Terry Walter

This study assesses the impact of minority shareholder empowerment via lower defeat thresholds in “say-on-pay” votes on CEO compensation and career prospects for directors. We exploit the adoption of the Australian “two-strikes” rule as a quasi-exogenous shock, which empowers shareholders to vote on board dismissal if a firm’s remuneration report receives 25 percent or more dissent votes for two consecutive years. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that firms respond to a “strike” by curbing excessive CEO pay. Under the two-strikes regime, independent directors are held more accountable for poor oversight and experience significant reputational penalties in terms of turnover and the loss of outside directorships subsequent to receiving a strike. The results are mainly driven by firms receiving a nonmajority strike, indicating that the effectiveness of the two-strikes regime stems largely from the lower defeat threshold. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G34.

Superannuation fees have come under public scrutiny in recent years with the belief they are too high. We examine the determinants of fees and their relationship with fund performance. Superannuation funds with higher investment fees have higher allocations to asset classes that trade in more complex markets. For-profit retail funds charge both higher investment and administration fees than other funds. Funds with higher investment fees do not generate higher returns than the least expensive funds. These findings suggest that superannuation members may not earn higher after-fee risk-adjusted returns by holding funds with higher fees. JEL Classification: G11

BHP Group was formed in 2001 when the Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited in Australia merged with the Anglo–Dutch Billiton Plc in the UK to form a dual−listed company. The American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) for BHP and Billiton trade on the NYSE, and despite these two securities having exactly the same voting rights and US dollar denominated dividends, the BHP ADR generally sells at a premium to the Billiton ADR, though that premium has considerable time−series variation. We investigate whether differences in the imputation tax systems that apply to dividends in Australia and the UK help explain the time series variation in the premium of the ADR prices. Our results confirm that imputation tax differences are a significant determinant of the premium. Our paper hence provides direct evidence that imputation tax credits are capitalised into equity prices.

In a seminal study, Elton and Gruber (1970) argue that ex‐dividend day pricing can be used to infer marginal tax rates of shareholders. We examine ex‐dividend day pricing for individual firms and ask whether their CFOs could use the history of a firm's ex‐dividend price‐drop ratios to infer reasonable estimates of shareholders’ marginal tax rates. We use TAQ data for 1,124 US firms that have at least 30 ex‐dividend days during the period August 1993 to October 2012. Our results show that ex‐dividend day pricing is so noisy as to prohibit sensible estimates of shareholders’ marginal tax rates.