong adopted competition law by testing four diffusion mechanisms: coercion, competition, learning, and the Brussels Effect. Using structured process tracing and extensive archival evidence, it evaluates the distinct observable implications of each mechanism. Singapore—often cited as a most‐likely case for the Brussels Effect—adopted competition law only when the United States made it a requirement of the USSFTA. Hong Kong, despite its greater exposure to EU competition enforcement, resisted reform for nearly 15 years and shifted only when Beijing signaled support for a general competition law. In both jurisdictions, firms did not internalize EU standards or lobby for EU‐style rules, and neither regime adopted EU‐type merger control. Competitive interdependence receives no empirical support, while learning operates mainly as an adaptive tool once external pressure is present. The findings refine the scope conditions of market‐driven regulatory diffusion and highlight the political foundations of ‘economic constitutions.’
- Open Access
- 20 October 2025
- Published by Wiley in European Law Journal
- Vol. 31 (3) , 297-314
The limits of passive power: Competition law in Singapore and the EU's global legal influence
As the United States retreats from global rule‐making, the European Union (EU) must decide whether to shape global legal regimes actively or rely on its market power. Optimists claim that EU norms spread passively as a result of the Brussels Effect (BE), while sceptics point to transnational processes such as conditionality, policy learning and hybridization—core to Transnational Legal Orders (TLO) theory. This article tests these competing explanations in a doubly most likely case: competition policy, where BE is seen as pervasive, and Singapore, cited as a model BE case. The findings support TLO theory over BE. Although Singapore's competition law includes EU‐like provisions, these are not the result of BE‐style diffusion but emerge from broader transnational interactions. This suggests that the EU cannot rely on passive regulatory spillovers to extend its legal influence. Active engagement remains necessary to sustain global convergence with EU norms.
- 20 October 2025
- Published by Wiley in European Law Journal
- Vol. 31 (3) , 297-314
Open AccessThe limits of passive power: Competition law in Singapore and the EU's global legal influence
As the United States retreats from global rule‐making, the European Union (EU) must decide whether to shape global legal regimes actively or rely on its market power. Optimists claim that EU norms spread passively as a result of the Brussels Effect (BE), while sceptics point to transnational processes such as conditionality, policy learning and hybridization—core to Transnational Legal Orders (TLO) theory. This article tests these competing explanations in a doubly most likely case: competition policy, where BE is seen as pervasive, and Singapore, cited as a model BE case. The findings support TLO theory over BE. Although Singapore's competition law includes EU‐like provisions, these are not the result of BE‐style diffusion but emerge from broader transnational interactions. This suggests that the EU cannot rely on passive regulatory spillovers to extend its legal influence. Active engagement remains necessary to sustain global convergence with EU norms.
- 7 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 15 (3) , 601-632
Intrinsic vs. extrinsic incentives for reform: An informational mechanism of E(M)U conditionality
- 7 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 15 (3) , 601-632
Intrinsic vs. extrinsic incentives for reform: An informational mechanism of E(M)U conditionality
- Open Access
- 11 April 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Public Administration
- Vol. 40 (14) , 1211-1222
Explaining Informal Policy-Making Patterns in the Eurozone Crisis: Decentralized Bargaining and the Theory of EU Institutions
During the Eurozone crisis, the so-called ‘Merkozy duumvirate’ emerged as an informal, but highly visible EU policy-making pattern. This article asks why such forms of decentralized bargaining emerge and what this implies for the theory of EU institutions. According to an approach based on negotiation theory, the article argues that Merkozy is a strategic tool used by Germany to realize its preferences on EU crisis management. Based on an incomplete contracts theory of EU institutions, instead, the article analyses Merkozy as an informal institution created by France and Germany to avoid being discriminated by supranational institutions. Both approaches are employed to assess Merkozy’s role in the decision-making process leading to the adoption of the Fiscal Compact.
- 11 April 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Public Administration
- Vol. 40 (14) , 1211-1222
Open AccessExplaining Informal Policy-Making Patterns in the Eurozone Crisis: Decentralized Bargaining and the Theory of EU Institutions
During the Eurozone crisis, the so-called ‘Merkozy duumvirate’ emerged as an informal, but highly visible EU policy-making pattern. This article asks why such forms of decentralized bargaining emerge and what this implies for the theory of EU institutions. According to an approach based on negotiation theory, the article argues that Merkozy is a strategic tool used by Germany to realize its preferences on EU crisis management. Based on an incomplete contracts theory of EU institutions, instead, the article analyses Merkozy as an informal institution created by France and Germany to avoid being discriminated by supranational institutions. Both approaches are employed to assess Merkozy’s role in the decision-making process leading to the adoption of the Fiscal Compact.
- 31 October 2016
- Published by University of Deusto in Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto
- No. 55,p. 119-143
Toma de decisiones en la UE – o el minucioso diseño de la dispersión del poder
¿Cómo toma sus decisiones la Unión Europea? ¿Está el poder concentrado en manos de unos pocos, o está disperso? ¿A quién tendrían que dirigirse aquellos con intereses que dependen de decisiones legislativas europeas? Para responder a estas preguntas, el presente artículo revisa los principales procedimientos legislativos de la UE utilizando la metodología estándar de los modelos espaciales en la teoría de la elección racional. Después de un primer examen de las relaciones inter-institucionales entre la Comisión, el Consejo y el Parlamento, se procede a un examen más detallado de la toma de decisión en el seno de cada una de estas instituciones. Los principales argumentos son tres, dos más constructivos y uno más crítico. Primero, se puede demostrar que la UE se caracteriza por una dispersión calculada del poder. Segundo, a pesar de sus limitaciones, los modelos espaciales producen resultados satisfactorios en la explicación de los procedimientos de la UE, incluso cuando las decisiones de algunos actores parecen a priori irracionales. Tercero, y de manera más crítica, la dispersión del poder que caracteriza a la UE hace que varias teorías actualmente utilizadas para entender la UE, como la del principal-agente, no sean apropiadas.Recibido: 19.05.2016 Aceptado: 22.06.2016
- 31 October 2016
- Published by University of Deusto in Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto
- No. 55,p. 119-143
Toma de decisiones en la UE – o el minucioso diseño de la dispersión del poder
¿Cómo toma sus decisiones la Unión Europea? ¿Está el poder concentrado en manos de unos pocos, o está disperso? ¿A quién tendrían que dirigirse aquellos con intereses que dependen de decisiones legislativas europeas? Para responder a estas preguntas, el presente artículo revisa los principales procedimientos legislativos de la UE utilizando la metodología estándar de los modelos espaciales en la teoría de la elección racional. Después de un primer examen de las relaciones inter-institucionales entre la Comisión, el Consejo y el Parlamento, se procede a un examen más detallado de la toma de decisión en el seno de cada una de estas instituciones. Los principales argumentos son tres, dos más constructivos y uno más crítico. Primero, se puede demostrar que la UE se caracteriza por una dispersión calculada del poder. Segundo, a pesar de sus limitaciones, los modelos espaciales producen resultados satisfactorios en la explicación de los procedimientos de la UE, incluso cuando las decisiones de algunos actores parecen a priori irracionales. Tercero, y de manera más crítica, la dispersión del poder que caracteriza a la UE hace que varias teorías actualmente utilizadas para entender la UE, como la del principal-agente, no sean apropiadas.Recibido: 19.05.2016 Aceptado: 22.06.2016
- 25 June 2015
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 54 (2) , 233-248
The Origins of the Common Market: Political Economy vs. Hagiography
- 25 June 2015
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 54 (2) , 233-248
The Origins of the Common Market: Political Economy vs. Hagiography
- 25 May 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Political Science Review
- Vol. 8 (4) , 495-515
Social democratic parties and antitrust policy: evidence from Western Europe (2002–13)
This paper investigates the position of social democratic parties (SDPs) towards antitrust (competition) policy. Given their traditional state-interventionist attitude and their ties with organized labour, SDPs have long been considered as not supportive of antitrust policy. However, antitrust policy’s goal of granting consumers lower prices is beneficial to salary earners. Hence, it is not surprising that SDPs’ support for antitrust policy varies considerably. To account for such variation, this paper hypothesizes that SDPs’ support for antitrust policy depends on: (a) the influence of trade unions; (b) the electoral system; and (c) the degree of coordination of the economy. Analysing in depth 16 party manifestos of West European SDPs from 2002 to 2013, we check the plausibility of our hypotheses with seven paired comparisons. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that the influence of trade unions affects SDPs’ support for antitrust policy, while the impact of electoral system and economic coordination appears less evident.
- 25 May 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Political Science Review
- Vol. 8 (4) , 495-515
Social democratic parties and antitrust policy: evidence from Western Europe (2002–13)
This paper investigates the position of social democratic parties (SDPs) towards antitrust (competition) policy. Given their traditional state-interventionist attitude and their ties with organized labour, SDPs have long been considered as not supportive of antitrust policy. However, antitrust policy’s goal of granting consumers lower prices is beneficial to salary earners. Hence, it is not surprising that SDPs’ support for antitrust policy varies considerably. To account for such variation, this paper hypothesizes that SDPs’ support for antitrust policy depends on: (a) the influence of trade unions; (b) the electoral system; and (c) the degree of coordination of the economy. Analysing in depth 16 party manifestos of West European SDPs from 2002 to 2013, we check the plausibility of our hypotheses with seven paired comparisons. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that the influence of trade unions affects SDPs’ support for antitrust policy, while the impact of electoral system and economic coordination appears less evident.
- 21 March 2015
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
- Vol. 6 (3) , 212-221
On the Conditional Success of International Conditionality Policies (With Evidence from Greece and Spain During the Eurozone Crisis)
- 21 March 2015
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
- Vol. 6 (3) , 212-221
On the Conditional Success of International Conditionality Policies (With Evidence from Greece and Spain During the Eurozone Crisis)
- 6 September 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Acta Politica
- Vol. 49 (2) , 174-195
Institutional change and continuity in the European Union: The super-commissioner saga
- 6 September 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Acta Politica
- Vol. 49 (2) , 174-195
Institutional change and continuity in the European Union: The super-commissioner saga
- 22 May 2013
- Published by Wiley in European Law Journal
- Vol. 19 (5) , 682-704
The Causes and Consequences of the Collegial Implementation of European Competition Law
- 22 May 2013
- Published by Wiley in European Law Journal
- Vol. 19 (5) , 682-704
The Causes and Consequences of the Collegial Implementation of European Competition Law